JUDGMENT The above Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal arises out of proceedings in execution and involves for determination an interesting question of limitation. One Ramanathan Chettiar filed a suit O.S. No. 64 of 1937 on the file of the Chief Court, Pudukottah impleading one Venkatrama Rowth as the 1st defendant and Ramaswami Rowth as the 2nd defendant, and sought to recover a sum of money A money decree was passed against the 1st defendant alone on 28th October 1939, by the trial Court with a charge on a half share of the plaint A and B Schedule properties, but the 2nd defendant was exonerated. The plaintiff preferred an appeal seeking to have a decree against the 2nd defendant also but that was dismissed by by the appellate Court on 19th January, 1943. The plaintiff decree-holder filed the first execution petition on 6th February, 1943, but that was dismissed on 9th December, 1945. The next execution petition was M.P. No. 568 of 1945, which was presented on 21st October, 1945, in the Chief Court of Pudukottah. During the pendency of the said execution petition the territory of Pudukottah became integrated with the Madras State and the execution petition pending on the file of the Chief Court, Pudukottah was transferred to the District Munsiff's Court of Pudukottah. On 9th March, 1950, that execution petition was dismissed. The next execution petition was filed on 19th June, 1951, in the District Munsiff's Court of Pudukottah but was returned for presentation to the proper Court on 2nd July, 1951. On 9th July, 1951, the execution petition was presented to the Sub-Court, Pudukottah and was taken on file and numbered as E.P. No. 488 of 1951. On 15th December, 1953 the execution petition was dismissed by the advent of Madras Ordinance V of 1952 which put an embargo on proceedings against the judgment-debtor who was an agriculturist. The next execution petition was E.P. No. 6 of 1958 presented on 26th September, 1955, to the Sub-Court of Pudukottah. The persons now executing the decree are the legal representatives of the deceased decree-holder Ramanathan Chettiar and the person resisting the execution is the legal representative of the deceased 1st defendant, judgment-debtor. The contention of the judgment-debtor raised in the Courts below and now forming the subject-matter of the Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal is that the execution petition E.P. No. 6 of 1958 is barred by limitation. The contention of the judgment-debtor raised in the Courts below and now forming the subject-matter of the Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal is that the execution petition E.P. No. 6 of 1958 is barred by limitation. The whole of the plea rests upon section 48, Civil Procedure Code. The date of the decree is 19th January, 1934, E.P. No. 6 of 1958 was presented on 26th September, 1955 and being a fresh application for execution presented after the expiration of twelve years from the date of the decree sought to be executed, so the argument ran, was barred by the terms of section 48, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Sub-Judge overruled the plea on the ground that the order passed by the Munsiff's Court on 9th March, 1950, was passed without jurisdiction and that therefore E.P. No. 568 of 1945 must be deemed to be still pending and that no final orders had been passed in that execution petition and that E.P. No. 6 of 1958 presented on 26th September 1955, must be deemed to be in continuation of E.P. No. 568 of 1945 and not a fresh application caught by section 48, Civil Procedure Code. In this view he held that the present execution petition is not barred by limitation. On the appeal by the judgment-debtor to the District Court of Tiruchirapalli the learned District Judge confirmed the decision of the executing Court on other grounds. He held that the provisions of section 48, Civil Procedure Code, pleaded by the judgment-debtor may not avail, in view of the saving provisions of Madras Ordinance V of 1955, Madras Act V of 1954 and Madras Act I of 1955 which together grant a respite of one year, six months and twenty-six days for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for suits and execution proceedings. He also held that under section 4 (7) of Madras Act I of 1955 the provisions of section 4(1) of that Act will be deemed to be a subsequent order within the meaning of section 48 (1), Civil Procedure Code. The judgment-debtor has preferred the above Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal and challenges the decision of the Courts below overruling the plea of limitation. Mr. The judgment-debtor has preferred the above Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal and challenges the decision of the Courts below overruling the plea of limitation. Mr. D. Ramaswami Ayyangar appearing for the appellant contended that section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code prescribing the outer limit of a period of 12 years does not constitute a period of limitation, that the saving provisions of the enactments referred to, Ordinance V of 1955, Act V of 1954 and Act I of 1955, which dealt with only exemption from the period of limitation, cannot therefore be attracted and engrafted upon section 48, Civil Procedure Code. He contended that section 48, Civil Procedure Code, must be treated as fixing the statutory limit of 12 years for execution of decrees from the terminus a quo in clauses (a) and (b) of sub- section (1) of the said section and cannot constitute strictly what may be called the period of limitation, as the Civil Procedure Code was not concerned with fixation of the period of limitation. However attractive the argument may be, it is not sustainable in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Kandaswami v. Kannappa I.L.R. (1952) Mad. 421: (1951) 2 MLJ. 668 (F.B.)