Ramautar Mistri v. Rajindra Singh — 1960 DIGILAW 202 (PAT)

Judgment Raj Kishore Prasad, J. 1. This application, by the defendant, arises out of his application made under Section 476 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, for filing a complaint against the plaintiff-opposite party, far his prosecution under Sections 471 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The history of the litigation, leading up to the present application, may briefly be stated as below: On 3-4-56 a title suit was instituted, by the plaintiff-opposite party, against the defendant petitioner, in the court of the 1st Munsif at Hajipur. In that suit, the plaintiff on 27-5-57 filed a patta, purported to have been executed on 5-6-1906, by Ajodhya Mistry, the father of the petitioner, in favour of the grandfather of the opposite party, along with a petition, stating therein that he had found out this document as well as other documents from old records, and, therefore, he was filing the disputed patta as well as other documents in Court, which may be taken in evidence and kept with the record. On 31-7-57 the petitioner filed a petition praying to send the above-mentioned patta for examination to the expert at Nasik. This petition, however, was rejected on the ground that, according to the plaintiff, who filed the patta, it did not relate to the land in suit, and, therefore, it was not a relevant document for the purpose of deciding the title and possession of the plaintiff with regard to the disputed land. On 29-10-57 the suit was transferred from the 1st court of the Munsif at Hajipur to, the court of the Additional Munsif of the same place, according to the order of the District Judge. Before the Additional Munsif, the petitioner filed a petition on 19-12-57 asking the court to inspect the" disputed patta and to mention in the order sheet that the stamp affixed on it is of King George V. On this petition, the Additional Munsif inspected the patta and recorded his memo of inspection, in the order sheet of that day, to the following effect: Inspected the alleged Khista patta filed by the plaintiff on 27-5-57. It purports to have been executed on 5-6-1900 Fifth day of June Nineteen hundred and six. The revenue stamp affixed on the Khista patta appears to have been cut before posting. The face of the King is not visible, only the Crown is visible. It purports to have been executed on 5-6-1900 Fifth day of June Nineteen hundred and six. The revenue stamp affixed on the Khista patta appears to have been cut before posting. The face of the King is not visible, only the Crown is visible. It cannot be said whether the revenue stamp affixed on the said Khista patta bears the face of King George the V or King George. the VI. But it is certain that the revenue stamp does not bear the figure (face) of King Edward the Seventh. The suit was, thereafter, decided by the Additional Munsif, who dismissed it on 23-12-57. 3. It may be noted here that the disputed patta of 1906, although filed by the plaintiff, for being used in evidence by him, was not actually used by him, and, therefore, it was not exhibited in the suit. 4. On 9-1-58 the petitioner filed a petition, under Sec. 476 Code of Criminal Procedure, for filing a complaint against the opposite party not before the First Court of the Munsif, where the disputed patta was filed, and, before whom the suit was instituted and then pending, but, before the Additional Munsif, to whom the suit was transferred subsequently and who had decided the suit. On this application a miscellaneous case was started, and, thereafter, on 15-2-1958 as the Additional Court of the Munsif, before whom the application under Section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure, was made, was abolished, it was transferred to the 2nd Court of the Munsif of the same place, according to the order of the District Judge. The learned Munsif, 2nd Court, held the enquiry and on 8-1-59 allowed the application of the petitioner and held that a prima facia case has been made out against the opposite party, and, therefore, a complaint should be made before the Subdivisional Magistrate, Hajipur, against the opposite party for his prosecution under Sections 471 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code. He, accordingly directed a complaint to be filed. 5. He, accordingly directed a complaint to be filed. 5. An appeal against the above order was then taken, by the plaintiff opposite party, to the court of the District Judge, Muzaffarpur, who, by his order of the 17th February, 1960, set aside the order of the learned Munsif and refused to file a complaint, as he held that no prima facie case had been made out, and that there was no reasonable chance of conviction of the opposite party, and, further that it would not be expedient in the interest of justice to allow the complaint to be filed against, the opposite party as directed by the learned Munsif because the petitioner wanted just to satisfy his own sense of grudge. He also entertained doubts about the competency of the Munsif, 2nd Court, to file complaint as contemplated by Sec. 476, Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. The defendant, thereupon, being aggrieved by the above order, came up in revision to this Court and obtained the Rule under consideration. 