ORDER P.T. Raman Nayar, J. 1. The petitioner and respondents 3 and 4 were applicants before the 1st respondent Regional Transport Authority (R.T.A. for short) for a stage carriage permit for operating between Chalakudy and Kuzhur via Ashtamichira, Annamanada and Valiaparamba. The R.T.A, granted the permit to the petitioner. Respondents 3 and 4 appealed to the 2nd respondent State Transport Appellate Tribunal (S.T.A.T.) which, allowing the appeal of the former and dismissing that of the latter, granted the permit to the former. The present petition is directed against this order of the S.T.A.T., and the prayer in the petition is for a writ of certiorari quashing that order. 2. The route in question is 18 miles long, and it was a new route in the sense that there was no bus operating along its entire length. But, for the first six miles, from Chalakudi to Ashtamichira, there were six buses running of which five belonged to the third respondent, a company commonly known by its initials, A. B. T.� The next six miles, from Ashtamichira to Annamanada, was as yet unpenetrated by bus traffic and has been expressively referred to as a virgin sector. Over the next three miles from Annamanada to Valiaparamba there was only one bus operating and that belonged to a third party, and again, over the last three miles, from Valiaparamba to Kuzhur, there was only one bus running and that belonged to the 3rd respondent. Of the several buses operating over different parts of the route, there was one operating between the same two termini, Chalakudy and Kuzhur, but, for half the distance, along a different route. From Ashtamichira that bus goes to Mala instead of to Annamanada, and it joins the route now in question at Valiaparamba, so that, operating between the same two termini it covers nine out of the 18 miles of the route in question. And this bus belonged to the 3rd respondent. 3. It will thus be seen that out of the seven buses on the route, five belonged to the 3rd respondent and only two, one running over the first sector of six miles and the other over the third sector of three miles belonged to others. The only bus operating between the same two termini was of the third respondent. 3. It will thus be seen that out of the seven buses on the route, five belonged to the 3rd respondent and only two, one running over the first sector of six miles and the other over the third sector of three miles belonged to others. The only bus operating between the same two termini was of the third respondent. There was thus such a concentration of the existing permits over the route in the hands of the 3rd respondent as to amount to a monopoly in the sense in which that word is used in this context See Sri R. V. Service v. Raman and Raman (Pr.) Ltd .A.I.R. 1959 Madras 492 for a precise definition. The grant of the present permit to the 3rd respondent company strengthens its monopoly, and alternative services for the public would be largely (and between the same two termini, solely) services operated by the 3rd respondent itself. If the new service is not satisfactorily operated by the 3rd respondent, the travelling public can only fall back on the 3rd respondent's other services, so that the 3rd respondent would have no competition to fear and would lack that incentive for maintaining a proper and efficient service. As pointed out in the Madras case already referred to and in N. Transport Co. v. S. T. Authority A.I.R. 1959 Madhya Pradesh 320, monopoly can operate against the public interest, and an elimination of the 3rd respondent on the score of monopoly would be valid in law, coming as it would within section 47 (1)(a) Motor Vehicles Act. As I have already indicated the main evil of monopoly is that, lack of competition tends to abuse, and I cannot accept the argument advanced on behalf of the 3rd respondent that, unless a person already operates along the entirely of a route, there can be no question of his securing a monopoly over that route. To create a monopoly in the sense in which that word is used it seems to me sufficient if the buses whether over the whole or substantial portions of the route are largely operated by him. 4. In considering the five applications before it, the R.T.A. eliminated the 3rd respondent (who was the first applicant before it) with the following words: "A.B.T. (3rd respondent) is the biggest operator about Chalakudi. 4. In considering the five applications before it, the R.T.A. eliminated the 3rd respondent (who was the first applicant before it) with the following words: "A.B.T. (3rd respondent) is the biggest operator about Chalakudi. They operate also a longer route covering both termini and grant of this one too will not be in the interests of the travelling public. No. 1 is therefore ruled out." The R.T.A. then proceeded to consider the qualifications of the remaining five applicants, and holding that the present petitioner, the 6th applicant before it, was the best of the five granted the permit to him. 5. Although it does not use the word, "monopoly, and although it could have made its order more explicit, it is obvious that the ground on which the R.T.A. ruled out the 3rd respondent's application was the ground of monopoly. It thought that a further concentration of permits in the hands of the 3rd respondent would not be in the interests of the travelling public, and, as we have seen, this was a ground for elimination which was a good ground in law. 6. In rejecting an application by the 3rd respondent for a stay of the grant of the permit to the petitioner pending the appeal before it, the S.T. A.T. seems to have correctly understood the ground of the R.T.A rejecting of the 3rd respondent's application, for it observed that, "once it is established that the petitioner (the present 3rd respondent) is the biggest operator it may be open to the 1st respondent (the R.T.A.) to make a choice among the remaining applicants taking into consideration their comparative qualifications. But, when it came to deciding the appeal, the S.T.A.T. proceeded on a complete mis-appreciation of the R.T.A. order and proceeded to observe that the 3rd respondent had "been eliminated or screened dubbing him as the biggest operator. The S.T.A.T. also observed that one of the grounds of the R.T.A rejection was that the 3rd respondent was already operating a longer route covering both termini and that for that reason it would not be in the interests of the travelling public to grant the permit to him. The S.T.A.T. also observed that one of the grounds of the R.T.A rejection was that the 3rd respondent was already operating a longer route covering both termini and that for that reason it would not be in the interests of the travelling public to grant the permit to him. Then the S.T.A.T. proceeded to say that there was no provision in the Act or in the Rules by which an operator could be eliminated on the sole ground that he was the biggest operator and, on the strength of the decision in M. Ramayya v. State of Andhra A.I.R. 1956 Andhra 217, that the fact that the 3rd respondent was already operating on part of the route was a qualification rather than otherwise. In this view it held that the elimination of the 3rd respondent by the R.T.A. as bad, and after considering the respective merits of the contestants before it, namely, the present petitioner and the 3rd and 4th respondents, came to the conclusion that the 3rd respondent was best qualified to serve the interests of the public and therefore granted it the permit. 7. As we have seen it was not really on the ground that the 3rd respondent was the biggest operator in the area, or on the ground that the 3rd respondent was already operating on part of the route that the R.T.A. rejected his application. It was on the ground that the 3rd respondent held a monopoly of permits on the route and that the grant of this permit to it would not be in the interests of the travelling public. The R.T.A.'s rejection was on a ground valid in law and, in holding that the rejection was bad in law and in setting it aside on a complete misapprehension of the ground on which it proceeded, it seems to me that the S.T.A.T. committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record. 8. I allow the petition and quash the order of the S.T.A.T. The petitioner will get his costs from the 3rd respondent who alone has contested the petition. Advocate's fee Rs. 150.