JUDGMENT P.T. Raman Nayar, J. 1. It might be that the acquittal of the accused in this case of an offence under section 16 read with section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 37 of 1954, on the ground that the Food Inspector who took the sample in question did not comply with the provisions of section 10 (7) of the Act was wrong. Nevertheless I do not propose to interfere, for, it seems to me, that there is no proof that the prosecution was one duly authorised under section 20 (1) of the Act. If that be so, the defect goes to the very root of the matter, and the court below acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and in trying the offence; and, sitting in appeal against acquittal, I am not disposed to set aside the acquittal and quash the proceedings before the trial court so as to subject the accused to a fresh prosecution on proper authority. 2. The complaint in this case was laid by a Sanitary Inspector of the Palai Municipality within the limits of which the offence is alleged to have taken place. It is said that the municipal council had, at a meeting held on 12th September 1958, passed a resolution authorising this particular Sanitary Inspector to prosecute this particular accused for this particular offence. If that be so, no doubt the prosecution would have been one duly authorised under section 20 (1) of the Act, for, under the definition in section 2 (viii), the municipal council would be the local authority for the area in question. But, of this alleged resolution, there is no proof whatsoever. What has been marked in evidence is Ext, P-5, an order by the Commissioner of the Municipality, authorising the Sanitary Inspector in question to prosecute the accused for the offence. The order no doubt states that there was a resolution passed by the council on 12th September 1958 authorising the Sanitary Inspector to prosecute the accused but that statement by a person who is not a witness is quite irrelevant to prove the resolution. The way in which the resolution has to be proved is prescribed by section 78 (5) of the Evidence Act; and neither the statement of the Commissioner in Ext. The way in which the resolution has to be proved is prescribed by section 78 (5) of the Evidence Act; and neither the statement of the Commissioner in Ext. P-5, nor the oral evidence of the Sanitary Inspector as P.W. 1 that there was a resolution by the municipal council, is admissible as evidence of that resolution. The argument that, under the provisions of the District Municipalities Act, the Commissioner is bound to give effect to every resolution of the council is neither here nor there, for what we are now concerned with is whether there was a resolution by the council authorising prosecution, not whether the Commissioner was right or wrong in directing the Sanitary Inspector to file the complaint. And merely because the Commissioner, though no doubt a public servant charged with statutory duties, directed the Sanitary Inspector to prosecute the accused no presumption can conceivably arise under section 114, illustration (e) of the Evidence Act that there was a resolution by the council. It is well settled that the presumption that can be raised thereunder is that a judicial or official act which has been performed was regularly performed No presumption can be raised that the act was in fact performed, and that fact must be proved by evidence without the aid of any presumption. 3. As I have already remarked, the absence of proof of due authority for the prosecution under section 20 of the Act, goes to the very root of the matter and deprives the court of jurisdiction. I am not prepared to countenance for a moment the argument that because no express objection was taken by the accused on the score of section 20 (1), it must be presumed that there was due authority. No decision that I know of has said this; on the contrary every decision on the point emphasises that it is for the prosecution to prove the due authority or sanction required to invest the court with jurisdiction. The wording of section 20 (1) can itself leave no doubt in the matter, for, what it says is that no prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or local authority. The wording of section 20 (1) can itself leave no doubt in the matter, for, what it says is that no prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or local authority. Due authority is therefore a pre-requisite for the initiation of the prosecution, and proof thereof, for cognizance. Hukumal Asoomal v. Emperor (1), has been cited as authority for the proposition that in such cases, where no objection is taken by the accused, the necessary sanction or authority may be presumed. I do not understand that decision to lay down any such proposition, and what actually happened in that case was that the learned Judges declined to countenance an objection on the score of want of sanction for the first time put forward in revision. If there is anything in the decision susceptible of the interpretation that the prosecution need prove sanction or authority, where sanction or authority is required for cognizance, only if specific objection is taken by the accused, I must with great respect dissent. 4. I dismiss the appeal.