7. The first point, raised by Mr. Hussain, was that the reasons given by the Court of appeal below for disallowing the application of the petitioner under Section 476, Code of Criminal Procedure, are erroneous and his decision is reverse (Sic). It was further argued that the court of appeal below has erred in law in holding that as the patta was not exhibited in the suit and the court trying the suit had no opportunity to express its opinion on its genuineness or otherwise, it cannot be said that the. plaintiff had committed an offence under Section 471 of the Penal Code, simply because he filed if in court, intending thereby to use it in evidence, because, he submitted that, the word "uses", occurring in Sec. 471 of the Penal Code, also includes filing of the document, even though, it is not subsequently used as evidence in the suit. 8. It may be mentioned that Mr. Hussain confined himself only to the offence under Sec. 471, Penal Code, and, therefore, no argument was put forward regarding the offence under Sec.193 of the Penal Code, which was also alleged by the petitioner to have been committed by the opposite party, and, as such I shall also deal only with Sec. 471, Penal Code. 9. In support of his above contention, Mr. 9. In support of his above contention, Mr. Hussain relied on Idu Jolaha V/s. The Crown 3 Pat LJ 388 : AIR 1918 Pat 274, Baju Jha V/s. Emperor. 9 Pat LT 800 : AIR 1929 Pat 60 and, Mobarak Ali V/s. Emperor, 17 Cal : WN 94. 10. In order to decide the question, whether the mere filing of a document is enough to bring a person within the mischief of Sec. 471 of the Penal Code, it is necessary to read Sec. 471, which runs thus: 471. Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged document. 11. The essential Ingredients of this Section, therefore, are (i) fraudulent or dishonest use of a document as genuine, and, (ii) knowledge or reasonable belief on the part of the person using the document that it is a forged one. 12. It was held by the Supreme Court, in Shiv Bahadur Singh V/s. State of Vindh Pradesh -- , that a person bringing into existence a document, bearing a certain date, but brought into existence on a later date, by antedating it, is guilty of the offence of forgery under Sec. 465 of the Penal Code. 13. In the instant case, the fact that the patta, purported to have been executed in 1906, was affixed with a revenue stamp, bearing not the face of King Edward the Seventh, who was then the reigning Emperor of India, but the face of either King George the Fifth or King George the Sixth, who were the reigning Emperors after 1908, ex facie, showed that it was a forged document within the meaning of Sec. 471 read with Sections 463 and 470 of the Penal Code. 14. The question, however, is whether the mere filing of this patta in Court, made the plaintiff guilty of an offence under Sec. 471, Penal Code. 15. To constitute a use, as contemplated by Sec. 471, it is not necessary that the forged document should be used as evidence in a court. It is sufficient that it is used in order that it may ultimately appear in evidence or used dishonestly or fraudulently. The nature of the user is not material. 15. To constitute a use, as contemplated by Sec. 471, it is not necessary that the forged document should be used as evidence in a court. It is sufficient that it is used in order that it may ultimately appear in evidence or used dishonestly or fraudulently. The nature of the user is not material. It is, therefore, not necessary that the court should accept a document produced before it or filed in court. If a person puts forward a document as supporting his claim in any matter, whether that document is acted upon by the court, or used in evidence, is immaterial for the purpose of constituting use of the document by the party within the meaning of this section. The use of a document as genuine must be fraudulent or dishonest. The use of a forged document, which is contemplated by this Section, is such use as causes wrongful gain or wrongful loss. The use of a forged document will be fraudulent and dishonest under this section, even though the document itself is unnecessary for the case of the party who uses it, and, though, in fact, he has a perfectly good title without it. 16. There is, therefore, no doubt that in order to bring a person within the purview of Sec. 471, it is enough if he files a forged document, which he knows or has reason to believe that it is a forged document. 17. The view of the court of appeal below, therefore, that because there is nothing to show that the patta, admittedly filed by the opposite party, and intended to be used in evidence subsequently, in support of this case, was "exhibited" as a documents and the court had an opportunity to record its finding as to whether it was a genuine or a forged document, is not a sufficient ground for holding that, even if the other elements envisaged by Section 471, are satisfied the person filing the document would not be guilty of an offence under Sec. 471 of the Penal Code. 18. The above view, that mere filing of a document is enough to bring the party filing it within the mischief of Sec. 471, Penal Code, is sup ported also by the decisions relied upon on behalf of the petitioner. 19. 18. The above view, that mere filing of a document is enough to bring the party filing it within the mischief of Sec. 471, Penal Code, is sup ported also by the decisions relied upon on behalf of the petitioner. 