Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J.- I have had the benefit of perusing the judgment just now delivered by my learned brother and with all due respect, I regret I am unable to agree with my learned brother in the conclusions arrived at by him. This appeal is against the Order of Rajagopalan, J., in W.P. No. 467 of 1957. The 3rd respondent in the said Writ Petition is the appellant. Though the facts have been set out in great detail by my learned brother, still I would like to set them out in my own way. The appellant, Messrs. Swamy Motor Transport (Private) Ltd., Tanjore, is one of the bus operators in the District of Tanjore. He was operating 11 buses on the route between Tanjore and Kumbakonam, via, Papanasam, a distance of 25 miles. Another operator, Sri Rama Vilas Service (Private) Ltd., was operating as many as six buses on the same route, Tanjore to Kumbakonam. The first respondent in this appeal, Messrs. Raman & Raman (Private) Ltd., is another operator who was operating 10 buses on the route between Kumbakonam to Tiruvarur via Kodavasal and Rama Vilas Service was also plying 4 buses on this latter route. While the distance of the route between Tanjore and Kumbakonam is 25 miles, the distance of the route between Kumbakonam and Tiruvarur via Kodavasal is 24 miles. Some years ago, the Respondent is said to have plied some buses between Kodavasal and Koradachery a distance of seven miles, as shown in the plan furnished by the parties, but had ceased to do so since 1943. Sometime in 1955 the Respondent applied to the Regional Transport Authority for sanction of a route between Kodavasal and Koradachery and for grant of a permit to ply a bus on the said route. It is stated that the present appellant intervened and objected to the proposal. As could be gathered from the report made by the Deputy Transport Commissioner State Transport Authorities, to the Secretary to Government, Home Department, Fort St. George, Madras, in No. Lr. 33853-E. 2/56, dated 19th October, 1956, this application was rejected after notification of the application under section 57 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act by the Regional Transport Authority under the following resolution dated 16th April, 1956. “Heard the applicant. George, Madras, in No. Lr. 33853-E. 2/56, dated 19th October, 1956, this application was rejected after notification of the application under section 57 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act by the Regional Transport Authority under the following resolution dated 16th April, 1956. “Heard the applicant. This has already been considered on 30th December, 1955 and was not recommended due to Divisional Engineer (High Ways) conditional recommendation and the applicant also agrees with this view now. Hence rejected.” The Respondent thereupon appealed on 25th May, 1956, to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal against the decision of the Regional Transport Authority. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, in its order, R. No. 24344/A-2/56, set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated 16th April, 1956 and remanded the matter for fresh disposal in the light of the observations made by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. It is now stated that the Regional Transport Authority heard the matter on remand and, once again, rejected the application of the Respondent for the new route, Kodavasal to Koradachery and refused to grant a permit therefor. Apparently, further proceedings in respect of this order of the Regional Transport Authority have not yet terminated. We are not, however, concerned with these pending proceedings in this appeal. On the 4th of January, 1956, the Appellant before us applied to the Regional Transport Authority for grant of a variation of the route, Tanjore to Kumbakonam via Papanasam into a route, Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal and for a permit in respect of his two buses, namely, M.D.O. 1081 and M.D.O. 1100. These two buses were among the 11 buses that were being plied by the Appellant on the route, Tanjore to Kumbakonam via Papanasam. This application appears to have been notified straightway under section 57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act on the 6th of April, 1956. This notification was however cancelled subsequently and on the 14th March, 1956, the application of the Appellant was notified under section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The procedure to be observed in respect of notifications under this section has been provided by way of Standing Orders in the shape of G.O. Misc. 4912, Home, dated 18th December, 1950, and G.O. Ms. No. 382, dated 3rd February, 1956, apart from what is contained in the section itself. The procedure to be observed in respect of notifications under this section has been provided by way of Standing Orders in the shape of G.O. Misc. 4912, Home, dated 18th December, 1950, and G.O. Ms. No. 382, dated 3rd February, 1956, apart from what is contained in the section itself. To this notification under section 47 of the said Act the 1st Respondent preferred an objection on the 30th March, 1956. By a resolution dated 21st May, 1956, the Regional Transport Authority decided to drop the proposal for the variation or extension of the route. It is not necessary to extract the terms of the resolution here but the admitted fact is that this resolution was not communicated to any of the parties concerned, it being conceded by both sides as held by a series of decisions that the ground for such non-communication of the resolution passed under section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act being that an order passed under section 47 was purely an administrative one and was not one which decided the rights or claims of any of the parties concerned. Such a decision on the rights or •claims of the parties which alone is a judicial one is made only after the entire procedure under section 57 is gone through. It has also been held that the procedure under section 47 is merely to decide whether or not it is necessary in the interests of the public to vary or extend any route without reference to any particular operator ; whereas the procedure under section 57 is with a view to decide which operator is to be given the variation of route in respect of which buses, if the proposal to vary or extend is approved of and the order passed is a judicial one. A point was taken in the course of arguments before us that when there was no recommendation made by the Regional Transport Authority as to the opening of a new route or of an extension of an existing route under section 47 and when the proposal had not received the approval of the Transport Commissioner, as required by the G.Os. referred to above, the Regional Transport Authority could not have the power further to consider the grant of a permit or variation of a permit for a new route or extension of a route respectively. referred to above, the Regional Transport Authority could not have the power further to consider the grant of a permit or variation of a permit for a new route or extension of a route respectively. It may be stated that this point is not quite relevant to the issue before us, for even if the Transport Authority decided not to recommend the proposal and did not obtain the sanction of the Transport Commissioner, it does not absolve it from the obligation to notify the application, to receive objections and to hear parties under section 57 before the application is disposed of. The action under section 47 being only exploratory and advisory, the orders of Government in this behalf are not mandatory in their effect. Thereafter on the 31st May, 1956, the Regional Transport Authority notified the application of the appellant for extension or variation of the route under section 57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, fixing the date for receipt of objections from the interested parties. It is common ground that while Sri Rama Vilas Service, Kumbakonam, put in an objection to the application of the appellant for grant of extension of route, Tanjore to Kumbakonam via Papanasam up to Koradachery via Kodavasal, the Respondent did not choose to file any such objection to the said application of the appellant notified on the 31st May, 1956. This failure on the part of the 1st Respondent it was sought to be explained by learned counsel, Mr. Nambiar for the 1st Respondent, was due to the reason that notwithstanding the fact that the first respondent was a registered bus operator having paid the prescribed fee, and on that account entitled to receive copies of all notifications from the Regional Transport Authority, he did not receive a copy of the notification in question and hence could not put in his representation. This argument is not convincing and it is also being put forward only in this Court and without any material in support therefor. It transpires that a mahazar from the village of Kamugakudi, the first signatory thereto being one Sri Jagannadha Vandayar, was also received by the Regional Transport Authority. At the hearing held on the 26th of July, 1956, the Regional Transport Authority passed the following resolution:- “Heard the parties. Koradacheri is connected by rail with Tanjore and existing road facilities between Kumbakonam and Kodavasal are adequate. At the hearing held on the 26th of July, 1956, the Regional Transport Authority passed the following resolution:- “Heard the parties. Koradacheri is connected by rail with Tanjore and existing road facilities between Kumbakonam and Kodavasal are adequate. The proposed variation is not the best method of providing traffic facilities between Koradacheri and Kodavasal in the public interest. Hence the application is rejected.” The resolution was signed by the Regional Transport Authority only on the 29th July, 1956, as could be seen from the copy of the resolution furnished to this Court. This resolution is said to have been communicated to the appellant only on the 10th of August, 1956. It transpires however that even long prior to the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority dated 29th July, 1956, rejecting the application of the appellant for extension of the route in question, Sri Varadan, M.L.A. and Sri M. D. Thyagaraja Pillai, M.L.A. had petitioned to the Minister for Transport, Government of Madras, urging upon the Minister to examine and consider the question of providing through transport facilities between Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal in the one case and for providing through transport facilities between Kumbakonam to Koradachery and Tanjore to Nagapattinam via Kodavasal in the other, for the benefit of the travelling public, so that the public may have easy and quick mode of transport. The petition of Sri Varadan, M.L.A., appears to have been received by the Minister on 18th July, 1956, while the petition of Sri Thyagaraja Pillai, M.L.A., who is also said to be the President of the District Congress Committee was received on the 15th July, 1956. On the 6th August, 1956, the appellant also sent in an application to the Ministry of Transport, Madras, under section 43-A (2) as amended by the Madras Act XXXIX of 1954. In his petition the appellant prayed that the Government may be pleased to take the facts and circumstances mentioned in his petition into account and to direct the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, for extending the existing service performed by buses Nos. M.D.O. 1081 and 1100 between Tanjore-Kumbakonam, to Koradacheri via Kodavasal and for such further or other order as may seem fit and the nature of the case may require. M.D.O. 1081 and 1100 between Tanjore-Kumbakonam, to Koradacheri via Kodavasal and for such further or other order as may seem fit and the nature of the case may require. The facts set out in all these three petitions referred to above only go to establish the pressing need that existed, at the time for providing easy, quick and through transport facilities between Tanjore and Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal on the one hand, and Tanjore and Nagapattinam via Koradacheri on the other. Whether or not the petitions of Sri Varadan and Sri. Thyagaraja Pillai were instigated by the Appellant is not relevant in the present context and there is also no evidence whatever to prove that these two members of the Legislative Assembly made representations to the Minister for Transport at the instance of or for the benefit of the Appellant. Therefore, it would only be fair to assume that the two members of the Legislative Assembly have been acting on their own behalf and in the interest of the generality of the travelling public whom they had the privilege to represent in the Assembly. It is significant however to note that these petitions were made very much prior to the decision of the Regional Transport Authority, rejecting the application of the Appellant for extension of the route and even before the decision of the Regional Transport Authority was communicated to the appellant himself. It is also obvious that these two members of the Legislative Assembly and the appellant were moving the Government only under section 43-A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, though the petitions of the M.L.As. in terms did not say so, whereas the petition of the appellant makes it quite clear that his petition was only under section 43-A (2) of the Act. Mr. Nambiar called in question the propriety of the two M.L.As. making representations and the Appellant himself petitioning to the Government and the Government entertaining such a petition from the Appellant. I am unable to see any impropriety in the action taken by the members of the Legislature or by the Appellant or in the Government entertaining such representations and petitions when made to it, in the circumstances then existing. I shall revert to it at a later stage. I am unable to see any impropriety in the action taken by the members of the Legislature or by the Appellant or in the Government entertaining such representations and petitions when made to it, in the circumstances then existing. I shall revert to it at a later stage. On receipt of the said two petitions from the two members of the Legislative Assembly and from the appellant, the Government of Madras called for a report from the Deputy Transport Commissioner, the State Transport Authority, as to the need for extension of the route as Tanjore to Koradachery. After investigating into the representations made by the two M.L.As. and the appellant, the Deputy Transport Commissioner, State Transport Authority, Egmore, Madras, submitted a report to the Secretary, Home Deportment, Fort Saint Geroge, Madras, No. Lr. 33853 E/2/56 dated 19th October, 1956. The entire history of the case was also set out in the report of the Deputy Transport Commissioner. At the conclusion of his report the Deputy Transport Commissioner made the following submissions:- "Thus from the above it will be seen, that Sri Varadan, Member of the Legislative Assembly and Sri M.D. Thiyagaraja Pillai, Member of the Legislative Assembly, and Sri Swami Motor Transports (Private) Ltd., Tanjore, have stressed the need for providing transport facilities between Tanjore and Koradacheri (via) Kumbakonam and Kodavasal. If the contention that there should be direct transport facilities between Tanjore to Koradacheri (via) Kumbakonam and Kodavasal is to be conceded, then this can be achieved only by opening of a new route from Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal. In the circumstances, the Government may be pleased to decide the issue." It will be seen from this report that the only issue that had to be decided by the Government was whether or not provision should be made for direct transport facilities between Tanjore and Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal by the opening of a new route from Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal. It is true that when the Government considered the said representations of the two M.L.As., and the appellant and the report of the Deputy Transport Commissioner, the Appellant had not mentioned about the rejection of his application for an extension of the route by the Regional Transport Authority for the obvious reason that he had no notice of it when he filed his petition. The Deputy Transport Commissioner however had brought to the notice of the Government, not only the rejection of the Appellant’s application for extension of the route between Tanjore and Kumbakonam but, also the pendency of the revision petition which had by then been preferred by the appellant before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Even so, the Appellant, it has to be fairly stated, could not have mentioned the pendency of any revision petition dated the 10th September, 1956 preferred by him before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in his petition before the Government dated 6th August, 1956 for much the same reason, namely, that at the time he petitioned to the Government under section 43-A (2), he had not received any communication from the Regional Transport Authority about the rejection of his petition. It is worth repetition that his application as stated already before the Government was on the 6th August, 1956, whereas the rejection of his application was communicated to him by the Regional Transport Authority only on the 10th August. So also, at the time he filed the revision before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the Government had not yet issued the G.O., namely, 3199, Home Department, dated 16th November, 1956, and he could not have also made any reference to the said G.O. in his revision petition before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, for while the revision petition was filed on the 10th September, the G.O. was passed only on the 16th November. All arguments based on such failure of the Appellant against the validity of the Government Order, namely, the G.O. No. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956, seem to me to be only futile and without substance. After taking into consideration the representations made by the two M.L.As. and the appellant and the report of the Deputy Transport Commissioner with reference to the conditions specified in section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Government passed the G.O.Ms.No.3199, dated 16th November, 1956, impugned in W.P. No.18 of 1957. This G.O. was passed without hearing any of the parties but solely on the representations before the Government and the report of the Deputy Transport Commissioner. This G.O. was passed without hearing any of the parties but solely on the representations before the Government and the report of the Deputy Transport Commissioner. The operative portion of the said G.O. is in the following terms:- "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 43-A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (Central Act IV of 1939) the Government of Madras hereby directs the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, to vary the existing route Tanjore to Kumbakonam as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal in respect of two buses." This G.O. appears to have been communicated only to the Transport Commissioner,. Madras, the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, the Regional Transport Officer, Tanjore, Sri Varadan, M.L.A., Kumbakonam, Sri M.D. Thyagaraja Pillai, M.L.A., Koradachery, Tanjore, and M/s. Swami Motor Transports (Private) Ltd., Marunthattangudi Post, Tanjore. This was because all these parties having made representations were entitled to know their final disposal by the Government. The 1st Respondent was not a party to the proceedings before the Government, as he had made no representations to the Government and so no copy was communicated to him. The Government was not compelled by any provisions of law to issue a copy to the 1st Respondent. In the meanwhile, a month after, the resolution of the Regional Transport Authority dated 29th July, 1956 was communicated to the Appellant, the Appellant preferred the revision before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 10th September, 1956. It may be noted that at the time the G.O.Ms.No.3199, dated 16th November, 1956, was passed by the Government, the revision filed by the Appellant before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was actually pending. This revision petition, it is seen from the proceedings of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, was once returned and later represented by the Appellant on the 10th October, 1956. It is to be observed that Sri Rama Vilas Service (not before us) also made a representation on the 27th November, 1956, to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal against the revision petition of the Appellant before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. But so far as the 1st Respondent is concerned, he did not make any representation against the revision petition of the Appellant until so late as 4th December, 1956. But so far as the 1st Respondent is concerned, he did not make any representation against the revision petition of the Appellant until so late as 4th December, 1956. It is conceded by Counsel on both sides that this representation of the Respondent to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal against the revision filed by the Appellant was beyond the prescribed time. It has, however, to be remembered that this belated representation made by the Respondent was, nevertheless, taken into consideration by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, when it considered and passed the order in favour of the Appellant in its proceedings dated the 13th May, 1957, now impugned in W.P.No. 467 of 1957 and out of which this appeal has arisen. It is also to be noted that while the Appellant had preferred his revision petition before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal long before the G.O. dated the 16th November, 1956, was passed by the Government, both Sri Rama Vilas Service (Private) Ltd. and the present 1st Respondent had preferred their objections to the revision petition of the Appellant only long after the G.O. was issued by the Government. It must be presumed that both had knowledge of the G.O. in the ordinary course of events. After the issue of the G.O. Ms.No. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956 the Appellant is said to have presented a fresh application on the 19th November, 1956, to the Regional Transport Authority to grant him variation of the conditions of the permit for two other buses of his, namely, MDO Nos. 1959 and 1960. That application seems to have been notified by the Regional Transport Authority on the 19th February, 1957, under section 57 (3) of the Act. The 1st Respondent objected this time to the grant of the variation of permits to the Appellant. The Regional Transport Authority, after going through the procedure under section 57, granted on the 30th of April, 1957, the variation asked for by the Appellant in respect of his two buses, MDO Nos. 1959 and 1960. As against this, the 1st Respondent has preferred a revision before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which is said to be still pending. The Regional Transport Authority, after going through the procedure under section 57, granted on the 30th of April, 1957, the variation asked for by the Appellant in respect of his two buses, MDO Nos. 1959 and 1960. As against this, the 1st Respondent has preferred a revision before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which is said to be still pending. Not being satisfied with this, it is stated that the 1st Respondent filed another W.P. N0.432 of 1957 before this Court and this Writ Petition appears to have been dismissed on the 8th November, 1957, for the reason that his alternative remedy, namely, a revision petition filed before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was still pending. Consequent upon the dismissal of W.P.N0.432 of 1957, the stay granted by this Court against the plying of the two buses by the Appellant was also vacated. In the result, the other two buses of the Appellant, MDO Nos. 1959 and 1960 which are not covered by W.P. No. 467 of 1957 are stated to be now plying on the extended route, Tanjore to Koradachery via Kodavasal. We are not, in the present appeal, concerned with the permits granted to these two other buses of the Appellant. On the 7th of January, 1957, about two months after the G.O. Ms. No. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956, was passed by the Government giving direction to the Regional Transport Authority under section 43-A (2), the 1st Respondent challenged the validity of this G.O. in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 under Article 226 of the Constitution. The present Appellant was third Respondent in that petition. The 1st Respondent had prayed in the said Writ Petition, W.P.No. 18 of 1957, for a writ of mandamus and other appropriate reliefs and orders. This Writ Petition was dismissed by Rajagopalan, J., on the 2nd April, 1957, by an elaborate order in which every one of the prayers of the 1st Respondent was rejected as untenable and in respect of which no relief could be granted. On the question of the validity of the G.O. however, the learned Judge declared accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent, that the Government exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon it by section 43-A (2) when it purported to limit the use of a portion of the extended route Tanjore to Koradachery in respect of “only two buses” . The propriety of this order of Rajagopalan, J., has been the subject of much argument on both sides, in the course of this appeal and I shall revert to the consideration of the same at a later stage. It may however be mentioned at this stage, that no appeal was preferred against this order of Rajagopalan, J., in the said W.P.No.18 of 1957 by the present Appellant, for the obvious reason that the petition was dismissed in toto, without giving any relief to the 1st Respondent, except for the finding that the G.O. was in excess of the jurisdiction vested in the Government under section 43-A (2) and on that ground declaring that the G.O. was not valid. Sometime after this order in W.P.No.18 of 1957 was passed, that is, on the 13th May, 1957, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, in its proceedings in R. No. 47986/A3/56, dated the 13th May, 1957 on a consideration of the revision petition of the Appellant represented on the 10th of October, 1956, the representation dated 27th of November 1956, made by Sri Rama Vilas (Private) Ltd. and the representation dated 4th of December, 1956 made by the 1st Respondent in this appeal, passed an order setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority dated 29th of July, 1956 and allowing the revision petition of the Appellant and directing the Regional Transport Authority to grant the variation applied for by the Appellant in respect of his two buses, MDO Nos. 1081 and 1100. While passing this order, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal made a pointed reference to the petitions filed by the two M.L.As., namely, Sri Varadan and Thyagaraja Pillai, and the petition of the Appellant to the Government under section 43-A (2) which culminated in the issue of the G.O. Ms. No. 3199, dated 16th of November, 1956, directing the Regional Transport Authority to vary the existing route, Tanjore to Kumbakonam, into Tanjore to Koradachery in respect of two buses. No. 3199, dated 16th of November, 1956, directing the Regional Transport Authority to vary the existing route, Tanjore to Kumbakonam, into Tanjore to Koradachery in respect of two buses. After doing so, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal also referred to the writ petition filed by the 1st Respondent questioning the validity of the said G.O. and the terms thereof in the following terms:- “The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the Government had powers to issue the said Government Order by virtue of section 43-A (2) of the Act and the High Court refused to grant the writ of mandamus applied for by Sri Raman and Raman Limited.” After making these observations, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal considered exhaustively the merits of the case for and against the variation of the route and the issue of the permit in respect of the Appellant’s two buses, in a lengthy paragraph and concluded in the following terms:- “On a careful consideration of all the materials and contentions and the representations, I feel satisfied that the variation asked for by the petitioner is quite reasonable and is in the best interest of the travelling public particularly of the people residing on the sector Kodavasal and Koradachery and between Kumbakonam and Kodavasal. The Regional Transport Authority’s order has therefore to be set aside.” This order was communicated to all the parties that were before the Tribunal. It was against this order that the 1st Respondent filed W.P.No. 467 of 1957 on the 27th of May, 1957, questioning the validity of the order issued by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in its proceedings R.No. 47986/A3-56, dated 13th of May, 1957 on various grounds, which I shall presently, consider, and praying that the said order should be quashed and such further or other orders that may be necessary in the circumstances of the case may be passed. This writ petition along with other writ petitions Nos. This writ petition along with other writ petitions Nos. 464 and 484 of 1957, 450 of 1957 and 486 and 1957 came up for disposal before the learned Officiating Chief Justice on the 8th November, 1957, and in a common order in which one of the main questions, namely, whether the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to exercise any revisional powers after the 16th February, 1957, on which date section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act enacted and incorporated in the Act by Act C of 1956 was brought into force, was considered and the learned Offi- ciating Chief Justice held that the attack on the validity of the exercise of the jurisdiction the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had to revise the orders of the Regional Transport Authority failed. After this finding, W.P. No. 467 of 1957 was again posted for the further hearing in view of the representations made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there were several other features with reference to-each of these petitions still to be considered, and on the 19th September, 1957, the learned Officiating Chief Justice passed an order holding that the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 13th of May, 1957, was vitiated for the reason that it took into account G.O. Ms. No. 3199 as one of the relevant factors to be considered and thereupon set aside the said order. In passing the order, the learned Officiating Chief Justice also took into consideration a few other grounds for holding that the exercise of the revisional powers by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was vitiated. It is this order of the learned Officiating Chief Justice and the various grounds on which it is based, which now forms the subject-matter of the appeal before us. I shall now proceed to consider the various points urged by the counsel on both sides as to the validity or otherwise of the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal now impugned in the writ petition. The first point raised by Mr. G. R. Jagadisan, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, relates to the validity of the G.O. Ms. No. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956. The first point raised by Mr. G. R. Jagadisan, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, relates to the validity of the G.O. Ms. No. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956. That the Government is entitled to issue such orders and directions of a general nature as it may consider necesssary, in respect of any matter relating to road transport, to the Provincial Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority, and that such Transport Authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions cannot be and is not disputed. Section 43-A (1) expressly vests such powers in the State Government. Similarly, that the State Government, may on a consideration of the matters set forth in sub-section (1) of section 47, direct any Regional Transport: Authority or the State Transport Authority to open any new route or to extend an existing route or to permit additional stage carriages to be put, or to reduce the number of stage carriages on any specified route is also not disputed. Section 43-A (2) vests such powers in the State Government as per the amended section by enactment, namely, Madras Act XXXIX of 1954. If such power vests in the State Government to pass orders of the kind provided for by section 43-A (1) and (2), the question that arises is whether G.O. Ms. No. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956, was an order within the scope of the powers given by the section or it was outside the scope of the powers. Mr. Nambiar, appearing on behalf of the 1st Respondent, contended that the G.O. in question was outside the scope of the powers given to the State Government by section 43-A (1) and (2) had been decided in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 by Rajagopalan, J., and that the same question could not be canvassed before this Bench by the Appellants It was also urged by Mr. Nambiar that so far as the present appeal was concerned, it related only to the validity or otherwise of the impugned order passed by the State Appellate Tribunal on the 13th of May, 1957 and any issue with regard to the validity of the Government Order Ms. No. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956 did not arise and could not be agitated by the first Appellant in this appeal. Mr. No. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956 did not arise and could not be agitated by the first Appellant in this appeal. Mr. Jagadisan, the learned counsel for the Appellant, urged on the other hand, that in so far as the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 13th May, 1957, was held to be vitiated and invalid by reason of the reference to the G.O. in question, which had been held to be invalid and unlawful by Rajagopalan, J., it was open to him to urge before this Bench that the G.O. itself was not invalid, that the decision of the learned Judge on the question of its validity or otherwise was not operative as res judicata against the Appellant and that therefore any reference to the G.O. if the G.O. were proved to be a valid one, would not vitiate the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, Mr. Jagadisan contended that he was entitled to canvass for the validity of the G.O. itself before a reference to it could be held to be relevant and valid or otherwise. I think there is force in this contention. The learned Judge who decided W.P. No. 18 of 1957, having held in the first instance that the G.O. was unlawful and in the next instance that reference to the said G.O. in the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was a vitiating factor, the question as to the validity of the Government Order does arise though not directly for consideration in this appeal before this Bench. This Bench is, in my opinion, not precluded from examining the question as to how far the order of the Government is unlawful and how far the reference made by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to such an order had the effect of vitiating the order passed in revision by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. In Midnapur Zamindar Company v. Naresh Narayanan Roy1, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the findings that may be adverse to a defendant who succeeded in the case cannot be res judicata, and that the succeeding party will not be precluded from raising the question as to the validity of the findings of the Court adverse to him in subsequent proceedings. The following passage occurring at page 55 is relevant to the point:- “Their Lordships do not consider that this will found an actual plea of res judicata, for the defendants, having succeeced on the other plea, had no occasion to go further as to the finding against them; but it is the finding of a Court which was dealing with facts nearer to their ken than the facts are to the Board now, and it certainly creates a paramount duty on the Appellant to displace the finding, a duty which they have not been able to perform.” A Bench of this Court presided over by the learned Chief Justice and Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J., in Bapayya v. Ramakrishnayya2, had occasion to consider a case where a defendant was dissatisfied with certain statements made in the judgment which was filed in the appeal. In that case the decision in Krishnachandra Goldar v. Moheshchandra Saha3, was relied on. The learned Chief Justice held that that case had no application to the facts before them. In doing so, the learned Chief Justice made the following observations:- “In the first place, the trial Court accepted the plea of defendant 1 that the suit was not maintainable. He expressly asked for its dismissal and secured its dismissal with an order for costs in his favour. A party cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold, and defendant 1 having asked the Court to dismiss the plaintiff’s suit, must accept the dismissal. Moreover, there is nothing in the decree which affects defendant 1 adversely. No finding in the judgment of the District Munsif can operate as res judicata. The rights of the parties were left entirely untouched by the dismissal of the suit.” It is obvious that the appellant, in whose favour W.P. No. 18 of 1957 was dismissed, had no right of appeal and the findings against him in the said writ petition could not have been made the subject-matter of an appeal. Therefore as per the decision in Natesa Pillai v. Central Road Traffic Board4, the findings of Rajagopalan, J., in the said writ petition could not operate as res judicata as against the Appellant, so as to prevent him from raising the question of the validity of these findings in the present appeal. I do not find any force in the argument of Mr. I do not find any force in the argument of Mr. Nambiar that the validity of the G.O cannot be canvassed in this appeal as the learned Judge, Rajagopalan, J., had held it to be invalid or unlawful in the previous writ petition No. 18 of 1957. The contention however that in writ jurisdiction we have to go by the face of the order that has been impugned and that it cannot be supported on other grounds is a different matter and I shall revert to it at a later stage. The question that has to be determined at the outset then is as to how far the particular G.O. in question, namely, G.O. Ms. 1399, dated 16th November, 1956, could be considered to be one passed in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in the State Government under section 43-A (1). When once it is conceded that under section 43-A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the State Government has power to direct any Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority (1) to open any new route or (2) to extend an existing route or (3) to permit additional stage carriages to be put or (4) to reduce the number of stage carriages on any specified route, what remains to be examined is only whether the terms of the order of the Government in question are in any way in excess of the powers so given to the State Government and whether the said terms of the order infringe in any manner upon the exercise of the powers that are vested in the Regional Transport Authority or any other quasi-judicial Tribunal under sections 47 and 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act. A reading of the G.O. makes it clear that long prior to the petition submitted by the appellant to the Government for orders under section 43-A (2) the Government had received on 18th July, 1956, a representation from Sri Varadan, M.L.A. urging upon the Government to consider the question of providing easy and quick transport facilities between Tanjore and Koradachery. The Government record produced before us discloses that this petition was in due course referred to the Deputy Transport Commissioner, the State Transport Authority, for remarks. The Government record produced before us discloses that this petition was in due course referred to the Deputy Transport Commissioner, the State Transport Authority, for remarks. Again another representation dated the 15th of July, 1956, was received by the Government from another M.L.A. Sri Thyagaraja Pillai, who is also the President of the District Congress Committee, Tanjore, urging that the Government should consider the same question of providing easy transport facilities for the convenience of the travelling public between Tanjore and Koradachery. This petition appears also to have been referred to the Deputy Transport Commissioner for his report in due course. It was only after these two representations had been referred to the Deputy Transport Commissioner that the Appellant submitted his petition for a similar relief being provided to the travelling public between Tanjore and Koradachery. No doubt in his representation the appellant memoralised to the Government not merely to consider the need for extending the existing service Tanjore-Kumbakonam to Koradachery via Kodavasal, but also prayed that the Regional Transport Authority may be directed for extending the existing service performed by his two buses, MDO Nos. 1081 and 1100 between Tanjore-Kumbakonam to Koradacheri via Kodavasal. In the report received by the Government from the Deputy Transport Commissioner, the State Transport Authority, dated the 19th of October, 1956, after setting out the various events and facts that had occurred prior to his report, the specific recommendation of the Deputy Transport Commissioner was in the following terms, as seen from the concluding paragraph of his report already extracted: "Thus from the above it will be seen that Sri Varadan, member of Legislative Assembly, and Sri M. D. Thyagaraja Pillai, Member of Legislative Assembly, and Sri Swami Motor Transport (Private) Ltd., Tanjore, have stressed the need for providing transport facilities between Tanjore and Koradacheri via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal. If the contention that there should be direct transport facilities between Tanjore to Koradacheri via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal is to be conceded, then this can be achieved only by opening a new route from Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal.” (Italics are mine.) It has to be observed that the specific recommendation of the Deputy Transport Commissioner was only for opening of the new route from Tanjore to Koradacheri via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal and not with reference to any individual or specified buses. The preamble to the Government Order also makes it clear that what the Government was concerned with was only the suggestion that the existing route, Tanjore to Kumbakonam may be varied as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal and not the grant of the variation or permits to any particular operator or in respect of any particular buses of any operator. The Government has also stated in the first paragraph of the order in question that it has carefully examined the representation with reference to the conditions specified in section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act and that it had consulted the Transport Commissioner in deciding that the present route Tanjore to Kumbakonam should be varied as Tanjore to Koradacheri via Kumbakonam in respect of two buses. In the operative portion of the Order, the Government has definitely stated that it was acting only in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 43-A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) and, it was only in exercise of such powers that it directed the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, to vary the existing route Tanjore to Kumbakonam as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal in respect of two buses. The main objection to the terms of the G.O. before Rajagopalan, J., and before us centered round that part of the order which directed the Regional Transport Authority to vary the existing route in respect of two buses. (Italics are mine). While conceding that the G.O. is valid in so far as it directs the Regional Transport Authority to vary the existing route Tanjore to Kumbakonam as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam-Kodavasal, Mr. Nambiar contends that the further direction that such variation should be “in respect of two buses” takes the order outside the scope of the powers vested in the Government under section 43-A (2), and therefore, it has the effect of encroaching or infringing upon the powers that are vested only in the Regional Transport Authority to grant permits in consequence of such variation of the route. It is difficult for me to agree with Mr. It is difficult for me to agree with Mr. Nambiar that the mere fact that the Government directed the variation to be in respect of two buses, at once converts the Government Order into a particular order, in favour of a particular individual, in respect of particular buses, and therefore takes it outside the character of a general direction, which latter alone is within the competence of the State Government under the said section 43-A (1) and (2). Mr. Nambiar seeks to support this argument by stating that this direction, that the variation should be considered in respect of two buses, if considered in relation to the application of the appellant for the variation of the existing service in respect of his two buses, namely, MDO Nos. 1081 and 1100, has undoubtedly the effect of encroaching upon the judicial discretion vested in the Regional Transport Authority to grant permits to any buses of any individual on his application. In my opinion, this contention of Mr. Nambiar cannot have any force, for if the State Government, while passing the G.O. was really concerned with the prayer of the Appellant that the variation should be granted in respect of his two buses, or if the Government had intended that the direction to the Regional Transport Authority should be to grant varition to the appellant in respect of the two buses named by the appellant, then certainly the Government should have issued the order in the manner now suggested by Mr. Nambiar. On the other hand, it is quite obvious that neither the preamble nor the operative portion of the G.O. do indicate that the specific request of the appellant was being granted; nor that the grant of variation was to be for the buses whose numbers he had specified; nor did it name any individual operator to whom the permits were to be granted, much less the name of the appellant. The fact, therefore, remains that though the Appellant had applied for variation of route in respect of his two named buses, the Government did not choose to grant his prayer, but declined to accede to the same and merely directed the Regional Transport Authority in general terms only to vary the permit in respect of two buses which were unspecified and unnamed. This would only go to show that the Government was not concerned with the actual grant of the permit to any particular individual or in respect of any particular bus, but was only confining itself to a general direction in terms of the order. This decision as to the issue of the permits and the selection of the particular operator and the particular buses was obviously left entirely to the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority and it cannot be said that there was any restriction or limitation imposed upon the powers or discretion of the Regional Transport Authority in the matter of choosing the operator and the buses for the variation of the route. The further question that has been raised is whether the State Government was; competent to limit the variation of the routes in respect of two buses only and whether it did not fetter the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority in the matter of actual number of buses to be put on the route. I do not think that the mere fact that the Government gave a direction that the variation of the route should be in respect of two buses, is a limitation that has the effect of interference with or infringement of the powers of the Regional Transport Authority. Under section 43-A (2), it has already been noticed that the State Government has power to direct any Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority to open any new route or to extend any existing route or to permit additional stage carriages to be put or to reduce the number of stage carriages on any specified route. This power involves ipso facto the direction that the extension of the existing route may be in respect of one or more buses, so long as it does not specify the persons or the buses. Such a direction therefore that the extension of the route or variation thereof should be considered in respect of any two buses cannot be said to be inconsistent with or to be in excess of the powers vested in the Government. In having directed that the extension of the route should be in respect of two buses, the Government intended only to give an indication to the Regional Transport Authority that the need for extension of the existing route may be served by two buses. In having directed that the extension of the route should be in respect of two buses, the Government intended only to give an indication to the Regional Transport Authority that the need for extension of the existing route may be served by two buses. It did not also prevent, by any means, the Regional Transport Authority to grant more permits than two, if it felt that there was need to permit such extra number of buses. Conversely the Regional Transport Authority would have been well within its power also if it had thought it fit to restrict the number of buses to less than two in consideration of the actual needs of the situation. Even if it were otherwise, I cannot agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent that the direction to vary the permit in respect of two buses detracts the order of the Government from its general character and makes it one in excess of its jurisdiction; or that it encroaches upon the powers of the Regional Transport Authority. On the other hand, it seems to me that it is but logical consistent and appropriate that, while directing the Transport Authority to vary the existing route, the Government should indicate in respect of how many buses such a variation could take place, so long as the Government has not fettered in any way the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority to be exercised in a judicial manner, in the matter of choosing the deserving operator who is to be granted variation of the route and in fixing particular buses of any one or more of the operators in respect of which such variation should be granted. It has to be observed in this connection that the Government Order does not state that the variation of the route should be in respect of only two buses. The word ‘only’ is not found in the terms of the order. The learned Judge, in deciding W.P. No. 18 of 1957, has however imported the word, ‘only’ on more than one occasion in the course of his judgment in order to support his view that the Government order limits the exercise of the jurisdiction that vests in the Regional Transport Authority by restricting the number of buses only to two. Vide paragraphs 14 and 16 in the judgment of Rajagopalan, J., in W.P. No. 18 of 1957. Vide paragraphs 14 and 16 in the judgment of Rajagopalan, J., in W.P. No. 18 of 1957. I do not think that there is any warrant for the importation of the term ‘only’ in the operative portion of the Government Order in question. It is only by the importation of such a term of limitation, that the learned Judge appears to have arrived at the conclusion that by reason of restricting the number of buses “only to two ”, the Government exceeded its jurisdiction. On the other hand, as observed by the learned Judge himself, in paragraph 9 of the said Judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, the Government did not specify which two of the 17 buses, 11 belonging to the Appellant, 6 belonging to Sri Rama Vilas Service (Private) Ltd., and 10 belonging to the 1st Respondent, should be permitted to ply on the extended route and it did not purport to decide that question at all No doubt, the Appellant, in his representation to the Government, specifically asked for a direction that two of his buses, MDO Nos. 1081 and 1100, should be permitted to ply up to Koradachery on the extended route, but as observed by the learned Judge himself, “that request was not granted by the Government, either in form or in substance in the G.O. in question.” It was in this view that the learned Judge rejected the contention of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent that in substance the Government Order Ms. No. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956, granted the 3rd respondent a variation of the condition of the permit for his two buses MDO Nos 1081 and 1100. That being so, the mere fact that the appellant applied for a direction in respect of his two buses, which direction was however not granted to him by the Government, cannot make the Government Order to have the effect of imposing a limitation on the powers of the Regional Transport Authority, simply because it stated that the extension of the route may be considered in respect of two buses, which clearly meant any two buses of any operator, existing or new. Further, as I have already observed, there is considerable force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the power of the Government to direct the Transport Authority to consider the extension of the route in respect of two buses was only ancillary or incidental to the powers vested in the Government under section 43-A (2) to direct the Regional Transport Authority to permit additional stage carriages to be put or to reduce the number of stage carriages on any specified route Such a direction, as I have already, stated, does not in any way limit or take away the powers of the Regional Transport Authority to proceed under section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act and to adjudicate the rights and claims as between the rival applicants, including the 1st respondent, for permits or variation of the routes in respect of buses either already plied by them or any new ones required to be put on the road. The terms “additional stage carriages” on “any new route” or “extension of an existing route” in section 43-A (2) do involve the suggestion as to the number of buses that may be considered. It is also clear that the Government Order does not purport to take upon itself such adjudication of the rival claims between any operators or applicants by the terms of its order. After the issue of this general direction that the existing route should be varied in respect of two buses, the power of the Regional Transport Authority concerned, to proceed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act is left wholly intact with regard to the further steps to be taken to give effect to the directions of the Government. It is not denied that the Transport Authorities constituted under the Act are bound to give effect to all the orders and directions given by the Government. I am, therefore, unable to hold that the Government Order should be construed to be one passed in excess of the jurisdiction vested in the Government under section 43-A (2), for the mere reason that the direction included an indication that the extension of the route or variation of the permit should be in respect of any two buses. I am, therefore, unable to hold that the Government Order should be construed to be one passed in excess of the jurisdiction vested in the Government under section 43-A (2), for the mere reason that the direction included an indication that the extension of the route or variation of the permit should be in respect of any two buses. From this point of view the Government Order is not vitiated and with all respect I am unable to agree with the decision of Rajagopalan, J., in regard to this Government Order. A point has been taken by Mr. Nambiar that after the receipt of the Government Order in question, the Regional Transport Authority issued a notification calling upon the Appellant alone to state what objection he had for extension of the route in respect of his two buses and that the language in which this notification has been couched would go to confirm the view that the Government Order in substance granted the extension of the permits to the Appellant. How exactly the Regional Transport Authority acted after the receipt of the G.O. in question is not relevant for the consideration of the validity or otherwise of the Government Order. The procedure adopted by the Regional Transport Authority after the receipt of the said G.O. may be right or may be wrong, but it cannot have any bearing on the interpretation of the legality or otherwise of the Government Order itself or the scope of its terms. The next point that has been urged by Mr. Nambiar against the validity of the Government Order is that it was passed without notice to the 1st respondent, in spite of its having been brought to the notice of the Government that the 1st respondent had applied for a permit in respect of a new route between Kodavasal and Koradachery and that he had also objected to the proposal to extend the route between Tanjore and Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal, when it was notified under section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Mr. Nambiar also contended that though the 1st respondent had not put in a representation before the Government, the principles of natural justice required that notice should have been given to the 1st respondent before the Government thought of passing the order in question. This point has been raised by Mr. Mr. Nambiar also contended that though the 1st respondent had not put in a representation before the Government, the principles of natural justice required that notice should have been given to the 1st respondent before the Government thought of passing the order in question. This point has been raised by Mr. Nambiar in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 and that has been dealt with by Rajagopalan, J., in the order dismissing the petition. In paragraph 19 of his order in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 Rajagopalan, J., has held that the failure of the Government to give an opportunity to the 1st respondent to make his representations vitiated the exercise of the jurisdiction the Government had to extend the route upto Koradachery. With due respect I am unable to agree with this view of the learned Judge. In considering the representations made to the Government by the two Members of the Legislative Assembly and by the appellant before us for a direction that the need for the extension of the route Tanjore to Kumbakonam as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kodavasal, the Government was not taking upon itself the duty of settling the question as to which of the operators should get the permit, in which case alone the first respondent, and any others, who happened to be the existing operators on the route, or near about it or on a sector