Judgment G.N.Prasad, J. 1. Etwa Oraon, who has preferred this appeal from Jail, has been convicted under Sec.302, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. It is alleged that he committed the murders of Mango Oraon who was the wife, and Musammat Charia, who was the aunt, of Bandhu Oraon (P. W. 5). The occurrence took place in the afternoon of the 9th June, 1958, in an orchard known as Baghia Tongri orchard in village Ghalghra Pahan-toli situated at a distance of about ten miles from police station Sessai. 2. The prosecution case is that at about 4 p.m. on the date of the occurrence Mt. Charia was collecting wood under a mahua tree in Baghia Tongri at some distance from the main village. On the same occasion, Mango Oraon was proceeding to village Kocha with a basket with a view to sell sag. In the meantime, the appellant came to the orchard with a lathi in his possession and with that lathi he assaulted Mt. Charia who fell down. Mango Orain wanted to run away from the spot, but the appellant assaulted her also with his lathi with the result that she also fell down. Birso Orain (P. W. 2), the daughter of Mango Orain, happened to be tending goat in the vicinity and she witnessed the occurrence. She raised an alarm whereupon certain villagers came. In the meantime, the appellant fled in the direction of village Puso after throwing away his lathi in a ditch. Mango was carried to a spot under a mange tree and water was given to her, but she died at the spot. Mt. Charia was taken to her house, but she also died some time after reaching her house. In the evening, Gere Oraon (P. W. 1) returned to the village from some other village and learnt what had happened. He went to the choukidar and the choukidar came to the village. The choukidar was also informed about the occurrence. Gere Oraon (P. W. 1) proceeded to the police station in the company of the choukidar (P. W. 12) and he lodged the first information report at 6 a. m. in the morning of the 10th June, 1958. 3. The Assistant Sub Inspector (P. W. 16), who recorded the first information, report, exhibit 3, took up investigation. Gere Oraon (P. W. 1) proceeded to the police station in the company of the choukidar (P. W. 12) and he lodged the first information report at 6 a. m. in the morning of the 10th June, 1958. 3. The Assistant Sub Inspector (P. W. 16), who recorded the first information, report, exhibit 3, took up investigation. He reached the scene of the occurrence at 10-30 a. m. on the 19th June, 1958 and held inquests over the dead bodies of Mt. Cheria and Mango Oraon, both of which were forwarded to Gumla hospital for post mortem examination. The Assistant Sub Inspector (P. W. 16) inspected the place of the occurrence and conducted other investigations until the 12th June, 1958. Thereafter further investigation was carried on by the Sub Inspector (P. W. 17), who, in due course, submitted charge-sheet against the appellant. The trial was held by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner of Chotanagpur resulting in the conviction of the appellant as stated above. 4. The defence of the appellant was one cf insanity within the meaning of Sec. 84, Indian Penal Code. I have used the expression insanity in this judgment in the sense of unsoundness of mind. 5. The solitary witness to the occurrence in this case is Birso Orain (P. W. 2), the daughter of Mango. P. W. 2 has deposed that at the time of the occurrence she was tending goat. Her mother was going to village Kocha to sell Sag. Charia was picking wood at Baghia Tongri. The appellant came from the village and assaulted Charia with a lathi with the result that she fell down. Mango was flying, but the appellant assaulted her also and she too fell down. P. W. 2 has further deposed that she raised an alarm at which Charwa (P. W. 3), Chotua (P. W. 4), Some (P. W. 11) and one Burn came there. The appellant threw his danta in a ditch and fled towards Puso. The further evidence of P. W. 2 is that Mango succumbed to her injuries under the mango tree where she was brought and given water. Charia was carried home in an injured condition. This evidence of P. W. 2 has been amply corroborated both with regard to the factum of the occurrence as also to the fact of the appellant being the assailant of Charia and Mango by overwhelming materials on the record. Charia was carried home in an injured condition. This evidence of P. W. 2 has been amply corroborated both with regard to the factum of the occurrence as also to the fact of the appellant being the assailant of Charia and Mango by overwhelming materials on the record. 6. The medical evidence shows that there were four lathi injuries on the dead body of Mango Oraon. Internal examination revealed that there were comminuted fracture of the left temporal, the prietal and a portion of the frontal bones, the broken ends of the bones lacerating the dura mater and brain substance underneath. There were haemorrhage and blood clots in the cavity of the scalp. The injuries were ante-mortem and grievous and appeared to have been caused by hard blunt substance such as lathi. On the dead body of Charia Orain also there were four injuries. The occipital bone was fractured, the fracture extending to the base of the skull. Haemorrhage and blood clots were found over the dura mater and inside the skull cavity. The injuries of Charia Orain also were ante mortem and grievous and appeared to have been caused by a hard blunt substance such as lathi. The medical evidence, therefore, amply supports the evidence of BirsO Orain (P. W. 2) with respect to the factum of the murders of Charia and Mango as a result of assaults with lathi. 