19. In 3 Pat LJ 386 : AIR 1918 Pat 274, it was held that the filing of forged documents with a plaint is user of them within the meaning of Sec. 471 of the Penal Code. In that case, three letters were filed along with the plaint, but were not actually used in course of the case, and, therefore, it was argued that there has been no user within the meaning of S.471 of the Penal Code. This contention was rejected by their Lordships, Roe and Imam JJ., who observed that inasmuch as documents not filed with a plaint may be rejected or their use refused at a subsequent stage of the case and the first step towards admission being the filing of them with the plaint, the filing of documents with a plaint is user. 20. In 9 Pat LT 800 : AIR 1929 Pat 60. one of the points raised was that Section 471 of the Penal Code cannot apply to user of a document for the purpose. of securing an acquittal. It was held by the learned Chief Justice, Sir Courtney-Terrell, sitting singly, that Sec. 471 I.P.C. applies to an user of a document for the purpose of securing an acquittal, and, its application is not restricted to user for the purpose of producing material gain or material loss to another, in that, the obtaining of an acquittal is very distinctly the obtaining of an advantage and brings the case within the definition of dishonestly in Sec.24 I.P.C. which is not an exhaustive definition of the word dishonestly. It was, therefore, held that Sec. 471 of the Penal Code applies not only in cases where the document has been given in evidence, but also in cases where it has been produced, and, that the ambit of the word produced is very wide, including documents filed or presented, but either rejected or not taken into account by the court. 21. 21. In 17 Cal W N 94, it was held by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, presided over by Holmwood and Imam, JJ., that the filing of a forged document as the basis of a plaint or as a necessary sequel to the pleas in the plaint constitutes an user of it within Sec. 471, I.P.C., and it is incumbent on the person using it to show that he filed the document in all good faith believing it to be genuine. 22. It was, further, held that the mere fact that a litigant is interested in establishing the contents of a forged document filed by him in support of his case does not raise the presumption that he filed it knowing it to be forged. 23. The facts of the above case, however, are very much similar to the facts of the present case, and, therefore. the above case is of great significance here. In the just mentioned case, the accused filed a forged document in support of his case, but, when the forgery was discovered, he fled away without prosecuting his case and without attempting to offer any explanation. On these facts, it was held that, this conduct of the accused was not consistent with his innocence and want of guilty knowledge. Here also, when it was detected that the patta filed by the plaintiff, purported to have been executed in 1906, did not bear the revenue stamp with the face of King Edward the Seventh, the then reigning Emperor, but, that of King George Fifth or King George Sixth, who reigned much later than 1906, which prima facie showed that it was a forged document, the plaintiff did not use it, rather objected to its being sent to the expert at Nasik as asked for by the petitioner. 24. 24. On a consideration of the above authorities and of Sec. 471 of the Penal Code itself, I, therefore, hold, in disagreement with the court of appeal below, that, simply because the opposite party filed this patta, which was alleged to be forged and fabricated, but was not actually used by him in evidence in support of his case, and, as such, it was not exhibited, is not a ground for holding that that fact alone does not bring the petitioner within the mischief of Sec. 471 of the Indian Penal Code, even if it is established that the plaintiff fraudulently or dishonestly used it as genuine, having knowledge or reasonable belief that it was a forged document. 25. In the instant case, the learned District Judge, has taken into consideration the above facts, and after considering all the circumstances, he took the view that as the document purported to have been executed at a time probably when the plaintiff was not even born and certainly there was absolutely nothing to show that he was present at the time of the execution of the document, therefore. there was nothing to show that he had knowledge of the fact that it was not a genuine document. He, therefore, held that an offence under Sec. 471 I.P.C. had not been made out, and, that, at any rate, there was no reasonable chance of his conviction. In other words, he found that a prima facie case had not been made out upon the evidence before him for inquiring further into the question whether the offence alleged has or has not been committed. 26. The Court, before setting the criminal law in motion, should exercise great care and caution and it must be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge in respect of which the prosecution is directed, and, no prosecution ought to be directed unless there is a reasonable probability of conviction. The words, "appears to have been committed", in Sec. 476, Code of Criminal Procedure, also show that the intention of the Legislature is that there must be sufficient materials before the Court to show that an offence is likely to have been committed. The words, "appears to have been committed", in Sec. 476, Code of Criminal Procedure, also show that the intention of the Legislature is that there must be sufficient materials before the Court to show that an offence is likely to have been committed. Where there is no legal evidence which goes to show that there is reason to believe that an offence has been committed and where it is obvious that the prosecution is bound to end in a failure a complaint ought not to be preferred. 