JUDGMENT M.C. Desai, J. - This petition for writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus has been filed in the following circumstances :- 2. An election of the Municipal Board, Mussoorie, was held in 1957. From ward no. 4, Kulri, three members were to be elected, each elector having three votes. An electoral roll was prepared for the ward as required by the U.P. Municipalities (Preparation and Revision of Electoral Rolls) Order, 1953, and five candidates were nominated, including the petitioner and opposite-party no. 2. Sri Gopal Datta, Dr. R. Prakash and the petitioner secured largest numbers of votes, viz. 481, 469 and 453 respectively, and were declared duly elected from the ward. Opposite-party no. 2 secured 420 and the fifth candidate Kirpal Singh, 412. Two election petitions were filed to challenge the election of the petitioner, one by opposite-party no. 2 and the other by Kirpal Singh. We are not concerned with the election petition of Kirpal Singh. The main allegations in the election petition of opposite- party no. 2 were that the petitioner was elected "by reason of improper admission of votes from nos. 2130 to 2422 of the electoral roll of the said ward no. 4 and he has not been elected by a majority of lawful votes," that the names of voters entered in the electoral roll at nos. 2130 to 2422 were added subsequently and did not legally form a part of the electoral roll and the voters were not entitled to cast their votes at the election and that the result of the election had been materially affected by the non-compliance with the provisions of Secs. 12-B, 12-C, 12-D, 12-E, 12-G and 13-E(1) and (3) of the U.P. Municipalities Act and RR. 7 to 15 and 17 of the U.P. Municipalities (Preparation and Revision of Electoral Rolls) Order and also by certain errors, irregularities and informalities committed by the Electoral Registration Officer. The errors, irregularities committed by the Electoral Registration Officer were said to be that he entertained claims for entry in the electoral rolls though they were vague, that he disallowed permission to a pairokar of the petitioner to inspect the claims, that he did not hold any inquiry into the claims and did not apply his mind to every claim individually, that he added names of certain claimants in the electoral roll of ward no. 4 even though their names were entered in the electoral roll of ward no. 5, that after it was finally decided during the preparation of the Assembly Electoral Roll that the persons did not reside in ward no. 4 and had, therefore, no residential qualification to vote in it, he had no jurisdiction to entertain their claims and hold that they did possess the residential qualification for ward no. 4, that the list of the added names was not published by him in the prescribed manner, that the electoral roll became final and was published as such on 16-9-1957, that the petitioner applied on 9-10-1957 for enrolment of 244 voters, that the prescribed enrolment fee of Re. 1/- per voter was paid by the petitioner and Dr. R. Prakash, that the application was supported by a false affidavit to the effect that the voters were more than 21 years of age and were residents of ward no. 4, that the Electoral Registration Officer did not permit his pairokar Lachhman Das to inspect the claims and consequently he could not file proper objections against them, that some of the claims were on behalf of bogus or fictitious persons, some were on behalf of minors and some were on behalf of persons who were disqualified to vote, that no orders were passed by the Electoral Registration Officer on the claims, that only at the time of poll on 16-10-1957 it was found that the claims had already been allowed and that entries were made at serial nos. 2130 to 2422 in hand in the electoral roll, that about 200 of these persons cast their votes and cast them in favour of the petitioner and but for their votes the opposite-party would have secured the highest number of votes, that no printed copy of the electoral roll containing the entries at nos. 2130 to 2422 was made available for sale to the opposite-party as was required under R. 17 (5) read with R. 15 (6) of the (Preparation and Revision of Electoral Rolls) Order and that there was no publication of the electoral roll containing the additions. 2130 to 2422 was made available for sale to the opposite-party as was required under R. 17 (5) read with R. 15 (6) of the (Preparation and Revision of Electoral Rolls) Order and that there was no publication of the electoral roll containing the additions. The election petition was opposed by the petitioner and one of the pleas that he took was that Sec. 19 (2) (a) of the Act specifically prohibits questioning of an election on the ground that the name of any person not qualified to vote had been inserted in the electoral roll. The election petition is being heard by opposite-party no. 1. He framed no less than 17 issues; issues 1, 2 (a), 2 (b), 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15 and 16 deal with the above-mentioned allegations in the election petition in respect of the addition of the names of the electors at serial nos. 2130 