7. So far as the place of the occurrence is concerned the evidence of Birso (P. W. 2.) receives ample corroboration from the evidence of the Assistant Sub Inspector (P. W. 16). 8. So far as the prosecution case about the appellant being the assailant of the two women, Mango and Charia, is concerned, there does not) appear to be any reasonable ground for entertaining any doubt against the testimony of Birso (P. W. 2). There is no suggestion whatsoever of any prior ill will between P. W. 2 and the appellant. In fact, P. W. 2 has clearly stated that the appellant had no enmity with her mother and that he had no enmity with Charia either. It seems to me clear, therefore, that P. W. 2 has not indulged in false accusation against the appellant. . 9. The material question for determination, therefore, is whether the defence of insanity is available to the appellant in this case. It seems to me clear, therefore, that P. W. 2 has not indulged in false accusation against the appellant. . 9. The material question for determination, therefore, is whether the defence of insanity is available to the appellant in this case. It is necessary to refer to section 84 of the Indian Penal Code which is in these terms:- "Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law." This section has been the subject-matter of discussion in a number of decided cases and it is now well settled that in order to succeed in a plea of insanity, the accused has to establish firstly, that at the time of committing the offence he was of unsound mind, and, secondly, that the unsoundness of mind was of such a degree that he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. It is also, in my opinion, undisputed that the burden of proof in the matter rests upon the defence. The real question is what is the nature or the ex tent of the burden of proof which rests upon the defence in order to succeed in the plea of insanity. 10. The earliest decision of this Court to which our attention has been drawn is Emperor V/s. Gedka Goala, AIR 1937 Pat 363 in which the chief material relied upon in support of the plea of insanity was the evidence of the Assistant Surgeon who had kept the accused under observation for sometime subsequent to the occurrence. The opinion of the Assistant Surgeon was as follows:- "I cannot say what the state of the mind of the accused was before I kept him under observation. It is possible the accused committed the occurrence in a temporary fit of insanity. Such a fit may come all on a sudden and disappear after a short while". It was held that a mere possibility that the accused may have been insane was insufficient to establish the kind of insanity referred to in Section 84, Indian Penal Code. It is possible the accused committed the occurrence in a temporary fit of insanity. Such a fit may come all on a sudden and disappear after a short while". It was held that a mere possibility that the accused may have been insane was insufficient to establish the kind of insanity referred to in Section 84, Indian Penal Code. 11 The next decision of this Court in point of time is Narain Sahi V/s. Emperor, AIR 1947 Pat 222. Therein it was observed:- Whether or not an accused at the time he committed the act was of unsound mind is a matter of inference from his Previous and contemporaneous acts, statements and demeanour and from any other relevant evidence as to insanity in his ancestors or relations, as to particular illness affecting the mind and from any medical evidence that may be tendered. Mere eccentricity is not enough, there must be enough to show that at the material time the accused was suffering from some definite or recognisable form of mental disease." In relation to the other question also, namely, as to whether the unsoundness of mind was of a degree and nature to satisfy one of the knowledge tests laid down by Section 84, Indian Penal Code it was observed that "it is both just and necessary to apply to the evidence of their acts, demeanour and statements the same standards of logical inference as we ordinarily apply to those of sane persons." Upon the particular facts of the two cases, the defence of insanity did not succeed in the two reported decisions noticed above. 