Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. This second appeal by defendant No. 1 arises out of a suit for damages for malicious prosecution; which has been decreed by the Courts below. The plaintiffs-respondents claimed Rs. 500.00 by way of damages. The Courts have granted him a decree for Rs. 300.00 only. 2. The facts are these :- Krishna Chandra Sahu, father of defendant No. 1, was killed in the night of the 2nd of November, 1954, Defendant No. 1 lodged a first information report before the police for prosecution of the respondents on the allegation that, when attacked, his father cried for help and defendant No. 1 rushed to the place of occurrence, and that he found the plaintiffs running away. It was further alleged that his father cried out that the Tripathies, namely, the plaintiffs, were killing him. Defendant No. 1 further stated that he had identified the accused by the light of the torch he carried with him. The plaintiffs were tried by the Additional Sessions Judge of Jamshedpur, and were eventually acquitted of the charge of murder on the 12th of October, 1955. Thereafter they filed the present suit for damages on the ground that defendant No. 1 instituted the criminal case against them out of malice and without reasonable and probable cause. 3. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondents. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the entire finding of the appellate Court was vitiated because of lack of independent consideration of the evidence about murder. He urged that the defendants had adduced evidence to prove that murder had in fact been committed by the plaintiffs-respondents, and there was reasonable and probable cause. The lower appellate court has not considered that evidence and has based his Conclusion partly on the findings reached by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the Sessions trial. In my opinion, this contention is well founded. The learned Subordinate Judge, who heard the appeal, has not at all considered the evidence adduced by the defendants, and he has rested his conclusion on the findings of the learned Additional Sessions Judge as will appear from the following observations:- "It is not for me to go into the details of other evidence connected with the murder case. The learned Subordinate Judge, who heard the appeal, has not at all considered the evidence adduced by the defendants, and he has rested his conclusion on the findings of the learned Additional Sessions Judge as will appear from the following observations:- "It is not for me to go into the details of other evidence connected with the murder case. Witnesses in the murder case for the prosecution have been examined in this case by the defendants to show that there was reasonable and probable cause but the learned Sessions Judge had found that it was not possible for the defendant No. 1 to have identified these plaintiffs near the place of occurrence and the same conclusion from the evidence adduced in this case is arrived at". This was an entirely wrong approach. It was incumbent upon the learned Additional, Sessions (Subordinate ?) Judge to Consider the evidence afresh and come to an independent conclusion whether or not there was reasonable and probable cause for defendant No. 1 to institute the murder case. If any authority is needed I would refer to a decision of a Bench of this court in the case of Nagendra Kumar V/s. Etwari Sahu, 1957 BLJR 546 : ( AIR 1958 Pat 329 ). It has been laid down there that the judgment of the Criminal Court is in no way binding upon the Civil Court in a suit for damages for malicious prosecution, and, therefore, that such a judgment is admissible to show who were the wit-nesses examined by the parties and what documents were produced in that case, when the existence of such documents and non-examination of such witnesses were challenged in the civil action, but it is not admissible for the purpose of proving malice and want of probable and reasonable cause. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge has acted exactly contrary to the principle of Jaw which governs a suit for malicious prosecution. 5. Apart from this, he has found that there was a long standing enmity between the plaintiffs on one hand and defendant No. 1 and his father on the other. That is no doubt an evidence of malice, but that also affords a probable motive for the plaintiffs to commit the offence of murder. 5. Apart from this, he has found that there was a long standing enmity between the plaintiffs on one hand and defendant No. 1 and his father on the other. That is no doubt an evidence of malice, but that also affords a probable motive for the plaintiffs to commit the offence of murder. It will be recalled that the first information report was based upon what defendant No. 1 had heard his father uttering at the time of the incident. There is absolutely no material on the record to falsify this aspect of the prosecution case. It may be that the evidence was not sufficient for establishing the charge of murder. But there appears to be no reason why the evidence should not be regarded as constituting a justifiable ground for instituting the criminal case. As laid down in the case of Nagendra Kumar, 1957 BLJR 546 : ( AIR 1958 Pat 329 ) referred to above, in a suit for malicious prosecution the question of reasonable and probable cause depends not upon the actual existence, but upon the reasonable and bona fide belief in the existence of such a state of things as would justify the course pursued in making the accusation complained of. Their Lordships have further pointed out that a man is not bound, before-instituting a proceeding, to see that he has only evidence as would be legally sufficient to secure a conviction. Neither is it necessary that the defendant should act only on legal evidence, and inquire into everything at first hand. It is sufficient if he proceeds on such information as a prudent and cautious man may reasonably accept in the ordinary affairs of life, and it is for the plaintiff to show that there was want of proper care in testing that information. When I judge the evidence in the light of these observations, I think the plaintiffs have failed to establish by satisfactory evidence that there was no reasonable and probable cause. At one time I thought of remanding the case to the Court below for a fresh decision; but I find that it will serve no useful purpose. There is absolute lack of legal evidence to prove lack of reasonable and probable cause, even, assuming that malice existed between the parties. 6. I would, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. There is absolute lack of legal evidence to prove lack of reasonable and probable cause, even, assuming that malice existed between the parties. 6. I would, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. The parties will bear their own costs throughout.