thereof, would be entitled to notice. As I have already observed, the Government by its order definitely desisted from deciding or adjudicating the individual claims of the operators for the extension of the route in question. Apart from directing that Tanjore to Kumbakonam route may be varied as Tanjore to Koradachery, and that it could be done in respect of two buses, it did not, expressly or impliedly, direct the Regional Transport Authority as to the choice of the operator, or the selection of the particular buses to be granted permit on the extended route. The Government was, therefore, well within its province, when it took up for consideration the representations made to it and called for a report from the Deputy Transport Commissioner, and thereupon passed a general order directing the Regional Transport Authority to extend the route in respect of two buses. The Government was, therefore, well within its province, when it took up for consideration the representations made to it and called for a report from the Deputy Transport Commissioner, and thereupon passed a general order directing the Regional Transport Authority to extend the route in respect of two buses. In so far as the said order did not in letter or in substance involve the adjudication of the rival claims of any operator, or the suitability or otherwise of any particular operator, or bus, which had to be given permit, and the Government being well aware that that question was entirely within the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority, there is no force in the contention that the Government should have given notice to the 1st respondent before it passed the order. Nothing compelled the Government to do so, much less any principles of natural justice. The further contention raised by Mr. Nambiar that independently of any principles of natural justice, the Government were bound by the terms of section 43-A (2) read with section 47 (1) of the Act to give notice to the 1st respondent as one of the persons already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed extension within the meaning of section 47 (1) has also been dealt with by Rajagopalan, J., in his order in W.P. No. 18 of 1957. He has observed in paragraph 20 of his order as follows: “It is true that section 47 (1) does require the statutory authority to take into consideration any representations made among others by persons already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route. That statutory obligation carries with it a further implied obligation to give notice to such bus operators was the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner which J am not inclined to accept. That statutory obligation carries with it a further implied obligation to give notice to such bus operators was the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner which J am not inclined to accept. It is not however necessary to express any concluded opinion of mine on that point in these proceedings.” I am of the opinion that a reading of section 43-A (1) and (2) and the particular clause, which states that the Government may on a consideration of the matters set forth in sub-section (1) of section 47 direct the Transport Authority to do a certain thing, does not warrant that the operators concerned with the routes or a sector of the route or on the route nearby are entitled as a matter of right to any notice from the Government. Section 43-A (2) only states that the Government may on a consideration of the matters set forth in sub-section (1) of section 47 direct any Regional Transport Authority to do any one of the acts specified in that section. But it does not in letter or spirit require the Government itself to call for representations from the operators on any part of the route proposed to be extended. It had, on the other hand, instituted the proper proceedings by calling for a report from the State Transport Authority on the matters it had to take into consideration, and had in fact received an exhaustive report, on which it acted. If the representations are already made to Government, certainly the Government is entitled to take them into consideration. In this case, the 1st respondent had made no representation to the Government in the matter. Nothing contained in the terms of section 43-A (2) read with section 47 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act compels the Government in my opinion to give notice to an operator like the 1st respondent. While agreeing with all respect with the view expressed by Rajagopalan, J., in paragraph 20 of his order in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, though he has made some reservations, I think that the contention of Mr. Nambiar that the 1st respondent is entitled to notice either on principles of natural justice or in terms of section 43-A (2) is not tenable, and it has to be rejected. Consequently, the contention that the Government Order is vitiated for failure to give notice is not sound and cannot be accepted. Nambiar that the 1st respondent is entitled to notice either on principles of natural justice or in terms of section 43-A (2) is not tenable, and it has to be rejected. Consequently, the contention that the Government Order is vitiated for failure to give notice is not sound and cannot be accepted. Another point which has to be considered is that it was not open to the appellant to have obtained an order like the one in question from the Government when he had the right to prefer a revision before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and that the Government was not justified in issuing the Government Order when the appellant had another remedy. This argument proceeds on a fallacy. There is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act which prevents the appellant from making a representation to the Government for taking action under section 43-A (2), however such representation may be misconceived in its scope. The mere fact that he had filed a petition and that it was rejected could not also prevent him from making such a representation to the Government. But in fact, he made his representation long prior to the rejection of his application. There is also nothing in the Act, which called upon the Government to refuse to consider any representation from any party for directions under section 43-A (2) of the Act. All that the Government was concerned with was whether any direction was called for, in the interests of the public, and not with any adjudication of the rights and claims of rival parties when it was called upon to take action under section 43-A (2). The mere fact that a person in the position of the appellant was entitled to other remedies for redress of his grievance, was not a factor that could prevent the Government from taking action under section 43-A (2). Nothing could compel the Government to refuse to exercise the power vested under section 43-A (2) so long as it was not acting judicially and not usurping the powers of the Regional Transport Authority, in so acting. The argument, therefore that the Government acted illegally in issuing the Government Order in question on these grounds is wholly without any substance. The next question that has been argued by Mr. The argument, therefore that the Government acted illegally in issuing the Government Order in question on these grounds is wholly without any substance. The next question that has been argued by Mr. Jagadisa Iyer is that even if it is considered that the direction in the impugned Government Order as to the extension of the route in respect of two buses was in excess of jurisdiction, still if this direction is ignored or deleted from the order of the Government, it will still be intelligible, complete and valid by itself. That is to say, if a part of the Government Order is bad in as much as it makes a reference to two buses, it cannot be said that the entire order on that ground is vitiated and illegal. Then the question for consideration is whether the so called offending portion constitutes such an intergral part of the Government Order, that if it were to be separated, the rest of the Government Order would become unintelligible and meaningless ; or whether the offending part is so inextricably connected with the non-offending part that there could be no severance possible, in order to decide whether the Government Order could still be held valid after the severable portion is deleted or ignored. Mr. Nambiar argued that the entire Government Order had to be taken as an integrated whole and that severance was not possible ; and this argument was accepted by Rajagopalan, J., in paragraph 16 of his Order in W.P. No. 18 of 1957. A reading of the impugned Order shows clearly that the first direction was in respect of the extension of the existing route Tanjore to Kumbakonam as Tanjore to Koradachery, and the second direction was that such an extension might be in respect of two buses. If the second direction is omitted from the Order, it seems to me pretty clear that the first direction could still stand without being affected in regard to its validity from the point of view of jurisdiction of the Government to issue such an order. With due respect to Rajagopalan, J., I am unable to agree with him that if the limitation on the number of buses to ply was beyond the jurisdiction of the Government, the entire order would appear to be vitiated. With due respect to Rajagopalan, J., I am unable to agree with him that if the limitation on the number of buses to ply was beyond the jurisdiction of the Government, the entire order would appear to be vitiated. In August Dorchy v. State of Kansas1, it is observed that a statute bad in part is not necessarily bad in its entirety and that legal effect can be given to the good part ignoring the bad and offensive part. The test to be applied is whether the bad part is so interwoven with the good part as not to be separable and if separated whether the remaining portion would not be viable and sustainable and meaningful. The intention of the Government in passing the Government Order is also a relevant factor to be taken into consideration in finding as to whether the order could be considered valid even if a portion of it is said to be invalid. In State of Bombay v. Balsara2, on the question as to whether as a result of some of the sections of the Act having been declared to be invalid, what is left of the Act should survive or whether the whole Act should be declared to be invalid, Fazl Ali, J., has observed that the provisions which are invalid cannot affect the validity of the Act as a whole. He further observed that the test to be applied when an argument like the one addressed in that case was raised, had been very correctly summed up by the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada3, in these words: “The real question is whether what remains is so inextricably bound up with the part declared invalid that what remains cannot independently survive or, as it has sometimes been put, whether on a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed that the Legislature would have enacted what survives without enacting the part that is ultra vires at all.” In the light of these observations, I do not think that the latter part of the impugned Government Order is so inextricably connected with the earlier part as to entitle us to hold that the Government would not have passed that order at all without including the latter part. The first part of the order still remains essentially to be one directing the extension of the route in question, though in the 2nd part there is a further direction that such extension may be in respect of two buses. In Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh1, Sulaiman, J., has observed: "It is a well established principle that if the invalid part of an Act is really separate in its operation from the other parts, and the rest are not inseverably connected with it, then only such part is invalid, unless of course, the whole object of the Act would be frustrated by the partial exclusion. If the subject which is beyond the legislative power is perfectly distinct from that which is within such power, the Act can be ultra vires in the former, while intra vires in the latter. The test is said to be whether "the statute with the invalid portions omitted would be substantially a different law as to the subject-matter dealt with by what remains from what it would be with the omitted portion forming part of it." See Rex v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration2. "A particular section of an Act however may not be an isolated and independent clause, and may form part of one connected indissoluble scheme for the attainment of a definite object ; in which case it would have to be considered as an inseparable part of the whole. A law which is ultra vires in part only may thereby become ultra vires in whole if the object of the Act cannot at all be attained by excluding the bad part. If the offending provisions are so interwoven into the scheme of the Act that they are not severable, then the whole Act is invalid; see In re Initiative and Referendem Act.3 For instance, the whole texture of the Act was found inextricably inter-woven in Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada4". Applying these principles, the impugned order of the Government cannot be invalid in its entirety. The earlier part will still be valid even, if it is granted that the latter part is ultra vires. The next question that arises is whether the Government Order is one that is adverse to the first respondent and whether it is vitiated for want of notice to the 1st respondent before it was passed. The earlier part will still be valid even, if it is granted that the latter part is ultra vires. The next question that arises is whether the Government Order is one that is adverse to the first respondent and whether it is vitiated for want of notice to the 1st respondent before it was passed. In so far as the Government Order gives only a direction that the route should be extended and that the extension should be considered in respect of two buses, it cannot be said to be an order adverse to the 1st respondent, as it does not affect his interest in any manner. The extension of the route, and the permits in respect of such extension, may be granted by the Regional Transport Authority either in favour of the first respondent or the appellant or the other operator, viz., Sri Rama Vilas Service, who is not before us. So far as the Regional Transport Authority was concerned, the question of granting permit was still open and lay within its province, and it could not be said that the mere issue of a direction that the route should be extended and that such extension should be in respect of two buses, was by any stretch of imagination adverse to any interest of the 1st respondent. If the issue of the direction was adverse to the first respondent’s interests, it was no less adverse to the interests of the appellant, in so far as it did not concede his prayer that the permit should be in his favour and in respect of his two buses and no one could anticipate to whom the permits would actually be granted. On this ground also, it is not possible to agree with the contention that the Order of the Government in question was adverse to the interests of the first respondent, and therefore he was entitled to notice either under law or under the principles of natural justice before the Government passed the order. Another point that needs to be considered in this connection is one raised by Mr. Jagadisa Iyer that the impugned order of the Government is only an administrative order and is not liable to be quashed on the application of the first respondent. Another point that needs to be considered in this connection is one raised by Mr. Jagadisa Iyer that the impugned order of the Government is only an administrative order and is not liable to be quashed on the application of the first respondent. I have already held that in so far as the impugned order was not adjudicating or deciding any rights between the parties, and so long as there was no ‘list’ in relation to the direction which was issued by the Government, it could not be other than a mere administrative order. The proceedings taken by the Regional Transport Authority under section 47 and the decision in consequence of such proceedings have been held repeatedly to be purely administrative orders, even by Rajagopalan, J., himself, and even so if the order issued under section 43-A (2) does not encroach upon the powers of the Regional Transport Authority, it would remain only an administrative order. It has been the uniform ruling of this Court and other Courts in India that administrative orders like this are not liable to be questioned by means of writ proceedings. In paragraph 22 of his order in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 Rajagopalan J., has held that the contention that the impugned order viewing it merely as a direction under section 43-A (2) to extend an existing route, must prevail. I respectfully agree with him. Rajagopalan, J., further held that the order was invalid on the sole ground that the direction contained therein that the extension should be considered in respect of two buses was in excess of jurisdiction. With due respect to him I am unable to agree with this view. This leads on to the further question as to whether the order of Rajagopalan, J., was passed in the proper exercise of jurisdiction when he declared that the order of the Government was vitiated, while he dismissed the Writ Petition No. 18 of 1957 as a whole, and whether such a declaratory relief was available to the first respondent in writ proceedings. In Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India1, the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 45 of its judgment as follows: “As regards the other point, it would appear from the language of Article 32 of the Constitution that the sole object of the Article is the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India1, the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 45 of its judgment as follows: “As regards the other point, it would appear from the language of Article 32 of the Constitution that the sole object of the Article is the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. A proceeding under this Article cannot really have any affinity to what is known as a declaratory suit. The first prayer made in the petition seeks relief in the shape of a declaration that the Act is invalid and is apparently inappropriate to an application under Article 32.....” It has also been observed that Article 32 “is not directly concerned with the determination of constitutional validity of particular legislative enactments. What it aims at, is the enforcing of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, no matter whether the necessity for such enforcement arises out of an action of the executive or of the legislature. To make out a case under this Article, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to establish not merely that the law complained of is beyond the competence of the particular legislature as not being covered by any of the items in the legislative lists but that it affects or invades his fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of which he could seek enforcement by an appropriate writ or order. The rights that could be enforced under Article 32 must ordinarily be the rights of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such rights and approaches the Court for relief.” Applying this ruling, it cannot be said that the impugned Government Order in any way affected any fundamental right of the first respondent to entitle him to any relief. The Order was under section 43-A (2) which was analogous to the procedure laid down in section 47 and quite different from the procedure laid down in section 57. To similar effect is the decision in. Maqbulnissa v. Union of India2, cited by Mr. Jagadisa Iyer. There it was held that the powers to issue writs orders or directions should not be utilised for giving what is in essence a declaratory relief. To similar effect is the decision in. Maqbulnissa v. Union of India2, cited by Mr. Jagadisa Iyer. There it was held that the powers to issue writs orders or directions should not be utilised for giving what is in essence a declaratory relief. Considered in the light of these decisions, the net result of the order of Rajagopalan, J., in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 was no other than giving a declaration that the Government Order was invalid, when in fact it did not affect any rights of the first respondent or of any other party for the matter of that, and did not also enable the learned Judge to give the 1st respondent any one of the numerous reliefs he had asked for. This was because the Government Order was not judicial, as it did not decide any rights of one party or the other, and no matter was set at rest by the Government Order as between the first respondent, the appellant and any other operator. In that view, it was not an encroachment upon the judicial discretion vested in the Regional Transport Authority. The rights of the parties would get affected only by reason of a decision taken by the Regional Transport Authority in pursuance of section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act. If the Government Order was, therefore, valid and if no declaratory relief was available to the first respondent in respect of the Government Order and the entire Writ Petition No. 18 of 1957 was itself dismissed without giving any relief whatever to the first respondent, then the main question that arises is whether a reference to it by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal could on the face of the record, vitiate the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in revision against the order of the Regional Transport Authority under section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Before this question is decided, I should deal with a few other points raised in this connection by Mr. Jagadisa Iyer, the learned counsel for the appellant. In the first place, Mr. Jagadisa Iyer contended that the first respondent was not a person aggrieved and could not maintain the writ petition out of which the present appeal has arisen, as he had no locus standi to do so. Jagadisa Iyer, the learned counsel for the appellant. In the first place, Mr. Jagadisa Iyer contended that the first respondent was not a person aggrieved and could not maintain the writ petition out of which the present appeal has arisen, as he had no locus standi to do so. It is argued that in the present case, there is no civil right that has been violated, so as to enable the first respondent being considered as an aggrieved party to justify a writ application. The right that the first respondent is agitating for is no doubt a statutory one created by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. If he wants to enforce such a statutory right when it is violated, the statute itself lays down the procedure which he has to conform to before he seeks the enforcement of the right under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has been repeatedly laid down that the Motor Vehicles Act furnishes a complete machinery in itself for the vindication of the rights assured by its provisions and that the remedy must be sought within the scheme of the Act itself. It is also incumbent on the Court to see how far the parties seeking relief under the said Article 226 of the Constitution have conformed to the requirements of the statute before any relief could be given to them. As has already been pointed out, the first respondent did not lodge before the Regional Transport Authority any representation in response to the notification issued under section 57 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. He did not also participate in the public hearing on the 26th of July, 1956, when the decision was made, rejecting the application of the appellant. The first respondent, no doubt, intervened in the proceedings before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, when the appellant invoked jurisdiction of that Tribunal under section 64 (2) of the Act. But having failed to make any representation before the Regional Transport Authority, and having failed also to conform to the requirements of section 57 (4), the first respondent had no locus standi to go before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, being a defaulter in the matter of conforming to the procedure prescribed under section 57 of the Act. But having failed to make any representation before the Regional Transport Authority, and having failed also to conform to the requirements of section 57 (4), the first respondent had no locus standi to go before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, being a defaulter in the matter of conforming to the procedure prescribed under section 57 of the Act. The mere fact that he filed a representation before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, which was admittedly out of time, could not also give him a locus standi as contended for by Mr. Nambiar. So also the fact that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal took into consideration the belated representation of the first respondent, who had not availed himself of the right given to him under the statute, would not make him, or give him the status of, a party to the proceedings before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. To say that because the State Transport Appellate Tribunal took into consideration the belated representation of the first respondent, the first respondent became factually a party to the revision proceedings before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and thereby acquired a locus standi so as to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a contention which appears to me to be far-fetched. It may be that this Court does not exercise an appellate or revisional jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But it does not mean that it should overlook the fact as to how far the party, invoking such a jurisdiction, has itself conformed to the provisions of the statute under which he seeks enforcement of his rights. It does appear that in passing the order setting aside the decision of the Regional Transport Authority the representation of the first respondent was taken on file by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal but that by itself would not give a locus standi to the first respondent and make him an aggrieved party, unless it be that a legal right of the respondent had been violated, which alone would enable him to seek relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. In The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta1, in discussing the scope of the power of this Court in issuing writs or directions, it has been observed at page 33 as follows: “The language of the Article shows that the issuing of writs or directions by the Court is not founded only on its decision that a right of the aggrieved party under Part III of the Constitution (fundamental rights) has been infringed. It can also issue writs or give similar directions for any other purpose. The concluding words of Article 226 have to be read in the context of what precedes the same. Therefore, the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under this Article.” No doubt in C.S.S. Motor Service v. State of Madras1, it has held that the plying of a motor vehicle is a fundamental right, but what is the fundamental right that the first respondent has acquired in the present case and which has been violated by the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal ? Obviously none: In In re Ramamoorthi2, also it has been held that it is not the province of the High Court to interfere either suo motu or at the instance of any person, whenever there is any disregard or violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. Its power under Article 226 of the Constitution can only be invoked at the instance of a person who has a personal grievance against any act of the State in its executive capacity, which inflicts a legal injury on him since, the right, which is the foundation of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or a corresponding provision, is a personal and individual right. Therefore, the mere passing of an order which is presumed to be adverse to the first respondent without his having conformed to the requirements of section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act will not involve the violation of any legal rights accrued to or vested in the first respondent nor could it be said to have caused any legal injury to him. The mere statement of the first respondent in his affidavit that he is likely to suffer irreparable loss and will be gravely prejudiced, cannot be held to be sufficient in the eye of the law to establish that there was legal right violated or legal injury caused to him by the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal so as to give him a locus standi to file the writ out of which this appeal has arisen. The decision in Anwar Khan v. Munim Khan3, which followed the decision in Bagaram v. State of Bihar4, that the invocation of writ would be available only for the enforcement of a legal right and the performance of legal duty is quite pertinent to the present case. In Ragunath v. S.T.A. Orissa5, a Bench of the Orissa High Court held that: "Where a person files an objection to the grant of a permit to another person long after the period fixed by section 54 (4) is over, he has no right of appeal. Consequently, the Chairman of the Provincial Authority has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal filed by such a person and to set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority." In V.M.T. Asson v. M.T. Service6, also