to 2422 of the electoral roll and the hearing of the claims. The petitioner moved opposite-party no. 1 to try these issues first, but he refused to do so, being of the view that the election petition could not be disposed of piecemeal. Thereupon the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court, petition no. 683 of 1959, for a writ of prohibition restraining him from inquiring into the matter relating to the addition of the names at nos. 2130 to 2422 of the electoral roll. This Court on 18-10-1959 directed opposite-party no. 1 to frame an additional issue "whether in view of the Full Bench decision . . . ., it is open to the Tribunal to enquire into any of the issues nos. 1, 2, 2 (a), 2(b), 2(c), 4, 7, 8, 9(a), 9(b), 11, 15 and 16 and, if so, into which of them" and determine it as a preliminary issue. In compliance, opposite-party no. 1 framed and tried the issue, held that the Full Bench decision did not apply to the facts before him and that he was competent to decide all the issues. Thereupon this petition was filed. The reliefs claimed are a certiorari to quash the order of opposite-party no. In compliance, opposite-party no. 1 framed and tried the issue, held that the Full Bench decision did not apply to the facts before him and that he was competent to decide all the issues. Thereupon this petition was filed. The reliefs claimed are a certiorari to quash the order of opposite-party no. 1 that the Full Bench decision did not apply to the facts of the case and he was competent to decide all the issues, a prohibition restraining him from proceeding with the consideration of issues 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, and 16 and a mandamus commanding him not to exceed his jurisdiction. After admitting the petition this Court issued an interim order forbidding opposite-party no. 1 to try issues 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15 and 16. 3. Rules regarding electoral rolls are contained in Secs. 12-A to 12-H of the Municipalities Act and in the U.P. Municipalities (Preparation and Revision of Electoral Rolls) Order, 1953. There must be an electoral roll for every ward prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Act; it is to be prepared by the Electoral Registration Officer after adopting the Assembly Roll. Every person who is qualified to be registered in the Assembly Roll of the ward is entitled to be registered in the Municipal Electoral Roll of the ward, but a person who is disqualified for registration in the Assembly Roll is disqualified for registration in the municipal electoral roll and his name must be struck out from the roll. No person is entitled to be registered in the electoral roll of more than one ward. The electoral roll of each ward must be revised every year. The State Government has power to make provision in respect of certain matters by an order. The (Preparation and Revision of Electoral Roll) Order contains rules regarding the preparation of electoral rolls, publication, claims to inclusion of names in a roll, particulars to be furnished by every claimant, hearing and decision of claims, amendment of tolls and the annual revision of rolls. 4. The law regarding election petitions is contained in Secs. 19, 20 etc. of the Act. Only the provisions of Sec. 19 are relevant in this petition; it reads as follows :- ''19 (1). 4. The law regarding election petitions is contained in Secs. 19, 20 etc. of the Act. Only the provisions of Sec. 19 are relevant in this petition; it reads as follows :- ''19 (1). The election of any person as a member of a board may be questioned by an election petition on the ground - (a) that such person committed.......a corrupt practice........; (b) that such person was declared to be elected by reason of the improper rejection or admission of one or more votes, or for any other reason was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes; (c) that such person was not qualified to be nominated as a candidate..........or that the nomination paper of the petitioner was improperly rejected. (2) The election of any person as a member of a board shall not be questioned - (a) on the ground that the name of any person qualified to vote has been omitted from, or the name of any person not qualified to vote has been inserted in, the electoral roll ; (b) on the ground of any non-compliance with this Act or any rule...........or of any error, irregularity or informality on the part of the officer............charged with carrying out this Act ........... unless such non-compliance, mistake, error, irregularity or informality has materially affected the result of the election." 