Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. This is a petition by R. P. Agarwala late Superintending Engineer in the Ministry of Irrigation in the State of Bihar under Article 226 of the Constitution to call up and quash the order of the State Government dated 25th May, 1959 whereby he was compulsorily retired from the Government service substantially on the ground that the Order was invalid and ultra vires for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, 2. The material facts may be shorty stated as follows : The petitioner having obtained the degree of Bachelor of Civil Engineering, joined the Bihar Engineering Service as an apprentice Engineer in the Irrigation Department of the State of Bihar on 27th July, 1930, and was confirmed as Assistant Engineer in July, 1931. He was promoted to officiate as the Executive Engineer from April, 1945 and was confirmed in that post in 1949. After having worked in different capacities he was promo-led to officiate as Superintending Engineer Irrigation Department in May, 1952. While so employed, he was asked by a letter dated 25th March, 1954, addressed to him by the Secretary to Government to furnish a complete and full statement of the details of all movable and immovable properties of and above the value of Rs. 100, including details of bank balance, ornaments Safety vault deposits, Life insurance policies, motor cars and other investments, held or acquired by him, his wife or any other member of his family living with or in any way dependent on him. On 5th May 1954, the petitioner submitted the required statement. Four years later in 1958 he was served with a notice dated 11th February, 1958, to show cause within thirty days of the receipt thereof as to why he should not be compulsorily retired, as it appeared that he was corrupt in the discharge of his duties. No less than ten instances of misconduct, including nepotism and dishonesty, on which the charges were based were set out therein (vide Annexure C). On 13th April, 1958, the petitioner showed cause. The charges and the explanation of the petitioner were considered by the Government which finally decided that the petitioner should be compulsorily retired from service with effect from the date the order was served upon him. On 13th April, 1958, the petitioner showed cause. The charges and the explanation of the petitioner were considered by the Government which finally decided that the petitioner should be compulsorily retired from service with effect from the date the order was served upon him. This decision of the Government is contained in the letter No. 12348 dated 28th May, 1959, from the Secretary to Government, Irrigation Department, to the Chief Engineer Irrigation, Bihar and is as follows : "Sub: Compulsory retirement of Shri R. P. Agarwala S. E. Irrigation Department. I am directed to say that Shri R. P. Agarwala, a permanent Executive Engineer in the B. E. S. Class I (Officiating as S. E.) was asked in this Department memo No. 3/C-on dated 11-2-1958 through the Chief Engineer, Irrigation (north) to show cause why he should not be compulsorily retired from service under Rule 74 of the B. S. C. on account of certain allegations of his dishonest conduct, as set forth in the annexure thereto. 2. The explanation submitted by him has been considered by Government. While his explanation in respect of certain charges has; been considered satisfactory, that in respect of other charges has been found unsatisfactory. The charges that have been proved against him are serious, particularly that relating to the acquisition of assets by him, disproportionate to his known sources of income. An analysis of his C/Rs also shows that, barring a few flashes of good reports in some years, his work has all along been of average quality and he has often been regarded as technically not quite sound and also lacking in initiative and drive. He was also once severely censured by Government for irregularities committed in connection with the purchase of motor vehicle. Thus Shri Agarwala has, not only been dishonest but also inefficient. Government have, therefore, decided that be should be compulsorily retired from service. 3. Shri R. P. Agarwala should, therefore, be compulsorily retired from Government service with effect from the date of (sic) the order is served on him. It was communicated by the Chief Engineer to the Petitioner by his letter No. 19-C/E dated 28th May, 1959, which may be reproduced : Sub--Compulsory retirement of Shri R. P. Agarwala, Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Department. I am desired to send herewith a copy of letter received from the Secretary to Government, Irrigation Department, Bihar for your information. It was communicated by the Chief Engineer to the Petitioner by his letter No. 19-C/E dated 28th May, 1959, which may be reproduced : Sub--Compulsory retirement of Shri R. P. Agarwala, Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Department. I am desired to send herewith a copy of letter received from the Secretary to Government, Irrigation Department, Bihar for your information. You are requested to make over charge to Shri M. P. Singh Executive Engineer, Design (North) immediately. The date when you hand over charge should be reported in due course." It is this order which the petitioner seeks to set aside on the ground, inter alia, that the order was illegal and void in that it was made in violation of the mandatory provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution without affording him any reasonable opportunity to meet and refuse the charges levelled against him. He further pleaded that even if the State of Bihar had powers to order compulsory retirement without assigning any reason, the impugned order amounted to his removal from service since the imputation of misconduct constituted an indelible stigma on his character, integrity and efficiency and was ultra vires and unconstitutional as he wag not given reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, as required by clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. 