a Bench of the Nagpur High Court held that where the petitioner has not made his representation under section 57 (3), Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for an additional permit, he is not entitled to be heard in opposition to the application of the non-applicant to whom the permit is granted. In the present case, if the first respondent had not put in his opposition before the Regional Transport Authority, his representation before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, itself being beyond time, the fact whether or not his representation was taken into consideration by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, could not give the first respondent any right to question the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in a writ proceeding. In the light of the rulings cited above, the question arises as to whether if the first respondent had no right of appeal by reason of having failed to put in his objection under section 57 (3) and (4), could he be placed in a better position when he comes before the Court invoking the writ jurisdiction, without having complied with the provisions of the statute. In Ex parte Stott,7 "a licensing authority under the Cinematograph Act, 1909, granted to a theatre proprietor a licence for the exhibition of cinematograph films at his theatre. The licence was subject to the condition that the licensee should not exhibit any film if he had notice that the licensing authority objected to it. A firm who had acquired the sole right of exhibition of a certain film in the district in which the theatre was situated entered into an agreement with the licensee for the exhibition of the film at his theatre. The licensing authority having given notice to the licensee that they objected to the exhibition of the film the firm applied for a writ of certiorari to bring up the notice to be quashed on the ground that the condition attached to the licence was unreasonable and void, and that they were aggrieved by the notice as being destructive of their property." It was held that "whether the condition was unreasonable or not, the applicants were not persons who were aggrieved by the notice and were not entitled to apply for a certiorari ". Applying the ruling of this case, the mere existence of an adverse order, even if the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal were Considered to be one such, would not justify the application for a writ. The party applying must be the person aggrieved by the order. A mere remote injury cannot be of any avail, nor a mere complaint would be enough. There is also another aspect to be considered in coming to the conclusion as to whether the first respondent had any locus standi to file a writ application and it turns upon the conduct of the first respondent himself. The first respondent, not having taken advantage of the procedure available to him in the various stages prior to the passing of the revisional order, could he be still entitled to say that he has a right to come to this Court by a writ of certiorari . Paragraph 265 at page 140 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume II, has been relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in this connection. Paragraph 265 at page 140 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume II, has been relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in this connection. It states thus: "Although the order is not of course it will though discretionary nevertheless be granted ex debito justitiae, to quash proceedings which the Court has power to quash, where it is shown that the Court below has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, if the application is made by an aggrieved party and not merely by one of the public and if the conduct of the party applying has not been such as to disentitle him to relief; and this is the case even though certiorari is taken away by statute, and although there is an alternative remedy. The order of certiorari will never be granted to remove an erroneous order at the instance of the party in whose favour the error was made?" Mr. Jagadisa Iyer also relied upon paragraph 119 of the same Volume the observations in which are to the same effect. The continuous default of the first respondent in the instant case to observe the procedure under section 57 (3) and (4) is certainly a relevant factor which would disentitle the first respondent to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Relying upon Dholpur Co-operative T. and M. Union v. Appellate Authority1, Mr. Nambiar argued that as a result of the introduction of two more buses by an illegal order on the route, the income of the first respondent was likely to decrease, that the loss was quite substantial and could not be said to be normal, and that, therefore, it could not be denied that the first respondent was substantially affected by the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, that the first respondent was therefore an aggrieved person and that he had a right to challenge the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal on the ground of total lack of jurisdiction by an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. I do not think that Mr. Nambiar has laid proper and sufficient foundations for the application of this decision to the facts of the present case. I do not think that Mr. Nambiar has laid proper and sufficient foundations for the application of this decision to the facts of the present case. In so far as the route was being only extended and the first respondent was not on the extended route previously, it cannot be said that he was suffering any substantial loss by reason of two buses having been introduced on the extended route between Kodavasal and Koradachery. That nobody was operating on this route prior to the sanctioning of the extension and granting of permits is beyond dispute. Another point urged by Mr. Nambiar was that even though the first respondent did not make the appellant a party in his representation, dated 4th December, 1956, before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, a copy of the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was however, communicated to him and this gave him right to file the writ application. It is rather extraordinary to contend that because a copy of the order was communicated to the first respondent he became an aggrieved party so as to question the order in a writ petition. It is significant also that the appellant did not make and had no reason to make the first respondent a party before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Could it be contended in the circumstances that the first respondent became an aggrieved party, because he had made a representation which was out of time to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. In Anjaneya Motor Transport v. State of Madras1, the learned Chief Justice and Rajagopalan Iyengar, J., have considered the question as to how far a person who does not conform to the procedure laid down by the Statute is entitled to notice or would have locus standi to prefer an appeal. The headnote of that decision is in the following terms: “Section 57 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act makes provisions for the interested public being notified when an application for the grant or variation of a permit is made to the Transport Authority. Section 57 (4) provides the limitation. If an operator or a person intersted does not take steps in time, he has no right to be heard before orders are passed and that is the effect of section 57 (4). Section 57 (4) provides the limitation. If an operator or a person intersted does not take steps in time, he has no right to be heard before orders are passed and that is the effect of section 57 (4). When an appeal or revision is filed, though there is no statutory provision, in that regard the principles of natural justice require that notice should be given to those who were parties to the proceedings. But merely because a person files a representation out of time, he does not become in any sense a party to the proceedings entitled to notice of and hearing of the revision or appeal. The knowledge of the appellate or revisional authority as to the existence of a person whose rights may be affected has really no bearing upon the right of such person to notice. If the authority (the Government) had the power to pass an order (under its revisional jurisdiction) such an order could not be held to be vitiated by the caption given to it purporting to be an appeal.” In his further observations Rajagopala Iyengar, J., has stated as follows: “From this it is argued that the appellants should be treated as parties to whom notice ought to have been issued and that any order passed without notice to them would be vitiated as contravening the principle of audi alteram partem. The learned Judge in the judgment under appeal has explained this decision to which he was himself a party and we agree with him in his construction of this passage as not supporting the contention of the appellants.” I respectfully agree with the ruling in this Bench decision and it is sufficient authority for the proposition that the first respondent in this case cannot have any locus standi to file a writ application or to complain that the order of the Government was passed without notice to him. For all the above reasons, I am inclined to hold that the first respondent had no locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court in writ proceedings against the order of the revisional authority, namely, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. For all the above reasons, I am inclined to hold that the first respondent had no locus standi to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court in writ proceedings against the order of the revisional authority, namely, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The next question that still remains to be considered is whether a reference to the Government Order in the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, which was impugned in the writ petition out of which this appeal, has arisen, vitiated the order passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. I have already dealt with the question that if the Government Order is a valid Government Order a reference to it will not vitiate the order. I shall now proceed on the basis that if the Government Order was illegal and invaild, as was declared by Rajagopalan, J., a reference to it has really vitiated the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. On this question, Mr. Jagadisa Iyer argued that the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is not based on the validity of the Government Order but rather on the merits of the case. There is force in this contention. A close perusal of the order would show that in the earlier part thereof, the history of the case has been set out and thereafter the appellant’s case has been set out. In the next stage, the applications made by the two members of the Legislative Assembly have been referred to. Then the representation of the appellant himself, dated the 6th of August, 1956, to the Government has been referred to. Then the Government Order, dated the 16th of November, 1956, is referred to in the following terms: “The Government in their order in G.O. Ms. No. 3199, Home, dated 16th November, 1956, decided that the present route Tanjore to Kumbakonam should be varied as Tanjore to Koradachery (via) Kumbakonam and Kodavasal in respect of two buses on that route and issued directions to the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, to vary the existing route accordingly.” This reference to the Government Order, it should be remembered does not say that the Government Order in terms or by implication was to the effect that the appellant should be given permit on the extended route. It only refers to the decision of the Government and directions to vary the route accordingly. It only refers to the decision of the Government and directions to vary the route accordingly. So that it cannot be said that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal understood the order of Government to be anything more than a general direction contemplated under section 43-A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, could not, therefore, be taken to have understood this order as a judicial order infringing upon the authority and discretion of the Regional Transport Authority to grant the permits to any fit and proper persons. After having set out the order in the only manner in which it could have been done, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal then proceeds to refer to what took place after the Government Order was passed. It stated that immediately after the Government Order was issued by the Government, Messrs. Raman and Raman filed Writ Petition No. 18 of 1957 questioning the validity of the Government Order and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, and the petitioner herein to forbear from enforcing the directions in the said Government Order. Here, again, it cannot be said that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was setting forth anything beyond the narration of what actually had taken place at an earlier stage. The reference that is now objected to as having had the effect of vitiating the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is in the following terms: “.....the High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the Government had powers to issue the said Government Order by virtue of section 43-A (2) of the Act and the High Court refused to grant the writ of mandamus applied for by Sri Raman and Raman, Ltd.” This statement of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is generally correct, and it does not appear, by any construction that may be put on this statement, that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal misconstrued the scope of the order of the High Court in W.P. No. 18 of 1957. For in the first instance, the statement says that the High Court dismissed the petition. This is a statement of fact and cannot be disputed. Then it says that the High Court held that the Government had powers to issue the said Government Order by virtue of section 43-A (2) of the Act. For in the first instance, the statement says that the High Court dismissed the petition. This is a statement of fact and cannot be disputed. Then it says that the High Court held that the Government had powers to issue the said Government Order by virtue of section 43-A (2) of the Act. Except for the words “the said Government Order” this statement also is quite consistent and in keeping with what the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had stated in the earlier portion of its order when it made a reference to the Government Order itself. For, as has already been pointed out, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, in the earlier portion of the order itself definitely understood the Government Order only to be of a general character and of an administrative kind and not as one deciding any dispute between the contesting or rival operators. In that light, the statement made by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, that the High Court held that that the Government had powers to issue the said Government Order by virtue of section 43-A (2) of the Act could not be said to be a wrong understanding or misconstruction of the High Court’s decision. In fact, in paragraph 22 of his order, while dimissing W.P. No. 18 of 1957, Rajagopalan, J., has held that viewing it (the Government Order) merely as a direction under section 43-A (2) to extend an existing route it was an administrative order, and that that contention should prevail. The understanding by the State Appellate Tribunal also appears to me to be quite in accordance with this finding of the learned Judge in the said paragraph 22 of his order. For, what the State Transport Appellate Tribunal has said is that the High Court held that the Government had powers to issue the Government Order by virtue of section 43-A (2), and if that is read along with the prior statement that the Government in this Government Order issued directions to vary the existing route in respect of two buses, there appears to be no scope for the contention that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal misunderstood or misconstrued the High Court’s decision. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal only understood the order of the Government to be an order issued under section 43-A (2), giving a general direction to the Regional Transport Authority, and that such a general direction given under section 43-A (2) was legitimate and legal is what the High Court itself had held in W.P. No. 18 of 1957. In other words, what the State Transport Appellate Tribunal understood from the order of the High Court in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 was nothing more than that the Government was within its powers in giving a general direction to the Regional Transport Authority. In the next stage, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal went on to say that the High Court refused to grant the writ of mandamus applied for by Messrs. Raman and Raman, thus showing that its understanding of the High Court order as one upholding the Government Order only as a general order falling within the scope of section 43-A (2), in respect of which no relief could be given to the first respondent; unless it is clearly established that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal understood the order of the Government as a direction given to the Regional Transport Authority to give extension of the route, and permits to the appellant, which is by no means the case, and that it understood further that such a specific order was upheld by the High Court, it cannot be argued that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was influenced by the Government Order or that it misconstrued the decision of the High Court, when it decided to set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and directed the variation of the route in favour of the appellant’s two buses. Even granting that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal misconstrued the High Court’s order, that its decision was influenced by such a misconstruction is not apparent by any means on the face of the record. For, in the next half of its order it deals elaborately with the merits of the case for coming to the conclusion that the order of the Regional Transport Authority under Revision should be set aside, instead of proceeding to set aside the order of the R.T.A. on the basis of the Government Order and the High Court’s order in W.P. No. 18 of 1957. In this part of the order every aspect of the case has been discussed in order to justify its decision. If it was influenced by the Government Order or the wrong understanding of the High Court’s order in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, there was absolutely no need for the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to go into the merits at all, and the mere fact that it did so, only goes to prove that what influenced the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was only the merits of the case and the need for the variation is the interest of the public and not the two other factors, viz., the Government Order and the High Court’s order. The mere statement that on a careful consideration of all the materials and contentions and the representations the State Transport Appellate Tribunal felt satisfied that the variation asked for by the petitioner was quite reasonable and was in the best interests of the travelling public, particularly of the people residing on the sector Kodavasal and Koradachery and between Kumbakonam and Kodavasal, cannot be said to be a vitiating factor, so as to make the order of the Tribunal illegal and capable of being quashed. The reference to the Government Order as a general direction contemplated under section 43-A (2) no doubt was there, but it cannot be said that such a reference was to an irrelevant factor as Rajagopalan, J., has held. If the State Transport Appellate Tribunal conceived of the Government Order to be a general order and of its statutory force as such an order, then a reference to it must be held to be a reference to quite a relevant factor. It cannot be said to vitiate the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. But the fact however remains, as could be gathered from the elaborate discussion of the merits of the case, that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal did not consider the Government Order as of a binding character or fettering its discretion in which case it should have stopped with a reference to the Government Order and proceeded to give its decision immediately on the basis of the Government Order itself. I is significant to note in this connection that no exception has been taken to the merits of the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority. I is significant to note in this connection that no exception has been taken to the merits of the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority. A mere reading of the order would show, on the face of it, that the Tribunal allowed itself to be influenced by the Government Order is what Mr. Nambiar contended. It is difficult for me to accept this contention. In my view, the Government Order has been understood to be merely a general order with regard to the extenion of the route with an indication as to the number of buses that may be permitted. A reference to it in this light cannot be said to be illegal. The order of the Government has been construed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, as seems to be the case, that it was only a general direction given by the Government. If such be the case, then a reference to it cannot be said to be an extraneous consideration which has influenced the order in question. A subordinate Tribunal like the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, it is conceded, is bound to consider the order of the superior authority issued in regard to policy of the Government or in the interests of the public as a whole. In other words, if the State Transport Appellate Tribunal understood the order of the Government to be one of a general character competent to be issued under section 43-A (2) of the Act, and if a reference is made to that order in that view, in coming to a conclusion on the merits of the case, surely it cannot be said that the Tribunal was surrendering its discretion when it decided on the merits of the question before it. At page 335 of Cases in Constitutional law by Keir and Lawson, 4th edition, the following observations occur which seem to-be apposite to the present case: "Can a person entrusted with a discretion be held to surrender his discretion if he conforms to a policy or rules laid down by a superior authority or even the Government itself? Obviously if the superior authority or the Government embodies its policy or rules in legislation which it has power to make, the subordinate must obey. Obviously if the superior authority or the Government embodies its policy or rules in legislation which it has power to make, the subordinate must obey. He does not surrender his discretion because the limits of his discretion have been changed. Otherwise it seems that although he surrenders his discretion and acts ineffectually if he actually obeys the order of a superior (Simms Motor Units, Ltd. v. Minister of Labour1, he acts lawfully and effectually if he conforms freely to the policy of the Government. As Evatt, J. said in R. v. Mahony Ex parte Johnson,2) "In order to show that the respondent’s discretion was influenced by irrelevant matters, much has been made of the fact that the respondent has stated, in his very candid affidavit, that he paid regard to the Commonwealth Executive Policy, although receiving no dictation from Government." "If it is assumed that the licensing officer has discretion to refuse licences, I think that he is not debarred from considering the existence of such a policy. He would be regarded not as a judicial but as an administrative officer vested with a discretionary power. He would have to act honestly,, but he might well pay some regard to the preference scheme favoured by the Government. He would be expected to pay special attention to the requirements of the port which, in a sense, is committed to his charge. ‘Above all, the discretion to be exercised would be his discretion, and he could not allow the Executive or any other person to exercise it for him. Upon the same assumption of a discretion, there is no reason why he should not be allowed to seek the opinions of persons well experienced in the methods of providing and organising labour. ‘Above all, the discretion to be exercised would be his discretion, and he could not allow the Executive or any other person to exercise it for him. Upon the same assumption of a discretion, there is no reason why he should not be allowed to seek the opinions of persons well experienced in the methods of providing and organising labour. It cannot be assumed that the well experinced and the well qualified are absent from the responsible executive of the day." It is obvious from a reading of the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that, far from being carried away by the Government order or by the misconstruction of the High Court’s order in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal actually went into the merits of the case, notwithstanding these two factors, and was influenced only by what it thought was in the best interests of the public and therefore in its revisional jurisdiction directed the Regional Transport Authority to vary the route and to issue permits to the appellant. The further question that arises for consideration is whether by looking at the order and on the face of the record it appears that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal has relied upon something which the High Court has not stated in. W.P. No. 18 of 1957 and whether that forms the basis of its decision. As already observed, in my view, its decision is not based upon its misconstruction that the High Court held the Government Order to be valid and lawful. What the State Transport Appellate Tribual understood was that the High Court held that the Government had powers to issue the Government Order under section 43-A (2) and not that the High Court had held that the Government Order was a valid one, and that the High Court dismissed the writ without granting any relief. To my mind it makes considerable difference between saying that the High Court held that the Government had power to issue the Government Order under section 43-A (2) and saying that the High Court held the Government Order in question to be valid and: lawful. That this latter is not what the State Transport Appellate Tribunal stated goes to throw much light upon how the State Transport Appellate Tribunal construed the decision of the High Court in W.P. No. 18 of 1957. That this latter is not what the State Transport Appellate Tribunal stated goes to throw much light upon how the State Transport Appellate Tribunal construed the decision of the High Court in W.P. No. 18 of 1957. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may also be taken to have construed the order of the High Court to say that the Government Order was valid only so far as it applied to the extension of the route and not to the extension in respect of two buses if it is remembered that it had the Government Order before it, which it must have perused in full. Such a view does not appear to be causing any violence to the meaning of the words used by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in the context. However the fact remains that the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is based only on the merits irrespective of the legality or otherwise of the Government Order and there can be little doubt that it would have arrived at the same conclusion even if it had construed the decision of the High Court in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 as declaring the Government Order to be. invalid and unlawful in its entirety. On the point that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had misdirected himself by referring to the Government Order as a relevant factor, I have already observed that so far as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was concerned, the G.O. was a relevant factor, when it is remembered that the Government had power to issue a general direction under section 43-A (2) and when it is considered that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal took the Government Order only as a direction to vary the extended route in respect of two buses and not as specific order deciding any rights between any set of parties. Another point argued by Mr. Nambiar is that when the State Transport Appellate Tribunal made a reference to the Government Order and took it into consideration, the first respondent ought to have been given notice that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal intended to take into consideration the said Government Order. I do not think that there is any force in this contention. It cannot be argued that the first respondent was entitled to any notice and that he ought to have been given notice of the Government Order. I do not think that there is any force in this contention. It cannot be argued that the first respondent was entitled to any notice and that he ought to have been given notice of the Government Order. This Government Order was passed on the 16th of November, 1956. It was the subject-matter of W.P.No. 18 of 1957 filed by that first respondent himself, and the order in that writ petition was passed on the 2nd of April, 1957. The impugned order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was passed on the 13th of May, 1957. When the first respondent challenged the said order of the Government in W.P.No. 18 of 1957 filed on the 7th of January, 1957, he had full information and knowledge that copies of that G.O. were communicated to all the Transport Authorities and the parties thereto and that the Transport Authorities were bound to give effect to such orders in so far as they were valid. Nothing could have prevented the first respondent in bringing, to the notice of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, his objection that the G.O. should not be taken into consideration, while considering the revision. The first respondent knew also that a copy of the judgment in W.P.No.18 of 1957 had been sent to the Regional Transport Authority. He had effective and real opportunity thus to present his case against the G.O. before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. In these circumstances, it is futile for the respondent’s learned counsel to contend that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal should have given notice to the first respondent that it would take into consideration the G.O. on the ground that it was a fresh matter not within the knowledge of the first respondent. Reliance has been placed in this connection on the judgment of the learned Chief Justice in W. A. No. 35 of 1955. The facts in that case are not ad idem with the facts in the present case. It cannot be said that in the present case the G.O. or the order in W. P. No. 18 of 1957 was evidence in any sense of the term to enable the Tribunal to come to a decision. The principle of the decision in Jerbai K. Kapadia, In re1, does not have any application to the facts of the present case. The principle of the decision in Jerbai K. Kapadia, In re1, does not have any application to the facts of the present case. The Government Order, as stated already, has been contested and challenged by the first respondent and he was fully aware of its import and effect and he should have known that such Government Orders are always circulated to the Tribunals subordinate to the Government. It has been rightly argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that judgment and G.Os. cannot constitute new matters of evidence in any sense of the term. Even though the G.O. was not published, when once the first respondent knew about the contents of the G.O. and the fact that such G.Os. are commnicated to the subordinate Tribunals to be obeyed, it was open to the first respondent to have made any representation he liked to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in regard to the G.O. It is difficult to see how the Tribunal was bound to give notice of the G.O. to the respondent, unless there was some controversy or dispute about it or its contents, which alone would compel the Tribunal to give notice to both the parties for arguments or clarification. The contention that the Tribunal was in duty bound to give notice to the first respondent about the G.O. which was communicated to it, and failure to do so, has occasioned failure of justice, is devoid of any force, especially when the first respondent had every effective opportunity, to place his objections before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The G.O. cannot be described as a new matter of evidence to be taken into account by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal so as to justify an opportunity being claimed by the first respondent as if to rebut the contents of the G.O. This is especially so, when it is remembered that the first respondent was not himself keen in prosecuting the case before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal as could be seen by his belated representation. Actually he was acting indifferently in the matter, because he knew that he had no locus standi, and therefore not entitled to notice. Still there was ample justice shown to him, when his representation which was filed certainly long after the G.O. was issued, was taken into consideration by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Actually he was acting indifferently in the matter, because he knew that he had no locus standi, and therefore not entitled to notice. Still there was ample justice shown to him, when his representation which was filed certainly long after the G.O. was issued, was taken into consideration by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. In Mew Prakash Transport Co., Ltd. v. New Suwarna Transport Co., Ltd1., reiterating the observations and approving the decision in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.2, it has been held as follows: “Keeping in view the observations of this Court quoted above and the principles of natural justice discussed in the several authorities of the highest Courts in England, we have to see how far the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder justify the criticism of the High Court that the Appellate Authority did not give full and effective opportunity to the first respondent to present his point of view before it. As already indicated, the statutory provisions do not contemplate that either the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Authority had to record •evidence or to proceed as if they were functioning as a Court of law. They had to decide between a number of applicants as to which of them was suitable for the grant of the fresh permit applied for They took into consideration all the relevant matters and came to their decision which has not been attacked as partial or perverse. The only ground which survived before the Appellate Bench of the High Court was that the requirements of natural justice had not been satisfied. The only question that we have to determine is whether the Appellate Authority was justified in using the second report made by the police, though it had not been placed into the hands of the parties. That report did not directly contain any allegations against the first respondent. Hence there was nothing in that report which it could be called upon to meet. The only effect of the report was that many of the objections raised against the suitability of the appellant had been withdrawn by the police on further consideration of their records. The police report is more for the information of the authorities concerned with the granting of permits than for the use of several applicants for such permits. The only effect of the report was that many of the objections raised against the suitability of the appellant had been withdrawn by the police on further consideration of their records. The police report is more for the information of the authorities concerned with the granting of permits than for the use of several applicants for such permits. In our opinion therefore the fact that the Appellate Authority had read out the contents of the police report was enough compliance with the rules of natural justice. We have also pointed out that no grievance was made at the time the Appellate Authority was hearing the appeal by any of the parties, particularly by the first respondent, that the second report should not have been considered or that they wished to have a further opportunity of looking into that report and to controvert any matter contained therein.” This decision is sufficient authority for the proposition that the revisory authority was under no obligation to give notice of its intended reference to the G.O. communicated to it by the State Government. For the reasons given above, I cannot agree with the order of Rajagopalan J., in having held that the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was vitiated by reference to the G.O. or that it was not a relevant factor to be taken into account by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal or that it was based on a misconstruction of the order in W.P. No. 18 of 1957. In my view this appeal has, therefore, to be allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, I would direct each party to bear his own costs. Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.-This is an appeal by Swami Motor Transport Ltd. Tanjore, the third respondent in W.P. No 467 of 1957, against the order of Rajagopalan, J., allowing the petition of Raman and Raman Ltd., Kumbakonam and issuing a writ of certiorari to set aside the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras, dated 13th May, 1957, revising the orders of the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, dated 26th July, 1956, rejecting the appellant’s application for the variation of the route Tanjore to Kumbakonam as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal in respect of the appellant’s buses MDO 1081 and 1100, and granting the variation, despite the respresentations of Raman and Raman, Ltd., the petitioner in W.P. No. 467 of 1957. The facts were briefly these: The appellant and Sri Rama Vilas Motor Service were running 11 buses and 6 buses respectively on the route Tanjore to Kumbakonam via Papanasam, covering a distance of 25 miles. Raman and Raman and Sri Rama Vilas Service were running 10 and 4 buses respectively from Kumbakonam to Tiruvarur via Kodavasal, a distance of 24 miles, Kodavasal lying in the middle of this route. There was no bus service from Kodavasal to Koradachery a distance of 7 miles, possibly because Koradachery was served from Tanjore directly by rail. In 1955 Raman and Raman applied for plying buses along a new route Kodavasal to Koradachery, not covered by buses till then. The proposed route was new, and it was dropped by the Regional Transport Authority, the competent authority, on 30th December 1955, in view of the Divisional Engineer, Highways, not recommending it, owing to the unsuitablity of the road to stand heavy traffic. Raman and Raman appealed to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, against the order rejecting its petition, and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, on 13th September, 1956, set aside the order of rejection and remanded the petition for fresh disposal by the Regional Transport Authority, in the light of the observations in its judgment. Meanwhile, the appellant applied, on 4th January, 1956, to the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, for the variation of the route Tanjore to Kumbakonam for two buses, viz., MDO Nos. 1081 and 1100, as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal. The usual procedure prescribed in the G.Os. like G.O. Misc. No 4912, Home, dated 18th December, 1950, and G.O. Misc. Meanwhile, the appellant applied, on 4th January, 1956, to the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, for the variation of the route Tanjore to Kumbakonam for two buses, viz., MDO Nos. 1081 and 1100, as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal. The usual procedure prescribed in the G.Os. like G.O. Misc. No 4912, Home, dated 18th December, 1950, and G.O. Misc. No. 382, dated 3rd February, 1956, was for the Regional Transport Authority, to first publish a notification under section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act in order to hear representations made by members of the public, or by persons already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route or routes, or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or routes lay, or by any association interested in the provision of transport facilities, in order to decide whether such a variation of the route should be granted, dealing with the application as if it were an application for a permit as provided under rule 208 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, and give a decision as to whether the extension or the variation of the permit was in the interests of the public, and, if it gava a decision that it was in the interests of the public, to apply for administrative sanction of the varied or extended route from the Transport Commissioner, and then publish a notification under section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act to deal with the particular application of the individual concerned, and to grant it to him or to others considered better fitted. In case, the Regional Transport Authority did not consider the variation or extension to be in the interests of the public generally, and therefore resolved not to recommend it, it would still publish a notification under section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act in order to dispose of the particular application. In other words, the notification under section 47 was to decide in general whether the extension or variation applied for was necessary in the interests of the public and should be recommended, and the notification under section 57 was in order to dispose of the particular application and to decide, in case the variation or extension was recommended and approved, to whom the new or extended permit should be granted. Section 57 (3) provides for representations against the grant of the extension or variation to the applicant. Section 57 (5) gives the person making the representation an opportunity of being heard either in person or by duly authorised representative. Section 57 (4) says that no representation in connection with an application referred to in sub-section (3) shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made in writing before the appointed day and unless a copy thereof is furnished simultaneously to the applicant by the person making such representation. The Regional Transport Authority in this case published a notification under section 57 (3) regarding the appellant’s application for variation and extension of its permit for the two buses, first instead of the notification under section 47. Sri Rama Vilas Service sent a representation on 13th February, 1956, against the appellant’s application for extension or variation. Raman and Raman claims before us to have sent a representation on 24th February, 1956, but could not show us a copy of the same nor could we trace the original or any reference to it in the file. The appellant’s counsel strenuously denied that any such representation was sent. The Regional Transport Authority cancelled the notification under section 57, thus wrongly issued before the notification under section 47, and issued a notification under section 47. Raman and Raman, as well as Sri Rama Vilas Service, sent in representations against the need for the extension and variation. The Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, at its hearing on 21st May, 1956, resolved as follows: “Heard parties. Koradachery is connected by rail (23 miles) with Tanjore and by the proposed variation the distance will amount to 45 miles by bus. Further, existing facilities between Kumbakonam and Kodavasal are quite adequate and the proposed variation is not the best method of providing traffic facilities between Koradachery and Kodavasal in the public interest and hence variation not recommended.” After this resolution was passed, the Regional Transport Authority published another notification under section 57 (3) of the Act. Sri Rama Vilas Service made representations against the grant of the variation and extension to the appellant. It is out of the picture now. Raman and Raman did not make any fresh representation. According to Mr. M.K. Nambiar, its learned counsel there was an arrangement under which any transport company paying Rs. Sri Rama Vilas Service made representations against the grant of the variation and extension to the appellant. It is out of the picture now. Raman and Raman did not make any fresh representation. According to Mr. M.K. Nambiar, its learned counsel there was an arrangement under which any transport company paying Rs. 8 per year was considered to be a registered transport company and was entitled to get individual copies of all notifications, and Raman and Raman had registered its name and paid the requisite subscription and had failed to get a copy of the second notification under section 57, and had, therefore, failed to make the representation to the second notification under section 57. This was a new contention, not set up before Rajagopalan, J., in this writ application though referred to vaguely in the affidavit of Raman and Raman in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, and so, we have not gone into it, as the necessary documents etc., have not been exhibited and are not on record. The Regional Transport Authority, at its sitting on 26th July, 1956, heard the application of the appellant and the representations received from Sri Rama Vilas Service, and rejected the appellant’s application as it considered the grant of the variation and extension to be not in the interests of the public, for various reasons given by it. We are informed by the learned counsel on both sides that the resolutions passed by the Regional Transport Authority under section 47 are not communicated to the person making the application for variation or extension, or to the persons making representations against it, possibly because the resolutions are administrative and general orders, regarding the advisability or otherwise of the extension or variation sought for, and not orders on the petitions themselves, and the resolutions are to recommend or not the variation or extension, and for that reason also are kept uncommunicated, the final orders communicated being only those passed under section 57. The order passed under section 57 rejecting the petition of the appellant was communicated to the appellant only on 10th August, 1956. But, as urged by Mr. Nambiar, the parties may have informal and irregular ways of coming to know from the office about the orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority, under section 47 or 57. So, according to Mr. But, as urged by Mr. Nambiar, the parties may have informal and irregular ways of coming to know from the office about the orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority, under section 47 or 57. So, according to Mr. Nambiar it is not surprising that Sri Varadan M.L.A., Kumbakonam, and Sri Thyagaraja Pillai, M.L.A., Koradachery had, after the resolution, of the Regional Transport Authority on 21st May, 1956, not to recommend the appellant’s application for extension or variation, and before the orders of the Regional Transport Authority on 26th July, 1956, under section 57 were passed, sent in petitions to the Government stating that direct transport facilities from Kumbakonam to Koradachery or from Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal were essential in the interests of the public of Koradachery a coconut and paddy centre, as the public were suffering from lack of such quick facilities for transport. On 6th August, 1956, after the Regional Transport Autho rity had rejected the appellant’s application on 26th July, 1956, and before it had communicated the order to him the appellant also sent a petition to the Government detailing its request before the Regional Transport Authority and requesting the Government to direct the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, for extending the existing service performed by its buses MDO Nos. 1081 and 1100 between Tanjore and Kumbakonam to Koradachery via Kodavasal. This application was presented to the Government by Mr. T. Chengalvarayan, counsel for the appellant, and specifically prayed for the exercise of the Government’s powers under section 43-A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, as amended in 1954, for granting the prayer. According to Mr. Nambiar, the petition by two influential Congress M.L.As., Messrs. This application was presented to the Government by Mr. T. Chengalvarayan, counsel for the appellant, and specifically prayed for the exercise of the Government’s powers under section 43-A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, as amended in 1954, for granting the prayer. According to Mr. Nambiar, the petition by two influential Congress M.L.As., Messrs. Varadan and Thyagaraja Pillai, to the Congress Ministry in power, were themselves not proper, though they did not request for the grant by Government of the specific request of the appellant, and the petition by the appellant requesting for the very same relief it had prayed for before the Regional Transport Authority and rejected by it under sections 47 and 57 of the Act was in the highest degree improper, and the Government should not have entertained such a petition from a party before a quasi-judicial tribunal like the Regional Transport Authority, especially when it knew that the party had a right of filing a revision petition before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which right the party actually exercised a few days later. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal passed orders on 13th May, 1957, reversing the Regional Transport Authority’s order dated 26th July, 1956 and forming the subject-matter of W.P.No. 467 of 1957 and this appeal. The Government received the appellants application also, and called for the report of the Deputy Transport Commissioner, State Transport Authority, Egmore, on the petitions of Messrs. Varadan and Thyagaraja Pillai and the appellants. Sri Reghupathirao Naidu, the Deputy Transport Commissioner, submitted his report bringing to the notice of the Government specifically the fact of Raman and Raman having applied in 1955 itself for a permit to ply its buses on the new route Kodavasal to Koradachery, in extension of its route Kumbakonam to Thiruvarur via Kodavasal, and its rejection, and dealt with the conditions prevailing on the routes Tanjore-Kumbakonam, Kumbakonam-Tiruvarur via Kodavasal and the new route Kodavasal to Koradachery. He ended up by requesting the Government to pass suitable orders. The Government then passed G.O. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956. He ended up by requesting the Government to pass suitable orders. The Government then passed G.O. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956. In the preamble to it, the Government refers to the petitions of Sri Varadan and Sri Thyagaraja Pillai, M.L.As., and of the appellant, and to the report of the Deputy Transport Commissioner and says that it has carefully examined the representations with reference to the conditions specified in section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and in consultation with the Transport Commissioner, Madras, has decided that the route Tanjore to Kumbakonam should be varied as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal in respect of two buses. In Paragraph 2, it says: “In exercise of the powers conferred by section 43-A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939), the Government of Madras hereby directs the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, to vary the existing route, Tanjore to Kumbakonam, as Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal in respect of two buses.” Copies of the G.O. were communicated to the Transport Commissioner, the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, the Regional Transport Officer, Tanjore, Messrs. Varadan and Thyagaraja Pillai and the appellant. No copy was communicated to Raman and Raman, Sri Rama Vilas Service though they were already operating on the Kumbakonam to Kodavasal route, a sector of the varied and extended route contemplated. Nor was notice given to either of them about the proposed extension of the route Tanjore to Kumbakonam to Koradachery via Kodavasal, and they were allowed to make their representations, including the representation that they were already running their buses from Kumbakonam to Tiruvarur via Kodavasal and were covering the sector of Kumbakonam to Kodavasal, which the appellant was not and that Raman and Raman had applied for the new route Kodavasal to Koradachery, even in 1955, and had been refused it on the report of the Highways Engineer against such extension on technical grounds. Mr. Mr. Nambiar has attacked the validity of this G.O. on the ground that notice was not given to Raman and Raman and Sri Rama Vilas Service, operators of a sector of the route, though the Government had purported to have complied with the requirements of section 47 making it obligatory to take into consideration any representation made by persons already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route, adding that they could not make any representations to the Government as they were not aware of the petitions of Messrs. Varadan and Thyagaraja Pillai and the appellant to the Government. Mr. Nambiar also pointed out that the Deputy Commissioner’s report to the Government had clearly shown the interest of Raman and Raman as running over a sector, viz., Kumbakonam to Kodavasal, and as having applied for the new route Kodavasal to Koradachery earlier. He also stated that Raman and Raman could not even get a copy of the G.O. from the Regional Transport Authority to whom it was communicated, and had to apply to the Government for a copy and suffer very great delays, and that it finally got a copy and filed W.P.No.18 of 1957 in this Court for issuing a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or other direction directing the State of Madras and the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, to forbear from enforcing G.O. Mis. No. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956. That writ petition was filed on 7th January, 1957. The appellant was the third respondent in that writ petition. No. 3199, dated 16th November, 1956. That writ petition was filed on 7th January, 1957. The appellant was the third respondent in that writ petition. Rajagopalan, J., passed an order dated 2nd April, 1957, holding that in view of the fact that Raman and Raman, the petitioner, was plying 10 buses on the Kumbakonam to Kodavasal route, the major sector of the extension from Kumbakonam to Koradachery covering 19 miles, and that Sri Rama Vilas Service was also running 4 buses on that sector as against none by this appellant, the failure of the Government, especially in view of the report of the Deputy Transport Commissioner, showing the interest of Raman and Raman, etc., to give notice to Raman and Raman and an opportunity to make its representation against granting the extension and variation, vitiated the exercise of the jurisdiction the Government had under section 43-A (2) to extend the route from Kumbakonam to Koradachery, as section 43-A (2) a so required the conditions stipulated in section 47 to be observed, and the principles of natural justice clearly required such a notice. In that view, he did not consider fully the question whether the Government was obliged to give notice to Raman and Raman and Sri Rama Vilas Service even under the law and the rules, under sections 43-A (2), 47 (1), etc., apart from the particular circumstances proved in the case making it obligatory to give Raman and Raman notice on the principles of natural justice. He, therefore, held that G.O.No.3199 was unlawful, and vitiated by the failure to give notice, but refused a writ of mandamus, as the Government had already issued the Government Order and no question directing it to direct the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, from giving effect to it arose, as the Regional Transport Authority could take into account only lawful directions given by the Government under section 43-A (1) or 43-A (2) of the Act, and that no writ of mandamus could issue to the Government directing it to cancel G.O. No. 3199 as it was issued in purported exercise of its administrative control and authority, and no question of issuing a writ of certiorari would arise, and no question of a writ of prohibition also, as that would be anticipating a wrong order by the Regional Transport Authority relying on the unlawful Government Order before such an order was passed. So, while declaring the Government Order to be unlawful and vitiated, and in excess of the Government’s powers also, because it restricted the extension and variation to two buses, which it had no power to do and which only the Regional Transport Authority and other Transport Authorities could do, he dismissed the writ petition, though without costs. On the very same day as the filing of the W.P. No. 18 of 1957 on 7th January, 1957, praying for restraining the Regional Transport Authority from giving effect to G.O. 3199, the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, issued a notification under section 48-A of the Motor Vehicles Act stating that it was proposed to vary the permits of two buses belonging to the appellant and running from Tanjore to Kumbakonam to run from Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal, in pursuance of G.O. 3199, and directing the appellant to file objections, if any, within three months from that date. No notice was sent to Raman and Raman or to Sri Rama Vilas Service, who were opposing the appellant’s application, but notice was sent only to the appellant who was asking for the variation and extension. The appellant was granted the extension and variation in respect of two other buses, viz., MDO Nos. 1959 and 1960, on 30th April, 1957. The appellant had applied on 18th November, 1956, two days after the Government Order, for such extension and variation in respect of his buses MDO Nos. 1081 and 1100, and it was in respect of buses MDO Nos. 1959 and 1960, since the matter relating to buses MDO Nos. 1081 and 1100 was pending in the revision petition by Raman and Raman before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and the revision petition was disposed of only on 13th May, 1957. Raman and Raman filed W.P. No. 432 of 1957 against the extension and variation regarding bus Nos. 1959 and 1960. Though the appellant was running the two buses MDO Nos. 1081 and 1100, as well as the other two buses MDO Nos. 1959 and 1960, it was finally allowed by this Court only to run the two buses MDO Nos. 1959 and 1960 since even G.O. No.3199 allowed only two buses to run from Kumbakonam to Koradachery via Kodavasal, the appellant is still running those two buses. 