5. The contention of the petitioner is that the grounds covered by issues 1, 2, 4, 7, etc. are the grounds mentioned in Sec. 19(2) (a) and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and it is prohibited from trying them. Opposite-party no. 2 in reply relies upon Sec. 19 (2) (b) and contends that the grounds are those mentioned in it. 6. It is not the case of opposite-party no. 2 in the election petition that entries nos. 2130 to 2422 of the electoral roll are a forgery or unauthorized; what his case is that they were made in the electoral roll by the proper authority but without following the prescribed procedure and in contravention of certain provisions. The opposite-party challenges the right of the persons mentioned in the entries to be voters at all and to have their names enrolled in the electoral roll; this exactly is the ground which is expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of an election tribunal by Sec. 19 (2) (a). The opposite-party challenges the right of the persons mentioned in the entries to be voters at all and to have their names enrolled in the electoral roll; this exactly is the ground which is expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of an election tribunal by Sec. 19 (2) (a). Once a name is entered in an electoral roll by the competent authority, who at least professes to have followed the prescribed procedure, the ground that the person was not qualified to vote is a ground that cannot be taken in an election petition. Whatever may be said about forgeries and unauthorized interpolations in an electoral roll, an entry made by the competent authority, who professes to have followed the prescribed procedure, stands on a different footing and cannot be separated from the rest of the electoral roll and treated as not forming a part of it. We are unable to appreciate the argument of opposite-party no. 2 that the disputed entries do not form a part of the electoral roll and that the sanctity that is attached by Sec. 19 (2) (a) to an electoral roll is not attached to them. We do not agree that an electoral roll can be split up in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the opposite-party into two parts, one within the prohibition contained in Sec. 19(2) (a) and the other without. That an entry is made in contravention of either the substantive or the adjective law is no justification for treating it as not forming a part of the electoral roll. The very idea behind the enactment of Sec. 19(2) (a) is that the correctness of no entry in an electoral roll should be allowed to be challenged in an election petition on the ground of infringement of the substantive law. When it is conceded by the opposite-party that the disputed entries are in the electoral roll, his objections to them on the ground that the voters were not qualified to vote is barred by Sec. 19(2) (a). 7. As regards Sec. 19(2) (b), it appears to us that the first part of it is another exception to the rule contained in Sec. 19(1) and that its latter part is an exception within exception, i.e. removes it from the exception in certain circumstances. The grounds on which an election can be challenged are enumerated in sub-Sec. (1). 7. As regards Sec. 19(2) (b), it appears to us that the first part of it is another exception to the rule contained in Sec. 19(1) and that its latter part is an exception within exception, i.e. removes it from the exception in certain circumstances. The grounds on which an election can be challenged are enumerated in sub-Sec. (1). Since a right of appeal is a creation of statute, no appeal lies except as provided for; in other words, the grounds enumerated in sub-Sec. (1) are exhaustive. There is nothing in it to suggest that they are only some of the grounds and that the other grounds are to be found in the remaining part of the section or elsewhere. Sub-Sec. (2) starts with the sentence that the election shall not be questioned and clearly this provision supplies an exception to sub-Sec. (1). There would have been no necessity of sub-See. (2), unless the grounds mentioned in it were included in the grounds enumerated in sub-Sec. (1). If those grounds were different from any of the grounds mentioned in sub-Sec. (1), it would have been unnecessary to lay down that an election cannot be challenged on those grounds. Once it is accepted that an election can be challenged only on the grounds mentioned in sub-Sec. (1), it follows that it cannot be challenged on any other ground and there would have been no necessity of specifying two of other grounds in sub-section (2) and of saying that an election cannot be challenged on either of them. The second part of the ground mentioned in Sec. 19(1) (b) is wide enough to cover both the grounds mentioned in sub-Sec. (2). If some voters who cast their votes in favour of a successful candidate were really not qualified to vote and if they had not been allowed to vote or if their votes had been disregarded the successful candidate would not have secured a majority of votes, it is a case of his being not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes and his election could be challenged under Sec. 19(1) (b) on that ground. The legislature, however, thought it better not to allow the election to be challenged on that ground and, therefore, enacted Sec. 19(2) (a). The legislature, however, thought it better not to allow the election to be challenged on that ground and, therefore, enacted Sec. 19(2) (a). Similarly if the result of any non-compliance with the Act or the Rules or of any error, irregularity or informality was that a candidate received votes which but for the non-compliance, error, irregularity or informality he