ORDER V.R. Newaskar, J. The facts giving rise to this petition are few and simple. Petitioner Daryaosingh had held lands, which are the subject-matter of this petition, as Gair Maurushi Khashtakar from opponent No. 1 Pyarelal who was the Zamindar of the village Bhardi (District Shajapur) where the lands are situate. Pyarelal later obtained a decree for ejectment against the petitioner on 16-5-1948 on the ground that the said land was required by him for personal cultivation as he had not in his possession 40 Bighas of land permitted by law for the purpose. This was done by him in pursuance of the provisions of sections 318 and 319 of the Qanoon Mal. However he after obtaining petitioner's ejectment did not act to his representation that the land was needed for his personal cultivation and led it out to opponent No. 2 Isharsingh. Under section 319-A of the Qanoon Mal the petitioner could take proceedings in these circumstances for possession of land for cultivation in the same capacity in which he had held the same earlier i.e. as a Gair Maurushi Kashtakar subject to payment of rent which he used to pay in the past. This he did on 6-10-1951. But prior to this Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act was passed. In pursuance of the provisions of the said Act on 3-9-1951 a Notification No. 5710 was issued and published in the Madhya Bharat Government Gazette dated 7-9-1951 notifying 2-10-1951 as the date of vesting as referred to in section 3(1) of the Act as a result of which all proprietary rights affected by the Act passed to be vested in the State. The suit filed by Daryaosingh subsequent to the date of vesting i.e. on 6-10-1951 against Pyarelal and Isharsingh under section 319-A of the Qanoon Mal for restoration of his former status and for possession of the land succeeded in the Tehsil Court. Appeals filed by Zamindar did not succeed upto the Court of Additional Commissioner, Ujjain. Pyarelal then moved the Board of Revenue by means of a revision petition. The Board allowed the petition and held the suit of Daryaosingh filed by him on 6-10-1951 under section 319-A as not maintainable by reason of the provisions of Zamindari Abolition Act, the Act having become operative from 2-10-1951. Pyarelal then moved the Board of Revenue by means of a revision petition. The Board allowed the petition and held the suit of Daryaosingh filed by him on 6-10-1951 under section 319-A as not maintainable by reason of the provisions of Zamindari Abolition Act, the Act having become operative from 2-10-1951. The petitioner now has approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution for setting aside the aforesaid decision of the Board of Revenue on the ground that on a correct appraisal of the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act read in light of the principles of statutory construction as regards the retrospectively of a statute with reference to vested rights, his suit was maintainable and that the view taken by the Board of Revenue was erroneous and involved an erroneous refusal to exercise jurisdiction which, in fact existed. If the contention is well founded, this petition no doubt ought to succeed. But the question is whether having regard to the general scheme of the Act and the material provisions therein regarding the land of the description which is involved in the present petition the petitioner can be said to have a vested right and if so can it be said that there is nothing express or implied in the Act to interfere with such a right. As regards the question whether the petitioner has a vested right to obtain back the land or not it may be said that having regard to the provisions of section 319-A of the Qanoon Mal (Gwalior) the petitioner had acquired a right to obtain back the land as a Gair Maurusi Kashtakar from the proprietor and his transferee since the proprietor having obtained the land to make up his 25 Bighas of Khudkasht land for personal cultivation by ejecting the petitioner under the provisions of section 318 of the Qanoon Mal instead of acting upto his representation had given it on rent to Isharsingh. Is this right which he had acquired before the date of notification intended to be interfered with. If the Act is clear and specific and is calculated not to recognise this right then the petition ought to fail. Is this right which he had acquired before the date of notification intended to be interfered with. If the Act is clear and specific and is calculated not to recognise this right then the petition ought to fail. But if there is nothing in the Act to deprive the petitioner of his right which he has against the proprietor and his sub-tenant the general principle with regard to non-retrospectivity of a statute with reference to vested rights ought to apply. At this stage it will be useful and proper to refer to material provisions of the Act indicating the object, the general scheme of the Act and also those which deal with rights with reference to Khudkasht land of a proprietor entered as such on the date of notification namely 2-10-1951. The preamble of the Act is sufficiently eloquent to indicate the object of the statute. It reads thus: An Act to provide for the public purposes of the improvement of agriculture and financial condition of agriculturists by abolition and acquisition of the rights of proprietors in villages, MUHALS, CHAKS or blocks settled on Zamindari system which is only a system of keeping an intermediary between the State and the tenants injurious to the betterment of agriculture as well as the agriculturists in Madhya Bharat and for other matters connected therewith. Section 2(3) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act defines 'Khudkasht land' means land cultivated by the Zamindar himself or through employees or hired labourers and includes sir land. Section 3 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act lays down:- (1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act and subject to the provisions of section 8 on and from a date to be specified by a notification by the Government in this behalf (hereinafter referred to as the date of vesting) all proprietary rights in a village, MUHAL, land, CHAK or block in Madhya Bharat vesting in a proprietor of such village, MUHAL, land, CHAK