Judgment :- 1. Crl. M.P. 271 of 1959 is an application under S.417 (3), Crl. P.C., for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal, and there having been a delay of two days in making it, Crl. M.P. 277 of 1959 was filed under S.5 of the Indian Limitation Act, or shortly the Act, to condone the delay. The latter has been referred to a Division Bench for decision, raising the question: "Whether S.5 of the Act can apply to an application under S.417 (3)." 2. S.417 (4), Crl. P.C. provides that: "No application under sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal." The material part of S.5 of the Act may also be quoted below: "Any appeal or application for leave to appeal or any other application to which this section may be made applicable may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." Thus, S.5 applies in terms, to an application for leave to appeal, and on comparing it with S.3 of the Act, it is clear, that it is not restricted in its application, as S.3 is, to the periods of limitation prescribed by the First Schedule of the Act, but can apply to periods prescribed by other enactments. There is nothing in the express language of S.417 (4), Crl. P. C. to exclude the operation of 8.5 of the Act. There is nothing in the express language of S.417 (4), Crl. P. C. to exclude the operation of 8.5 of the Act. S.29 (2) (a) of the Act which has some relevancy may also de quoted: S. 29 [2] "Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of S.3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law." [a] "the provisions contained in S.4, S.9 to 18 and S.22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." The effect of this provision is, that where a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from that prescribed by the First Schedule in the Act, S.5 cannot apply so as to extend the former period. But, as the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended, the two conditions which must co-exist in order to attract S.29, are, that the period of limitation must be prescribed by a special or local law, and that such period must be different from that under the Act. Obviously, the Criminal Procedure Code is not a local law; it is not a special law either, as it constitutes the general law of procedure in criminal cases, in the same way as the Civil Procedure Code has been held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Kandaswami Pillai v. Kannappa Chetty, (A.I.R. 1952 Madras 186), to constitute the general law of procedure in civil cases. The second condition was found against by Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J. in In re Viswanathan Chettiar, A.I.R. 1957 Madras 300, when a similar question arose before him, but Ramaswami, J. in Coimbatore Municipality v. Narayanan, A.I.R. 1958 Madras 416, preferred to exclude the operation of S.29 (2) of the Act, on the other ground. In our judgment, the first condition being not satisfied, there is no need to consider the second. 3. It may now be considered, whether S.417 (4), Crl. P.C. at least impliedly, if not expressly, excludes the operation of S.5 of the Act. A cursory reading of S.417 (4), Crl. In our judgment, the first condition being not satisfied, there is no need to consider the second. 3. It may now be considered, whether S.417 (4), Crl. P.C. at least impliedly, if not expressly, excludes the operation of S.5 of the Act. A cursory reading of S.417 (4), Crl. P.C. may perhaps suggest, that no application for special leave to appeal can ever be entertained, after the expiry of sixty days from the date of the order of acquittal. So too the language of S.48 of the Civil Procedure Code appears to exclude the operation of the provisions of the Act extending the period of limitation, because it enacts that: "No order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application prescribed after the expiration of 12 years." from the dates specified therein; but the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case cited, has held, that the Civil Procedure Code and the Limitation Act "are statutes relating to procedure and they are in pari materia, and therefore to be taken and construed together as one system as explanatory of each other" and that accordingly "the expression 'prescribed' in S.15 [1] of the limitation Art does not mean prescribed by the First Schedule to the Act. It would include a case where a period of limitation is prescribed by any general statute like the Civil Procedure Code." By parity of reasoning, the term 'prescribed' in S, 5 of the Act has to be similarly interpreted, with reference to S.417 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and this view was adopted by Umamaheshwaram, J. in Putchalapalli Venkata Subbareddi v. Duvvuru Papireddi, A.I.R. 1957 Andhra Pradesh 406, in order to hold, that S.5 of the Act applies to S.417 (4), Crl. P.C. This case was followed by a Division Bench of the same court consisting of K. Subba Rao C. J. (as he then was) and Basi Reddy, J. in In re Parchuri Adeshamma, A.I.R. 1958 Andhra Pradesh 230. P.C. This case was followed by a Division Bench of the same court consisting of K. Subba Rao C. J. (as he then was) and Basi Reddy, J. in In re Parchuri Adeshamma, A.I.R. 1958 Andhra Pradesh 230. The anomaly in holding that similar provisions of the Act do not apply to an application under S.417 (4), has been illustrated in Putchalapalli Venkata Subbareddi v. Duvvuru Papireddi, where Umamaheshwaram, J. has posed the question as to what would happen if the period of sixty days expires on a day on which the court is closed; but for S 4 of the Act, the application would have to be rejected. Similarly, without the application of S.12 (2) of the Act, the time taken for obtaining a copy of the order, which in a given case, may exceed sixty days, would not be excluded from computation. 4. The only decision which has taken a contrary view, to which our attention was drawn is Mahammad Ibrahim v. Gopi Lal, A.I.R. 1958 Allahabad 691, in which the learned judges seemed to think, that the words of S.417 (4) were by themselves sufficient to exclude the operation of S.5 of the Act, but they did not consider the ambit of S.5, as applicable also to applications for leave to appeal, or the scope of S.29(2) of the Act as not excluding the operation of S.5. In Municipal Board, Lucknow v. Bhagwan Das, A.I.R. 1959 Allahabad 500, decided by a division bench of the same Court, it was observed that the view taken earlier may require further consideration. 5. Thus, on a construction of the relevant statutory provisions as well as on the weight of authority, we feel no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that S.5 of the Act is applicable to applications for special leave to appeal under S.417 (4), Crl. P.C., In his affidavit, the petitioner has explained, that he could not come to Ernakulam on the due date for making the application, for what appears to us to be a valid reason, and had entrusted the papers to his brother, who however, was held up in connection with a litigation in the Taliparamba Munsiffs Court, in which he was concerned, and reached Ernakulam late. We consider, that the delay may be condoned. Crl. M. P. No. 277 of 1959 is therefore granted. We direct that Crl. We consider, that the delay may be condoned. Crl. M. P. No. 277 of 1959 is therefore granted. We direct that Crl. M. P. 271 of 1959 will be posted in due course.