1081 and 1100, as well as the other two buses MDO Nos. 1959 and 1960, it was finally allowed by this Court only to run the two buses MDO Nos. 1959 and 1960 since even G.O. No.3199 allowed only two buses to run from Kumbakonam to Koradachery via Kodavasal, the appellant is still running those two buses. W.P. No. 432 of 1957 was eventually dismissed by this Court, as there was an alternative remedy, before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, regarding the Regional Transport Authority’s order dated 30th April, 1957, relating to bus Nos. 1959 and 1960. That matter is still pending before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and those buses are, therefore, still running. It is stated by Mr. Nambiar that after the order of remand dated 13th September, 1956, passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal regarding the refusal of Raman and Raman’s application for the route Kodavasal to Koradachery, the matter went up again before the Regional Transport Authority but was dismissed by it, as G.O. No. 3199 had permitted only two buses to run on that route and the two buses of the appellant had already been granted that route. Raman and Raman have taken the matter again to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and it is said to be pending there. On 13th May, 1957, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal heard the appellant’s petition against the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, dated 26th July, 1956, rejecting its application for the variation of the route Tanjore-Kumbakonam to Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal in respect of two buses, MDO Nos. 1081 and 1100. After referring to the previous history, and to G.O. No. 3199, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal reversed the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted the variation applied for by the appellant in respect of the two buses MDO. Nos. 1081 and 1100. 1081 and 1100. After referring to the previous history, and to G.O. No. 3199, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal reversed the order of the Regional Transport Authority and granted the variation applied for by the appellant in respect of the two buses MDO. Nos. 1081 and 1100. Sri Pushparaj, who constituted the State Transport Appellate Tribunal then, held that all the existing routes for getting to Koradachery from Tanjore or Kumbakonam for the travelling public were round-about and cumbersome, and the variation applied for by the appellant was the simplest and best to meet the needs of the travelling public of Kumbakonam or of any other place between Kumbakonam and Kodavasal and between Papanasam and Kumbakonam, to go to Koradachery, and that the variation asked for by the appellant was quiet reasonable, and was in the best interests of the travelling public, particularly of the people residing on the sector Kodavasal to Koradachery and between Kumbakonam and Kodavasal. But, instead of resting his order on this finding, he went on to say: “Immediately after the Government Order was issued by the Government, Messrs. Raman and Raman filed a Writ Petition No. 18 of 1957 questioning the validity of this Government Order and prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, and the petitioner herein to forbear from enforcing the directions in the said Government Order. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the Government had powers to issue the said Government Order by virtue of section 43-A (2) of the Act, and the High Court refused to grant the writ of mandamus applied for by Messrs. Raman and Raman Ltd.” The State Transport Appellate Tribunal had allowed Raman and Raman, which had not made any representation before the Regional Transport Authority under section 57 (3) of the Act, when the application was notified for a second time under section 57, to make a representation before it, and it considered its representation and even sent a copy of its order to it as if it was a party to the proceedings. Against this order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Raman and Raman filed W.P. No. 467 of 1957 on 27th May, 1957 urging various grounds for quashing the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The respondents were the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the Regional Transport Authority Tanjore, and the appellant. Against this order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Raman and Raman filed W.P. No. 467 of 1957 on 27th May, 1957 urging various grounds for quashing the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The respondents were the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, the Regional Transport Authority Tanjore, and the appellant. That petition was hotly contested on the ground that the petitioners had no locus standi to file the writ petition, having not filed any representation under section 57 (3) of the Act and therefore not being entitled to be heard under section 57 (4) of the Act by the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Appellate Tribunal or this Court, and also challenging all the grounds raised by Raman and Raman against the State Transport Appellate Tribunal’s order, like the State Transport Appellate Tribunal’s taking into account evidence not before the Regional Transport Authority, like G.O. No. 3199 and the judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 and misconstruing that judgment as holding the Government Order to be legal whereas it held it to be illegal and unlawful, and the invalidity of G.O. No. 3199, because of failure to give notice to Raman and Raman under the principles of natural justice in order to enable it to make representations, and all other grounds urged by Raman and Raman. Rajagopalan, J., held that Raman and Raman had locus standi to file the writ, being aggrieved at the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal allowing the route to trade rival, thereby suffering financial loss, and held further that, whatever be the effect of section 57 (4) regarding the representations before the Regional Transport Authority the matter was different in this case, because the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had allowed Raman and Raman to file representations before it and had made it factually a party to the revision proceedings, and that, further, the writ jurisdiction of this Court was wider than the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority or of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and would give the petitioner, a person aggrieved at the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal locus standi to file such a petition. He also held that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had taken into consideration G.O. No. 3199, as one of the relevant factors influencing its decision reversing the Regional Transport Authority’s and that it had misconstrued the judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 as holding that the Government had powers to issue the said Government Order by virtue of section 43-A (2) of the Act, whereas the judgment had actually held that the Government Order was vitiated and was unlawful because of lack of notice to Raman and Raman, and that the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had become vitiated by taking into consideration the Government Order which had been declared to be ultra vires by this Court and by misconstruing the High Court’s decision on the point. So, on 8th November, 1957, he allowed the petition, issued a writ of certiorari, and set aside the orders of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, dated 13th May, 1957, and directed the appellant to pay the costs of Raman and Raman. This appeal is against that order. I have perused the records and heard the learned counsel on both sides and the learned Government Pleader for the Government. Mr. G. R. Jagadisan, learned Counsel for the appellant, attacked Rajagopalan, J.‘s order as wrong and passed without jurisdiction as Raman and Raman had no locus standi to file the writ petition, and on wrong grounds, like G. O. No. 3199 being invalid and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal acting illegally in acting on it and misconstruing the judgment of Rajagopalan, J., in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 reported in Raman and Raman, Ltd. v. The State of Madras1. He wanted it to be set aside in toto and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal’s order restored in full. The learned Government Pleader was only anxious that G. O. No. 3199, which, according to him, was only a general order, and not one passed in favour of the appellant or any other person individually, should be held to be within the powers of the Government under section 43-A (2) of the Act and to be binding on all the transport authorities and tribunals, and should be held valid, despite failure of notice to Raman and Raman, before passing it. He urged that the Government was concerned only with this, and was not concerned with whether the State Transport Appellate Tribunal’s order granting variation and extension to the appellant was confirmed or reversed or modified, or whether any other body, like Raman and Raman, was given the new route if they deserved it under the rules. Mr. M. K. Nambiar, learned counsel for Raman and Raman urged that Rajagopalan, J.‘s order quashing the State Transport Appellate Tribunal’s order was perfectly valid and ought not to be disturbed in the least, that G. O. No. 3199 was invalid in toto owing to the Government’s acting improperly in receiving and acting on the representations of a party before a Tribunal like the Regional Transport Authority, constituted under the law, and that the State Transports Appellate Tribunal’s order was vitiated by its misconstruction of the judgment of the Rajagopalan, J., in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, thinking that he had held that the Government had authority to issue the Government Order whereas he had held that the Government Order was illegal and ultra vires, and was also vitiated by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal taking new materials not before the Regional Transport Authority into consideration, like G. O. No. 3199 sanctioning a new route and filling up a lacuna and making it impossible for the route to be assigned to the appellant, and referring to the judgment of Rajagopalan, J., in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 and going wrong in its construction without giving notice to Raman and Raman, which had been allowed to make representations before it, that it was going to take these new facts into considerations. He urged that if notice had been given, Raman and Raman would have shown the Government Order to be invalid-that it had been held to be invalid by this Court in W.P No. 18 of 1957, and would have prevented the misconstruction of the judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. He urged that if notice had been given, Raman and Raman would have shown the Government Order to be invalid-that it had been held to be invalid by this Court in W.P No. 18 of 1957, and would have prevented the misconstruction of the judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. Of course, he urged that Raman and Raman had locus standi to file the writ petition, as it was aggrieved by the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in granting the variation and extension to its rival which had come into the field later than itself, and had no sector qualification, like it, he urged also that Raman and Raman had been allowed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to make representations before it despite its failure to make representations before the Regional Transport Authority under the second notification under section 57, which failure too he attributed to the Regional Transport Authority’s failure to send notice to Raman and Raman, a registered transport concern entitled to be given a copy of that notification. I shall first discuss the question of locus standi of Raman and Raman to file the writ petition. Mr. Jagadisan urged that because Raman and Raman had failed to make a representation under section 57 (3) of the Act in reply to the second notification under section 57, no representation by it in connection with the appellant’s application for extension and variation could be considered by the Regional Transport Authority under section 57 (4), and that, as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had only the same jurisdiction as the Regional Transport Authority, it could not also consider any representation by Raman and Raman regarding the variation and the extension, and that the mere fact that it allowed it to make a representation before it as an act of grace would not make it a party to the proceedings or entitled to notice regarding new matters taken into consideration by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, like G. O. No. 3199 and the Judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, or make it have a legal or statutory grievance sufficient to file a writ because of alleged prejudice and loss caused by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal’s order granting the appellant the variation and extension. He pointed out that the Supreme Court has laid down in Veerappa Pillai v. Ramam and Raman, Ltd and others1, as follows: “The Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribes an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the Transport Authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. The Regional Transport Authority and the Provincial Authority are entrusted under section 42 with this power. They may be described as administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions in the matter of grant of permits.......There is a general provision of section 43-A that the Provincial Government may issue such orders and directions of a general character as it may consider necessary to the Provincial Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority in respect of any matter relating to road transport ; and such transport authority shall give effect to such orders and directions. There is, therefore, a regular hierarchy of administrative bodies established to deal with the regulation of transport by means of a motor vehicle. Thus we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievance or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had. As observed already, the issue or refusal of permits is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities and it is not a matter of right.” Mr. The remedies for the redress of grievance or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had. As observed already, the issue or refusal of permits is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities and it is not a matter of right.” Mr. Nambiar, for Raman and Raman, urged that these observations applied to the state of affairs before the Constitution of India came into force and have been changed or at least modified after the Constitution came into force as can be seen from the ruling of a Bench of this Court in C.S.S. Motor Service v. State of Madras1, where Rajamannar, C.J., and Venkatarama Ayyar, J., as he then was, have held that, under the Indian Constitution, the right to carry on business is one of the freedoms expressly protected under Article 19(1) (g), and that the citizens have a right to ply motor vehicles on the public pathways and that any infringement of that right, even if it is by the Legislature, can be justified only if it falls within the scope of Article 19(6), and that the grant or refusal of permits by the transport authorities in all its stages, including an order under section 64-A, is a judicial act, and the Provincial Government should frame rules laying down the principles on which the selection from among the applicants is to be made, and such rules must be, as required by Article 19(6), reasonable and in the interests of the public, and the rules so laid down should be followed by all transport authorities, including the Government, acting under section 64-A without any discrimination and that the decision of the transport authorities granting or refusing to grant permits are liable to be reviewed by the Court and be set aside if they are unreasonable, arbitrary or discretionary. Mr. Jagadisan urged that this latter ruling has not affected the observations in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman, Ltd., and others2, and has only added to them certain other observations. I agree, though the additions are very significant and affect the scope of original observations materially. Mr. Mr. Jagadisan urged that this latter ruling has not affected the observations in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman, Ltd., and others2, and has only added to them certain other observations. I agree, though the additions are very significant and affect the scope of original observations materially. Mr. Jagadisan then relied on the rulings of Benches, of the Orissa High Court in Raghunath Patnaik v. S. T. A. Orissa3, of the Rajasthan High Court in Dholpur Co-operative T. & M. Union v. Appellate Authority4, and of the Nagpur High Court in M. M. T. Association v. M. T. Service5, which have held that where a person has not filed a representation to the notification under section 57, he has no right to make any representations before the Regional Transport Authority against the application for the grant of the permit, and that he has no right to do so in appeal also, and argued from this that, as Raman and Raman has no legal or statutory right to make such a representation before the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, it could not be deemed to have a statutory or legal grievance or to be “an aggrieved party” entitled to file a writ in this Court, whatever its financial loss might be by the permit being granted to its trade rival, and that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal’s act of grace permitting Raman and Raman to make representations before it in the revision petition filed by the appellant would not take it a factual party, as held erroneously by Rajagopalan, J., and entitled to file a writ. He added that, as the Supreme Court has held in Charanjit Lal v. The Union of India1, The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta2, Harivishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed3, and New Prakash Transport Co., Ltd. v. Mew Suvarna Transport Co., Ltd.4, even though writ can be issued under Article 226 for purposes other than the enforcement of fundamental rights, the concluding words of the Article have to be read in the context of what precede the same, and the existence of a right is the foundation of the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court under this Article. He also relied on the ruling of the King’s Bench in ex parte Stott5, and urged that whether the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, was reasonable or unreasonable, legal or illegal ,valid or invalid, Raman and Raman was not a person who was aggrieved under the law, and was, therefore, not entitled to apply for a writ of certiorari. He relied on Paragraph 265, Volume 11 of Halsburys’ Laws of England (Third Edn.) and on the following observation therein: “Although the order is not of course, it will, though discretionary, nevertheless be granted ex debito justitiae to quash the proceedings which the Court has the power to quash where it is shown that the Court below has acted without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, if the application is made by an aggrieved parcy and not merely by one of the public, and if the conduct of the party applying has not been such as to disentitle him to relief and this is the case even though certiorari is taken away by statute and though there is an alternative remedy.” He relied also on the Paragraph 119 of the same volume and on the following observations therein: “Where the proceedings are regular upon their face and the inferior tribunal had jurisdiction, the superior Court will not grant the order of certiorari on the ground that the inferior tribunal had misconceived a point of law. When the inferior tribunal has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot (merely because it incidentally misconstrues a statute or admits illegal evidence or rejects legal evidence or misdirects itself as to the weight of the evidence or convicts without evidence) be deemed to exceed or abuse its jurisdiction.” He also relied on the following passage in Cases in Constitutional Law by Keir and Lawson, (1954 Edn.) of pages 335 and 336:- “Can a person entrusted with a discretion be held to surrender his discretion if he conforms to a policy or rules laid down by a superior authority or even the Government itself ? Obviously, if the superior authority or the Government embodies its policy or rules in legislation which it has power to make, the subordinate must obey. He does not suttender his discretion because the limits of his discretion have been changed. Obviously, if the superior authority or the Government embodies its policy or rules in legislation which it has power to make, the subordinate must obey. He does not suttender his discretion because the limits of his discretion have been changed. Otherwise, it seems that although he surrenders his discretion and acts ineffectually, if he actually obeys the order of a superior (Simons Motor Union, Ltd. v. Minister of Labour6, he acts lawfully and effectually if he conforms freely to the policy of the Government.” He relied also on a ruling of a Bench of this Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in Anjaneya Motor Transport v. State of Madras7, where it has been held that simply because a person makes a representation beyond time, he does not become in any sense a party to the proceedings entitled to notice and hearing of the revision or appeal, and that the knowledge of the appellate or revisional authority as to the existence of a person whose rights may be affected has really no bearing upon right of such a person to notice. After a very careful consideration of the entire matter, I have no doubt whatever that Raman and Raman had locus standi to file the Writ Petition No. 467 of 1957, as held by Rajagopalan, J. The Supreme Court has held in the Harivishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and others3, that a writ of certiorari will issue when an inferior Court or tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it or fails to exercise it; (2) when it acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates, the principles of natural justice; and (3) when there is a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g., when its decision is based on clear ignorance, or disregard of the provisions of law. As found in the passages from Halsbury quoted above, any aggrieved parly can file a writ. I cannot agree with Mr. G. R. Jagidisan’s Contention that the grievance, though real, cannot be recognised if it is not a statutory grievance. Nor can I agree with Mr. Nambiar that any member of the public even without a grievance can file a writ. This latter contention will lead to extraordinary results. I cannot agree with Mr. G. R. Jagidisan’s Contention that the grievance, though real, cannot be recognised if it is not a statutory grievance. Nor can I agree with Mr. Nambiar that any member of the public even without a grievance can file a writ. This latter contention will lead to extraordinary results. If it is accepted, any Court-bird can file a writ attacking the correctness of a judgment in which he is not interested in the least. Mr. Nambiar urged that writs by any citizen can be allowed attacking the legality and validity of a cabinet. This is somewhat doubtful. In In re P. Ramamurthi1, a writ by a citizen and a legislator against the nomination of Sri C. Rajagopalachariar and three others of the Madras Legislative Council, was held to be not maintainable by a Bench of this Court. The Bench remarked that infringement of mere political rights in general was no ground for the issue of a writ and that a personal individual grievance was essential. That is why in the passages from Halsbury, we find the phrase “if the application is made by an aggrieved party and not merely by one of the public”. Mr. Jagadisan’s contention that a grievance must not only exist but must be statutory to enable an aggrieved person to file a writ does not also appeal to me. That will be extending the theory of damnum sine injuria beyond justifiable limits. Unless a statute says that a particular injury will not be recognised as an injury, the grievance will still be a legal grievance. Here, no statute says like that. All that section 57 (4) of the Motor Vehicles Act says is that no representation in connection with an application referred to in sub-section (3) shall be considered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made in writing before the appointed day and unless a copy thereof is furnished simultaneously to the applicant by the person making representation. It specifically prohibits only the Regional Transport Authority to consider such representations. It does not even prohibit the appellate or revisional authority, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, or the Government, from considering such representations themselves, if made to them. So, even if I hold against Mr. It specifically prohibits only the Regional Transport Authority to consider such representations. It does not even prohibit the appellate or revisional authority, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, or the Government, from considering such representations themselves, if made to them. So, even if I hold against Mr. Nambiar’s contention that Raman and Raman did make a representation under section 57 (3) on 24th February, 1956, in answer to the first notification under section 57, because though alleged by Raman and Raman in its affidavit in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 and not specifically refuted by the appellant, there is no sufficient proof of it, still the fact remains that Raman and Raman did make a representation to the appellant’s application in answer to the notification under section 47 and might be excused for not knowing that a second notification under section 57 would follow. This is a curious case where the Regional Transport Authority erroneously published the notification under section 57 first, and then the notification under section 47, and then again another notification under section 57. Again, there is the fact that though the Regional Transport Authority’s resolution dated 21st May, 1956, under section 47, not to recommend the variation or extension applied for by the appellant, was not communicated officially to the appellant or to Raman and Raman or to Sri Rama Vilas Service, I agree with Mr. Nambiar that all the parties must have known about it unofficially from the Regional Transport Authority’s office, and that Messrs. Varadan and Thyagaraja Pillai put in their petitions to the Government recommending the route refused to be recommended by the Regional Transport Authority, and the appellant put in his petition later on, and Raman and Raman rested happy and inactive because the Regional Transport Authority had not recommended the extension and variation asked for by the appellant. Naturally, Raman and Raman would not have expected any different order from the Regional Transport Authority, under section 57, even if it had suspected that a second notification under section 57 would issue. As it expected, the Regional Transport Authority, by its order dated 26th July, 1956, rejected the application of the appellant for the variation and the extension. Raman and Raman must have known about this too, and must have been doubly lulled into inactivity thereafter. Raman and Raman was not proved to be aware of the petitions of Messrs. As it expected, the Regional Transport Authority, by its order dated 26th July, 1956, rejected the application of the appellant for the variation and the extension. Raman and Raman must have known about this too, and must have been doubly lulled into inactivity thereafter. Raman and Raman was not proved to be aware of the petitions of Messrs. Varadan and Thyagaraja Pillai and by the appellant to the Government. No notice was given to it regarding them, nor could it have expected a petition by a party, in a matter directly pending before a quasi-judicial tribunal, like the Regional Transport Authority, to be entertained by the Government, as it would have been improper. Again, when the appellant filed a revision petition before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority rejecting its application for variation and extension, Raman and Raman, coming to know of it, intervened and was allowed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to make its representations against the appellant’s revision petition. Though Mr. Jagadisan urged that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to to do so, and that, even if it had jurisdiction, it was only an act of grace and would not make Raman and Raman a party to the proceedings, there is no doubt in my mind that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had ample powers to allow Raman and Raman to make representations in the revision petition, especially when the representations were in support of the order sought to be set aside, and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal must also be presumed to have the inherent power to allow such representations by parties interested, in the absence of any provision of law prohibiting it. The scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act is to invite objections and representations and not to stifle them. Each case has to be decided on its own facts. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal had, as Rajagopalan, J., held, made Raman and Raman factually a party to the revision petition, and had even communicated a copy of its order to it. I do not think that tile State Transport Appellate Tribunal was so strictly bound by section 57 (4) as. to make the prohibition therein regarding the Regional Transport Authority hearing any representation applicable to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal also, Such penal clauses must be strictly construed. I do not think that tile State Transport Appellate Tribunal was so strictly bound by section 57 (4) as. to make the prohibition therein regarding the Regional Transport Authority hearing any representation applicable to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal also, Such penal clauses must be strictly construed. As held in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman, Ltd., and others1, relied on by Mr. G. R. Jagadisan himself, the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal are administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions in the matter of the grant of permits, and as held in C. S. S. Motor Service v. State of Madras2, relied on by Mr. Nambiar, the grant or refusal of permits by the transport authorities in all its stages is a judicial act, and the decisions of the transport authorities granting or refusing to grant permits are liable to the reviewed by this Court and set aside, if they are unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory. As the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was a quasi-judicial body, and its order in revision a judicial act, it follows that its admitting additional evidence, like Government Order 3199 and the judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, without notice to Raman and Raman, which it had allowed to intervene and make representations, entitled Rajagopalan, J., at the instance of Raman and Raman, the aggrieved party, to issue a writ of certiorari on the grounds mentioned in Harivishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and others3, as the decision of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, upsetting the Regional Transport Authority’s decision, and relying on Government Order 3199 and the judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, without giving an opportunity to Raman and Raman to be heard, violated the principles of natural justice, and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal also committed a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings in construing Rajagopalan, J.‘s judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 as holding that the Government had a valid right to issue Government Order 3199 whereas, Rajagopalan, J., had held just the contrary, and had held the Government Order to be illegal, because of want of notice to Raman and Raman, Sri Rama Vilas Service, etc., and the violation of the principles of natural justice. Mr. Jagadisan then relied on the conduct of Raman and Raman disentitling it from filing the writ. Mr. Jagadisan then relied on the conduct of Raman and Raman disentitling it from filing the writ. This was a belated contention based on the passage from Halsbury cited above, that a writ of certiorari will issue only if the conduct of the party applying has not been such as to disentitle him to relief . I see nothing in the conduct of Raman and Raman, by which is meant its not filing representations before the Regional Transport Authority in answer to the second notification under section 57, disentitling it from getting a writ of certiorari. So, I hold that Raman and Raman had locus standi to file the writ. The next contention of Mr. Jagadisan was that, even so, the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal did not deserve to be quashed, as it had not misconstrued the judgment of Rajagopalan, J., in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, and, even if it had miscon trued it, it had not relied on it as one of the important pillars for its judgment but had only mentioned it as one of the reasons, and because it was bound to obey the directions in Government Order 3199, or at least, the general direction therein sanctioning the new route from Kodavasal to Koradachery and the extension of the route from Kumbakonam to Kodavasal, in consultation with the Transport Commissioner. I cannot agree. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal did misconstrue the judgment of Rajagopalan, J., in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 regarding the validity of Government Order 3199. Rajagopalan, J., who delivered the judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, was himself the Judge who disposed of W.P. No 467 of 1957 now under appeal, and he considered in his judgment in this writ petition his finding regarding Government Order 3199 in his judgment in W.P. No 18 of 1957 and held, quite rightly, that he had held Government Order, 3199 as vitiated, invalid and illegal in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, whereas the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had remarked that the High Court held in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 that the Government had powers to issue the said Government Order by virtue of section 43-A (2) of the Act, just the reverse of what was held actually. Thus, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal committed a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings regarding the finding in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 concerning Government Order 3199, and this error was based on clear ignorance, and, so Rajagopalan, J., was perfectly justified in issuing a writ of certiorari. As regards the argument that the entire Government Order 3199, was binding on the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, that also cannot be upheld. It is only a valid Government Order that will be binding on the quasi-judicial tribunals constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, and not invalid Government Orders or invalid parts of Government Orders. Rajagopalan, J., had in W. P. No. 18 of 1957, refused a writ of prohibition to the Regional Transport Authority to provide for any anticipated breach of its legal obligations, as "he did not expect it to treat Government Order 3199, held by him to be illegal and invalid at least in parts, as wholly legal and valid. As Mr. Nambiar rightly urged, if the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had not, out of ignorance, misconstrued the judgment of Rajagopalan, J., in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 as holding Government Order 3199 to be valid, and within the powers of the Government under section 43-A (2) of the Act, it is inconceivable that it would have differed from the finding of Rajagopalan, J., and held it to be wrong, and acted on the Government Order as valid, whatever the powers of this Bench might be to do so. I shall later on discuss how far, in my opinion, Government Order 3199 would be valid even though notice was not given to Raman and Raman and Sri Rama Vilas Service. I entirely agree with Rajagopalan, J., that it was certainly not valid when it restricted the extension and variation to two buses. I would also held that it was invalid in another respect, viz., in extending the route Tanjore-Kumbakonam, held by the appellant, without considering the advisability of extending the route Kumbakonam to Kodavasal, held by Raman and Raman and Sri Rama Vilas Service though the latter would be the more natural thing to do, as it formed part of the sector. Mr. Mr. Jagadisan urged that as the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had relied on the judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, misconstruing it, only as one of the reasons for its order for setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and for granting the appellant the extension and variation sought for, and as it was not clear that this reason had influenced it materially, there was no need for Rajagopalan, J., to interfere and quash the State Transport Appellate Tribunal’s order by issuing a writ of certiorari. This argument cannot hold good. A Bench of this Court, consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Somasundaram, J., has held in W.A. No. 35 of 1955 as follows:- "In our opinion, the principle enunciated by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in that decision applied to this case and that principle is this: "When more than one reason is given and when one of them, which from the language of the order appears to be substantial and has been taken into consideration, it is impossible for the court to sustain the order on the ground that it was really the valid reason that effectively operated to bring about the decision and not the invalid one. This principle has the high authority of the Judicial Committee in Li Hong Mi v. Attorney-General for Hongkong1. For relying on the misconstrued judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 alone, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal’s order deserves to be quashed, as it was an error apparent on the face of the record and it materially influenced it in arriving at its decision. But there was another vital error committed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, viz., its relying on the invalid portions of Government Order 3199. Mr. Jagadisan could not, of course, urge that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal should have held the Government Order to be legal and valid, despite Rajagopalan, J.‘s finding to the contrary. He could only urge that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was entitled to ingnore the Government Order and the judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 and proceed to dispose of the revision petition on other grounds. But that was not what the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, did, and this argument will not, therefore, help Mr. Jagadisan in this appeal. He could only urge that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was entitled to ingnore the Government Order and the judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957 and proceed to dispose of the revision petition on other grounds. But that was not what the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, did, and this argument will not, therefore, help Mr. Jagadisan in this appeal. There was a third error committed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, viz., in acting on new materials not before the Regional Transport Authority, like Government Order 3199 and the judgment in W.P. No. 18 of 1957, for deciding the revision petition. Mr. Jagadisan urged that Rajagopalan, J., had in several writ petitions including the one under appeal, held that when the existence of the new material was known to the other party, the failure to give notice to the party before using it will not vitiate the judgment. I cannot agree. A Bench of this Court, consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Somasundaram, J., has held, in W.A. No. 35 of 1955, that the reception of such new evidence without notice to the party affected and giving it an opportunity of rebutting any adverse statement contained therein, or inference therefrom, would vitiate the judgment. The Bench held it in an appeal from the judgment of Rajagopalan, J., himself, and set aside the observation of Rajagopalan, J., to the contrary. The learned Chief Justice relied on the decision of the King’s Bench in Rex v. Architects’ Registration Tribunal ex parte Juggar2, where it was held that it was improper for a tribunal which acted in a quasi-judicial capacity to consider and give weight to evidence contained in such documents. Mr. Jagadisan urged that in the case in the writ appeal, the new material consisted of electric bills, etc. and not a mere judgment of this Court and of a Government Order as in this case, and, so, the judgment in the writ appeal would not apply to the facts of this case, and that Government Orders and judgments of this Court are not really new materials and that even learned Judges of this Court use rulings not intimated to either side for supporting their decisions. I cannot agree. Even regarding judgments and inference drawn therefrom, in my opinion, parties must be given an opportunity to have their say. I cannot agree. Even regarding judgments and inference drawn therefrom, in my opinion, parties must be given an opportunity to have their say. It is well-known that judgments can be construed rightly or wrongly, and, at any rate, differently. Even in this case, the learned counsel on either side have construed certain judgments differently in their own favour. I, for one, would therefore, not advocate even judges using rulings to support their decisions without bringing them to the notice of the parties and hearing what they have to say about them. In my opinion, the principle audi alteram partem the corner-stone of both law and natural justice, requires it. Government Order 3199 was admitted not to have been published in any gazette, and Mr. Nambiar vehemently urged that not only Raman and Raman had no notice of it, when it was issued, but could not even get a copy of it for a long time after it was issued. Then it was urged by Mr. Jagadisan that Government Order 3199 was issued by the Government in exercise of itspowersundersection43-A(2) and that this Government Order was an administrative order as held by Rajagopalan, J., himself, and was not liable to be held to be invalid, in whole or in part, by this Court. He relied on the ruling of Rajagopalan, J., himself in W.P. Nos. 259, 757 and 758 of 1955 to that effect, and also on the rulings of a Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in M. Anantaramiah v.R. Venkata Ratnam1, on the Full Bench ruling of the Allahabad High Court in Mahbulunnissa v. Union of India2, and on the Bench rulings of the Allahabad High Court in Jyoti Sarup v. Board of Revenue, U. P.3, Ramaesh Chandra v. Principal, B. B. I. College4, and Keshab Chandra v. Inspector of Schools5, and on the second passage from Halsbury quoted already, and urged that Rajagopalan, J., should not have interfered with the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, however wrong in law and in fact, when it was based on the administrative order contained in Government Order 3199 which it was bound to obey and implement. I cannot agree The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, being a quasi-judicial tribunal, like the Regional Transport Authority, was bound to obey only lawful Government Orders and not invalid Government Orders or invalid parts of Government Orders. I cannot agree The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, being a quasi-judicial tribunal, like the Regional Transport Authority, was bound to obey only lawful Government Orders and not invalid Government Orders or invalid parts of Government Orders. Rajagopalan, J., had not interfered with Government Order 3199 itself and issued a writ of mandamus or certiorari to the Government about it. He had in fact dismissed W.P. No. 18 of 1957, praying for a writ against the Government. But when a quasi judicial tribunal like the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, acted on the invalid Government Order, he rightly interfered by way of a writ of certiorari and quashed the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal That he had the right, and, indeed, the duty to do. None of the rulings relied on by Mr. Jagadisan would prevent it. Mr Jagadisan’s contention that Raman and Raman, having failed in W.P. No 18 of 1957 and having not appealed against it, should not be allowed to agitate against the findings of Rajagopalan, J., regarding the admission of new material known to the party, the Government Order being an administrative order, etc., will not hold good. As Rajagopalan, J.‘s views in this matter have been overruled by a Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 35 of 1955, Raman and Raman can, under the: law, rely on the Bench ruling in favour of its contentions. Then Mr Jagadisan urged that Mr. Nambiar was wrong in contending that: the State Transport Appellate Tribunal should not have granted the appellant the extension and the variation, as there was no administrative sanction for the extended and varied route by the Transport Commissioner, as required by the Government Orders referred to above, as that was merely an administrative detail with which Courts are not concerned, and the Regional Transport Authority and the State: Transport Appellate Tribunal had ample power to allow the extension and variation even in the absence of a recommendation to the Transport Commissioner by the Regional Transport Authority, and approval by him of the variation and extension, and that, in this case, Government Order 3199 specifically allowed the extension and variation after consultation with the Transport Commissioner, and that part of the Government Order would hold good, and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal could pass fresh orders in the revision petition in the place of the order quashed by Rajagopalan, J. Mr. Nambiar urged that this argument was wrong and that this Court has no power in a writ petition to remand that matter for fresh disposal, or to direct the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to re-hear the matter and give a fresh decision, and that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal could not grant the variation and extension without the Transport Commissioner’s having granted administrative sanction, any more than a house which does not exist can be rented out to a tenant by a Court. He also contended that in this writ appeal we cannot consider the legality and validity of Government Order No.. 3199 in whole or in part. I am of opinion that this Court has got the right to consider the decision of Rajagopalan, J., about the validity of Government Order 3199 or any part of it, as urged by Mr. Jagadisan, though the State Transport Appellate Tribunal had no such power. The Government, no doubt, committed three grave errors when passing Government Order 3199. Firstly, it entertained, in my opinion, improperly, a petition from the appellant regarding extension and variation for its two buses when the matter was pending before the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, though it may be that the appellant had known about the rejection of its petition by the Regional Transport Authority. While the Government had powers under section 43-A (2) to open any new route, like the route from Kodavasal to Koradachery or to extend any existing route, like the Tanjore-Kumbakonam route to Kodavasal or Koradachery, or the Kumbakonam-Kodavasal route to Koradachery, or to permit additional stage carriages or to reduce the number of stage carriages on any specified route, under section 42-A (2), as urged by Mr. Jagadisan, it had no right to say that two buses alone should ply on the extended or varied or new route. That was a matter for the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to decide. Nor did it have the power to take a petition from a party whose petition was pending before the quasi-judicial tribunals, and by-pass those quasi-judicial tribunals by passing orders itself without even giving notice to Raman and Raman and Sri Rama Vilas Service, who were providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route. Nor did it have the power to take a petition from a party whose petition was pending before the quasi-judicial tribunals, and by-pass those quasi-judicial tribunals by passing orders itself without even giving notice to Raman and Raman and Sri Rama Vilas Service, who were providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route. Nor did it have the power to decide for itself that only the Tanjore-Kumbakonam route, held by the appellant should be extended to Koradachery, and not the Kumbakonam-Kodavasal route held by Raman and Raman and Sri Rama Vilas Service. By entertaining the application of the appellant when its petition for extension and variation was pending before the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and by disposing of the application in a way favourable to it by extending the route Tanjore-Kumbakonam to Koradachery and by restricting it to two buses, the Government had acted improperly, and especially when there was no notice to Raman and Raman and Sri Rama Vilas Service, and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, by acting on the illegal, invalid and improper Government Order 3199 had rendered its order in revision liable to be quashed by Rajagopalan, J., No doubt, the Government did not order the two buses to be given to the appellant. But, in the context that is what it intended to do, and the Regional Transport Authority’s notice dated 7th January, 1957 to the appellant and its peculiar wording would show it. The Government had no doubt, power, even without notice to any one, to sanction the new route Kodavasal-Koradachery. Mr. Nambiar urged that the Highway Engineer had not recommended that route as it was not fit for bus traffic. But that reason is unconvincing at any rate now. Not only had Raman and Raman applied for that route, and has a revision petition still pending before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal about the rejection of its application, but the appellant is now running two buses daily along that route. The proof of the pudding is in the eating and the running of the two buses from Kodavasal to Koradachery for the past so many months proves the fitness of the route for buses to run on it. Mr. Nambiar urged that portions of the Government Order 3199 cannot be separated, and the sanction of the new route Kodavasal to Koradachery held valid. Mr. Mr. Nambiar urged that portions of the Government Order 3199 cannot be separated, and the sanction of the new route Kodavasal to Koradachery held valid. Mr. Jagadisan contended that it can be done. I agree with Mr. Jagadisan. The test is whether the valid part makes sense and is separable, viable and sustainable. The Federal Court has observed in Shyamakant Lal v. Ram Bhajan Singh,1relied on by Mr. Jagadisan as follows: “It is well-established principle that if the invalid part of an Act is really separate in its operation from the other parts, and the rest are not inseverably connected with it, then only such part is invalid, unless, of course, the whole object of the Act would be frustrated by the partial exclusion. If the subject, which is beyond the legislative power, is perfectly distinct from that which is within such power, the Act can be ultra vires in the former while intra vires in the latter. The test is said to be whether the statute with the in valid portions omitted would be substantially a different law as to the subject-matter dealt with by what remains from what it would be with the omitted portions forming part of it. See Rex v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration2”. Applying that test, it is clear to me that the portion of Government Order 3199 which sanctioned the new route Kodavasal — Koradachery “in consultation with the Transport Commissioner” (which recital is not attacked by Mr. Nambiar as false) will be valid, as it is separable, viable and sensible, while the portions relating to the extension of the Tanjore-Kumbakonam route to Koradachery, instead of the Kumbakonam-Kodavasal route to Koradachery, and the restriction of the varied and extended route to two buses alone will be invalid, as interfering with the jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in a matter pending before them and, without even issuing notices to the affected parties. So, I agree with Rajagopalan, J.‘s quashing in W.P.No. 467 of 1957 the State Transport Appellate Tribunal’s order in revision, but would direct the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to hear the matter afresh and give a fresh decision in the revision petition, after hearing the representations of Raman and Raman about W.P. No. 18 of 1957 and G.O. No. 3199 the new materials, and acting only on the valid portion of G.O. No. 3199, namely, the sanction of the new route Kodavasal-Koradachery, and deciding for itself, whether the Tanjore-Kumbakonam route should be extended to Koradachery, or the Kumbakonam-Kodavasal route, should be extended to Koradachery, and to whom the new route or the extension should be granted. I agree with Mr. Jagadisan that this Court has got the power even in a writ petition, and even after quashing the order of the subordinate Court or tribunal to direct the matter to be re-heard and decided afresh by it, and differ from Mr. Nambiar. The King’s Bench has held in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal, Ex-parte Shaw1, relied on by Mr. Jagadisan as follows: “The Court of the King’s Bench has an inherent jurisdiction to control all inferior tribunals not in an appellate capacity, but in a supervisory capacity. This control extends not only to seeing that the inferior tribunals keep within their jurisdiction but also to seeing that they observe the law. The control is exercised by means of a power to quash any determination by the tribunal which on the face of it offends against the law. The King’s Bench does not substitute its own views for those of the tribunal as a court of appeal would do. It leaves it to the tribunal to hear the case again, and in a proper case may command it to do so. When the King’s Bench exercises its control over the tribunals in this way, it is not usurping the jurisdiction which does not belong to it. It is only exercising a jurisdiction which it has always had.” In my opinion, these observations will apply in full to the powers of a High Court in India, in writ petitions. When the King’s Bench exercises its control over the tribunals in this way, it is not usurping the jurisdiction which does not belong to it. It is only exercising a jurisdiction which it has always had.” In my opinion, these observations will apply in full to the powers of a High Court in India, in writ petitions. So, I would confirm Rajagopalan, J.‘s order in the writ petitions and dismiss the appeal and would direct the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to dispose of the Revision Petition afresh, but would direct all the parties to this appeal, in the peculiar circumstances, to bear their own costs. Advocate’s fee Rs. 250. As we have delivered differing judgments in W.A. No.125 of 1957, the matter may be placed before the Honourable the Chief Justice for nominating a third Judge to hear the matter. When the appeal came on for hearing before the third Judge (Balakrishna Ayyar, J.) in view of the difference of opinion, the following Order was made by Balakrishna Ayyar J.-At this stage I am inclined to take the view which does not completely coincide either with that of A. S. Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. or Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. This means that it will not be possible to have a majority opinion in accordance with which A.S. Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., can dispose of the appeal. As required by clause 36 of the Letters Patent, the papers will be placed before the Honourable the Chief Justice so that if he thinks fit to do so, a Bench may be constituted whose opinion will enable the appeal to be finally disposed of. Pursuant to the aforesaid order this writ appeal was heard by a Full Bench (Rajamannar, G.J., Ramachandra Ayyar and Ganapathia Pillai, JJ.). The Solicitor-General of India (C.K. Daphtary) for K.V. Venkatasubramania Iyer, T.R. Ramachandran, G. Ramaswami and S.M. Subramaniam, Advocates for the Appellant. The Attorney-General of India (M.C. Setalwad) for M.K. Nambiar and M. Natesan, Advocates for the first Respondent. The Additional Government Pleader (M.M. Ismail) on behalf of Respondents 2 and 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Rajamannar C.J.-This is an appeal from the Writ Petition No. 467 of 1957 filed under Article 226 of the Constitution in the following circumstances. The appellants before us, Messrs. Swamy Motor Transport (Private), Limited, held permits to ply buses on the route Tanjore to Kumbakonam. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Rajamannar C.J.