4. No formal enquiry was instituted against the petitioner and admittedly he was not afforded opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, as required by Article 311 (2). If, therefore, the impugned order of the Government amounted to dismissal or removal of the petitioner from Government service within the meaning of Article 311 (2) then the order must be held to be invalid, as the requirements of that Article had not been complied with. If, therefore, the impugned order of the Government amounted to dismissal or removal of the petitioner from Government service within the meaning of Article 311 (2) then the order must be held to be invalid, as the requirements of that Article had not been complied with. The State of Bihar, the respondent, however, contested the petition and urged that the order was nothing but an order of compulsory retirement, that it was entitled to retire a Government servant compulsorily by virtue of Rule 74 of the Bihar Service Code on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down therein and that hence the compulsory retirement, pursuant to a right conferred on it by Rule 74,_did not amount to dismissal or removal, as envisaged by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, and the order in question was not ultra vires and invalid. 5. Rule 74 provides as follows : "The State Government may require any Government servant who has completed twenty one years of duty and twenty five years of total service calculated from the date of his first appointment to retire from Government service, if it considers that his efficiency or conduct is not such as to justify his retention in service. Where any Government servant is so required to retire, no claim to any special compensation shall be entertained." Note I to Rule 74 is important and may be reproduced below : "Compulsory retirement effected in pursuance of this rule does not amount to dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution and a Government servant so retired cannot claim, as a matter of right, that he should be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. It shall also not be necessary in such cases to follow the procedure laid down for the institution of departmental proceeding against the Government servant before retiring him compulsorily from Government service." I may mention here that Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, as amended by Notification No. III/R1-2034/57-A 13210 dated 27th October, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Civil Services Rules) enumerates the penalties that may, for good and sufficient reason be imposed upon civil servants, and one of the penalties as mentioned in the new clause (iv-a) is "compulsory retirement". But Explanation III inserted by the aforesaid amendment in Rule 49 provides as follows : "Compulsory retirement of a Government servant in accordance with the provisions relating to his superannuation or retirement does not amount to a penalty within the meaning of this rule." There is no dispute that the conditions of service of the petitioner are governed by these rules. It will be seen that the petitioner was employed on 27th July, 1930, and was retired from Government service on 4th October, 1959, and therefore, Rule 74 applied in his case, and he could be compulsorily retired. The legal position under the Civil Services Rules admits of no doubt whatsoever. Under Rule 74 of the Bihar Service Code, the State Government has power to require any Government servant who has completed twenty one years of duty and twenty five years of service to retire compulsorily from Government service if it considers that efficiency or conduct is not such as to justify his retention in service, and the compulsory retirement effected in pursuance of this rule does not amount to penalty within the meaning of Rule 49 of the Civil Services Rules and does not constitute dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution so as to entitle him to the constitutional safeguards embalmed therein. The impugned order is prima facie not an order to dismiss or remove him from service but an order to retire him compulsorily from service, and, therefore, as explained in Note I to Rule 74 of the Bihar Service Code, he was not entitled, as a matter of right, to invoke to his aid Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules and claim protection of Article 311 (2). In short, if the Government has under the rules the right to terminate the employment of civil servants, at any time. then such termination is prima facie and per se not a punishment and does not attract the provisions of Article 311. This legal position has been affirmed by the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Shyamlal V/s. State of U. P., AIR 1954 SC 369 . Shyamlal, the appellant before the Supreme Court, was appointed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to the Indian Service of Engineers as an Assistant Executive Engineer with effect from 20th October, 1923. Shyamlal, the appellant before the Supreme Court, was appointed by the Secretary of State for India in Council to the Indian Service of Engineers as an Assistant Executive Engineer with effect from 20th October, 1923. In 1944, he was promoted to the rank of officiating Superintending Engineer, By a letter of the U. P. Government dated the 4th January, 1950, he was called upon to show cause within three weeks why he should not be compulsorily retired under the provisions of Article 465A Civil Service Regulations, as it appeared (1) that he had been making systematic and gross-over payments, apparently for no other reason than to benefit the contractors concerned, and (2) that he had spent large amount of public money for his own personal convenience and (3) that he had taken recourse to devious and unscrupulous methods. No Jess than, six instances on which these charges were based were then set out. The letter concluded with the following remarks : "Under the rules Government reserve the right to compulsorily retire any officer whose retention in service they consider not to be in the public interest. This is not, therefore, a formal enquiry under the classification, control and Appeal Rules but before taking the action indicated above Government were pleased to afford an opportunity to Shri Shyamlal, I. S.E. to show cause why he should not be