Judgment :- 1. This is a revision by the judgment-debtor in O.S. No. I11 of 1118 against the order of the learned Additional District Munsiff of Kottayam holding that the petitioner has no right to file an application under S.22 of Kerala Act, XXXI of 1958 (The Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act) and also further holding that the respondent herein should be considered to be a bona fide alienee of the purchaser in court auction. 2. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel on both sides, a few facts may be stated. The respondent's assignor herein obtained a decree in O.S. No. 111 of 1118 against the petitioner and was taking steps for bringing the properties to sale. It appears that the petitioner purported to assign the properties on 12-1-1118 in favour of a third party and on the strength of this sale deed the latter filed an application objecting to the attachment of the properties effected by the decree-holder in execution of the decree in O. S.111 of 1118. It is seen that the properties were actually attached on 13-12-1121 and after hearing the objections to the attachment raised by the stranger-purchaser claiming to be in possession of the properties in his own right independently of the judgment-debtor the court over-ruled those objections and allowed attachment and other proceedings to continue. The actual order rejecting the third party's objections to attachment was on 18-5-1122. 3. Subsequently, the properties were brought to sale by the decree-holder and actually on the date when the objections of the third party were over-ruled, the court sale itself took place, namely, on 18-5-1122, and the decree-holder was the auction-purchaser also. 4. On 2-5-1123 the decree-holder assigned the properties in favour of the present respondent herein under Ext. D1. It is seen that possession was not obtained by either decree-holder or the assignee-decree¬holder in pursuance of the decree obtained. Therefore, when possession was sought to be taken, again the third party alienee, whose objections to attachment were over-ruled came back to the scene :and obstructed the delivery proceedings. But the obstructions, to the delivery, raised by the third party were again over-ruled and the obstruction was asked to be removed by order of court dated 30-8-1950. 5. Therefore, when possession was sought to be taken, again the third party alienee, whose objections to attachment were over-ruled came back to the scene :and obstructed the delivery proceedings. But the obstructions, to the delivery, raised by the third party were again over-ruled and the obstruction was asked to be removed by order of court dated 30-8-1950. 5. It is further seen that the obstructor filed a suit to set aside the order over-ruling the objections to delivery-being effected and the judgment in the said suit has been marked as Ext. D2 in these proceedings. It will be seen that finally the learned District Munsiff dismissed the suit on the ground that it is barred by limitation. Here and there, there are certain findings or observations that there has been a sale and the properties also may have been put in the possession of the third party, namely, the plaintiff in the said suit. As I mentioned earlier, ultimately in view of the fact that no suit has been filed to set aside the order over-ruling his objections to attachment which he raised at an earlier stage within the time prescribed, the learned District Munsiff came to the conclusion that the present suit is barred by limitation and as such dismissed the suit. That means, the order of the executing court over-ruling the objections raised by the third party-purchaser to execution being levelled against the properties and the properties being delivered was confirmed as between the judgment-debtor and the present decree-holder or his assignee and the court proceeded on the basis that legal title and possession of the properties are with the judgment-debtor himself. 6. After all the proceedings, the present judgment-debtor filed an application claiming relief under S.22 of Kerala Act XXXI of 1958. As to what manner of relief he can get under the said section does not now arise in the proceedings now before me because the learned District Munsiff was of the view that the application is not maintainable. The reasons given by the learned District Munsiff for coming to this conclusion appear to be that the findings in the judgment evidenced by Ext. D2, show that the judgment-debtor has already parted with possession of the properties and therefore in as much as the judgment-debtor is not in possession of these properties, the application is not maintainable. The reasons given by the learned District Munsiff for coming to this conclusion appear to be that the findings in the judgment evidenced by Ext. D2, show that the judgment-debtor has already parted with possession of the properties and therefore in as much as the judgment-debtor is not in possession of these properties, the application is not maintainable. That is, the learned District Munsiff was of the view that relief can be claimed under-S. 22, only by a judgment-debtor who is in actual possession of the properties on the date when he filed the application under S.22. 7. The other ground on which the learned District Munsiff has held against the judgment-debtor was, that the present assignee-decree-holder should be considered to be a bona fide alienee of the' purchaser and as such he is protected by the third Proviso to S.22, clause (1) of the Act. Ultimately, the learned District Munsiff dismissed the application filed by the judgment-debtor. It is this order of the learned District Munsiff that is challenged before me in this Civil Revision Petition. 