27. The learned District Judge has kept in view the above principles, and, therefore, his opinion, which is a judicial opinion based on evidence before him, and not on fanciful or empty grounds, cannot be said to > be perverse or based upon a mere surmise or suspicion. The order of the learned Judge, therefore, is not vulnerable on the above grounds. 28. It was, next argued, by Mr. Hussain that the learned District Judge has wrongly held, that as the disputed patta was filed in the suit which was decided by the Additional Munsif, on the suit being transferred to him from the First Munsif, the Second Munsif, to whom the proceeding under Sec. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was transferred on the abolition of the Additional Court of the Munsif, had no jurisdiction to make the enquiry under Sec. 476 of the Code, because the alleged offence, if any, was not committed in or in relation to a proceeding of his court. 29. It appears from order No. 30 dated 15-12-58 of the miscellaneous case -- Misc. Case No. 31 of 1958 of the Second Court of the Munsif -- that the Additional Court of the Munsif, who tried the suit and before whom the application under Sec. 476, Code of Criminal Procedure, was originally made on 9-1-58, was abolished, and, therefore, the learned District Judge on 15-2-58 transferred this miscellaneous proceeding, then pending before the court of the Additional Munsif, to the court of the Munsif 2nd Court of the same place for disposal, instead of transferring it to the First Court of the Munsif, from where the suit had been transferred to the Additional Court of the Munsif, and, before whom the disputed patta was filed by the opposite party. Subsequently, during the pendency of this proceeding before the Second Munsif, an Additional Court of Munsif was re-established and it started functioning there.The petitioner, thereupon, made an application on 13-12-58 to the Second Munsif stating that as an Additional Court of Munsif had now re-started, this case may be transferred to that court. The learned Munsif, 2nd Court, however, on 15-12-58, said that when the original Additional Court of the Munsif was abolished, and, this proceeding, was transferred by the order of the District Judge to his court for disposal, simply because during the pendency of this proceeding in his court. a new Additional Munsifs Court, had started functioning, he could not transfer it, unless ordered by tile District Judge. The petitioner, therefore, was granted time to bring an order of transfer from the District Judge, but, he failed to do so, and, then, the learned Munsif, 2nd Court, proceeded to decide the miscellaneous case himself. 30. In support of his contention, that the Munsif 2nd Court to whom the case was transferred, on the abolition of the Additional Court of the Munsif before whom it was originally pending, was quite competent to hold the enquiry under Section 476 Cr. P.C. and make the complaint thereunder, Mr. Hussain placed reliance on Gerimal V/s. Shewaram, 27 Cri. LJ 780 : AIR 1926 Sind 215; Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal V/s. Ijjatulla Paikar ILR 58 Cal. 1117 : AIR 1931 Cal 190; and, Purna Chandra Dutta V/s. Sheikh Dhalu AIR 1930 Cal 721(2) : 34 Cal WN 914. 31. In 27 Cr. LJ 780 : AIR 1928 Sind 215. A Division Bench of the Sind Judicial Commissioners Court held that the only Court which can exercise the power conferred under Sec. 476 of the Cr. P.O. is the Court which has jurisdiction over the suit in which the alleged offence has been committed, whether such suit was instituted in such court or came to its file, by transfer from any other Court or otherwise. 32. P.O. is the Court which has jurisdiction over the suit in which the alleged offence has been committed, whether such suit was instituted in such court or came to its file, by transfer from any other Court or otherwise. 32. In ILR 58 Cal 1117 : AIR 1931 Cal 190, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that there is only one Court of Sessions in each sessional division, sitting at different places and manned by a number of Judges, and, therefore, when an offence of perjury is committed before one Judge of a Court of Session, a complaint by any other judge of that Court is a valid complaint. 33. In AIR 1930 Cal 721 (2) : 34 Cal WN 914 another Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that a Court of law does not consist of the particular individual or individuals who may be presiding over tile proceedings therein at any particular moment but it is a permanent institution, and, therefore, any judicial officer who sits in the Court is just as competent to deal with the matters coming before the Court, as any other incumbent of the office, and, as such, the words, "such court", in Sec. 476, Code of Criminal Procedure, include the successor of the office. 34. In my opinion, none of the above three authorities, relied upon, on behalf of the petitioner, is any answer to the question raised, nor, do they furnish any solution to the controversy under consideration. 