Ram Parikchan Pandey v. M. S. M. Sharma — 1960 DIGILAW 206 (PAT)

Judgment Tarkeshwar Nath, J. 1. The opposite party No. 1, Pandit M. S. M. Sharma, was the Editor of the daily newspaper "The Searchlight" and opposite party No. 2, Awadhesh Kumar Tiwari is the printer and publisher of the said newspaper. On the 30th August, 1960, a rule was issued on them to show cause as to why they should not be committed for contempt of Court for: (a) publishing in the issue (Morning and Dak editions) of the Searchlight dated the 2nd August 1960, extracts from a petition under Sec.110, Cr. P. C., filed before the District Magistrate of Darbhanga containing serious allegations against the character and the integrity of the petitioner Ram Parikchan Pandey; (b) publishing a photograph of the petitioner in the Morning edition of the Searchlight dated 2-8-1980; (c) publishing in the Dak edition of the same paper dated the 3rd August, 1960, a photograph of the petitioner under the caption; "Mr. Ramparichhan Pandey of Prihi under Khajouli P. S. Darbhanga against whom a petition has been filed before Mr. P. S. Appu, District Magistrate, Darbhanga for prosecuting him under Sec.110, Cr. P. C., (bad livelihood)."; and (d) Commenting upon the allegations made in the said petition in the issue (Morning and Dak edition) of the Searchlight dated 2-8-1960, which prima facie tended to interfere with the course of justice in a pending proceeding against the petitioner and was likely to prejudice the public mind against him. 2. The events leading to the filing of the application by the petitioner for issuing a rule against the opposite party are these: On the 29th July, 1960, an unstamped petition signed by 205 persons who were inhabitants of villages under Khajauli and Madhubani Police stations in the District of Darbhanga was filed before the District Magistrate of Darbhanga containing serious allegations against Ramparichhan Pandey (the present petitioner). It was alleged that Ramparichhan Pandey was a receiver of stolen properties, he harboured thieves and criminals, took part in the concealment and disposal of stolen properties, and abetted the commission of the offences of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating and mischief. It was alleged that Ramparichhan Pandey was a receiver of stolen properties, he harboured thieves and criminals, took part in the concealment and disposal of stolen properties, and abetted the commission of the offences of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating and mischief. Some of the allegations made against him can be summarised thus: (a) Ramparichhan Pandey had no ostensible means of livelihood and his presence in that locality was a constant source of terror and he adopted illegal means for maintaining himself and his dependents; (b) he extorted money from time to time from teachers, contractors and litigants, giving them the assurance that he would make recommendations on their behalf to the high dignitaries and Government officers of various departments; (c) he extorted a sum of Rs. 50 from Jawahar Lal Rai, Primary School teacher, for getting him transferred from Dulha Middle School to Ekma Upper Primary School. Similarly, he extorted specific sums from Kameshwar Choudhary, teacher, Gangadhar Yadav, Maulvi Manaur Khan, Bishwanath Jha, Umakant Chaudhary, Jogendra Singh and Mangal Chaudhary for securing orders from various authorities in their favour; (d) He was associated with criminals and dacoits and was in the habit of extorting money by falsely implicating rich and innocent persons; (e) He kidnapped the minor daughter of Ghutbar Jadav and subsequently sold her for Rs. 1000 to one Kailash Singh. Similarly, he kidnapped two other girls and sold them for Rs. 1600 and Rs. 1000, respectively to certain persons of village Madhurapur under Teghra police station; (f) Prior to the formation of the popular ministry he hardly possessed 2 to 3 bighas of land, but by reason of his association with persons highly placed he amassed a fortune having landed property worth about Rs. 50,000 without there being any ostensible means of income. (g) He, cheated Ganga Rai, Prabhanandan Rai and various other persons on the pretext of getting some favours for them from one official or the Other; (h) The hunger-stricken and unemployed person fell in his clutches and he took money from certain persons named in that application on the pretext of securing employment; (i) He was an ex-convict and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200 or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months for obstructing a public officer in the discharge of his duties and the conviction was upheld by the appellate Court; (j) About five years ago the Inspector of police, Khajouli Circle, recommended for drawing up a proceeding under Sec.110, Cr. P. C., against him, but the matter was ultimately dropped; (k) He was in the habit of travelling without ticket in trains and about four years ago he was convicted by the Railway Magistrate for doing so; (l) The signatories to that petition apprehended danger to themselves and their witnesses in the event of Ramparichhan Pandey becoming aware of the contents of that petition which was filed against him. A prayer was made in that petition to take action against Ramparichhan Pandey in accordance with law under Sec.110, Cr. P. C., and other existing laws and to keep him in custody during the period of investigation. The District magistrate treated this application as confidential and the same day he directed the Superintendent of Police, Darbhanga to get an inquiry made into those allegations by an officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of police. 