JUDGMENT Shiv Dayal, J. This is Defendant's second appeal from a decree for ejectment and arrears of rent from February 1, 1951 to November 1, 1954. The decree for ejectment is based on the ground that the Defendant neglected to pay arrears of rent within one month after notice of demand. It was alleged in the plaint that the ground floor of house No. 4/1419 was taken by the Defendant on rent in 1941. Thereafter the Defendant took on rent the first floor from the Plaintiff at Rs. 3 per month. It is in respect of the latter portion that this suit was instituted. The defence was that both the portions of the house were with the Defendant from the very beginning and the Plaintiff's allegation that the first floor was let out by a subsequent transaction was not correct. The first appellate Court has found in favour of the Plaintiff and it is not open to the Defendant to challenge that finding of fact in second appeal. It is urged by Shri Siddiqui that since there is another house of his own in which the Plaintiff is actually residing, the ground under Clause (g) of Section 4 of the M. B. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter called the Act) is not available to him for eviction from the suit premises. Learned Counsel argues that the mere fact of residing in another house belonging to himself is sufficient to dismiss the suit. In my opinion, this argument is too late in the day, in view of the Full Bench decision in Damodar Sharma v. Nand Ram 1960 MPLJ 925 : 1960 JLJ 473 . It is then urged that the Plaintiff gave no satisfactory evidence to prove that the existing accommodation in his possession was not equivalent to the suit accommodation in all respects as regards suitability. I agree with him that the Plaintiff has to satisfy in view of the interpretation made in the Full Bench decision that the alternative accommodation is not "reasonably equivalent" and that the observations in Motilal v, Badri Lal 1954 MBLJ 274 : AIR 1955 NUCMB 2096 that the Plaintiff was the 'sole arbiter' related to the 'genuineness' of the requirement. A clear distinction is pointed out between 'reasonably' and 'genuinely'. It is for the landlord to prove that there is a felt need, to be determined objectively. A clear distinction is pointed out between 'reasonably' and 'genuinely'. It is for the landlord to prove that there is a felt need, to be determined objectively. It appears from the judgment of the first appellate Court that no finding has been given on this point. This would have called for a remand but there is another ground on which ejectment has been decreed. In spite of notice the tenant did not pay arrears of rent. The demand notice covered the period from February 1, 1952 to June 30, 1954. It is urged on behalf of the tenant that as rent could legitimately be demanded only for a period of three years and in the notice, which the Plaintiff gave, time-barred rent was also demanded, the notice was no good for the purposes of Section 4 (a) of the Act. Reliance is placed on the decision of my learned brother Newasker J. in Ram Narain v, Banji 1959 MPLJ 3 : 1958 JLJ 708 . There it is held that the demand ought to be confined to what the landlord is entitled to claim; if he asks more, the tenant is within his rights to ignore such inflated demand. And if be pays what he is really liable for, that he may do by way of caution, desirability, convenience or any such consideration. But if he does not do so, it cannot be said that he ought to lose the protection available to him under the Act. Learned Counsel for the Appellant cites this authority in support of his proposition that if in the demand notice any such rent is included as had become barred by time the notice is ineffective for eviction under Section 4 (a) of the Act. I see no such dictum in Ram Narain's case 1959 MPLJ 3 : 1958 JLJ 708 . There, arrears of rent were demanded at the rate of Rs. 20 per month while as a matter of fact it was found that only Rs. 15 per month was the due rent. That case is an authority for the proposition that if a landlord demands rent at a higher rate, the notice is not in accordance with Section 4 (a). The expressions 'false, excessive or inflated demands' used by the learned Judge are undoubtedly wide, but they do not cover the case of a demand of a time-barred rent. That case is an authority for the proposition that if a landlord demands rent at a higher rate, the notice is not in accordance with Section 4 (a). The expressions 'false, excessive or inflated demands' used by the learned Judge are undoubtedly wide, but they do not cover the case of a demand of a time-barred rent. That proposition was really not under consideration in that case. In my judgment merely because some rent is allowed to become barred by time, the right is not extinguished although the remedy to recover the same is barred. Such rent may not be recoverable because of the statute of limitation, yet it cannot be said to be a false, excessive or inflated demand. Observations in Harihar Banerji v. Ram Sheshi Roy AIR 1918 PC 102 become opposite: The principles governing the construction of a notice to quit laid down by English cases are equally applicable to cases arising in India and they establish that notices to quit though not strictly accurate or consistent in the statements embodied in them, may still be good and effective in law; the test of their sufficiency is not what they would mean to a stranger ignorant of all the facts and circumstances touching the holding to which they purport to refer, but what they would mean to tenants presumably convergent with all those facts and circumstances; and further, they are to be construed not with a desire to find fault in them which would render them defective but to be construed ut resmagis valeat pereat Dee. But these principles are applicable to notices containing mistakes honestly but inadvertently made and not to inaccuracies deliberately inserted for fraudulent purposes. It seems clear to me that if the landlord includes in the notice of demand rent for these months for which time has already run out, it cannot be said that the demand is inserted for fraudulent purposes. Demand of a time-barred debt or a time-barred rent is no fraud. Observations in Gurpur Vamana Pai v. Venkatu Naika AIR 1936 Mad 116 and Harcharan v. Ram Krishna 1955 MBLJ 835 : AIR 1955 NUCMB 3877 support my view. Demand of a time-barred debt or a time-barred rent is no fraud. Observations in Gurpur Vamana Pai v. Venkatu Naika AIR 1936 Mad 116 and Harcharan v. Ram Krishna 1955 MBLJ 835 : AIR 1955 NUCMB 3877 support my view. Since no other defect is pointed out in the notice of demand and since admittedly three years rent was due by the tenant and was not paid despite notice, I see no error in the decree for eviction based on Section 4 (a) of the Act. Shri Siddiqui then invites my attention to the fact that although the trial Judge had held that only three years rent was recoverable from the Defendant and decided the issue accordingly, yet the first appellate Court without reversing that finding, passed a decree in favour of the Plaintiff for the whole amount as claimed in the plaint. Shri Kak concedes that this error has been inadvertently committed by the first appellate Court. This appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree of the first appellate Court for eviction are maintained. The decree for arrears of rent is modified. The Plaintiff shall get a decree for Rs. 108 only. The Plaintiff's claim for the rest of the arrears of rent is dismissed as barred by time. The Plaintiff shall also get his costs throughout from the Defendant, except costs on the dismissed part of the claim. Appeal allowed