35. Sec.195(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, with which alone we are concerned here, enacts that no Court shall take cognizance of the offences mentioned therein when such offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any court, except on the complaint in writing of such court, or a court to which it is subordinate. The offence under Sec. 471 of the Penal Code is one of the offences mentioned in Sec.195(1)(c). The word "Or", which intervenes between the words "document produced and the words "given In evidence", in Sec.195(1)(c) of the Code, shows that it is disjunctive, and that a complaint is necessary not only in cases where the document has been given in evidence, but also in cases where it has been only produced in Court. The word "Or", which intervenes between the words "document produced and the words "given In evidence", in Sec.195(1)(c) of the Code, shows that it is disjunctive, and that a complaint is necessary not only in cases where the document has been given in evidence, but also in cases where it has been only produced in Court. Sec.195(1)(c), therefore, only requires the production of a forged document in Court or its being given in evidence. Sec. 476 of the Code prescribes the procedure to be followed where a court is moved to make a complaint and that applies only to offences mentioned in Sec.195(1)(b) and 195(1)(c), and not mentioned in Sec.195(1)(a). Section 476A of the Code gives power to the superior court to make a complaint, in the manner provided by S. 476 of the Code, where its subordinate court has neither made a complaint under Sec. 476 nor rejected an application under Section 476 Cr. P.C., for the making of such complaint. Sec. 476B provides for an appeal to the appropriate court against an order passed in a proceeding under Sec. 476 or Sec. 476 A. 36. The words, "in or in relation to a proceeding in that court", in Section 476, have been used, as held by Rankin, C.J. with whom C. C. Chose, J. agreed, in Provat Ranjan Barat V/s. Uma Sankar Chatterjee AIR 1931 Cal 438 : ILR 58 Cal 727, merely to identify the court itself which is to take action under Section 476 Cr. P.C. The language "in or in relation to a proceeding in that court is necessarily naturally wide because it has to cover offences under Clause (b) as well as Clause (c) Sub-section (1) of Sec.195 of the Code. The words "in relation to a proceeding" in Sec. 476 mean that the offence has entered as a component into the proceeding. The offence need not have been committed before the Court, and it may have been committed before the proceedings began, but it is indispensable that the offence must in some manner have affected these proceedings or been designed to effect them or come to light in the course of them. The offence need not have been committed before the Court, and it may have been committed before the proceedings began, but it is indispensable that the offence must in some manner have affected these proceedings or been designed to effect them or come to light in the course of them. An offence committed after the close of the proceedings, is, as such, outside the scope of Sec. 476 Cri P.C. Sec. 476, therefore, like Section 1.95(l)(b) applies when the offence is committed not only in a proceeding in a Court of law, but also in relation to a proceeding in such Court. These words "in or in relation to a proceeding in court" occur in Sec. 476, as well as in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.195, but not in Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.195. These words have been left out in Clause (c) of Sec.195(1), because the sense produced by these words is sufficiently conveyed by the language used in Clause (c) of Sec.195(1); in other words, the offences mentioned in Clause (c) of Sec.195(1) are necessarily committed in relation to a proceeding in Court, in the same manner as the offence mentioned in Clause (b) of Section 195(1) and, therefore, Sec. 476 applies to both : vide Emperor V/s. Kushal Pal ILR 53 All 804 : (AIR 1931 All 443)(S.B). 37. It is plain from the words such court", or of some Other court to which such court is subordinate, used in Clause (c) of Sec.195(1), that a complaint for an offence punishable under Sec. 471 of the Penal Code must be made by the Court before which the offence is alleged to have been. committed by a party to a proceeding in that court, or by the court to which such former court is subordinate, within the meaning of Sub-section (3) of Sec.195. The word subordinate occurring in Sec.195(l)(b) and (c) has been given a special meaning therein. It is not any superior court that has jurisdiction, nor yet the court to which the former court is subordinate for, that might be termed, most general purposes but only the court to which it is subordinate within the meaning of Sec.195(3) of the Code. The word subordinate occurring in Sec.195(l)(b) and (c) has been given a special meaning therein. It is not any superior court that has jurisdiction, nor yet the court to which the former court is subordinate for, that might be termed, most general purposes but only the court to which it is subordinate within the meaning of Sec.195(3) of the Code. Sec.195, therefore, contains an express prohibition against taking cognisance of the kind of complaint we have here for an offence under Section 471 of the Penal Code unless the bar is lifted either by the original court or the court to which it is subordinate within the meaning of Sec.195(3). Those are the only courts invested with jurisdiction to lift the ban and make the complaint: See Kuldip Singh V/s. State of Punjab, -- . 38. As held by the Supreme Court in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi V/s. State of Punjab, -- , Sec. 476 of the Code must be taken to be exhaustive of all the powers of a court as such to lay a complaint, and a complaint filed by it, otherwise than under that section, should not be entertained but, Sec. 476 does not preclude the officer presiding over a court from himself preferring a complaint, and that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate before whom the complaint is laid to try it, like any other complaint, is not taken away by that section. 