12 There are two other decisions of this Court to which our attention has been drawn in both of which upon the facts of each case, the plea of insanity was upheld In Prabhu Ram V/s. The State, 1953 BLJR 606, the materials which were relied upon in support of the plea of insanity were the previous history of the accused, the history of his family and his behaviour before and after the commission of the act; and their Lordships came to the conclusion that if all these factors were considered, then there was only one and one reasonable inference, namely, that the accused was not merely of unsound mind but that he did not know the nature of the act that he had committed, that is to say, he did not know that he had killed his wife and, as he said, he was searching for a woman whom he had killed. The other decision of this Court is Kamla Singh V/s. The State, (S) AIR 1955 Pat 209 in which reference was made to Sec.105, Evidence Act, and it was observed that if upon the materials on the record it could not be positively held that the prisoner at the material time was not of unsound mind and that he was capable of knowing the nature of the act alleged against him, then the onus which lay upon him under Sec.105, Evidence Act, must be taken to have been discharged. In other words. "the defence has not to Prove affirmatively beyond reasonable doubt that the prisoner was of unsound mind and that by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of the act. What it has to prove is that the presumption under Sec.105, Evidence Act, against the prisoner that he was then not of unsound mind and that he knew the nature of the act alleged against him is not sustainable on the evidence on the record". What it has to prove is that the presumption under Sec.105, Evidence Act, against the prisoner that he was then not of unsound mind and that he knew the nature of the act alleged against him is not sustainable on the evidence on the record". In the latter part of their judgment, their Lordships referred to the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Parbhoo V/s. Emperor, AIR 1941 All 402 and then stated the law in the following form:- "The prisoner is entitled to be acquitted, if, upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole (including the evidence given in support of the plea of the said general exception), a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court whether the accused person is or is not entitled to the benefit of the said exception". The actual decision was reached upon the Particular facts of the case and it was held that the prisoner had not only rebutted the Presumption under Sec.105, Evidence Act, but had also proved affirmatively that his case was covered by the exception laid down in section 84, Indian Penal Code. 13. From the various reported decisions of this Court referred to above, it seems to me to be amply clear that the burden of Proof which rests upon the defence in order to succeed in a plea of insanity under section 84, Indian Penal Code, is not so onerous as the burden which rests upon the prosecution of affirmatively proving the guilt of the accused, but that the burden is discharged if the defence establishes facts and circumstances which might lead to a reasonable inference that at the time of the commission of the offence the accused was of unsound mind, the unsoundness of his mind being of the nature or extent mentioned in section 84, Indian Penal Code. It is not enough for the defence to rely upon a mere possibility that the accused may have been of unsound mind at the time when he committed the offence; but what is required is that regard being had to the previous history of the accused, his behaviour before or at the time of the commission of the act and his subsequent conduct, coupled with other circumstances, the Court should be in a position to hold that there was a reasonable probability that at the time when the offence was committed the accused was suffering from unsound-ness of mind of the nature or degree mentioned in section 84, Indian Penal Code. 14. A similar view appears to have been taken in Ramhitram Ramadhar Dube V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, (S) AIR 1956 Nag 187. At page 192, it was observed;- "The question is not whether the accused has established insanity categorically. It is not even whether he has created a doubt about insanity. The question is whether, regard being had to these circumstances, we should act on the supposition that there was a reasonable Probability that the accused acted while his cognative faculties were impaired to the extent of his not realising that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. We thus do not insist upon a categorical proof such as the prosecution is required to give to bring home the facts of the case to an accused. We do not give him the benefit of the doubt about his insanity. We are satisfied -- regard being had to the background of insanity, to the previous outbursts of violence and exhibition of unclean habits and moroseness, to the fact that he was even taken to the Lunatic Asylum and was detained for observation, though not certified as a lunatic but found to be a psycopath, to the motivelessness of the crimes, to his utter disregard of human life, and to the absence of any notion that his act was punishable or was wrong -- that the accused was affected by insanity sufficient to make his act dispunishable." 