., which considered the applicability of section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code in a context of orders of stay having prevented a decree-holder from executing the decree, who would otherwise have availed himself of the provisions of section 15 of the Indian Limitation Act. The question raised was whether section 48, Civil Procedure Code, is controlled by section 15 (1) of the Indian Limitation Act. One of the questions considered by the Full Bench was whether the period of 12 years mentioned in section 48, Civil Procedure Code, was a period of limitation within the meaning of section 15 of the Limitation Act. After reviewing elaborately all the prior decisions on the point Their Lordships held that it was well established that the Limitation Act and the Code were to be read together, because both were statutes relating to procedure and they were in pari materia and therefore to be taken and construed together as one system, as explanatory of each other. After reviewing elaborately all the prior decisions on the point Their Lordships held that it was well established that the Limitation Act and the Code were to be read together, because both were statutes relating to procedure and they were in pari materia and therefore to be taken and construed together as one system, as explanatory of each other. The following extracts from the judgment of the Full Bench at page 442 has a bearing on the question now to be decided: “I venture to think further that even if it be understood in the strictest sense, the period fixed by section 48 of the Code must be deemed to have become a part of the Limitation Act by a process of incorporation in Articles 181 and 182. Column (1) of the Article 181 speaks of an application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule or in section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Whether the word ‘prescribed’ in section 15 (1) would apply to periods of limitation provided by other statutes or not, it is clearly indicated by Article 181 that the period fixed by section 48 is in pari materia with the period of limitation provided in the Schedule to the Limitation Act.” At page 444 there is another observation which may also be usefully referred to: “If by an act of Court over which the decree-holder has no control, he is prevented from recovering the fruits of his decree during the full period of twelve years, it appears to me to be highly unreasonable that by the mere lapse of twelve years from the date of the decree, his rights should become extinct, rights which he was prevented from enforcing for a part at least of the period of twelve years.” The saving provisions under the special enactments referred to above are almost of a pattern resembling the provisions enacted under section 15 of the Indian Limitation Act. To quote section 8 of the last enactment (Madras Act I of 1955), it prescribes that: “in computing the period of limitation for a suit for recovery of a debt or an application for the execution of a decree in respect of a debt, the time during which the institution of the suit or the making of the application was barred under section 3 shall be excluded.” It will be unreasonable to let section 48, Civil Procedure Code, have a free play so as to destroy the beneficent effect of the special enactment relating to agriculturists. If section 48, Civil Procedure Code, is really a fixation of the period of limitation as held by the Full Bench in Kandaswami v. Kannappa, there cannot be any difficulty in holding that section 8 of Act I of 1955 and the other enactments which preceded it will have to be given their full effect by making them govern section 48, Civil Procedure Code. The total period of 1 year, 6 months and 26 days has to be excluded from the period of limitation prescribed under section 48, Civil Procedure Code. The period of one year, six months and 26 days is the total period occupied by the ban under the three enactments, Ordinance V of 1953, Act V of 1954 and Act I of 1955. Other High Courts have also taken the view that the twelve years in section 48, Civil Procedure Code, is only a period of limitation; Durgapal v. Panchan A.I.R. 1939 All. 403 (F.B.)., Ramgopal v. Sidram A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 164.4 (1955) 1 MLJ. 51 ., In Sinnaru Thevan v. Nachiappa Chettiar, the decision of the Full Bench in Kandaswami v. Kannappa, is followed. I am of opinion that the principle laid down in Kandaswami v. Kannappa, sufficiently repels the appellant's contention and the Courts below were right in holding that the last execution petition E.P. No. 6 of 1958 presented on 26th September, 1955, though beyond 12 years from 19th January, 1943, was yet in time by the application of the saving provisions of the enactments referred to above. In this view of the matter it is really unnecessary to consider whether the other point decided by the learned District Judge regarding the applicability of section 4 (7) of Act I of 1955 is well founded or not. In this view of the matter it is really unnecessary to consider whether the other point decided by the learned District Judge regarding the applicability of section 4 (7) of Act I of 1955 is well founded or not. In the result this Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. No leave. R.M.- Appeal dismissed.