compulsorily retired." The appellant submitted his explanations which, together with the Chief Engineers comments, thereon were placed before the Union Public Service Commission. The Commission came to the conclusion that five out of the six charges had been proved and submitted their report accordingly. On 17th April, 1953, the President, after considering the case and the recommendations of the commission decided that the appellant should retire forthwith from service under Note I to Article 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations. I may state here that the said Art. 465-A corresponds practically to Rule 74 of the Bihar Service Code and Note I to that Article to Note I to the said rule. In other words, both the State Government and the Union Government have powers to retire compulsorily a civil servant of the Union or the State as the case may be on fulfilment of the conditions laid down therein. In other words, both the State Government and the Union Government have powers to retire compulsorily a civil servant of the Union or the State as the case may be on fulfilment of the conditions laid down therein. Thereupon, the appellant filed before the Allahabad High Court a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying that the order of the President be quashed on the ground that he was Hot afforded any opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The High Court dismissed the application. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that compulsory retirement under the Civil Services Rules of an Officer did not amount to dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution, and the order of the President was not liable to be challenged on the ground that the public servant had not been afforded full opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The reasons, to appropriate the words of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, are these : Removal, like dismissal, no doubt brings about a termination of service but every termination of service does not amount to dismissal or removal. Article 311 does not apply to all cases of termination of service. Removal or dismissal generally implies that the officer is regarded as in some manner blameworthy or deficient, that is to say, that he has been guilty of some misconduct or is lacking in ability or capacity or the will to discharge his duties as he should do. There is no such element of charge or imputation in the case of compulsory retirement. The two requirements for compulsory retirement are that the officer has completed twenty five years service and that it is in the public interest to dispense with his further services. A compulsory retirement has no stigma or implication of misbehaviour or incapacity. Unlike removal or dismissal imposed as a penalty under Rule 49 of the Civil Services Rules, the compulsory retirement does not involve any evil consequences, such as, loss of benefit already earned and pension. An officer who is compulsorily retired does not lose any part of the benefit that he has earned. On compulsory retirement he will be entitled to the pension etc. that he has actually earned. There is no diminution of the accrued benefit. An officer who is compulsorily retired does not lose any part of the benefit that he has earned. On compulsory retirement he will be entitled to the pension etc. that he has actually earned. There is no diminution of the accrued benefit. It is manifest that the order compulsorily retiring a public servant involved "no element of charge or imputation" and did not amount to dismissal or removal, and therefore, does not attract the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution or of Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules. 6. Indeed, in the light of the aforesaid principles, the order of the State Government compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service is hardly open to challenge. His counsel Mr. P. R. Das, however, said that he would have had no grievance had the petitioner been simply retired from service pursuant to Rule 74 of the Bihar Service Code. His contention is that the order of compulsory retirement in the instant case amounts to imposing punishment, because certain charges of misconduct and dishonesty had been levelled against the petitioner casting thereby on him an indelible stigma. He pointed out that compulsory retirement of a civil servant with such a stigma on his character is nothing short of punishment and was tantamount to his dismissal or removal from service entitling him to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution, He urged that the order was, therefore, ultra vires and liable to be set aside. In support of his contention, he relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court one in Parshotam Lal Dhingra V/s. Union of India, 1958 SCR 828 : ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ), and the other in State of Bihar V/s. Gopi Kishore Prasad, 1960 BLJR 220 : ( AIR 1960 SC 689 ). In my opinion, this contention is not at all sound and is in the teeth of the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Shyamlal, AIR 1954 SC 369 , referred to above find in the unreported case of the State of Orissa V/s. Ramnarayan Das being Civil Appeal No. 61 of 1959, disposed of on 8th September, 1960. (Since reported in AIR 1961 SC 177 .) In the latter case Ram Narayan Das, the respondent was appointed in the year 1950 a Sub-Inspector on probation in the Orissa Police force. (Since reported in AIR 1961 SC 177 .) In the latter case Ram Narayan Das, the respondent was appointed in the year 1950 a Sub-Inspector on probation in the Orissa Police force. In view of the adverse reports received against him on July 28, 1954, notice was served on the respondent calling upon him to show cause why he should not be discharged from service "for gross neglect of duties and, unsatisfactory work". In the notice, ten specific instances of neglect of duty and two instances of mis-conduct, acceptance of illegal gratification and fabrication of official record were set out. By his explanation, the respondent submitted that action had already been taken against him by the Superintendent of Police in respect of instances