8. On behalf of the petitioner Mr. K.K. Mathew, his learned counsel, raised two contentions, namely (1) that the reasoning of the learned District Munsiff that judgment-debtors who are not in possession of the properties are not entitled to maintain an application under S.22 is wrong. Alternatively Mr. Mathew also contended that the learned District Munsiff has thoroughly misunderstood the scope of the claim orders, and their being over-ruled by the two courts and later confirmed ultimately by the suit. Therefore Mr. Mathew contended that in any event in view of those proceedings at any rate, as between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder's assignee the court must proceed on the basis that legal title and possession of the properties are still with the judgment-debtor and, therefore, an application filed by the present judgment-debtor under S.22 is perfectly competent. The second contention raised by Mr. Mathew is this: There was no allegation in the counter-affidavit filed in the lower court by the assignee-decree-holder that he is a bona fide alienee of the purchaser and as such he is protected by the third Proviso to S.22, clause (1) of the Act. When there was no allegation even, his client had no opportunity to meet such a case. When there was no allegation even, his client had no opportunity to meet such a case. That the assignee-decree-holder is such a person, was only mentioned in the course of the evidence of the respondent in the lower court and that was after the judgment-debtor's evidence had been closed; that is, Mr. Mathew's contention is that his client had no opportunity to meet this case of protection claimed by the assignee-decree-holder by virtue of the proviso mentioned above. 9. The larger question raised by Mr. Mathew also probably decided by the trial court, namely, that judgment-debtors, who are not in possession of the properties on the date of the application under S.22 of the Act are entitled to file applications claiming relief under the said section, may not be necessary to be decided by me in this proceeding in the view that I take about the contention of Mr. Mathew regarding the misreading and misapplication of the various claim orders and claim proceedings that have taken place as between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder in this case. The next contention also, namely, that his client had no real opportunity to meet the case of the assignee-decree-holder, that he is a bona fide alienee of the purchaser will also have to be reconsidered by the trial court as I am of the view that the view of the learned Munsiff that the application is not maintainable cannot be sustained. 10. Though Mr. Sivasankara Panicker, learned counsel appearing for the assignee-decree-holder, namely, the respondent herein, contended that there are findings in the judgment marked as Ext. D2 in these proceedings, to the effect that the judgment-debtor has parted with possession in my opinion, that will not in any way assist his contentions either raised here or which have' been accepted by the lower court, 11. As I mentioned already, though there may be some observations here and there, the ultimate effect of the suit is that the plaintiff therein, namely, the third party purchaser was not able to have the order of the executing court which negatived his objections to execution being taken regarding either the party or to the attachment at an earlier stage, set aside. In my opinion, these orders have been virtually confirmed by the final decree in the suit which as I have already stated ended against the third party purchaser. In my opinion, these orders have been virtually confirmed by the final decree in the suit which as I have already stated ended against the third party purchaser. Whatever may be the position regarding the judgment-debtor and the third party in other proceedings, so far as these proceedings are concerned, these questions must be taken to have been conclusively decided as against the third party. Therefore, in law, the position is that the judgment-debtor has got title and possession of the suit properties As I mentioned earlier, the third party intervenes at an earlier stage objecting to attachment of the suit properties on the ground that he has got title and possession of the properties. That was negatived. Again, he attempted to intervene and obstruct the proceedings regarding the delivery of the properties. There again, his objections were over-ruled and he lost. It was really to set aside the latter order that he filed the suit which resulted in Ext. D2. There again he has lost. Therefore the third party cannot be considered to be a person having either independent title or independent possession of the suit properties apart from the judgment-debtor. Mr. Mathew is well-founded in his contention that the learned District Munsiff has not properly appreciated the legal effect of the various claim orders and ultimately the confirmation of these orders by the dismissal of the suit by the judgment Ext. D2. The main reason given by the learned District Munsiff for saying that the judgment-debtor is out of possession is because of some observations contained in that judgment. Though no doubt the present assignee-decree holder was a party to that suit, he could not certainly file any revision or appeal against these findings, because ultimately the decision was in his favour. I have gone through that judgment and the findings are not as clear as the learned District Munsiff attempts to make. The main reason given by the learned District Munsiff for coming to the conclusion that the judgment-debtor is out of possession of the suit properties is really based, as I mentioned earlier, on some of the observations and findings in the judgment, Ext. D2. In my opinion, these observations have absolutely no value and we are only concerned with the final decree passed in that suit whose effect is that the