3. The news about the filing of this petition was published on the first page of the issue (Dak edition) of The Searchlight dated the 2nd August, 1960, with bold headlines in the following manner: "Plea To Start B. L. Case Against R. Pandey Noted Congressman of Darbhanga (From Our Own Correspondent) Laheriasarai, July, 30.: About two hundred persons of different villages under Khajouli and Madhubani Thanas in Darbhanga in a written petition filed before the District Magistrate, Shri P. S. Appu on July 29, prayed for the prosecution under Sec.110, C. ( ? ) P. C., (bad livelihood) and other existing laws of Ramparichhan Pandey of village Pirhi under Khajouli P. S. who is also an active member of the Darbhanga District Congress Committee." After this heading the news published was as follows: "Presenting facts for the D. M.s examination to prosecute Pandey for bad livelihood, the petitioners alleged that the said Ramparichhan Pandey was in the habit of committing and also abetting the commission of the offence of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating, thefts and mischief. He extorted money from the public as well as from the Government officials on grounds of either favour or disfavour or repression. He extorted money from the public as well as from the Government officials on grounds of either favour or disfavour or repression. Continuing they alleged that the said Ramparichhan Pandey had declared himself to be fully introduced and acquainted with the Government officials of the different departments, and thereby he had been extorting amounts from teachers, contractors, litigants etc., with promise to make pairvis to the respective authorities, His presence in their midst was, therefore, a constant source of terrorism as he had adopted method of blackmailing the poor villagers in the name of Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and higher Government authorities. The petitioners contested that the conduct and character of Ramparichhan Pandey was dangerous to society and as such was to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community. They had reasonable apprehension that as soon as Pandey came to know of this petition he would be all the more terror, and would terrorise the villagers. And so the aforesaid Pandey be kept in custody during investigation for the protection of the petitioners and their witnesses. Praying the District Magistrate for action against the said Ramparichhan Pandey in accordance with law as provided under Sec.110, Cr. P. C,, and other existing laws the petitioners inter alia stated...." After giving this gist of that petition certain paragraphs, which contained allegations against Ramparichhan Pandey regarding cheating, extortion, kidnapping, travelling without ticket and other matters, were published in extenso in the fourth, fifth and part of the sixth columns on page 8 of the issue dated the 2nd August, 1960 of "The Searchlight". The concluding portions of the report which continued up to the sixth column were in the following terms: "The petitioners have in this way quoted in their petition some 40 glaring cases in support of their allegations levelled against Ramprichhan Pandey for action under Sec.110, Cr. P. C., and existing laws." In the Morning Edition as well of the "The Searchlight" dated the 2nd August, 1960, the same report about the filing of the said petition was published with similar head-lines, and certain paragraphs of that petition were published in extenso. P. C., and existing laws." In the Morning Edition as well of the "The Searchlight" dated the 2nd August, 1960, the same report about the filing of the said petition was published with similar head-lines, and certain paragraphs of that petition were published in extenso. The concluding portion of the report there was in the following terms: "In this ,way the petitioners have cited some 40 glaring cases in support of their allegations against the said Pandey." Besides this report a photograph as well of Ramparichhan Pandey was published in that issue on the first page itself at the foot of the bold headline. These publications were followed by the publication of another photograph of Ram Pari-chhan Pandey on the first page of the Dak Edition of the Searchlight dated the 3rd August, 1960, with the following caption: "Mr.--Ramparichhan Pandey of Pirhi under Khajouli P. S. Darbhanga against whom a petition has been filed before Mr. P. S. Appu, District Magistrate, Darbhanga, for prosecuting him under Sec.110, Cr. P. C. (bad livelihood)." 4. On the 3rd August, 1960, the petitioner-filed an application before the District Magistrate for a certified copy of the petition alleged to have been filed by about 200 persons, but no orders were passed for the issue of the, copy. On the 8th August, 1960, the petitioner made another attempt for a certified copy, and his prayer was refused on the ground that the matter was confidential. On the 9th August, 1960, the petitioner filed an application before the District Magistrate to make an enquiry himself or get it made by the Additional District Magistrate, but he passed an order indicating that he had already sent the petition to the Superintendent of Police for enquiry by a gazetted officer. The same day the petitioner moved the District Magistrate for making a report to this Court, for taking action against the correspondent, the Editor and the Printer of "The Searchlight" under the Contempt of Courts Act, but he rejected the petition on the very same day holding that there was no ground for taking that step. In these circumstances, the petitioner filed the present application in this Court on the 29th August, 1960 for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act. In these circumstances, the petitioner filed the present application in this Court on the 29th August, 1960 for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act. His case is that his photographs were published in the two issues of the Searchlight with the object of making his identity known to the people at large throughout the State of Bihar and make his photograph available to persons who may be likely to figure either as complainants or as witnesses in support of the various allegations made against him. It is alleged that the opposite party, by publishing in extenso the allegations made against the petitioner, have virtually condemned him before the commencement of the trial and have polluted the fountain of justice. These issues of the Searchlight have been filed along with the petition. 5. The opposite party showed cause. They did not deny that they were the Editor and Printer and Publisher, respectively, of "The Searchlight". The publications of the various reports, certain extracts of the petition and the two photographs were not controverted. Their stand, however, was that they were within their rights as journalist and printer, respectively, in publishing a correct substance of the allegations made against a petitioner before the District Magistrate, and there was neither a cause pending nor one likely to proceed immediately in connection with the said petition. They denied to have committed any contempt of Court. 