of neglect of duty set out in the notice and no further action in respect thereof could on that account be taken against him, because to do so would amount to imposing double punishment. He denied the charge relating to misconduct and submitted that it wag based on the uncorroborated statements of witnesses who were inimical to him. He also asked for an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. The Deputy Inspector General of Police considered the explanation and observed : "I have carefully gone through the representation of the probationary S. I. His argument that he has already been punished by the S. P. for specific instances of bad work does not help him very much since all these instances of bad work during the period of probation have to be taken together in considering his merits for confirmation or otherwise. The S. I. has already had long enough of chance to work under different S. Ps., though in one district, but he has not been able to procure a good chit from any one. He has also been adversely reported against after the representation dealt with therein was submitted. It is, therefore, no good retaining him further in service. He is discharged from the date on which this order is served on him". He has also been adversely reported against after the representation dealt with therein was submitted. It is, therefore, no good retaining him further in service. He is discharged from the date on which this order is served on him". The Deputy Inspector General of Police on December, 11, 1954, in discharging the respondent from service, passed a formal order as follows: "Probationary S. I. Ramnarayan Das of Cuttack District is discharged from service for unsatisfactory work and conduct with effect from the date of the order is served on him." The respondent then presented a petition under Article 228 of the constitution in the High Court of Judicature, Orissa, challenging the validity of the order passed and praying for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ quashing the order of discharge. Arguments similar to those advanced by Mr. Das were raised before the Orissa High Court, and those arguments also prevailed there. The High Court observed that by discharging the respondent from service without holding an enquiry as contemplated by Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules and without complying with the requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution, an indelible stigma affecting his future career had been cast and quashed the order of discharge. Against that order the State of Orissa preferred appeal to the Supreme Court by a special leave. The Supreme Court repelled the contentions argued on behalf of the respondent and set aside the order of the Orissa High Court observing as follows : "The respondent had no right to the post held by him. Under the terms of his employment, the respondent could be discharged in the manner provided by Rule 55-B. Again mere termination, of employment does not carry with it any evil consequences such as forfeiture of his pay or allowances, loss of his seniority, stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, etc. It is then difficult to appreciate what indelible stigma affecting file future career of the respondent was cast on him by the order discharging him from employment for unsatisfactory work and conduct. The use of the expression discharge in the order terminating employment of a public servant is not decisive : it may, in certain cases, amount to dismissal. It is then difficult to appreciate what indelible stigma affecting file future career of the respondent was cast on him by the order discharging him from employment for unsatisfactory work and conduct. The use of the expression discharge in the order terminating employment of a public servant is not decisive : it may, in certain cases, amount to dismissal. If a confirmed public servant holding a substantive post is discharged, the order would amount to dismissal or removal from service; but an order discharging a temporary public servant may or may not amount to dismissal. Whether it amounts to an order of dismissal depends upon the nature of the enquiry, if any, the proceedings taken therein and the substance of the final order passed on such enquiry. Where under the rules governing a public servant holding a post on probation, an order terminating the probation is to be preceded by a notice to show cause why his service should not be terminated, and a notice is issued asking the public servant to show cause whether probation should be continued or the officer should be discharged from service the order discharging him cannot be said to amount to dismissal involving punishment. Undoubtedly, the Government may hold a formal enquiry against a probationer on charges of misconduct with a view to dismiss him from service and if an order terminating his employment is made in such an enquiry, without giving him reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution the order would undoubtedly be invalid." 7. In my opinion, the ratio decidendi in the cases of Shyamlal, AIR 1954 SC 369 and Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177 , affords effective answers to the contention of Mr. Das. It may be observed that in the case of Shyamlal, AIR 1954 SC 369 , three specific charges of misdemeanour were alleged. No departmental enquiry was instituted to investigate the case. His explanation only was considered. It was not found satisfactory, and without further action, he was retired forthwith from service. Similarly, in the other case, grave allegations of misconduct including acceptance of illegal gratification and fabrication of official record were made against Ram Narayan Das. No departmental proceeding was initiated to investigate into these allegations, as required by Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules. It was not found satisfactory, and without further action, he was retired forthwith from service. Similarly, in the other case, grave allegations of misconduct including acceptance of illegal gratification and fabrication of official record were made against Ram Narayan Das. No departmental proceeding was initiated to investigate into these