39. The Court, contemplated by Sec.195(l)(c), is the court before which the offence is committed. As a general rule, therefore, a complaint should be made by have court before which the offence is alleged to have been committed and not by any other Court. The power to direct prosecution is conferred by Section 478, on the "Court" and not on the particular officer who fills the judicial office at a particular time, and therefore, the successor in office is competent to make an order under Sec. 476 in respect of an offence committed before his predecessor-in-office. This has now been made clear also by Sec. 559(1) of the Code. But where a court is abolished and sometimes afterwards the said court is restored, but with its territorial limits somewhat curtailed, the court that is reconstituted cannot be held as the same as the one that had ceased to exist, because there is no such continuity. This has now been made clear also by Sec. 559(1) of the Code. But where a court is abolished and sometimes afterwards the said court is restored, but with its territorial limits somewhat curtailed, the court that is reconstituted cannot be held as the same as the one that had ceased to exist, because there is no such continuity. If the Court is not a permanent one, with a perpetual succession of judges, but is only a temporary one, or an additional court created for some time for some special purpose, and, thereafter, it is abolished, then it is only the superior court, to which that temporary or additional court, was subordinate within the meaning of Sec.195(3), that can make a complaint in the manner provided by Section 476, under Sec. 476 A of the Code. 40. The undisputed facts, which on the history of the case, indicated in the very beginning emerge are these : The suit was instituted in the first Court of the Munsif before whom the disputed patta was filed, but, subsequently, the suit was transferred to the Court of the Additional Munsif for disposal and he ultimately decided the suit. The application under Sec. 476 Cr. P.C. was made before the court of the Additional Munjif for making a complaint against the opposite party for an offence under Sec. 471 I.P.C. alleged to have been committed in relation to a proceeding of that court. On the abolition of the court of the Additional Munsif, this miscellaneous proceeding under Sec. 476 Cr. P.C. which was pending erstwhile before the Additional Munsif, was transferred by the District Judge, obviously under Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to the Second Court of the Munsif of that very place. The first Court of the Munsif, being a percnanent Court was then functioning. During the pendency of the proceeding before the second court of the Munsif, a new additional Court of the Munsif was re-established and it started functioning. There is no evidence to show if the entire business of the Court of the Additional Munsif, on its abolition, was transferred to the Second Court of the Munsif, or, only this particular proceeding was transferred to him. There is no evidence to show if the entire business of the Court of the Additional Munsif, on its abolition, was transferred to the Second Court of the Munsif, or, only this particular proceeding was transferred to him. There is also no evidence to show if the new Court of the Additional Munsif was re-established, in place of the old one, which was abolished with the same territorial or pecuniary Jurisdiction. 41. On the above facts on the record, therefore, two questions arise here for determination : (1) Whether the District Judge had power, under Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to transfer the proceeding under Sec. 476 Cri. P.C. from the court of the Additional Munsif, on its abolition, to the 2nd Court of the Munsif and, (2) Whether the 2nd Court of the Munsif, on such transfer, got the jurisdiction to make an enquiry and, thereafter, to make a complaint, under Sec. 471, Penal Code under Sec. 476, Cr. P.C. ? 42. With the above background and in the light of the foregoing principles, the above two questions, posed by me, have to be answered. 43. As regards the first question, whether the District Judge had power, under Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to transfer the proceeding under Section 476 Cr. P.C. from the Additional Munsif to the Second Munsif, in my opinion, he could not do so, for the obvious reason that a proceeding under Section 476 Cr. P.C. is a special proceeding which must be decided only by the two courts, mentioned in Sec.195(l)(b) or Sec.195(l)(c), as the case may be, read with Sec. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The District Judge cannot transfer such a proceeding under Sec. 476 Cr. P.C., for whatever reason it may be, to a court, which, in view of Sec.195(l)(b) and (c) read with Sec. 470 Cr. P.C. has no jurisdiction either to entertain the application or make a complaint, because it is not one of the two courts mentioned in S. l95(l)(b) and (c) Cr. P.C. Sec.195 contains an express prohibition against taking cognizance of the complaint, in the instant case, for an offence under Sec. 471 Cr. P.C., alleged to have been committed in relation to a proceeding before another court, which was not subordinate to it, within the meaning of Sec.195(3) Cr. P.C. 44. P.C. Sec.195 contains an express prohibition against taking cognizance of the complaint, in the instant case, for an offence under Sec. 471 Cr. P.C., alleged to have been committed in relation to a proceeding before another