6. Mr. Balbhadra, Prasad Singh for the petitioner, at first Submitted that the publication of the reports in the issues of the Searchlight constituted contempt and he has referred to the case of Regina V/s. Evening Standard Co. Ltd., (1954) 1 QB 578. It was held in that case that reports containing comments on cases before they were tried, or alleged histories of the prisoner who was on trial -- such as in the name of the Daily Mriror; Rex V/s. Bolam; Ex parte, Haigh, (1949) 96 SJ 220, in which the Court had to intervene--and all misreports were matters which tended to interfere with the due course of justice. Lord Hardwicke, L. C., observed in the case-known as the St. James Evening Post, (1742) 2 Atk 469, as follows: "There may be also a contempt of this Court. in prejudicing mankind against persons before the cause is heard. Lord Hardwicke, L. C., observed in the case-known as the St. James Evening Post, (1742) 2 Atk 469, as follows: "There may be also a contempt of this Court. in prejudicing mankind against persons before the cause is heard. There cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters." It may be pointed out that the report about the proceeding was published in the "Evening Standard" after the prisoner was indicted for the murder of his wife and the trial had commenced. In the case of The King V/s. Parke, (1903) 2 KB 432, a person was charged before the petty Sessions with an indictable offence triable only at the Assizes, but the matter was published in a newspaper tending to interfere with the fair trial of the charge, It was held that the publisher was guilty for contempt of Court, notwithstanding that at the time of the publication the person charged had not yet been committed for trial. In that case the person concerned was arrested on the 18th March, 1903, on charge of forgery and he was remanded to custody for some time. The offending matters were published in the issues of the newspaper dated the 19th March onwards. A rule was issued calling upon the defendant, the editor of that newspaper, to show cause why a writ of attachment should not issue against him for contempt of Court in publishing certain statements in his newspaper. It was urged on behalf of the defendant that there was no contempt as there was no cause pending in a Court. Dealing with that contention Wills J., observed as follows: Great stress has been laid by Mr. Dankwerts upon an expression which has been used in the judgments upon questions of this kind --that the remedy exists when there is a cause pending in the Court. We think undue importance has been attached to it. It is true that in very nearly all the cases which have arisen there has been a cause actually begun, so that the expression, quite natural under the circumstances, accentuates the fact, not that the case has been begun, but that it is not at an end. That is the cardinal consideration. It is true that in very nearly all the cases which have arisen there has been a cause actually begun, so that the expression, quite natural under the circumstances, accentuates the fact, not that the case has been begun, but that it is not at an end. That is the cardinal consideration. It is possible very effectually to poison the fountain of justice before it begins to flow. It is not possible to do so when the stream has ceased." Lord Hewart, C. J., did not consider the question in Rex V/s. Daily Mirror, (1927) 1 KB 845, as to whether there could be contempt of Court when proceedings were imminent but had not yet been launched as it did not arise. There was already an arrest and a charge" and the proceedings had already begun; but the observations of Wills, J., in (1903) 2 KB 432, referred to above were quoted in the case. In the case of Tuljaram Rao V/s. Governor of Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1939 Mad 257 (SB), it was held that to comment on a case which was about to come before the Court with knowledge of the fact was just as much a contempt as comment on a case actually launched. The Full Bench held in the case of Emperor V/s. P. C. Tarapore, AIR 1940 Sind 239 (FB), that it was immaterial whether the attack on the Judge was with reference to a case about to be tried or actually under trial or recently adjudged; in each instance the tendency was to poison the fountain of justice, to create distrust and destroy confidence of the people in the Courts which were of prime importance to the public in the protection of their rights and liberties. A rule was issued in that case on the Chief Editor and Mr. M. S. M. Sharma, Managing Editor, of the "Daily Gazette", and both were adjudged to be guilty of contempt of Court, but the latter alone was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 100. A rule was issued in that case on the Chief Editor and Mr. M. S. M. Sharma, Managing Editor, of the "Daily Gazette", and both were adjudged to be guilty of contempt of Court, but the latter alone was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 100. In re, Subrahmanyan, AIR 1943 Lah 329 (FB), also it was held that, the offence of contempt might) be committed even if there was no proceeding or cause actually pending provided that such a proceeding or cause was imminent and that the writer of the offending publication either knew it to be imminent or should have known that it was imminent. In Emperor V/s. Khushal Chand, AIR 1945 Lah 206, a case was registered by the police on the 4th July, 1944, One of the suspects was arrested on the 7th July and produced before the Magistrate on the 8th, and later on released on bail on the 21st. About a week later two articles appeared in vernacular newspapers containing offending matters, The internal evidence of the publications made in plain that one or both sets of respondents were aware: (a) that a fight had taken place on or about the 4th July; (b) that a case had been registered against 5 Hindu young men; (c) that two of the 5 men had been arrested; (d) that the investigation had started; and (e) that warrants of attachment had been obtained. On those facts it was held that they were sufficient to credit the respondents with the knowledge that the case in relation to which the articles were published was pending in a Court of Law, and that it was not necessary in the case of a criminal trial that the accused should have been committed for trial, or even that he should have