JUDGMENT Shiv Dayal, J. This is Defendant's second appeal from the decree passed against hip by the Additional District Judge, Gwalior, for ejectment from a portion of a house situated in Phalke Bazar, Lashkar and for Rs. 8 as arrears of rent. The suit had been dismissed by the trial Judge. Initially Phundilal and Rambabu Defendants were tenants of Ramchand and Bansilal, who subsequently sold the house on November 22, 1955, to Ashok Kumar, Plaintiff. It was alleged in the plaint that the Defendants had executed a rent-note on September 19, 1941 agreeing to pay Rs. 8 per month as rent for the suit portion on the ground floor. The salt portion consists of one shop and two rooms attached to it. It was further alleged that the Plaintiff required the suit premises for his own residence, that before purchasing the property notices had been given to the Defendants by the intending purchaser and the intending vendor, and that after the sale the Plaintiff gave another notice of eviction to the Defendants. The Defendants resisted the suit inter alia on the ground that the accommodation being nonresidential, no decree for eviction could be passed on the ground of residential requirement. The trial Judge held that as the suit premises were let out for the purposes of a shop as was clear from the rent-note itself no decree could be passed under Section 4(e) of the Accommodation Control Act. The lower appellate Court has taken a contrary view holding, in main, that the suit portion "is and can be conveniently used for residential purposes." It is urged by Shri Naoker that the above observations of the first appellate Court are contrary to the material on record and that the suit premises could not be held to be "Residential" and "non-Residential" accommodation. Section 4 provides for restriction on eviction thus: No suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds: * * * * (g) In the case of residential accommodation that the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for his own residence. (h) In the case of non-residential accommodation that the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for continuing or starting his own business. (h) In the case of non-residential accommodation that the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for continuing or starting his own business. It is clear from this that a landlord whose requirement is for residential purpose, can bring a suit for eviction of a tenant from a residential accommodation only. Likewise, he can bring a suit for eviction of a tenant from non-residential accommodation only if his requirement is for non-residential purpose. In other words, a suit for eviction in the case of non-residential accommodation does not lie on the ground of requirement for residential purpose. It is true that sometimes a portion of a house is used for residential purpose and another portion of the same house for non-residential purpose and in common parlance it can be said that the house is both residential and non-residential, but for the purposes of the Act an accommodation has to be treated either as residential or non-residential accommodations; it cannot be both. To construe otherwise is bound to entail anomalous results and to create a confusion in the application of Clauses (g) and (h) of Section 4 of the Act. If the reporting is correct, the decision in Amarchand v. Gijaya Gaurichand M.P. No. 105 of 1955 decided on 22-9-1955 (M. Hidayatullah C. J. and S. P. Kotval J.) ( 1956 N L J 84.) supports my view on principle. Although the word "Accommodation" has been defined in the Act, the expressions "residential accommodation" and "non-residential accommodation" have not been so defined. It seems clear to me that if a house is not used wholly but is used mainly for purposes of residence it must be deemed to be a residential accommodation and, conversely, if it is used mainly for non-residential purposes even if its subsidiary use is residential, it must be deemed to be a non-residential accommodation. I get support from the decision in Lakshman Santu Sintre v. Bal Krishna Shetye AIR 1925 Bom 398. The primary purpose for which the building is let out or used must be the determining factor in deciding whether a building is residential or non-residential (A.I. R. 1949 Mad. 785), It is observed in Dr. I get support from the decision in Lakshman Santu Sintre v. Bal Krishna Shetye AIR 1925 Bom 398. The primary purpose for which the building is let out or used must be the determining factor in deciding whether a building is residential or non-residential (A.I. R. 1949 Mad. 785), It is observed in Dr. Mahanand v. V. R. Ayyar 1959 MPLJ 248 : 1959 JLJ 127 : The Act intends to divide the accommodation into two categories-residential and non-residential-and secures to the landlord the accommodation by ejecting the tenant if the landlord's need be of the same category to which particular accommodation can be found by the Court to belong. If the accommodation in question is residential the landlord can secure the ejectment of a tenant occupying the same if he genuinely needs the same for the purpose of residence and there is no place in the city or town so as to satisfy his need. If on the other hand the accommodation is non-residential then he can secure the ejectment of a tenant therefrom in case hie genuine need be for a non-residential purpose and there is no other place in the city or town satisfying that need of his. In the final analysis whether a particular accommodation falls in one or the other of the categories is a question of fact depending upon various factors including the constructional features, the situation, amenities available, conveniences provided, the number of rooms, the actual use to which the same is being put and several other factors. I am also aware of the observations in Bhanwar Lal v. Phoolchand 1959 MPLJ 76 : Where the premises were let out for shop and the landlord requires these for residence) one of