allegations, as required by Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules. Witnesses were examined, but he was not afforded any opportunity to cross-examine them. He was simply asked to explain and his explanation only was considered. He was not given any opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. Being a mere probationer, the rule provided for his discharge from service, and acting thereunder, the Government discharged him from service. It is noteworthy that the formal order communicated to him also stated that he was discharged from service for unsatisfactory work and conduct. Thus, it will be seen that though there were serious imputations of misconduct and requirements of Article 311 (2) were not complied with in both, these cases, still the order of compulsory retirement in one case and the order of discharge in, the other were held by the Supreme Court to be perfectly legal, for the, simple reason that discharge or compulsory retirement effected in exercise of the right given to the Government under the rules, did not amount to imposing punishment and did not constitute dismissal or removal within, the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. It is difficult to understand how imputation of misconduct can altogether be avoided. It will appear that under Rule 74 of the Bihar Service Code unsatisfactory work or conduct is the ground for compulsory retirement. That being so, it is plain that if it is not to be dubbed capricious or partial, the Government, in the interest of sound administration, has, both for the satisfaction of itself and the delinquent Government servant, to consider his suitability or otherwise for continued and efficient work in the light of his past record of service and current allegations of misconduct made against him, and this process will necessarily involve framing of charges and demanding explanation. If that be the right course for the Government to adopt, and I have, no doubt about that, a mere imputation of misconduct, inefficiency, etc., howsoever grave, cannot, as contended for by Mr. Das, be adopted as a criterion to determine whether in a given case compulsory retirement amounts to dismissal or removal, as contemplated by Article 311, tO Any that the Gov-eminent should consider the grounds for compulsory retirement secretly without being made known to the Government servant concerned, will be dishonest from the point of view of Government and unfair from the point of view of the civil servant. The proper legal test was laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177 , aforesaid. As stated therein, "whether it amounts to an order of dismissal depends upon the nature of the enquiry, if any, the proceedings taken therein and the substance of the final order passed on such enquiry," In this case there was no formal enquiry, as required by the rules governing the conditions of service. It was most informal enquiry intended only for the satisfaction of the Government. Before taking decision one way or the other the Government has to consider whether in a given case the circumstances warranted dismissal or only compulsory retirement from service under the rules. In order to determine what action the Government should take, an investigation was to be made. Such an enquiry, even though involving levelling of charges, does not per se import punishment. It only purports to furnish a motive for the Government to take necessary action. But, motive is of no consequence, if the rules empower the Government to terminate the service. Such an enquiry, even though involving levelling of charges, does not per se import punishment. It only purports to furnish a motive for the Government to take necessary action. But, motive is of no consequence, if the rules empower the Government to terminate the service. As observed by Chagla C. J. in Shrinivas V/s. Union of India, (S) AIR 1956 Bom 455 , which was approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra, AIR 1958 SC 36 , above referred to, "whatever may be the motive which may influence the exercise of a legal right if the legal right exist then the motive becomes irrelevant, and if in a case where Sec.240(3) or Article 311 does not apply the Government has the right to dispense with the services of a temporary servant, then it is not open to a temporary servant to say that his services were dispensed with for an ulterior motive or for a motive which was not a proper motive". Where, however, the rules do not permit termination of the service, or the Government does not propose to take action under the rules, say, where the case merits severer punishment, then a formal and detailed enquiry as prescribed by rules will indeed be necessary. For example, take the case of compulsory retirement. Where the Government finds a permanent public" servant unsuitable for the post on account of misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, and the conditions laid down in Rule 74 of the Bihar Service Code are also fulfilled, three courses are open to the Government: (1) it may dismiss him from service outright; such dismissal, as laid down in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra, AIR 1958 SC 36 , above referred to must per se be a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture of the servants rights and brings about a premature end of his employment; (2) instead of dismissing him outright, it may choose to impose upon him the penalty of compulsory retirement, which is one of the penalties laid down in Rule 49 of the Civil Services Rules; and (3) the Government may proceed to take action against the servant in exercise of its powers under the rules regulating the conditions of his service. In the first two cases, termination of service will be a dismissal or removal by way of punishment, and so within the purview of Article 311 (2). In those cases, the Government servant is entitled to the safeguards provided in Article 311 and, therefore, where no proceedings have been taken as provided in Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules and the Government servant has not been afforded opportunity, first to defend himself and; second to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him, the