JUDGMENT 1. THIS is a second appeal on behalf of the defendant in a suit for ejectment on the ground of default and on the ground of own use and occupation. 2. SO far as requirement for use and occupation, the first court held in favour of the plaintiff and the court of Appeal below reversed that finding. So far as default is concerned, both the courts came to the same finding, viz there was default. Mr. A. C. Ghose on behalf of the appellant did not in his opening raise any question regarding the requirement for own use and occupation on the ground that the finding was in his favour. He challenged the finding on the ground of default. According to Mr. A. C. Ghose, the suit was filed after the 1956 Act had come into force. The tenancy that was entered into between the parties by a contract was terminated by a notice to quit with effect from 30th April, 1956 and after such termination the suit was instituted on 23rd August, 1956. Mr. Ghose says that, if section 40 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956 applies, then the 1950 Act may apply. If, on the other hand, the cause of action for the suit had been complete after 30th April, 1956, the suit would be governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956. Mr. Ghose says that on that interpretation of section 40, the plaintiff had a choice and he elected to take the advantage of 1956 Act rather than 1950 Act. According to Mr. Ghose, the plaintiff had two remedies open to him. Those two remedies were inconsistent and, therefore, the plaintiff having chosen the remedy in accordance with the Act of 1956, the Act of 1950 cannot be referred to at all. The basis of such election, according to Mr. Ghose, is the filing of an application under section 17 of the Act of 1956. If the plaintiff intended to have his remedy in accordance with the 1950 Act, he could have applied under section 14 of that Act. But he did not do that. Hence, the plaintiff must be deemed to have elected to have his remedy under the 1956 Act. Mr. If the plaintiff intended to have his remedy in accordance with the 1950 Act, he could have applied under section 14 of that Act. But he did not do that. Hence, the plaintiff must be deemed to have elected to have his remedy under the 1956 Act. Mr. Ghose then says that the cause of action for the suit was complete on 1st of May, 1956 when the tenant did not vacate the premises and the suit being instituted on the 23rd August 1956, the suit should, apart from the doctrine of election, be considered to have been instituted under the 1956 Act. According to Mr. Ghose, if 1956 Act applies, defaults subsequent to that Act would apply. That means that defaults from April to July 1956 may be taken into consideration but not any default which occurred at the time when the Act of 1950 had still been in force. In that view of the matter, according to Mr. Ghose, there has been no default and the appeal must, therefore, be allowed. [after stating the argument of Mr. H. C. Ghose, his Lordship continued.] On the question of default Mr. H. C. Ghose says that there has been default-whether the 1950 Act applies or 1956 Act applies. Mr. A. C Ghose's rejoinder is that, if the 1950 Act applies, then there was no default within the meaning of that Act because default under section 14 is only with reference to an ejectment suit pending under section 12 (1) (i) of that Act. As there was no ejectment suit pending at that time, there is no question of any default within the meaning of that Act. With reference to the Act of 1956 Mr. H. C. Ghose says, supposing that Act applies, under section 17, sub-clause 4 proviso, there have been four defaults within 12 months and that is sufficient for a decree on the ground of default. Mr. A. C. Ghose's rejoinder to this point that, even though the period has been stated to be one year, this must be understood with reference to the fact that the Act was prospective and anything that happened at a time before the Act came into force must be kept completely out of consideration. [after dealing with the question of requirement his Lordship continued. ] 3. I am not inclined to agree that the Act of 1950 would apply. [after dealing with the question of requirement his Lordship continued. ] 3. I am not inclined to agree that the Act of 1950 would apply. The cause of action for a suit for ejectment did not become complete till the 1956 Act came into force. If the tenant had vacated the house on 30th April, 1956, no right would have accrued to the landlord under the Act of 1956 nor anything would be called in question. Mr. H. C. Ghose attempted to say that, to the landlord, there accrued a right to get the advantage of the default while the Act of 1950 was in force because these defaults were during the 1950 Act. I am afraid, I cannot agree for the reason, that default by itself gives no right to the landlord. Default is something to show that the tenant is not entitled to protection, but default by itself is no cause of action for eviction. Absence of default may be a reason for protection and there is no process by which the landlord can or may take advantage of such default simpliciter. He can certainly sue for non-payment. As the cause of action for eviction was complete after the new Act came into force nothing but the new Act of 1956 can apply and, therefore, there is no question of election. But that does not answer the entire problem raised by Mr. A. C. Ghose. The fact is that there was no default subsequent to the Act of 1956 coming into force. The question is whether defaults prior to the Act can be taken into account. If those are taken into account, then what is the meaning of the word 'default'. In order to determine whether there was default, the Act of 1950 may be referred to or the 1956 Act may also be referred to. The question is which has to be referred to? As I have stated above, by default simpliciter no right accrued in favor of the landlord, 1950 Act would not be attracted under section 40 of the 1956 Act. Therefore, when we understand 'default' for the purpose of the suit filed under the 1956 Act, we must understand the word 'default' in the sense in which it has been understood in the 1956 Act. Therefore, when we understand 'default' for the purpose of the suit filed under the 1956 Act, we must understand the word 'default' in the sense in which it has been understood in the 1956 Act. Hence, in my opinion, even during the period before the 'institution of the suit we have to consider whether there was a default or no default, we have to understand the meaning of the word 'default' with reference to the Act of 1956 rather than with reference to the Act of 1950; but Mr. Abinash Chandra Ghose says that defaults prior to the Act cannot be taken into consideration. It is indeed true that the