been brought before a Magistrate provided he was arrested and was in custody. This Court also took a similar view in the case of the Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bihar V/s. Murali Manohar Prasad, ILR 20 Pat 306: (AIR 1941 Pat 185). In State V/s. Radhagobinda Das, AIR 1954 Orissa 1, it was held that if a person making a publication which was likely to interfere with the fair trial of the case, was aware that the proceeding was imminent, then the offence was complete, and it was not essential that the case should have been pending. In State V/s. Radhagobinda Das, AIR 1954 Orissa 1, it was held that if a person making a publication which was likely to interfere with the fair trial of the case, was aware that the proceeding was imminent, then the offence was complete, and it was not essential that the case should have been pending. This view was approved in another ease, the State V/s. Editor, Printer and Publisher of Matrubhumi, (S) AIR 1955 Orissa 36. 7. The principles deducible from these cases; can be summarised thus: (a) An act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a Judge into contempt or to undermine his authority amounts to contempt of Court and it can briefly be characterised as scandalising the Court itself; (b) Abusing parties or their lawyers concerned in cases may amount to contempt; (c) Any act or writing which prejudices mankind against persons or tends to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the Courts is contempt of Court; (d) Publication of an article or a report in a newspaper commenting on the proceeding of a case reflecting on the Judge, Jury, the parties, their witnesses or lawyers amounts to contempt, and it is immaterial whether it relates to a cause about to be tried, or actually under trial, or recently decided, as in each case the tendency is to shake the confidence of the people in the Courts and to poison the fountain of justice; and (e) It would amount to contempt of Court if the offending matters were published, at a time when no proceeding or cause was actually pending, but such a proceeding or cause was imminent and the persons responsible for the publication, either knew it to be imminent, or should have known that it was imminent. 8. In the light of these principles the facts of the present case have to be examined in order to ascertain as to whether a proceeding or a case was pending at the time the reports and photographs were published in the issue of the Searchlight and whether the opposite party had knowledge of the same. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the proceeding commenced the moment the petition signed by about 200 persons was filed before the District Magistrate making serious allegations against the petitioner. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the proceeding commenced the moment the petition signed by about 200 persons was filed before the District Magistrate making serious allegations against the petitioner. He urged that the petition, apart from containing a prayer for the drawing up, a proceeding under Sec.110, Cr. P. C., was virtually a complaint against Ramparichhan Pandey in respect of the various specific offences alleged to have been committed by him and the District Magistrate exercised his judicial mind in directing the Superintendent of Police to get an enquiry made. According to him, the judicial proceeding commenced on the lodging of the information itself. He referred to the case, the King V/s. T. P. O Connor, (1913) 1 KB 557, in support of his proposition. In that case the appellant was apprehended on December. 7 and charged on December 9. The question arose whether the proceeding was pending on December 13, 1912, the date of the commencement of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1912. It was held that the proceedings were pending on December 13. Both the arrest and the charge being prior to December 13, there could be no doubt that the proceeding was pending on December 13, The facts being different, that case is of no assistance in determining as to whether a proceeding commenced on the filing of the said petition before the District Magistrate. In Gilbert Littletons case, 77 ER 126, the circumstances were these: The Bill in the Star Chamber was exhibited in Hilary term before the Parliament, and the process was returnable in Easter term, which was after the Parliament, and it was resolved, that the Bill should, within the true intendment of the exception be deemed to be dependent. The learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that in that case the Bill was held to be pending the moment it was filed in the Star Chamber. It is difficult to draw the same analogy with regard to the petition before the District Magistrate. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the case of Asgarali Nazarali Singaporewalla V/s. State of Bombay, 1957 SCR 678 : ((S) AIR 1957 SC 503 ). It is difficult to draw the same analogy with regard to the petition before the District Magistrate. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the case of Asgarali Nazarali Singaporewalla V/s. State of Bombay, 1957 SCR 678 : ((S) AIR 1957 SC 503 ). In that case the offence relating to bribery and abetment thereof was committed on the 28th July, 1950; the accused were charge- sheeted on the 16th June, 1951; the trial commenced on the 14th July, 1951 and charges were framed on the 27th September, 1951. 40 witnesses were examined and a large number of documents were exhibited in the course of the trial and the prosecution closed its case on the 25th July, 1952. During the course of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (Act XLVI of 1952) was enacted by Parliament on the 28th July, 1952, amending the Indian Penal Code, and the Code of Criminal Procedure and providing more speedy trial of certain offences punishable under Sec.161, I. P. C., and other offences by a Special Judge, The Presidency Magistrate, however, proceeded with the trial and convicted some of the accused. The High Court held that the trial was without jurisdiction after the commencement of the said Act which provided for trial by a Special Judge, and in that view of the matter the conviction was set aside and a retrial was ordered. The question arose in the Supreme Court as to whether the case against the accused was pending before Presidency Magistrate on the 28th July, 1952, the date of