third party has no title or possession of the suit properties. D2. In my opinion, these observations have absolutely no value and we are only concerned with the final decree passed in that suit whose effect is that the third party has no title or possession of the suit properties. If that is so, it follows that the judgment-debtor is the person who is in possession of the properties. As I mentioned earlier, it is not really necessary for me to consider the other larger question as to whether relief can be claimed under S.22 by judgment-debtors who are not in actual possession of the properties on the date of the application under S.22. The main basis of the judgment of the learned District Munsiff is vitiated for the reasons mentioned by me earlier and it follows that the order of the learned District Munsiff holding that the application under S.22 of Act XXXI of 1958 is not maintainable, falls to the ground. 12. Therefore, in my opinion, the judgment-debtor was competent to file the application under S.22 and claim relief. As to what type or manner of relief should be given to him is a totally different matter and that will have to be considered by the lower court when the matter goes back to it. 13. I am also impressed by the contention of Mr. Mathew that there has been no proper adjudication on the question that the decree-holder, namely, the respondent herein, is a bona fide alienee of the purchaser. 14. According to Mr. Mathew, if the assignee or the alienee of the purchaser does not plead or satisfy the court that he is a bona fide alienee of the purchaser and as such protected by the third Proviso to S.22, clause [1] of the Act, no relief can at all be granted to him. In this case Mr. Mathew contended that the assignee did not make any averment in his counter-affidavit filed in the lower court claiming protection under this proviso. Therefore, according to Mr. Mathew, the respondent was not entitled to raise this contention at the stage of evidence. 15. Mr. Sivasankara Panicker went to the extent of contending that it is really the judgment-debtor, who files an application under S.22 who must satisfy the court that the alienee of the purchaser "is not a bona fide alienee of the purchaser", and as such the proviso does not apply. 15. Mr. Sivasankara Panicker went to the extent of contending that it is really the judgment-debtor, who files an application under S.22 who must satisfy the court that the alienee of the purchaser "is not a bona fide alienee of the purchaser", and as such the proviso does not apply. In my opinion it is not possible to accept this contention of Mr. Sivasankara Panicker, because accepting this position will only lead to this, namely, asking a party to prove a negative in the first instance which certainly cannot be understood to be the scheme of the section. On the other hand, in my opinion, Mr. Mathew is well-founded in his contention that the proviso is really for the benefit of persons who are entitled to rely upon it and seek its protection to plead that fact and also place the necessary evidence before the court to show that they are entitled to the protection given by that proviso. I am also satisfied that the protection given under the said proviso is in the nature of an affirmative defence to be specifically pleaded and raised by a party claiming that protection and initially he must place sufficient material before the court to show that he comes within the protection of the said proviso. But I am not able to accept Mr. Mathew's contention that once not having raised this plea in his counter-affidavit, he cannot certainly be allowed to raise it at any later stage. As the matter is now going back to the lower court for re-enquiry on the merits of the application, in my opinion, in order to do substantial justice to both parties, it is desirable that the assignee-decree¬holder is allowed to file a supplementary statement or affidavit, if he so chooses within a week from this date averring the necessary facts and claiming protection under the third proviso to S.22, clause [1] of the Act. This short time is given because Mr. Sivasankara Panicker has agreed before me that his client does not want more time. Within ten days thereafter the judgment-debtor will file his rejoinder or objection, if any to the plea raised. Parties will also join issue on this matter during the enquiry on this application. 16. This short time is given because Mr. Sivasankara Panicker has agreed before me that his client does not want more time. Within ten days thereafter the judgment-debtor will file his rejoinder or objection, if any to the plea raised. Parties will also join issue on this matter during the enquiry on this application. 16. It is needless to say that if the lower court is satisfied with the plea raised by the alienee in this behalf he will be perfectly entitled to protection given by the 3rd proviso to S.22, clause [1] of the Act. 17. In the result, the order of the learned District Munsiff holding that the judgment-debtor is not entitled to maintain the application is set aside and the application is remanded to that court for a proper disposal according to law, and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. I make it very clear that any observation that I have made should not be understood as meaning that the alienee is or is not a bona fide alienee of the purchaser within the meaning of the proviso or that he is or not entitled to any protection. These are all matters which will have to be pleaded and considered by the court below on the materials before it. Costs in this C.R.P. will abide and will be provided for in the order to be passed by the lower court. 18. The application itself will be taken up and disposed of by the learned District Munsiff within a period not exceeding two months from today. Allowed.