-This is an appeal from the Writ Petition No. 467 of 1957 filed under Article 226 of the Constitution in the following circumstances. The appellants before us, Messrs. Swamy Motor Transport (Private), Limited, held permits to ply buses on the route Tanjore to Kumbakonam. They applied on 4th January, 1956, for a variation of the route to enable them to run two of their buses MDO 1081 and MDO 1100, from Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal. On receipt of this application the Regional Transport Authority published a notification under section 57 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. There are two other operators on the route Kumbakonam to Kodavasal, namely, M/s. Raman and Raman and Sri Rama Vilas. Service Limited. Sri Rama Vilas Service sent a representation opposing the grant of variation. Raman and Raman allege that they also sent a representation but that has not been traced. It was pointed out that according to the procedure laid down by the Government, when an application for variation was received there should first be a notification under section 47 of the Act. The original notification under section 57 (3) was therefore cancelled and a notification under section 47 of the Act was published on 14th March, 1956. Both Raman and Raman and Sri Rama Vilas Service sent in representations urging that there was no need for the extension and variation. On 21st May, 1956, the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjavur resolved not to recommend the variation. The following is the resolution: “Heard parties. Koradachery is connected by rail (23 miles) with Tanjore and by the proposed variation the distance will amount to 45 miles by bus. Further, existing facilities between Kumbakonam and Kodavasal are quite adequate and the proposed variation is not the best method of providing traffic facilities between Koradachery and Kodavasal in the public interest and hence variation not recommended.” The Regional Transport Authority thereafter published on 31st May, 1956, a formal notification under section 57 (3) regarding the application made by the appellants for the variation. Sri Rama Vilas Service made representation against the grant of the variation but M/s. Raman and Raman do not appear to have filed afresh any such representation. Sri Rama Vilas Service made representation against the grant of the variation but M/s. Raman and Raman do not appear to have filed afresh any such representation. On 26th July, 1956, the Regional Transport Authority hearing the appellants and the representations received from Sri Rama Vilas Service rejected the appellants’ application as it considered that the grant of the variation and extension was not in the interests of the public. The order itself appears to have been communicated to the appellants on or about 10th August, 1956. The appellants applied to the State Transport Appellate Authority for a revision of the order of the Regional Transport Authority. Meanwhile two members of the Madras Legislative Assembly addressed two letters to the Minister for Transport requesting the Minister to provide through facilities between Tanjore and Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal as early as possible in the interests of the travelling public. There was no mention in these two letters of the application for the variation made by the appellants. The Appellants themselves filed a petition in the Ministry for Transport praying that the Regional Transport Authority Tanjore, may be directed to extend the existing service performed by their buses Nos. MDO 1081 and 1100 from Tanjore to Koradachery via Kumbakonam and Kodavasal. It is sufficient to say at this stage that there was no reference to this petition in the application made by them to the Regional Transport Authority. The appellants petition to the Government was dated 6th August, 1956. This was after the Regional Transport Authority had passed the order rejecting the appellants’ application though technically the order had not been communicated to the appellants till four days later. The Government appear to have communicated a copy of the petition to the Deputy Transport Commissioner, State Transport Authority, Egmore, for report. That officer after a full enquiry brought to the notice of the Government that the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, had rejected the application made by the appellants and against its order the appellants had preferred a revision petition to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras, and the matter was sub judice. The officer did not make any positive recommendation but left it to the Government to decide whether any variation should be granted. Thereupon the Government passed an order on 16th November, 1956 (G.O. Ms. The officer did not make any positive recommendation but left it to the Government to decide whether any variation should be granted. Thereupon the Government passed an order on 16th November, 1956 (G.O. Ms. No. 3199) which runs as follows: “Representations have been made to Government that the Public are put to great inconvenience for want of through travel facilities between Koradachery and Kumbakonam, that there is no bus service on the sector between Kodavasal and Koradachery, a distance of about 7 miles, that if one wants to go to Koradachery one has either to go to Tiruvarur and then come by bus to Koradachery in a round about way or has to go to Nidamangalam, catch the train there and then go to Koradachery. It has also been represented that there are five trains up and down on the route Tanjore to Nagapattinam (via) Nidamangalam, Koradachery and Tiruvarur, that they are not sufficient to serve the needs of the public and that additional bus facilities are quite essential between Kumbakonam, Tanjore and Koradachery (via) Kodavasal. It was therefore suggested that the existing route Tanjore to Kumbakonam may be varied as Tanjore to Koradachery (via) Kumbakonam and Kodavasal. The Government have carefully examined the representations with reference to the conditions specified in section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act and in consultation with the Transport Commissioner, Madras, have decided that present route Tanjore to Kumbakonam should be varied as Tanjore-Koradachery (via) Kumbakonam and Kodavasal in respect of two buses. 2. In exercise of the powers conferred by section 43-A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939) the Government of Madras hereby direct the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, to vary the existing route Tanjore to Kumbakonam as Tanjore to Koradachery (via) Kumbakonam and Kodavasal in respect of two buses.” Raman and Raman filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution (Writ Petition No. 18 of 1957) to issue a writ of mandamus directing the State of Madras and the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, to forbear from enforcing the above Government Order. That petition was disposed of by Rajagopalan, J., by his order dated 2nd April, 1957. That petition was disposed of by Rajagopalan, J., by his order dated 2nd April, 1957. He dismissed the petition on the ground that no writ of mandamus could be issued to the State because it had nothing further to do to give effect to the directions given in the said order and that no writ of mandamus could issue to the Regional Transport Authority in anticipation of a refusal by that authority to consider the objections preferred by the petitioner before him. Nevertheless the learned Judge examined at length the validity of the Government Order. His views may be briefly set out as they have a bearing on the contentions urged before us. (1) The Government in their above Order did not purport to grant expressly to the appellants herein a variation for their two buses. (2) The Government exceeded their jurisdiction conferred on them by section 43-A (2) when they purported to limit the use of a portion of the extended route, Kumbakonam to Koradachery, to two buses. (3) The failure of the Government to give an opportunity to Raman and Raman to make his representations vitiated the exercise of the jurisdiction which the Government had to extend the route up to Koradachery, because, it offended the principles of natural justice. The learned Judge commented on the fact that the appellants before us had failed to disclose the pendency of the proceedings before the Regional Transport Authority with reference to the very two buses mentioned by them to the Government and that susequently the Government were made aware of the proceedings by the Deputy Commissioner in his report. The Government were also made aware that there were objections to the proposal to extend the route from Kumbakonam to Koradachery. On 13th May, 1957, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal passed an order on the revision petition filed by the appellants before us, setting aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and directing the authority to grant the variation applied for by the appellants in respect of two buses, MDO 1081 and 1100. It is to quash this order that the writ petition out of which this appeal arises was filed by Messrs. Raman and Raman (Private) Limited. As it is this order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which is the subject of controversy, we shall deal with it in some detail. It is to quash this order that the writ petition out of which this appeal arises was filed by Messrs. Raman and Raman (Private) Limited. As it is this order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal which is the subject of controversy, we shall deal with it in some detail. The Appellate Tribunal after giving a brief history of the case at the outset referred to the two letters of two Members of the Legislative Assembly to the Government and to the petition by the appellants themselves. He then set out the gist of the order of the Government dated 16th November, 1956, which has been extracted in full, earlier in this judgment. The Tribunal then referred to Writ Petition No. 18 of 1957 and to the dismissal of the said petition. He understood the High Court to have held therein that the “Government had powers to issue the said G. O. by virtue of section 43-A (2) of the Act”. He did not mention the other important expression of opinion of Rajagopalan, J., that the said order of the Government was contrary to principles of natural justice as it was passed without notice to M/s. Raman and Raman. The Tribunal then went on to deal with the facts and circumstances bearing on the variation sought by the appellants. In his opinion the variation applied for was the most simple and the best to meet the traffic needs of the travelling public of Kumbakonam or any other place between Kumbakonam and Kodavasal and between Papanasam and Kumbakonam to go to Koradachery. He concluded thus: “On a careful consideration of all the materials and contentions and the representations, I feel satisfied that the variation asked for by the petitioner is quite reasonable and is in the best interests of the travelling public particularly of the people residing on the sector Kodavasal and Koradachery and between Kumbakonam and Kodavasal.” Rajagopalan, J., allowed Writ Petition No. 467 of 1957 and set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 13th May, 1957, on the sole ground that the Tribunal was in error when it took into account G.O. Ms. No. 3199 dated 15th November, 1956, as one of the relevant factors to be considered and that vitiated its final decision. No. 3199 dated 15th November, 1956, as one of the relevant factors to be considered and that vitiated its final decision. A preliminary objection was raised before the learned Judge that the petitioners before him, namely, M/s. Raman and Raman were not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction vested in this Court by Article 226 of the Constitution inasmuch as they had failed to oppose the application of Swamy Transport, the appellants, at the proper stage; but he overruled the objection. He held that the petitioner was a person aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal which conferred a benefit on the appellants to his detriment. Raman and Raman had been allowed to participate in the revision petition before the Tribunal and their objections were considered and rejected. In such circumstances Raman and Raman must be deemed to have been a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal and aggrieved by its order. After analysing the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal the learned Judge came to the definite conclusion that the Tribunal did take the Government Order above referred to as a relevant factor in determining the question in issue before it. As the G. O. was an irrelevant factor and that was taken into consideration by the Tribunal, the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was vitiated on that ground. Messrs. Swami Motor Transport Ltd., have filed the above appeal against the order of Rajagopalan, J. The appeal originally came on before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. The learned Judges differed and delivered long and elaborate judgments in support of their respective views. Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., held that Rajagopalan, J.‘s order should be confirmed. The learned Judge further directed the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to dispose of the revision petition filed by Messrs. Swami Motor Transport afresh. Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., disagreed with Rajagopalan, J., and held that the order of the Appellate Tribunal was not vitiated by reference to the Government Order? It was a relevant factor to be taken into account. The Tribunal’s order was not based on a misconstruction of the order in Writ Petition No. 18 of 1957. In his view the appeal should be allowed and Rajagopalan, J.‘s order set aside. On the question as to the legality and validity of the Government Order, the learned Judges were not in agreement. The Tribunal’s order was not based on a misconstruction of the order in Writ Petition No. 18 of 1957. In his view the appeal should be allowed and Rajagopalan, J.‘s order set aside. On the question as to the legality and validity of the Government Order, the learned Judges were not in agreement. According to Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., the Government Order was not valid but Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., thought that it was perfectly valid. As the two learned Judges differed, the appeal was referred to a third learned Judge, Balakrishna Ayyar, J. After listening to learned counsel for sometime Balakrishna Ayyar, J., passed the following Order:- “At this stage I am inclined to take a view which does not completely coincide either with that of A. S. Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. or Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. This means that it will not be possible to have a majority opinion in accordance with which A. S. Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., can dispose of the appeal. As required by clause 36 of the Letters Petent, the papers will be placed before the Honourable the Chief Justice so that if he thinks fit to do so, a Bench may be constituted whose opinion will enable the appeal to be finally disposed of.” Hence the appeal comes for disposal before this Full Bench. At the outset we shall dispose of a preliminary point raised on behalf of the appellants by the learned Socilictor-General, namely, that Raman and Raman who applied to this Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was not a person aggrieved by that order. The ground on which this objection was based is that Raman and Raman had not made a representation opposing the variation which was notified under section 57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It must not, however, be overlooked that when the notification under section 47 of the Act was published, a representation was filed by Raman and Raman on 30th March, 1956. In effect this was a representation against the application made by Swami Motor Transport Limited, for variation. As mentioned above, there was first a notification under section 57 which was cancelled, and then a notification under section 47 and again a notification under section 57. In effect this was a representation against the application made by Swami Motor Transport Limited, for variation. As mentioned above, there was first a notification under section 57 which was cancelled, and then a notification under section 47 and again a notification under section 57. Even assuming that technically it was necessary for Raman and Raman to have made a representation at each stage with reference to each notification, there can be no doubt that substantially they did make a representation opposing the variation. This we think is the most material circumstance in deciding whether Raman and Raman could invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. In our opinion, Raman and Raman were certainly persons aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Tribunal sought to be quashed. They had not only filed a representation, after the notification under section 47, they were even allowed to put forward their view before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The fact that they were heard by the Appellate Tribunal itself shows that they were treated as persons aggrieved. In discussing the question when an applicant for a writ of certiorari can be said to be a person aggrieved, the Earl of Reading, C.J., observed thus in Rex v. Richmond confirming Ex parte Howitt1: “The applicant does not, in my opinion, stand in the same category as a member of the public who may be said to have only a general interest in seeing that the law is properly carried out. He had a particular interest in this subject-matter, and nothing can better show this than the fact that he incurred the expense of instructing counsel to secure if he could the refusal of the confirmation and to contend that the confirming authority had no jurisdiction. Bearing in mind that the applicant is a person who was entitled to appear and object as having this interest that he was carrying on business as the licensee of premises in Richmond, I think the case comes within the decision of Rex v. Groom, Ex parte Cobbold” 2 . The learned Chief Justice quoted the following from the Judgment of Lord Alverstone, C.J., in that case: “It is sufficient if they have a real interest in the decision of the Justices, and they have in this case. The learned Chief Justice quoted the following from the Judgment of Lord Alverstone, C.J., in that case: “It is sufficient if they have a real interest in the decision of the Justices, and they have in this case. They took the point now raised before the Justices at the adjourned general annual licensing meeting and when the confirming order was made, and it would be too strong to say that they had not a sufficient interest in the matter to enable them to apply for the rule.” The true principle is to determine whether the applicant has an interest distinct from the general inconvenience which may be suffered by the law being wrongly administered. Obviously Raman and Raman had such an interest. It was Raman and Raman who had filed Writ Petition No. 18 of 1957, challenging the validity of the Government Order. We overrule this objection. The main question appears to us to lie within a very narrow compass, namely, whether the impugned order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal is vitiated by any manifest error of law. The learned Solicitor-General contended that the Tribunal was a quasi-judicial authority which was competent to decide whether or not an applicant should be granted a variation. That matter was solely within the jurisdiction of the transport authority and the Appellate Tribunal was a revisional authority. The Tribunal had on a consideration of all the circumstances decided that the variation was in the interests of the public. On that finding it was proper to grant the variation. With reference to Government Order Ms. No. 3199 dated 16th November, 1956, which the Tribunal mentioned in its order, the learned Solicitor-General’s contention was twofold:-(1) that even assuming that the Government Order was bad, the order of the Tribunal cannot be quashed, because, the Tribunal’s order is not based entirely on the Government Order. The Tribunal had not completely surrendered his judicial functions to the Government Order as binding him to come to only one conclusion. It will be wrong to say that the Tribunal was even influenced by the Government Order and (2) the Government Order itself is not bad or unlawful for any reason. The Government had not exceeded their powers under section 43-A (2) of the Act in passing it. The learned Attorney-General appearing for the contesting respondents, Messrs. It will be wrong to say that the Tribunal was even influenced by the Government Order and (2) the Government Order itself is not bad or unlawful for any reason. The Government had not exceeded their powers under section 43-A (2) of the Act in passing it. The learned Attorney-General appearing for the contesting respondents, Messrs. Raman and Raman, contended that it is really unnecessary to decide for a disposal of this appeal whether the Government Order was invalid or unlawful. The Government Order should not have been taken into account by the Appellate Tribunal in deciding the question before him. The Appellate Tribunal must have been influenced by the Government Order. In any event one cannot be certain whether and how far he was actually so influenced. The learned Attorney-General, however, was prepared to convince us that the Government Order was ultra vires and invalid. The first question which falls for decision is whether a consideration of the Government Order by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal was improper. We agree with Rajagopalan, J., that it was. The Tribunal was invested with appellate and revisional powers in respect of orders by the Regional Transport Authority. It was not a mere administrative or executive body. It should only deal with what may be generally described as "evidence on record" though it may be that the Tribunal is not governed strictly by the sections of the Indian Evidence Act. The Government Order cannot be said to be a piece of evidence. It embodied the decision of the Government as a Statutory authority. It was passed without hearing any one except on considering the petitions from the two Members of the Legislative Assembly and Messrs. Swami Motor Transport Limited. It was the duty and function of the Tribunal to come to a decision on the material on record which had been placed before the Regional Transport Authority, which was the subject-matter of the revision petition before it. It is obvious from a reading of the Tribunal’s order that it attached importance to the fact that the Government had taken a particular view of the very question which he had to decide. It is obvious from a reading of the Tribunal’s order that it attached importance to the fact that the Government had taken a particular view of the very question which he had to decide. The learned Solicitor-General referred us to a passage in S.A. De Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action at pages 203-204, viz: "It is, of course, immaterial that an authority may have considered irrelevant matters in arriving at its decision if it has not allowed itself to be influenced by those matters." But for an entire statement of the law on the point the following further passage is also material: "The influence of extraneous matters will be manifest if they have led the authority to make an order that is invalid ex facie, or if the authority has set them out as reasons for its order, or has otherwise admitted their influence. In other cases, the Courts must determine whether their influence is to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. If the influence of irrelevant factors is established, it does not appear to be necessary to prove that they were the sole or even the dominant influence ; it seems to be enough to prove that their influence was substantial." Reliance was placed by the learned Attorney-General on the well-established principle that when several reasons are given for coming to a particular conclusion, if some of the reasons are bad, the conclusion cannot stand. It is sufficient to refer to a judgment of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 35 of 1955 to which one of us was a party. There we agreed with the principle as enunciated by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in the following terms: "When more than one reason is given and when one of them which from the language of the order appears to be substantial and has been taken into consideration, it is impossible for the Court to sustain the order on the ground that it was really the valid reason that effectively operated to bring about the decision and not the invalid one." We pointed out that this principle has the high authority of the Judicial Committee in Li Hong Ni v. Attorney-General for Hongkong1. In the present case it cannot be said that the Appellate Tribunal has given the order of the Government as one of the reasons for arriving at his decision. In the present case it cannot be said that the Appellate Tribunal has given the order of the Government as one of the reasons for arriving at his decision. The underlying basis of the principle however will apply. If among several matters taken into consideration there is a matter which is irrelevant or extraneous, and the Tribunal must have been influenced by such irrelevant or extraneous matter also, then the order must be quashed because it cannot be determined what the Tribunal would have held if such matter had been excluded. We are also of opinion that G.O. Ms. No. 3199 dated 16th May, 1956, was itself not a valid and proper order. As we have seen above, that order was passed on two petitions from two Members of the Madras Legislative Assembly and a petition from Swami Motor Transport Ltd. Having regard to the prayer in the petition of Swami Motor Transport Ltd., namely, that the Government may be pleased to direct the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, for extending the existing service performed by buses Nos. MDO 1081 and 1100 between Tanjore-Kumbakonam to Koradachery via Kodavasal, we are of the opinion that the Government were virtually directing the Regional Transport Authority to grant the variation prayed for by Swami Motor Transport . It is true that the Government Order does not mention Swami Motor Transport, nor does it mention the numbers of the two buses. The order purports to be under section 43-A (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. That provision is as follows:- "The State Government may, on a consideration of the matters set forth in sub-section (1) of section 47, direct any Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority to open any new route or to extend an existing route or to permit additional stage carriages to be put, or to reduce the number of stage carriages, on any specified route." Though it cannot be said that the order of the Government is not in accordance with this provision, in the circumstances we think that the power under this provision has been used to compel a quasi-judicial tribunal like the Regional Transport Authority to dispose of a case in a particular way. What the Government has done is, to quote the words of the Supreme Court in Raman and Raman v. State of Madras2, "to couch the order in a general way to induce a tribunal to come to a particular decision in a given case. . ." We cannot refrain from expressing our surprise at the complete suppression by Swami Motor Transport of their having applied to the Regional Transport Authority for the same variation which they sought from the Government. Actually by the date of their petition the Regional Transport Authority had passed an order rejecting their application. It was said that the order was communicated only on 10th August, 1956, implying that Swami Motor Transport were not aware of the rejection of their application by the Regional Transport Authority. If this, be so they were gulity of a very high impropriety. When their application had been heard by and was pending the decision of the Regional Transport Authority, they approached the Government to influence the Regional Transport Authority to decide their case in their favour. The order passed by the Government in such circumstances cannot be held to be valid. During the course of the argument it was brought to our notice that the Deputy Transport Commissioner had referred in his report to the rejection of the application of Swami Motor Transport by the Regional Transport Authority and the revision petition filed by them to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The Deputy Transport Commissioner used the word "sub judice" to describe the state of affairs. The Government were therefore presumably aware that a competent authority had rejected the application of Swami Motor Transport and a revision petition was pending before a statutory tribunal. Without making any reference to these material matters, what in effect the Government purported to do was to forestall any decision by the Appellate Tribunal adverse to Swami Motor Transport. This is another ground on which we are prepared to hold that the Government Order was not valid. There is the further reason which was dealt with by Rajagopalan, J., in Writ Petition No. 18 of 1957, namely, that the order was passed without giving an opportunity to Raman and Raman to make their representation. Though for these reasons we hold that G. O. Ms. There is the further reason which was dealt with by Rajagopalan, J., in Writ Petition No. 18 of 1957, namely, that the order was passed without giving an opportunity to Raman and Raman to make their representation. Though for these reasons we hold that G. O. Ms. No. 3199 dated 16th November, 1956, was not valid, we desire to express our dissent from the view of Rajagopalan, J., that Government have no power under section 43-A (2) to specify the number of buses to ply on a new route or an existing route as extended by them. They can on a consideration of relevant circumstances indicate to the transport authorities that on a particular route a specified number of stage carriages would be adequate to meet the needs of the travelling public. This however does not affect the decision of this appeal. It follows that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal not only took into account an irrelevant and extraneous matter in coming to a decision, he took into account something which was neither legal nor valid. The order of the Appellate Tribunal is therefore vitiated by a manifest error of law and it was rightly quashed by Rajagopalan, J. Rajagopalan, J., did not expressly say what should happen after the order had been quashed. But Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. directed the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to dispose of the revision petition of Swami Motor Transport afresh after hearing the interested parties including Messrs. Raman and Raman. We agree that this is the proper course. The appeal is dismissed but with a direction to the above effect. There will be no order as to costs. V.S. ------ Appeal dismissed.