would not have received and if but for those votes he would not have received a majority of votes, it would be a case of his being not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes and again his election could be challenged on that ground under Sec. 19(1) (b). The legislature did not want an election to be challenged on this ground also and so enacted Sec. 19(2) (b), making another exception to the law contained in sub-Sec. (1); but here the exception was to be operative only if the non-compliance, mistake, error, irregularity, or informality did not materially affect the result of the election. If the non-compliance, mistake, error etc. materially affected the result, the election was allowed to be challenged under Sec. 19(1) (b). Any non-compliance, mistake, error etc. which materially affected the result of the election is thus not a new ground provided by the legislature for challenging an election; it is a ground covered by the phrase "for any other reason was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes." We respectfully differ from the interpretation placed on Sec. 19(2) by Mootham and Sapru, JJ. in Kailash Chand v. H.N. Agarwala, AIR 1954 Allahabad 219 : 1953 ALJ 619. It is unnecessary to say anything more regarding the decision in that case because the facts there were different and the learned Judges did not have to deal with effect of wrong entries in an electoral roll. 8. The ground that the name of a person qualified to vote has been omitted from, or that the name of a person not qualified to vote has been inserted in, an electoral roll is a ground mentioned in Sec. 19(2) (a); if the omission or the insertion arises from any non-compliance with the Act or any rule, or from any error, irregularity or informality on the part of the officer charged with the preparation and maintenance of the electoral roll, it also comes within the scope of 19 (2) (b). The prohibition on the raising of the ground mentioned in sub-Sec. (2) (a) is absolute or unconditional and in no circumstance can the election be challenged on the ground of the omission or the insertion. It is immaterial that the omission or the insertion arises out of any-non-compliance with the Act or any error, irregularity or informality; no matter how it arises, it cannot be made a ground for challenging the election. This means that if a ground comes within sub-Sec. (2) (a), it cannot be allowed to be taken even if it comes within sub-Sec. (2) (b) and the result of the election has been materially affected. If there is a clash between the provisions (2) (a) and (2) (b), the provision (2) (b) will give way to the provision (2) (a). Opposite-party no. 2 cannot rely upon the provision in 2 (b) if the case is covered also by the provision (2) (a). When one provision absolutely forbids the doing of an act and another provision merely permits the act to be done, both can be given effect to only by not doing the act. In Tahir Husain v. Ikram Khan, AIR 1931 Allahabad 26 : 1930 ALJ 763 Boys and Pullan, JJ. laid down that "in the presence of Sec. 19(2) (a), Sec. 19(2) (b) can have no application." We are, therefore, of the opinion that the opposite-party cannot challenge the petitioner's election on the ground of the entries nos. 2130 to 2422 being against the substantive law. The Tribunal, opposite-party no. 1, must take the entries in the electoral roll as correct and the electors, as qualified to vote, and must treat the votes cast by them, if otherwise in order, as lawful votes. It has no jurisdiction to treat their votes as unlawful only on the ground that they were not qualified to vote. 9. The words "for any other reason was not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes" are wide enough to cover non-compliance with the substantive law as well as non-compliance with the adjective law resulting in a majority of unlawful votes. If the successful candidate received votes of persons who were not qualified to vote at all, it is a case of his being elected by a majority of unlawful votes. If the successful candidate received votes of persons who were not qualified to vote at all, it is a case of his being elected by a majority of unlawful votes. Similarly it he is successful because of votes cast in his favour by persons qualified to vote but whose names were entered in the electoral roll in an irregular manner or without the prescribed procedure being followed, it is equally a case of his being not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes. If the name of a person is omitted from an electoral roll even though he is qualified to vote, the election of the successful candidate cannot be challenged on the ground of the omission, vide sub-Sec. (2). There is a certain procedure prescribed for that person's name being inserted in the electoral roll and it cannot lawfully be inserted in it without the procedure being followed. If it is inserted without the prescribed procedure being followed and his vote cast in favour of the successful candidate gives him a majority of votes, it can be said to be a case of the successful candidate's being not duly elected by a majority of lawful votes. The elector's vote