order of dismissal or compulsory retirement will be vitiated and ultra vires and liable to be quashed. The Government may, however, take the view that the allegations do not justify the deprivation of the Government servant concerned of the benefits acquired by him and hence dismissal will not be proper and that the alternative remedy will be more equitable, it may take recourse to the rules and simply retire the Government servant from service without the loss of accrued benefits. Where rule authorises termination of the service, the Government has obviously two courses open to it. It may dismiss or remove a Government servant from service for misconduct, and this will entail forfeiture of the benefits earned by him. It may, however, adopit the other and simpler course and terminate the service either according to the contract or the rules. In the latter case, Article 311 is not attracted even though misconduct is present, and even though that constitutes the motive for the action taken, and, I would: go further and say, even though the misconduct alleged is mentioned in the order terminating the service and communicated to the servant concerned. In order to determine whether or not a Government servant was entitled to the protection of Article 311 (2), the proper legal test is not only imputation of misconduct but also whether the termination of the service was by way of punishment, in other words, whether evil consequences, such as, forfeiture of pay, allowances, etc. flowed as a result of the order. The entire law has been made crystal clear by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra, AIR 1958 SC 36 , above referred to, in the following terms : "Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. flowed as a result of the order. The entire law has been made crystal clear by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra, AIR 1958 SC 36 , above referred to, in the following terms : "Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per so dismissal or removal ...... Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311 (2), as has also been held by this Court in (1955) 1 S C R 26 : (AIR 1934 S C 369). In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rules, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is,.... wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded On misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other, disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on, the officer affecting his future career. ........ But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such eases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences .......... The use of the expression "terminate or discharge is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant bad a right to the post or the rank or (2) whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination; of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service ...... Applying the aforesaid tests, the petitioner was not entitled as a matter of right to continue insendee after completion of twenty-five years of service. Under Rule 74 of the Bihar Service Code, he could be compulsorily retired. The compulsory retirement involved no forfeiture of his pay or allowances. Ho was entitled to the benefit that he had already acquired and he was also entitled to the pension. Under Rule 74 of the Bihar Service Code, he could be compulsorily retired. The compulsory retirement involved no forfeiture of his pay or allowances. Ho was entitled to the benefit that he had already acquired and he was also entitled to the pension. In these circumstances, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Shyamlal, AIR 1954 SC 369 and re-affirmed in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra, AIR 1958 SC 36 , such a compulsory retirement did not amount to punishment and did not constitute dismissal or removal within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the order retiring the petitioner compulsorily from service did not attract the protection of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 8. Mr. Das referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra, AIR 1958 SC 36 , more particularly the passage set forth above. He also relied strongly on the case of 1960 BLJR 220 : ( AIR 1960 SC 689 ). I need not embark upon a detailed examination of these cases, as they have been referred to and explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Narayan Das, AIR 1961 SC 177 . Their Lordships have observed that in the case of Gopi Kishore Prasad, 1960 BLJR 220 : ( AIR 1960 SC 689 ), the order was not one merely discharging a probationer following upon an enquiry to ascertain whether he should be continued in service, but it was an order as observed by the Court "clearly by way of punishment. They have further pointed out that there is no real inconsistency between the observations made in Parshotam Lal Dhingras case, AIR 1958 SC 36 and Gopi Kishore Prasads case, AIR 1960 SC 689 . For these reasons, the decision in Gopi Kishore Prasads case does not govern the present case. The principles laid down in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra, AIR 1958 SC 36 , rather support the order of compulsory retirement passed in the present case. In upholding the order of discharge of Ram Narayan Das, their Lordships of the Supreme Court rather relied upon their previous observations in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra, AIR 1958 SC 36 , which I have quoted above. These two eases, therefore, do not at all support the contention of Mr. In upholding the order of discharge of Ram Narayan Das, their Lordships of the Supreme Court rather relied upon their previous observations in the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra, AIR 1958 SC 36 , which I have quoted above. These two eases, therefore, do not at all support the contention of Mr. Das, and accordingly it cannot be accepted as correct. 9. In my considered judgment, the Order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner is legal and is not hit by the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The application is accordingly dismissed with costs. Heaving fee Rs. 250/-. Ramaswami, J. 10 I agree.