ORDER V.R. Newaskar, J. This appeal is preferred against an order refusing to restore an appeal dismissed for default. The circumstances in which the impugned order was passed were that the appeal was fixed for hearing on 18-3-1959. On that day neither the appellant nor his counsel was present and the appeal was consequently dismissed for default. An application for restoration was submitted under the provisions of Order 41, rule 19, Civil Procedure Code under the signature of the counsel Mr. M.D. Deshmukh. The reason put forth by the counsel for his absence on the date of hearing was that, that day he had gone to some other place and had expected to return during the Court time but could not do so due to accidental reason. This was ipso facto considered to be not a sufficient cause for the absence of the appellant or his counsel. The Court below therefore refused to restore the appeal. The present appeal is preferred against that decision. It is contended by Mr. Vijayvargiya for the appellant on the basis of the decisions reported in Pandu v. Hira AIR 1936 Nag 85 and Premshankar v. Rampyarelal 1944 NLJ 269 : AIR 1944 Nag 317 : ILR 1944 Nag 558, that when once a party engages a counsel to represent his case particularly in an appeal he should be taken to have done everything that is necessary for the prosecution of the case and in case the counsel does not appear for any reason he should not be met with a penalty of dismissal of the appeal. His personal absence should be taken to have been sufficiently accounted for by reason of the engagement of a counsel. I am unable to subscribe to such a broad proposition. I am prepared to assume that if the party has shown anxiety and diligence to secure the presence of himself or of his counsel where his personal presence may not be required but due to accidental reason either be or his counsel could not be present just at the time the case is called on for hearing in spite of their anxiety and diligence, it may be said that there is sufficient cause within the meaning of Order 41, rule 19, Civil Procedure Code. It is in each case a question of fact as to whether particular absence either of a party or his counsel is such that the party could not be visited with the penalty of the dismissal of his cause. In the present case such an anxiety on the part of the counsel does not appear to exist. The counsel leaves the place where the Court is situated for a different station without making any arrangement for the case. According to him he expected to return before the Court time was over. This is hardly any reason. In case he would have expected to return before the commencement of the Court time probably that would have been something. The case could be called on for hearing any time after the commencement of the Court hour and his expectation about his return before the close of the Court hour cannot mean that he had shown that anxiety or diligence to constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of the rule aforesaid. The decision in Premshankar v. Rampyarelal 1944 NLJ 269 : AIR 1944 Nag 317 : ILR 1944 Nag 558, has no application to the circumstances of the present case. In that case a cause at the original stage was dismissed for default when the party had taken case to engage two counsel so that one or the other might be present when necessary. Both the counsel could not appear due to accidental circumstances although there was no want of anxiety to remain present when the case was called on for hearing. The trial Court who had rejected the application for restoration had accepted the statement of the plaintiff's pleader Mr. Varma as quite reliable. On that statement he was present in the Court of the District Judge, before whom he had a case, at the time when the case was called on for hearing. There the hearing accidentally was going on not in open Court but in the chamber and therefore he could not get the information as soon as the case was called. This was considered to be a sufficient cause. The observations in Pandu v. Hira AIR 1936 Nag 85, to my mind, are somewhat wide though under the circumstances of that particular case the cause for the absence might have been sufficient. This was considered to be a sufficient cause. The observations in Pandu v. Hira AIR 1936 Nag 85, to my mind, are somewhat wide though under the circumstances of that particular case the cause for the absence might have been sufficient. I would therefore consider this to be not a fit case for interference with the order of the Court below. The appeal therefore is dismissed in limine. Appeal dismissed