court, which was not subordinate to it, within the meaning of Sec.195(3) Cr. P.C. 44. This question was considered by a learned single judge of the Allahabad High Court, Ashwortht J., in Rameshar Lal V/s. Rajdhari Lal AIR 1927 All 469. No doubt, the facts of that case are a little different from those of the present case, but, in my opinion, this interpretation of Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that it does not apply to a proceeding under S., 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if I may say So with respect, seems to be the correct view of the law. 45. In the above case, what had happened was that, while a proceeding under Section 476 Cri. P.C. was going on before the original court, which was the court of the Munsif of Sailpur, the District Judge transferred the proceeding to another court, which was the court of the Sab-ordinate Judge of Ghazipur, although the original court was in existence. The question, which, therefore, arose was whether Sec.24 C.P.C. can apply to a proceeding of a civil Court arising out of the power conferred on a Civil Court by Sec. 476 Cr. P.C. This question was answered in the negative. It was held that it was not intended by the legislature that, while proceedings were going on before the original court, the appellate court should step in and deal with the matter. His Lordship, while holding that Sec.24 C.P.C. did not apply to a proceeding under Sec. 476 Cr. PC., observed, with which observation I express my respectful agreement, thus: In my opinion Sec. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be construed as self contained and exhaustive, in respect of the matter of a Court making compliant against litigants on the ground of perjury or forgery. I construe the word proceeding in Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure to cover all proceedings contemplated at the date when the Civil P.C. was passed and not to cover a special proceeding not then in contemplaiton but established by a subsequent Act, namely, the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Act 18 of 1923). I construe the word proceeding in Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure to cover all proceedings contemplated at the date when the Civil P.C. was passed and not to cover a special proceeding not then in contemplaiton but established by a subsequent Act, namely, the Criminal Procedure Amendment (Act 18 of 1923). It is perfectly clear from the terms of Sec. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the legislature did not intend the power of making a complaint conferred by this section to be exercised by anyone but the Court before whom the offence has been committed "or a Court to which appeals from that Court ordinarily lie".... I hold that Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked to allow a Court other than the Court, in the course of proceedings, in which, a perjury or forgery was committed, or a Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from that Court, to entertain the question of preferring a criminal complaint. In my opinion also, the word proceeding" in Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, covers all proceedings contemplated at the date when the Civil Procedure Code was passed in 1908 and it does not cover a special proceeding not then in contemplation but introduced subsequently by the Criminal Procedure (Amendment Act (XVIII of 1923) in 1923. This construction of Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure is quite consistent with the scheme of Sec. 476 Cr. P.C. in respect of the matter of a Court making complaint for offences mentioned in Sec.195(1)(b) and (c) Cr. P.C. From the terms of Sec. 476 Cr. P.C. it is manifest that the Legislature did not intend the power of making a complaint conferred by Sec. 476 Cr. P.C. to be exercised by any other court except the Court before whom the offence has been committed, or a Court to which appeals from that court ordinarily lie. Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, does not apply to a proceeding of a civil court arising out of the power conferred on a civil court by Sec. 476 Cr. Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, does not apply to a proceeding of a civil court arising out of the power conferred on a civil court by Sec. 476 Cr. P.C., and, as such, the District Judge had no power to transfer it even on the abolition of the court of the Additional Munsif, on the facts of the present case, to the 2nd Court of the Munsif of the same place, which was not one of the two Courts contemplated by Sec.195(l)(c), Cr. P.C. read with Sec. 476 Cr. P.C. 46. The first question must, as such, be answered in the negative. 47. The second question is : Did the 2nd Court of the Munsif, on transfer of the proceeding under Sec. 476 Cr. P.C by the District Judge, get jurisdiction to make an enquiry and thereupon a. complaint under Sec. 476 Cr. P. C? When there is no evidence whatsoever to show that the entire business of the Additional Court of the Munsif, with all its territorial or pecuniary or like powers, was transferred to the 2nd Court of the Munsif so as to make it its successor, the 2nd Court of the Munsif could not be considered to be the successor of the court of the Additional Munsif, The Second Court of the Munsif was a permanent and an independent court. The new Additional Court of the Munsif, in the absence of evidence to show that it was restored with the same territorial or pecuniary or like powers possessed by the original Additional Court of the Munsif, which was abolished, so