This revision has been filed by the first defendant against the judgment and decree passed by the Munsiff, Kamalpur in favour of the 1st respondent in T.S. No.12 of 1957 of that Court. (2) The suit was one for possession under sec­tion 9 of the Specific Relief Act on the plea that the 1st respondent was dispossessed by the appellant from certain lands on 19-5-1959 corresponding to 5th Jaistha. The suit was brought on 20-11-57. Under Article 3 of the Limitation Act, the suit had to be brought within six months from the date of dispossession. Thus this suit was just one day too late as the last date of limitation was 19.11.1957. The petitioner in his written statement took the plea of limitation as one of the grounds of defence. We are only concerned with the question of limitation in the present petition. (3) The learned Munsiff considered the ques­tion of limitation and stated that the plaintiff was dispossessed on 19-5-1957 and the suit was in­stituted on 20-11-1957 and that under section 12; of the Limitation Act, the suit was within time as it has been instituted just on the last date of limitation. He also mentioned that the learned lawyer for the defence did not press it. If the law­yer did not press the question of limitation after having raised it in his written statement, the learn­ed Munsiff need not have considered the question at all and given a finding that the suit was within time, but could simply have stated that the question was not pressed. I cannot therefore accept the Munsiffs statement that the question was not press­ed. It was also mentioned by the petitioner's Ad­vocate that the question was pressed in the lower Court. The fact that the suit was obviously filed after the period of limitation was over would also make one think that the defence lawyer would not have given up a vital point for the defence. (4) Before I deal with the question of limita­tion I may dispose of the argument advanced for die 1st respondent that no revision petition would lie within Sec. 115 C. P. C. even if the learned Munsiff has given a wrong finding on the question of plea of limitation. (4) Before I deal with the question of limita­tion I may dispose of the argument advanced for die 1st respondent that no revision petition would lie within Sec. 115 C. P. C. even if the learned Munsiff has given a wrong finding on the question of plea of limitation. In support of the said conten­tion he cited certain decisions Ram Narayan v. Rumprasad Nathmal, AIR 1954 Nag 48, and Rama-swami Chettiar v. Meyyappan Servai, AIR 1939 Mad 740 , in which it has been held that a mistake of law by the lower Court will not warrant inter­ference i" revision and that even if there was a mistake by the lower Court in applying the law of limitation, the High Court will not interfere in revi­sion. (5') The petitioner has cited various other deci­sions for the contrary position, namely, Joy Chanel Lai v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury, AIR 1949 PC 239, Mohammad Khan v. Mohammad Salim Khan, AIR 1951 All 392 , Periannan v. Amman Kovil, AIR 1952 Mad 323 (FB), and Munshi v. Chiranji Singh, AIR 1956 All 237 . The decision AIR 1951 All 392 discusses all the leading authorities on the question and it has been held therein that by a wrong decision upon a question of limitation or a question of res judicata, the Court commits an illegality in the exercise or its jurisdiction with the result that it either fails to consider the case upon its merits or considers it upon its merits when it ought not to have done so. Thus, the Court acts illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction with the result that one of the parties is severely prejudiced. We have also the observa­tion of the P. C. in AIR 1949 PC 239. The Privy Council observed: "The cases of Babu Ram v. Munna Lai, ILK 49 All 454 : (AIR 1927 All 358) and Had Bhikajt V. Naro Vishyanath, ILR 9 Bom 432, may be men­tioned as cases in which a subordinate Court by its own erroneous decision (Erroneous that is in the view of the High Court), in the one case on a point of limitation and in the other on a question of res judicata, invested itself with a jurisdiction which in law it did not possess, and the High Court held wrongly their Lordships think, that it had no power to interfere in revision to prevent such a result". (6) The two decisions cited above thus clearly showed that where a Court erroneously decides a question of limitation holding that the matter was not barred by limitation and thereby assumes a juris­diction to 'go into the merits of the case, then the High Court can use its power under Sec. 115 C. P. C. to correct the mistake. Now we shall ap­ply the said principle in the present case and see if interference in revision is called for. The suit, as I stated, was one under See. 9 of the Specific Relief Act and it had to be brought within six months from the date of dispossession under Article 3 of the Limitation Act. When such a suit is presented to a Court, the Court has first got to see under Order 7 Rule 11(d) C. P. C. whether from the statement in the plaint the suit appeared to be barred by any law. If it appeared to the Court that it was barred by any law, then the plaint has to be rejected and the Court has no further jurisdiction to go on with the case. This provision in die C. P. C. does not appear to have been considered when this plaint was present­ed. Then the defendant raised the question of li­mitation in his written statement. The Court had. therefore to consider the question of limitation be­fore it went into the merits of the case. The Court did consider that question and held that the suit was within time. If this finding of the Court was erroneous then it would follow that the Court had no jurisdiction to go into the merits, Thus if it goes into the merits after giving an er­roneous finding and decides against die party who was adversely affected by the ruling, it follows that that party is seriously prejudiced. In other words, the Court has acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction to the serious prejudice on the party. Thus it is a case which would clearly come under Sec. 115(c) C. P. C. I should think it will also come under Sec, 115(a) namely, that the Court has exercised a juris­diction not vested in it by law. In order to give it jurisdiction to consider the case on its merits, it has given a wrong finding on the question of limi­tation. In order to give it jurisdiction to consider the case on its merits, it has given a wrong finding on the question of limi­tation. If that finding on the question of limitation is wrong then, as I said, it followed that it had no jurisdiction to deal further with the case. Thus it is clear that the High Court in its exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 115 C. P. C. has got to see whether the finding on the question of limitation is erroneous or correct. (7) Now we shall see whether the question of limitation has been correctly decided. When the dispossession took place on 19-5-59, the period of limitation has to be counted from 20-5-1957 in the light of Sec. 9(1) of the General Clauses Act and Sec. 12 and Article 3 of the Limitation Act. Limita­tion under Article 3 of the Limitation Act being six months, the period of six months is from 20-5-57 to 19-11-57, the last date of limitation being 19-11-57. The learned Munsiff has referred to Sec. 12 of the Limitation Act. I do not know how he found the suit to be within time by applying Sec. 12. Section 12 only says that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. Thus we exclude the date 19-5-1957, the date of dispossession, and count the period of limitation from 20-5-1957. Even then, the six months expired on 19-11-1957. The suit having been filed on 20-11-1957 was thus clearly barred by limitation. (8) It was next argued that the dispossession took place on the 5th Jaistha and that if the period of six months is calculated according to the Bengal Era, then the suit was within time. But that argument cannot be accepted because under Sec. 3(351 of the General Clauses Act, month shall mean a month reckoned according to British Calendar. (9) Thus, it is clear that the suit under Sec. 9 of the Specific Relief Act, was clearly barred by li­mitation and the learned Munsiff had no jurisdic­tion to go into the merits of the case and give a decree in favour of the first respondent. The revi­sion petition is allowed and the judgment and dec­ree of the Munsiff are set aside. The revi­sion petition is allowed and the judgment and dec­ree of the Munsiff are set aside. I do not wish how­ever to be hard on the respondent and force him 4o file a fresh suit. Hence I am not dismissing his suit, but only remanding it to the lower Court. The first respondent may apply for amendment ,of the plaint by asking for declaration of his title and possession and he may pay the necessary extra Court fee. In such a case the Munsiff will hear the suit as a title suit after giving opportunity to 'the petitioner to put forth his defence. In case, the plaintiff-first respondent does not apply within a period of one month for amendment of the plaint, the suit shall be dismissed by the Munsiff. Under the circumstances of this case, 1 direct parties to bear their own costs. Revision allowed.