the main issues should be whether the accommodation let out is residential or non-residential and to what extent it is of one category or the other, if it was both residential as well as non-residential. This requires consideration of such factors as instrument of tenancy specifically and explicitly declaring the purpose of letting as residential or nonresidential. Where there is no such document, the purpose of letting, the user of the premises by the tenant, the structural design and the antecedent user of the building by the landlord as known to the tenant and the acquiescence of the landlord to the particular user of the premises by the tenant. Where there is no such document, the purpose of letting, the user of the premises by the tenant, the structural design and the antecedent user of the building by the landlord as known to the tenant and the acquiescence of the landlord to the particular user of the premises by the tenant. And in that case A. I. R. 1952 Mad. 413 was referred to. In the rent-note executed by Phundilal in favour of Badridas, it is significant that the word 'shop' has been used throughout for the portion let out to the tenant and the word 'shop' has been used in contradiction with the word 'house'. The opening words are:- Colloquially the word *dukan* is used for non-residential accommodation while 'makan' for residential. It has also come in evidence that the suit premises are located in a line of shops. Shri Kak relies on the statement of Raghubar Dayal P. W. 4 and Din Dayal P. W. 3. Raghubar Dayal stated that the Defendant resided in the shop and did no business there. This statement is too vague to hold that it is a residential accommodation. He stated in cross-examination that he could not say whether Phundilal had taken the premises for business purposes or for residence. Din Dayal stated that Phundilal's father used to sleep there. This witness stated that Phundilal was doing business in the shop and that it was not used for residential purposes. The Defendant examined himself and stated that he had taken the premises for business purposes and had been carrying on business for 17 or 18 years. Plaintiff did not say a word on this point when he examined himself. The learned trial Judge, after discussing the entire evidence on record came to the conclusion that the suit premises were non-residential. I do not see any cogent reasons in the judgment of the first appellate Court for holding that the suit premises were in fact being used for residential purposes. The learned Judge has act stated what acts or conduct of the Defendant constituted a residential purpose, except that the Defendant's father used to sleep there. The finding of the first appellate Court is: But all the same it is clear from the evidence of P. W. 2 Din Dayal (it should have been D. W. 3) that in the suit accommodation sleeps the father of the Defendants. The finding of the first appellate Court is: But all the same it is clear from the evidence of P. W. 2 Din Dayal (it should have been D. W. 3) that in the suit accommodation sleeps the father of the Defendants. This would go to show that the accommodation in the suit about the time of suit was in fact being used for residence. But in my opinion merely because somebody sleeps in a shop, it does not become a residential accommodation. I get support from Mc Millan v. Rees (1946) 1 AllER 675. Sleeping at night in a shop is itself connected with business purposes i.e., for protection of goods from theft. Great deal of stress is laid on the fact that there are two rooms attached to the shop and it is argued that since those rooms can be used for residential purpose, the entire premises demised must be treated as residential accommodation. A somewhat similar question arose in Feyereisel v. Parry and Ors. (1952) 1 AllER 728. In that case by an agreement the landlord let to the tenant a camping site and a bungalow situate thereon. The tenant occupied the bungalow and carried on the business of a camping site proprietor. It was held that the camping site was the main object of the letting and the bungalow an adjunct to the business carried on by the tenant on the site, and, therefore, the bungalow was let together with "land other than the site of the dwelling house" within the meaning of Section 3(3) of the Rent and Mortgage Interest Act, 1939, and the Rent Acts did not apply to the premises. There is one more strong reason to support the finding of the trial Judge that the suit portion is non-residential. In the notice dated November 5, 1955 sent by the Plaintiff to the Defendant there is a clear distinction made between 'residential' portion and the non-residential one. At that time the two separate portions were with the Defendants and there were separate rent deeds: Ap ka kirayanama makan wa dukan elheda 2 dinank 19-9-41 ka baqabze Badridas maujud hain Dukan ka kiraya Ap 8 rupiye wa makan ka kiraya 4 rupiye dete hain. The Plaintiff being a minor, his father, Nemichand examined himself and admitted to have signed the above notice. The Plaintiff being a minor, his father, Nemichand examined himself and admitted to have signed the above notice. He nowhere stated that the suit premises were being used by the Defendant for residential purposes. For all these reasons the finding of the trial Judge must be upheld. The finding reached by the first appellate Court is not supported by the facts on record. The Plaintiff's suit for eviction must be dismissed because the suit portion is non-residential and he requires it for his own residence. As regards the decree for arrears of rent, Learned Counsel for the Appellant has not addressed me. This appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree of the first appellate Court are set aside so far as ejectment is concerned. The decree for Rs. 8 passed in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant is maintained. The Appellants shall get their costs throughout from the Respondents.