as-to establish continuity, must also be considered. to be a new and independent Court and not at all, on the facts here, a successor of the original Court or as the one that ceased to exist. Additional Court is not a permanent Court with a perpetual succession of Judges, but it is established from time to time for special purposes. The Second Court of the Munsif was neither the Court before which the alleged forged patta was filed, which was the First Court of the Munsif, nor the original Court which tried the suit,. nor, the appellate authority under Section 476-B Cr. P.C. nor the superior Court under Sec. 476-A Cr. The Second Court of the Munsif was neither the Court before which the alleged forged patta was filed, which was the First Court of the Munsif, nor the original Court which tried the suit,. nor, the appellate authority under Section 476-B Cr. P.C. nor the superior Court under Sec. 476-A Cr. P.C. It is not enough that the Second Munsif was also a Munsif because that is not to say that he was a successor-in-office of the Additional Munsif whose court was abolished. 48. Sec. 476 Cr. P.C. contemplates that Ordinarily the court to prefer the complaint shall be the original court before whom the offence has been committed and that an appellate court should only make a complaint when the suit has-been before it On appeal or when the original court has granted or refused a complaint and its order is appealed from to the appellate court. Sec.24 C P.C. therefore, cannot be invoked to allow a court, other than the court, in the course of proceedings to which, the offence is-alleged to have been committed, or, a court to which appeals ordinarily lie from that court, to entertain the question of preferring a criminal complaint. The reason is that the provisions of Sec. 476, Code of Criminal Procedure, are self-contained and exhaustive and the power of making a complaint cannot be exercised by any one except the court before which the offence has been committed or a court to which appeals from that court ordinarily lie. 49. In the instant case, Sec. 476-A, Cr. P.C., was applicable, because the court of the Additional Munsif having been abolished, before he made the complaint under Sec. 476 Cr. P.C., or rejected the application for the making of such complaint, the District Judge himself, being a superior court, to which the Additional Munsifs court was subordinate, within the meaning of Section 195(3) Cr. P.C., could make the complaint, if he thought fit, under Sec. 476 Cr. P.C., which applied. This Sec. 476-A has been newly added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1923 (Act XVIII of 1923). It empowers a superior court to which a civil, criminal or a revenue court referred to in Sec. 476 Cr. P.C., is subordinate, within the meaning of Sec.195(3) Cr. P.C., to exercise the same powers as those of the latter court under Sec. 476 Cr. It empowers a superior court to which a civil, criminal or a revenue court referred to in Sec. 476 Cr. P.C., is subordinate, within the meaning of Sec.195(3) Cr. P.C., to exercise the same powers as those of the latter court under Sec. 476 Cr. P.C. The superior court, however, has jurisdiction to act under this section only when the subordinate court has neither made a complaint under Sec. 476 nor rejected an application for such complaint. Section 476-A will, therefore, cover the present case also. 50. For the reasons given above, therefore, hold that the Munsif, 2nd court, had no jurisdiction to make a complaint against the opposite party, and, that the. learned District Judge was right in expressing a doubt that Munsif, 2nd Court had no jurisdiction to dispose of the application under Sec. 476 Cr. P.C. 51. In the present case, the learned District Judge, on appeal from the order of the 2nd Court of the Munsif making a complaint under Sec. 476 Cr. P.C., has recorded an express finding that it was not expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made and complaint filed. It is true that the absence from the record of such an express finding will not necessarily invalidate the complaint, if (here is sufficient material on the record to show clearly that the court had applied its mind to the question of expediency and had come to the conclusion that the enquiry was necessary. The District Judge, apart from his powers as an appellate court under Section 476-B, Cr. P.C., could, in view of Sec. 476-A, Cr. P.C. consider the desirability of himself preferring a complaint, if there was some prima facie ground for him doing so. The learned District Judge has, on a consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, recorded a finding that no prima facie case had been made out and that it was not expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint could be made. 52. For these considerations, in my opinion the decision of the court of appeal below, in refusing to file a complaint and in setting aside the order of the first Court filing a complaint, in any view of the matter, is correct in law and does not require any interference by this Court. 53. 52. For these considerations, in my opinion the decision of the court of appeal below, in refusing to file a complaint and in setting aside the order of the first Court filing a complaint, in any view of the matter, is correct in law and does not require any interference by this Court. 53. In the result, the application fails, and is dismissed, and, the rule is discharged but in view of the fact that those is in appearance on behalf of the opposite party, there will be no order for costs of this Court.