is not lawful because though he was qualified to vote, his name was illegally inserted of the electoral roll i.e. there was non-compliance with the adjective law. What is excepted out of 19(1) (b) by the provision contained in (2) (a) is the ground of the infringement of the substantive law and not that of the adjective law resulting in the insertion of the name of any person not qualified to vote. The reason why (2) (a) does not create an exception in favour of the ground that the adjective law was infringed resulting in the insertion is that all infringements of adjective law are provided for in the provision (2) (b). If the name of a person qualified to vote has been inserted in the electoral roll in contravention of the adjective law, the ground that it was wrongly inserted is one covered by Sec. 19 (l) (b) and, if the insertion has materially affected the result of the election, by Sec. 19(2) (b) also, but not by Sec. 19(2) (a), Sec, 19(2) (a) cannot apply if the person entered in the electoral roll is qualified to vote, howsoever irregularly his name might have been entered in it. 10. In Mohiuddin v. The Election Tribunal for Town Area, 1959 A.L.J. 169 the Full Bench has expressed a contrary view. Raghubar Dayal, J. observed at page 173 that "a lawful vote is one which is cast by a person who had the right to vote in circumstances which do not in any way invalidate the vote." He was of the opinion that the vote cast by a person whose name is entered in the electoral roll is a lawful vote even though he was not qualified to vote and his name could not be entered in the roll or his name had been entered in it in an irregular manner. With great respect we cannot agree that a lawful vote is a vote cast by a person whose name is in the electoral roll regardless of the substantive or the adjective law. We find it difficult to accept that the vote of a person who is not at all qualified to vote becomes lawful merely because erroneously his name is entered in the electoral roll. An error cannot make anything lawful. Once it is accepted that sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 19 creates exceptions to sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 19, it would become obvious that an objection that the vote was cast by a person not qualified to vote is an objection that, his vote was unlawful. Chaturvedi, J also took the same view, saying that it is no straining of language to say that the vote of a person whose name is entered in the electoral roll is a lawful vote. Jagdish Sahai,dissented. We do not feel ourselves hound in this case by the view expressed by the majority because the case dealt with the U.P. Town Areas Act, 1914, and not Sec. 19, Municipalities Act. The Full Bench discussed the provisions of Sec. 19 of the Municipalities Act because of their similarity with rule 48 of the Rules made under the U.P. Town Areas Act. Whatever interpretation was put by the learned Judges on the language used in Sec. 19 of the Municipalities Act was by way of obiter. 11. The objection of opposite-party no. 2 to the election of the petitioner is on the ground of infringement of the substantive law and the adjective law both. Whatever interpretation was put by the learned Judges on the language used in Sec. 19 of the Municipalities Act was by way of obiter. 11. The objection of opposite-party no. 2 to the election of the petitioner is on the ground of infringement of the substantive law and the adjective law both. The ground of infringement of the substantive law is barred by Sec. 19 (2) (a); the ground of infringement of the adjective law would be untenable unless it is pleaded that the result of the election was materially affect ed by the infringement. There is a distinct allegation by opposite-party no. 2 that about 200 electors of the disputed entries in the electoral roll cast their votes in the petitioner's favour; if they had not been allowed to vote the petitioner would not have received their votes and would have failed in the election. The margin between his votes and the votes secured by the opposite-party was of only 33. There is thus the plea that the result of the petitioner's election was materially affected by the irregular insertion of the names of these voters in the electoral roll. The Election Tribunal cannot go into the question whether they were qualified to vote or not, but can go into the question whether their insertion in the electoral roll was a result of any non-compliance, error, irregularity etc. 12. Issue 1 seems to refer to the infringement of the adjective law; so do issues 2 (a), 2 (b), 4, 8, 11 and 15. Opposite-party no. 2 can challenge the petitioner's election on the grounds covered by these issues and opposite-party no. 1 has jurisdiction to try them. Issue 9 (a) is clearly outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Issue 16 is one relating to the procedure at the trial and not to the question whether the election can be challenged on a certain ground or not. Issue 3 seems to be outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal but no relief is sought in respect of it in this petition and, therefore, we say nothing about it. In the result we find that the Tribunal, opposite-party no. 1, is prohibited from trying only issue 9 (a). 