15. A similar view was also taken in In re Raju Shetty, AIR 1960 Mys 48 wherein it was observed that the standard of proof required from the accused is that "there should be preponderance of probability showing that at the time when the offence was committed, the accused by reason of his unsound-ness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing what is either wrong or Contrary to law." Upon the Particular facts of the case, however, it was held that there was no preponderance of probability ..... in favour of the accuseds plea of unsoundness of mind. 16 It is necessary to notice two more decisions to which our attention was drawn by the learned Additional Standing Counsel. In re Pappathi Ammal, AIR 1959 Mad 239 the defence set up for the accused was that she was a sleep-walker or somnambulis and that she committed the offence in that mental condition. But there was no evidence to support the specific defence of somnambulism, and all that could be found upon the evidence was that it was possible that the accused was suffering from some sort of puerperal disorder. It was held that this was insufficient to bring the case within the exception laid down in Section 84, Indian Penal Code. The other case to which we were referred was State V/s. Chhotelal Gangadin Gadariya, AIR 1959 Madhya Pradesh 203. In that case, the factors which were taken into consideration were; (i) the previous history of the accused, (ii) the nature and the character of the crime, (iii) the conduct of the accused subsequent to the crime, and (iv) the conduct during and after the trial. It was found that there was a Previous history of mental disorder, that the crime was committed without apparent motive suddenly, without apparent preparation, premeditation Or provocation, that the accused had made no attempt at concealment and had betrayed no emotion whatever throughout the trial. Considering the cumulative effect of the various circumstances which had been established, it was held that although the accused was conscious of the nature of his act, yet he did not know that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. In these circumstances, the defence of insanitv was upheld. 17. Considering the cumulative effect of the various circumstances which had been established, it was held that although the accused was conscious of the nature of his act, yet he did not know that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. In these circumstances, the defence of insanitv was upheld. 17. In the light of the principles deducible from the various decisions referred to above, it is manifest that the enquiry in the present case should be directed on the following lines. It has to be seen what are the circumstances relevant to the defence of insanity that have been established from the materials on the record, and then it should be decided whether the circumstances which have been established give rise to a reasonable Probability that at the time when the crimes were committed, the accused was suffering from unsoundness of mind of such a degree that he was incapable of knowing either the nature of his acts or that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. 18. I shall first refer to the medical evidence as to the mental condition of the appellant which is to be found on the record. It appears that when the Assistant Sub-Inspector (P. W. 16) arrested the appellant, the latter did not speak anything and he gave no reply to questions put to him by the police officer. P. W. 16, however, forwarded the appellant to the Assistant Surgeon of Gumla hospital. The Assistant Surgeon (P. W. 13) examined the appellant on 21-6-58 and found that the appellant was talking sensibly and he did not show any abnormal behaviour. P. W. 13 has stated that he had not kept the appellant under his observation and that he could not be definite about his mental condition at the time of the commission of the crimes. It appears that subsequently the appellant was kept under the observation of the Civil Surgeon (P. W. 18) from 12-6-1958 to 15-7-1958, but during this period the appellant showed no definite sign of insanity. He talked well, slept well and behaved normally. His habit was not dirty and he also did not display any sign of homicidal or suicidal tendency during the Period of the Civil Surgeons observation. He talked well, slept well and behaved normally. His habit was not dirty and he also did not display any sign of homicidal or suicidal tendency during the Period of the Civil Surgeons observation. In answer to the Courts question about the appellants mental condition at the time when he had committed the crime, the Civil Surgeon (P, W. 18) stated that he was not in a position to give any definite opinion. All that the Civil Surgeon was in a position to say was that the possibility of committing the crime during insanity could not be eliminated. It is, therefore, apparent that the medical evidence is unhelpful to the defence. 