Act is prospective. Nobody here says that the Act is retrospective or, in other words, it does not say that even though the Act was passed in 1956, it would apply to the causes of action for eviction before the Act came into force or to suits then pending. The question is whether default prior to the Act of 1956, can be taken into consideration in a suit for ejectment under the Act of 1956. According to Mr. A. C. Ghose, all defaults would be wiped away by the old Act and default subsequent to the passing of the new Act are the defaults, which have to be considered. Mr. H. C. Ghose has urged that meaning must be given to the proviso to clause 4 of section 17 of the present Act. The question is a simple question of construction of that proviso. That proviso says "defaults within a period of 12 months". The interpretation of Mr. A. C. Ghose is "defaults within a period of 12 months provided they occurred after the Act. " The effect of the interpretation of Mr. A. C. Ghose would be that no suit for ejectment on the ground of default could he instituted during the first four months after the Act came into force; but there is nothing in the Act which shows that such was the intention of the legislature. The words used in the proviso to sub-clause 4 do not show that. The Supreme Court has held in the case of Shyama Rao Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, (1) 1952 S. C. R. 683, that "it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the meaning when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used. The words used in the proviso to sub-clause 4 do not show that. The Supreme Court has held in the case of Shyama Rao Parulekar v. District Magistrate, Thana, (1) 1952 S. C. R. 683, that "it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the meaning when the meaning can be fairly gathered from the words used. " The meaning that is fairly gathered from the section itself is any period of 12 months prior to the date of the suit. Therefore, that meaning must be accepted. But the next question is, if that meaning is accepted, will that be limited to defaults committed subsequent to the Act? The words of the statute do not say that. The fact that the statute is prospective does not prove that. The question is whether that was the necessary intendment under the Act. In order to consider what was the intention of the Legislature we may refer to the objects and reasons. We may also refer to the marginal notes and the preamble as well but what decides is the language of the statute. There must be some clue somewhere within the Act itself or somewhere in relation to the Act that the intendment must be obtained. We cannot merely suppose any intendment neither in the preamble nor in the marginal notes nor in the objects and reasons nor in any part of the Act, it has been suggested that defaults prior to the Act must not be taken into consideration. 4. THE words used in the corresponding section of the 1950 Act were very specific, viz. "default in payment of rent referred to in clause (i) proviso to subsection 1 of section 12. " Therefore, it was a particular and a definite kind of default which was considered, viz. default in relation to the suit for ejectment under section 12 (1) (i) of the Act. If there were similar provisions in the Act of 1956, then there would be no default within the meaning of such a section. But the Legislature has changed the language in the new Act. They have omitted all reference of the ejectment suit and defaults are now without reference to suits filed under the Act. If there were similar provisions in the Act of 1956, then there would be no default within the meaning of such a section. But the Legislature has changed the language in the new Act. They have omitted all reference of the ejectment suit and defaults are now without reference to suits filed under the Act. The result would be that, had there been any reference to ejectment suits under the new Act, the default would necessarily be with reference to that period but the Legislature has omitted those words and used the word 'default' without any reference to any period or any suit whatsoever. In the 1950 Act the reference to section 12 (1) (i) might have meant the reference to a period after the Act of 1950 because section 12 (1) (i) refers to suits after the Act. But that reference is absent in the 1956 Act. The Full Bench case of Ajit Kumar Roy (2) supports this View. The reasons as it appears to me is not to give any restriction as to the period during which the default took place, provided it took place within 12 months. The interpretation of Mr. A. C. Ghose would imply that the Courts should add some words which the Legislature did not use. But the Courts have no power to do that. The Supreme Court has held that "the language used by the Legislature in an enactment is the true depository of the legislative intent" (Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab (3) 1953 S. C. R. 319). In the case of Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras (1) 1953 S. C. R. page 677, the Supreme Court held "to ascertain the legislative intent, all the constituent parts of a statute are to be taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of the general purpose and object of the Act itself". I have already considered that in order to interpret the words 12 months' we do not find anywhere any words which would support the meaning "12 months after the Act came into force." On the other hand, the general policy to maintain the rights under the old Act, to continue proceedings under the old Act shows that the Legislature never intended that defaults prior to the Act of 1956 would be simply wiped away after repeal of the Act of 1950. It ensured continuity and the main purpose of section 40 is continuity of rights and privileges, whereas, if the argument of Mr. A. C. Ghose is accepted, there would be loss of continuity and there could be no suit for ejectment on the ground of default within four months of the Act of 1956. I am afraid, there is absolutely nothing to support that nor is there anything to restrict the meaning in that way. It is indeed true that when we understand the word 'default' with reference to the Act of 1956, we must understand it in the context the Act of 1956 and not in the context of the Act of 1950. I, therefore, over-rule the contention of Mr. A. C. Ghose. The result is that the judgment and decree of the Courts below are affirmed. [after dealing with certain facts, his Lordship thus concluded.] The defendant is, therefore, given time to vacate till 30th April, 1961 but the defendant will go on making payments in terms of the order in the connected rule till 30th April, 1960. In default, the decree will become executable at once. There will be no order as to costs.