13. There is no substance in the contention of opposite-party no. 2 that the order passed by the Election Tribunal refusing to try the issues as preliminary issues is an interlocutory order. In the result we find that the Tribunal, opposite-party no. 1, is prohibited from trying only issue 9 (a). 13. There is no substance in the contention of opposite-party no. 2 that the order passed by the Election Tribunal refusing to try the issues as preliminary issues is an interlocutory order. The question whether an order is an interlocutory order or final order arises when it is sought to be quashed by a certiorari; a High Court may refuse to quash an interlocutory order by a certiorari. No such question arises in respect of a writ of prohibition. A prohibition goes to a tribunal; there is no question of quashing any order. Even if a Tribunal has decided by an order that it has jurisdiction in the matter, the older does not require to be quashed, and the High Court cart issue a prohibition for bidding it to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. If a tribunal threatens to act without jurisdiction, it can be prohibited from acting and it can be prohibited even though it has decided by an order that it has jurisdiction the order does not stand in need of being quashed by a certiorari. A prohibition is always issued while a matter is pending before a tribunal; if the tribunal has passed a final order there would arise no question of issuing a prohibition though there may arise a question of issuing a certiorari to quash its final order. It was observed by Lord Goddard, C. J. in R. v. Comptroller-General of patents, (1953) 1 A.E.L.R. 862, at page 866 that "if the defect of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the proceedings, the order of prohibition must go as of right and is not a matter of discretion." In Sewpujanrai v. Collector of Customs, A.I.R. 1958 (S.C.) 845 S. K. Das, J. observed at page 855 that "It is well settled that where proceedings in an inferior court or tribunal are partly within and partly without its jurisdiction, prohibition will lie against doing what is in excess of jurisdiction." Another objection taken by opposite-party no. 2 is that there is no question of jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal and that its decision that it can try all the issues may be a wrong decision but is not amenable to a writ of certiorari. 2 is that there is no question of jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal and that its decision that it can try all the issues may be a wrong decision but is not amenable to a writ of certiorari. As regards the order of the Tribunal that it can try all the issues, it is its decision and it has arrived at it in the course of its jurisdiction, but the question of jurisdiction is involved when it proceeds to try the issue. After deciding that it has jurisdiction to try them it will proceed to try them and if in law it has no jurisdiction to try them it is a case of its exercising jurisdiction not vested in it and it can be restrained by a prohibition. 14. The petitioner raised the plea of acquiescence before us. We have nothing to do with it. Whether the doctrine of acquiescence applies against opposite-party no. 2 or not is a matter to be seen in the election petition; the plea of acquiescence is by way of defence to the election petition. If such a plea is properly raised before opposite-party no. 1, it will consider it on merits. We are not concerned with it in this petition. 15. The first two successful candidates are not parties to the election petition, but the effect of not impleading them is not before us in this petition. It seems that because the petitioner was the third successful candidate, opposite-party no. 2 could get himself declared elected in place of him only. If he succeeds in the petition, the election of the petitioner would be set aside and opposite-party no. 2 might be declared to be duly elected in his place. That seems to explain why he did not implead the first two successful candidates, who had secured larger numbers of votes than the petitioner. Three persons had to be declared elected. Only opposite-party no. 2 in this petition claimed that he should be declared elected, so the election of only one of the three successful candidates could be set aside on his petition and he chose the petitioner. It would be for him to make out that he should be declared duly elected in place of the petitioner; the election petition cannot fail on the ground that the other two successful candidates have not been impleaded. 16. In the result we prohibit opposite-party no. It would be for him to make out that he should be declared duly elected in place of the petitioner; the election petition cannot fail on the ground that the other two successful candidates have not been impleaded. 16. In the result we prohibit opposite-party no. 1 from trying issue 9 (a) only and refuse the other reliefs. Since the petition fails substantially, we order the petitioner to pay costs of opposite-party no. 2.