the commencement of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, and it was held that the case was undoubtedly pending on the relevant date. Their Lordships quoted the definition of the word Pending as given in Strouds judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn., 3rd Vol. Their Lordships quoted the definition of the word Pending as given in Strouds judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn., 3rd Vol. at p. 2141, which, was the following terms: "Pending: A legal proceeding is pending as soon as commenced and until it is concluded; i.e., so long as the Court having original cognizance of it can make an order on the matter in issue, or to be dealt with, therein." It may be pointed out that on the facts of the case before the Supreme Court the question as to whether the case was pending before the Presidency Magistrate on the date of the enactment of the Criminal Law Amendment Act could by no means be contested and as such that decision does not carry the case of the petitioner any further. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the case of Queen Empress V/s. Tirunarasimha Chari, ILR 19 Mad 18. The Magistrate in that case on certain reports and the petition indicating likelihood of a riot, recorded the depositions of certain persons before passing an order under Sec.144, Cr. P. C. After the issue of the order the Magistrate directed the prosecution of one of them for giving false evidence, and the question arose whether he had jurisdiction to take action under Sec. 476, Cr. P. C. It was held that the Magistrate making an enquiry before issue of an order under Sec.144 was acting in a stage of a judicial proceeding and had, therefore, power to take action under Sec. 476. The Magistrate in that case had commenced the enquiry and had taken certain steps on the reports, and the petition filed before him, but the circumstances of the present case are different. The learned counsel pointed out that in a civil case the proceeding commenced from the date of the presentation of the plaint and the suit was deemed to be pending from that date. He drew our attertion to Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; but trie Explanation itself to that section provides in clearest terms that the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction. He drew our attertion to Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; but trie Explanation itself to that section provides in clearest terms that the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction. The analogy of a civil case and the presentation of a plaint which makes a suit pending cannot be applied in the case of a complaint or a petition filed before a- Magistrate for taking action under any law or under Sec.112, Cr. P. C. 11. Mr. Basudeva Prasad for the opposite party has refuted these contentions and he submitted that by mere filing of the said petition before the District Magistrate there was no proceeding and much less a judicial proceeding. He contended that a proceeding could not be said to be pending under the Criminal Procedure Code unless cognizance had been taken by the appropriate authority, and referred to the case of Jitan V/s. Emperor, 1 Pat LT 564. In that case the complainant sent a petition (not signed by any one) to the Sub Divisional Officer stating that the public path had been obstructed, and the latter sent the petition to one Mr. Everett for enquiry and report. On receipt of the report the Sub Divisional Officer examined the complainant on oath under Sec.200, Cr. P. C. summoned certain persons under Sec.283, I. P. C., and issued notice under Sec.144, Cr. P. C., On other persons, directing them not to trespass on certain lands and not to commit any breach of the peace. Dealing with the petition filed before the Sub- Divisional Officer, Jwala Prasad, J., observed that it was not signed by anybody, and if it was treat ed as a complaint the Magistrate ought to have immediately examined the complainant on oath be fore taking action thereon, and the order of the Magistrate sending the petition for inquiry was an executive order, not warranted by any provision of the Code. Mr. Mr. Basudeva Prasad, relying on this decision, submitted that in the present case as well the order of the District Magistrate directing the Super-intendent of Police to get an enquiry made was an executive order, and not a judicial order and, in fact, the District Magistrate did not choose to examine any one who was party to that application. The petition referred to by Jwala Prasad, J., was not signed by any one, and the Magistrate did not examine the complainant, but in the present case, the petition was signed by more than 200 persons, and so far the omission to examine any one of them on oath is concerned, it can be deemed to be only an irregularity and not an illegality: vide Bharat Kishore Lal V/s. Judhistir Modak, AIR 1929 Pat 473 (FB). These matters, however, do not seem to be at all relevant in the present case, as the question for consideration is not as to whether the order of the District Magistrate was a proper one. Mr. These matters, however, do not seem to be at all relevant in the present case, as the question for consideration is not as to whether the order of the District Magistrate was a proper one. Mr. Basudeva Prasad further referred to the case of R. R. Chari V/s. State of U. P., AIR 1951 SC 207 , where the following observations of Das Gupta, J., in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal V/s. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal 437 , were approved: "It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Sec.190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter, proceeding under Sec.200 and thereafter sending it for enquiry and report under Sec.202." The Supreme Court indicated in the case of Narayandas Bhagwandas V/s. State of West Bengal, AIR 1959 SC 1118 , as well that the principle enunciated by Das Gupta, J., referred to above was approved in Charis case, AIR 1951 SC 207 , and as regards cognizance of an offence the following observations were made: "As to when cognizance is taken of an offence will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is impossible to attempt to define what is meant by taking cognizance issuing of a search warrant for the purpose of an investigation or of a warrant of arrest for that purpose cannot by themselves be regarded as acts by which cognizance was taken of an offence. Obviously, it is only when a Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Sec.200 and subsequent sections of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under Sec.204 of Ch. XVII of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind, and, therefore, had taken cognizance." I would refer in this connection to the decision of the Special Bench of this Court in the case of Gopal Marwari V/s. Emperor, ILR 22 Pat 433: (AIR 1943 Pat 245) (SB). XVII of the Code that it can be positively stated that he had applied his mind, and, therefore, had taken cognizance." I would refer in this connection to the decision of the Special Bench of this Court in the case of Gopal Marwari V/s. Emperor, ILR 22 Pat 433: (AIR 1943 Pat 245) (SB). In that case, Meredith, J., observed as follows: "In my judgment, the word cognizance is used in the Code to indicate the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of ah offence. It is different thing from the initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate ........... Reverting again to complaint cases, it is clear from the wording of the Code that it is only when the stage is reached of an order under Sec.204, that is, for issue of process, that proceedings before the Magistrate can be said to commence, for Sec.204 is the first section in the Chapter headed Of The Commencement Of Proceedings Before Magistrate." Fazl Ali, C. J., after referring to the following observation in the case of Banwari Gope V/s. Emperor, ILR 22 Pat 175 : (AIR 1943 Pat 18) (FB), --"There can be no doubt that where a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon complaint, the proceeding before him is commenced as soon as the process is issued. -- held as follows: This view is fully in consonance with the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because Sec.204 of the Code which enables the Magistrate who takes cognizance of an offence to issue summons or warrant against the accused is the first section in Ch. 17 which deals with the commencement of proceedings before Magistrates. These words, in my opinion, are very important, because they show when and how according to the authors of the Code of Criminal Procedure legal proceedings before Magistrate should be deemed to commence." 12. The learned Government Advocate for the State submitted that the question as to when a proceeding under the Criminal Procedure Code could be deemed to be pending was not free from difficulty as it had to be ascertained on the facts and circumstances of each case. The learned Government Advocate for the State submitted that the question as to when a proceeding under the Criminal Procedure Code could be deemed to be pending was not free from difficulty as it had to be ascertained on the facts and circumstances of each case. He urged that the decisions relating to other statutes cited on behalf of the petitioner could not be very helpful and of guidance as the procedure laid down in other enactments were not the same as those in the Criminal Procedure Code. It could not be said that the proceeding commenced by mere filing of the petition before the District Magistrate and he, with his usual fairness, conceded that the benefit of doubt on this score should be given to the opposite party; but he urged that the proceedings in this case were imminent. 13. Having dealt with the various contentions and the cases cited, I have to take into account the facts of the present case. The petition signed by more than 200 persons containing serious allegations against Ramparichhan Pandey was filed before the District Magistrate, and the Edit6r and Printer, having learnt the contents of that petition from their correspondent, published reports in the issues of the Searchlight. They undoubtedly became aware of the allegations made against Ramparichhan Pandey, but they cannot be deemed to have been aware of the order passed by the District Magistrate., By mere filing of the petition, even if it could be treated as a complaint, it cannot be held that a proceeding commenced on the 29th of July, 1960. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, Sec.200 onwards, make it clear that if the Magistrate does not dismiss a complaint under Sec.203, but is of the view that there is sufficient ground for proceedings, he has to commence proceedings against the accused by compelling his attendance before the Court, and Sec.204 relates to the procedure for enforcing such attendance. A judicial proceeding cannot be deemed to have commenced against an accused unless and until the Magistrate issues process for his attendance. This view is in consonance with the decision in the case of ILR 22 Pat 433: (AIR 1943 Pat 245) (SB), already referred to. I would, therefore, accept the contention of Mr. Basudeva Prasad that on the 29th July 1960, there was (no?) proceeding against Ramparichhan Pandey. 14. This view is in consonance with the decision in the case of ILR 22 Pat 433: (AIR 1943 Pat 245) (SB), already referred to. I would, therefore, accept the contention of Mr. Basudeva Prasad that on the 29th July 1960, there was (no?) proceeding against Ramparichhan Pandey. 14. The next question arises as to whether a proceeding or cause was imminent and the op-posite party either knew it to be imminent or should have known that it was imminent. The allegations made against Ramparichhan Pandey in that petition were very serious, and specific instances of cheating, extortion, kidnapping were quoted therein. The signatories to that petition apprehended danger in case Ramparichhan Pandey was left at large, and the prayer was to take him in custody. In these circumstances it would be reasonable to presume that the District Magistrate was likely to take action against Ramparichhan Pandey, drew either a proceeding under Sec.110, Cr. P. C., or summon him for trial in respect of an offence under the Indian Penal Code. The District Magistrate was not expected to sit quiet and act capriciously, inasmuch as the law was set in motion and the allegations were so serious that they could not be brushed aside. The learned Government Advocate submitted that, having regard to the allegations made in that petition a proceeding was imminent and referred to the decision in the case of (S) AIR 1955 Orissa 36. It appears from the facts of that case that the bandh of a big reservoir was cut, as the result of