19. * * * 20. The evidence on the record, however, shows that there was history of insanity of the appellant a few months prior to the occurrence. This Lordship referred to the evidence and continued.) From these materials it is, in my opinion, amply clear that the appellant was suffering from unsoundness of mind from two or three months Prior to the occurrence and that during this period he bad to be kept in chains at home and that when he was released he used to go about threatening the villagers with assault, and only a few days before the occurrence he had shown violent tendency by assaulting Mango Orain without any rhyme or reason. The evidence on the record further shows that the villagers used to take no serious notice of the appellants conduct so such so that when he assaulted Mango about eight days before the present occurrence, even her husband, P. W. 5, did not go to his father but left him thinking that he was insane. From these circumstances there is, in my opinion, good reason to believe that the murders of the two women, Mango and Charia, had been committed by the appellant while he was suffering from unsoundness of mind. It is also clear from the evidence on the record that while suffering from unsoundness of mind, the appellant used to display tendency towards violence and had actually assaulted Mango only a few days before the present occurrence. It is also clear from the evidence on the record that while suffering from unsoundness of mind, the appellant used to display tendency towards violence and had actually assaulted Mango only a few days before the present occurrence. But nobody took any notice of his previous action is assaulting Mango on the ground that he was an insane person and, therefore, nothing was done which could have made the appellant to realise that his action in assaulting Mango was wrong or that it was an offence to indulge in assault over another person. 21. Learned Additional Standing Counsel has contended before us that even if it is held that the appellant was insane, the insanity was not of such a degree that he did not know what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. In support of this contention, learned counsel has relied upon the evidence relating to the appellants conduct at the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter. This Lordship alter referring to the conduct of the accused immediately after We occurrence, proceeded.) From these materials, I am inclined to think that even though the appellant might have been aware that he had indulged in assaults over the two women, he did not know that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. Apparently, he was under the impression, as on the former occasion when he had assaulted Mango, that it was not wrong or contrary to law to assault the two women. That appears to be a reasonable explanation of the conduct of the appellant in making no attempt at all to run away or to conceal himself after the occurrence. 22. Another important circumstance to be noticed in this connection is that both the murders were committed by the appellant without any motive. On the former occasion he had assaulted Mango without any cause. Similarly, on the date of the occurrence he first assaulted Charia without any cause, and thereafter when Mango started running away, then he assaulted her also without any cause. On the former occasion he had assaulted Mango without any cause. Similarly, on the date of the occurrence he first assaulted Charia without any cause, and thereafter when Mango started running away, then he assaulted her also without any cause. It is true that standing by itself the absence of motive is not sufficient indication of legal insanity, but there can be no doubt that this is an important factor which must be taken into consideration, along with the other facts and circumstances which have been established, for the purpose of determining the true state of the appellants mental condition at the time when the crime was committed. Thus, taking into consideration the previous background of the appellants insanity, his behaviour at the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter, the fact that his previous conduct in assaulting Mango a few days before the occurrence was taken no notice of, and the absence of motive for the murders which the appellant had committed, the conclusion to which I have reached is that at the time when the appellant committed the murders, he was suffering from unsoundness of mind and that his cognitive faculties were so impaired that he did not know that it was wrong or contrary to law to assault the two women. That being so, I hold that the appellant did commit the murders of Charia and Mango but the defence of unsound-ness of mind has been successfully established in this case. 23. For the reasons which I have given above, I find the appellant not guilty and acquit him of the charge under Sec.302, Indian Penal Code. The conviction and the sentence are set aside and the appeal is allowed. 24. The appellant will, however, not be set at liberty forthwith because there is reasonable ground for thinking that if he is set at large, then he might be a source of danger to the community. I would, therefore, direct that the appellant should be detained in safe custody in the jail until appropriate steps are taken by the State Government. Let a report be sent to the State Government under Section 471, Code of Criminal Procedure, along with a copy of this judgment. U.N.Sinha, J. 25 I agree