which water flowed out and the lands of several persons were submerged. On the 13th August, 1953, a first information report was lodged about that incident, The police investigated into the matter and submitted a charge-sheet on the 20th October, 1953 against three persons. The Magistrate received the charge-sheet on the 26th October, 1953, and took cognizance the same day and summoned, the accused. Meanwhile, there were three publications in the "Matrubhumi" on the 11th, 12th and the 17th September, 1953, respectively, which formed the subject-matter of contempt proceedings against the Editor, Printer and Publisher of that paper as well, Apart from these there were other publications in other newspapers as well. Meanwhile, there were three publications in the "Matrubhumi" on the 11th, 12th and the 17th September, 1953, respectively, which formed the subject-matter of contempt proceedings against the Editor, Printer and Publisher of that paper as well, Apart from these there were other publications in other newspapers as well. It was held that the publications constituted contempt of Court as they had reference to the Criminal case which was pending investigation before the police and in respect of which proceedings in Court were imminent. The following passage of that decision is, in my opinion relevant: "The question whether proceedings are imminent in any particular case, will always be a question of fact. There may be cases, where in spite of the fact that a F. I. R. has been lodged before the police, proceedings may not be said to be imminent; for example, if the F. I. R. does not disclose the names of the accused persons and the police find that there is no evidence in support of the occurrence and submit a final report, it may perhaps not be, in those circumstances, said that proceedings are imminent. Each case will depend upon its own facts; and we are not prepared to lay down a broad proposition that until a case actually comes before the Court and the Court takes cognizance either upon a complaint or upon a charge-sheet or otherwise, proceedings in contempt: cannot be started." With respect, I am in agreement with the views expressed in this case. Mr. Basudeva Prasad referred to the case of Emperor V/s. J. Choudhury, AIR 1947 Cal 414 (SB), and relied upon the following passage: "Be that as it may, it seems to be the case that whatever uncertainty there may still exist on the question whether the offence of contempt may be committed by a publication at a time when proceedings are imminent, but not yet begun, there is not a single decision, English or Indian, which has gone the length of holding that the offence may be committed even if the alleged offender had no knowledge or had no reasonable grounds for believing that proceedings were about to be launched. So to hold would in our Judgment be an unwarrantable extension of the law of contempt in such cases." On the facts of that case it was held that there was nothing to show that the respondents knew, or should have known, that a proceeding was about to be started in connection with the alleged Harrison Road incident and the affidavit of the respondents that none of them was at all aware or had any grounds for believing that any proceeding was pending or was about to be instituted in respect! of the said incident was accepted. The rule for contempt was thus discharged in that case. The learned Government Advocate pointed out that on the facts of that case their Lordships were satisfied that the respondents had no knowledge or had no reasonable ground tor believing that any proceeding was either pending or was imminent. There is great force in this submission. "It is also well established that the offence of contempt may be committed even if no case is actually pending provided that such a proceeding is imminent and the writer of the offending publication either knew it to be so, or should have known that it was imminent" --vide judgment d/-the 2nd February 1960, in Original Criminal Misc. No. 14 of 1959 (Pat) -- State of Bihar V/s. Shankar Lal Khirwal. 15. Mr. Basudeva Prasad made a comment that the real grievance of the petitioner, acceding to the facts set out in his application filed in this Court was that the District Magistrate did not make any enquiry and he wrongly treated the petition filed before him as confidential; but we are not concerned here with the validity or otherwise of his order. 16. As a result of all these considerations I find that on the facts and circumstances of this case a proceeding or cause was imminent and an inference can be fairly drawn that the opposite party had reasonable grounds for believing that a proceeding against Ramparichhan Pandey was imminent. 17. The proceeding being imminent, the matter left for consideration is as to whether the publications in question amounted to contempt of Court. 17. The proceeding being imminent, the matter left for consideration is as to whether the publications in question amounted to contempt of Court. The publications can be divided into four groups: (1) The news about the filing of the petition before the District Magistrate; (2) The report quoting in extenso certain paragraphs of that petition; (3) The comment made by the opposite party, and (4) The photographs of Ramparichhan Pandey along with his name and address indicating that the petition for prosecuting him under Sec.110, Cr. P. C., (bad livelihood), had been filed before the District Magistrate. 18. No exception has been taken with regard to the publication of the first item, i.e., the news but with regard to the second item, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that publication in extenso of the allegation made in that petition was per se contempt of Court. He referred to Bow-den V/s., Russel, (1877) 46 LJ. Ch 414. In that case the plaintiffs, before the hearing of the action for damages, sent copies of the statement of claim containing charges injuriously affecting the defendants character to persons not parties to the ac- tion, and it was held that it was calculated to interfere with the due course of administration of justice. In that case committal was not asked for, and the prayer was confined only to an injunction restraining the plaintiffs from publishing and circulating the statement of claim. That relief was granted. Reference has been made to J. and P. Coats V/s. Chadwick, (1894) 1 Ch 347. In that case the plaintiffs, pending an action for infringing a trade mark, issued a circular discussing the merits of the action. It was held that it was calculated to prejudice the defendants in their defence and it fell under the well established head of contempt, by interfering with the course of justice. The less severe remedy by way of injunction was sought for, and it was granted. In In re, Cheltenham and Swansea Railway Carriage and Wagon Co., (1869) 8 Eq 580, the usual order as to costs was passed against the publishers for publishing in extenso in a newspaper, before the hearing of the matter, the contents of a petition for winding up of a Company containing charges of fraud against the directors. In In re, Cheltenham and Swansea Railway Carriage and Wagon Co., (1869) 8 Eq 580, the usual order as to costs was passed against the publishers for publishing in extenso in a newspaper, before the hearing of the matter, the contents of a petition for winding up of a Company containing charges of fraud against the directors. In Re, Kalidas J. Jhaveri, ILR 44 Bom 443: (AIR 1920 Bom 174), the pleader was severely reprimanded for making over a copy of the letter sent by the District Judge of Ahmedabad to the Registrar of the High Court of Bombay, to the Editor of the "Young India" who published the same and commented on it in his newspaper whilst the case was sub judice. Mr. Basudeva Prasad referred to Sathappa Chettiar V/s. Rama-chandra Naidu, AIR 1932 Mad 26 , in support of his proposition that if the reports in question contained an accurate statement of the complaint set out in extenso they did not constitute contempt. In Emperor V/s. Tushar Kanti Ghosh, AIR 1946 All 298, caution was given to the persons responsible for the production of newspapers that everything should be "excluded from their columns in reference to pending cases, whether criminal or civil, which might possibly have the effect of prejudicing or prepossessing the mind of any judicial officer, juryman, or potential witness, who might be or become concerned with it". In Atindra Narayan Roy V/s. Hemanta Kumari, AIR 1934 Cal 606, it was held on facts that what was set out and published in a newspaper was merely a summary of the plaintiffs allegations contained in the plaint of a suit, and there was no attempt to pre-judge the issue or to substitute what was sometimes called "trial by newspaper" for trial by a Court of justice. 19. In the present case the allegations made in the petition filed before the District Magistrate were very serious, disgraceful and damaging to Ramparichhan Pandey. To put it briefly, he was painted black as a moral wreck. The repetitions of those allegations in the issues of the Searchlight before the trial were undoubtedly very much embarrassing to Ramparchhan Pandey. His alleged underhand dealings, secret activities, antecedents and character were exposed and a wide publicity was given. The evils which have arisen can be easily visualised. To put it briefly, he was painted black as a moral wreck. The repetitions of those allegations in the issues of the Searchlight before the trial were undoubtedly very much embarrassing to Ramparchhan Pandey. His alleged underhand dealings, secret activities, antecedents and character were exposed and a wide publicity was given. The evils which have arisen can be easily visualised. It would not be correct, in my opinion, to lay down a general proposition that the publication in extenso of the pleadings, of the statements made in a petition, or other petitions or portions thereof filed before a Court would be per se contempt of Court, as circumstances may vary in each case, it is for the Court to decide in each case as to whether such publications amount to contempt. In the present case the allegations were so derogatory to the position of Ramparichhan Pandey that the publications of the same in extenso do constitute contempt and they have a tendency to prejudice the public mind against him. 20. Counsel for the petitioner has taken exception to the comment made by the opposite party in the issues of "the Searchlight". The opposite party indicated their view that there were 40 glaring cases in support of the allegations levelled against Ramparichhan Pandey. They not only formed this opinion before the scrutiny of the case by a Court, but broadcast it by publishing the same to make it available to the subscribers and readers of the Searchlight" which has a wide circulation. 21. The publication of photographs with the caption already referred to is to be deprecated all the more. Although more than 200 persons were signatories, yet they and the likely witnesses might not be able to identify Ramparichhan Pandey; but their task has been made easier and the copies of the photograph are now available to them. They might as well feel obliged to the opposite party for the service done to them. 22. The opposite party provided a delectable morsel to the scandal loving people among the readers of the Searchlight. They have in this case exceeded the limit. Before treading on forbidden fields, it was their duty to take care. They acted without due consideration and they deviated from the track of prudence. 22. The opposite party provided a delectable morsel to the scandal loving people among the readers of the Searchlight. They have in this case exceeded the limit. Before treading on forbidden fields, it was their duty to take care. They acted without due consideration and they deviated from the track of prudence. The publications in question are calculated to prejudice the public mind and interfere with the due course of justice and they, therefore, manifestly come within the am-bit of the law of contempt. 23. The learned counsel for the opposite party informs us today that Pandit M. S. M. Sharma (opposite party No. 1) is dead. In the circumstances, the question of his conviction and sentence does not arise and the proceeding must be deemed to have become infructuous so far as he is concerned. I, however, find opposite party No. 2 Sri Awadesh Kumar Tiwari guilty of contempt of Court and sentence him to pay a fine of Rs. 100.00 to be paid within two weeks from today, failing which, he must undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two weeks. 24. This application is accordingly allowed and the rule is made absolute against opposite party No. 2, There will be no order for costs of this application. H.K.Chaudhuri, J. 25 I agree.