or block, as the case may be, or in a person having interest in such proprietary right through the proprietor shall pass from such proprietor or such other person, to and vest in the State free of all encumbrances. (2) After issue of a notification under sub-section, (1), no right shall be acquired in or over the land to which the said notification relates, except by succession or under a decree or order of a Court or under a grant or contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the Government, and no fresh clearings for cultivation or for any other purpose shall be made in such land except in accordance with such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf. ................................................................................................................................................... Section 4 provides for consequences of vesting of an estate of a Zamindar in the State and it deprives the Zamindar of all his right, title and interest that of recovery of rent in the Zamindari property except such as is specifically saved and vest such interest in the State from 2-10-1951. Sub-section (2) of section 4 is material. It provides:- (1).......................................................................... (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the proprietor shall continue to remain in possession of his Khudkaskt land, so recorded in the annual village papers before the date of vesting. (3).......................................................................... Section 37(1) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act provides:- (1) Every proprietor who is divested of his proprietary rights in an estate, CHAK, block or Muhal shall, with effect from the date of vesting be a PACCA tenant of the Khudkasht land in his possession and the land revenue payable by him shall be determined at the rates fixed by the current settlement for the same kind of land. (2)................................................................................................................................................ Section 38(1) and (2) provides:- (1) Subject to the provisions of this section every tenant of a proprietor shall be deemed to be a PACCA tenant of the land comprised in his holding from the date of vesting. (2) Every sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant who deposits with the Tehsildar within the period specified in sub-sections (3) and (4) the following amount to be paid to the proprietor or tenant or sub-tenant, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a PACCA tenant of the land comprised in his holding. Till amount is deposited, his former statues shall continue. The right of becoming a PACCA tenant by depositing money shall firstly be that of the tenant of the sub-tenant, if any, and if he fails to deposit money shall be that of the sub-tenant:- (a).......................................................................... (b)......................................................................... Till amount is deposited, his former statues shall continue. The right of becoming a PACCA tenant by depositing money shall firstly be that of the tenant of the sub-tenant, if any, and if he fails to deposit money shall be that of the sub-tenant:- (a).......................................................................... (b)......................................................................... (c) In the case of a sub-tenant of the Khudkasht or sir of the proprietor - An amount equal to six times the net annual income of that land of the proprietor. (d).................................................................................................................................................... Sub-section (4) lays down:- If the holding be in the possession of a sub-tenant, he may deposit the money within eight years of the date of vesting. On the expiry of eight years, the original tenant or the proprietor, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the PACCA tenant of that holding. Then sub-sections (6) and (7) provide for a statutory fiction of Government having settled land on rent as indicated in those sub-sections upon the original tenant, or sub-tenant and tenant of a sub-tenant respectively. Explanation (1) attached below. Sub-section (7) is:- In case of every sub-tenant or tenant of a sub tenant, as the case may be, deemed to be a PACCA tenant under sub-sections (2) and (3), it shall be presumed that the Government has settled his land with him, if he is a sub-tenant of the Khudkasht or Sir land of the proprietor, on the same rent which he has been paying to the proprietor and in any other case, on each rent as the original tenant has been paying to the proprietor and if that portion holds rent-free or on concessional rent or pays the rent in kind, the rent shall be fixed at the village rate assessed in the current settlement. (1) The PACCA tenancy rights under this section shall accrue or be acquired in respect of such land only as may be in the actual possession of the tenant, sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant. (2)........................................................................ (1) The PACCA tenancy rights under this section shall accrue or be acquired in respect of such land only as may be in the actual possession of the tenant, sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant. (2)........................................................................ Section 41 lays down:- When the proprietary rights in any village, Muhal, land, Chak or block are vested in the State under section 3 of this Act, every Sakitu-milkiyat, Pacca Maurushi, Mamuli Maurusi, Gair Maurusi tenant of such village, Muhal, land, Chak or block who was in possession of any holding, shall, from the date of vesting, be deemed to be a tenant of the Government and the proprietor shall also likewise, in respect of the holding of his Khudkasht or Sir, be deemed to be the tenant of the Government from the date of vesting and all provisions of Part II of Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, shall, subject to other provisions of this Act, apply to such village, Muhal, land, Chak or block and similar provisions of Qanoon Mal, Gwalior State, Samvat 1983, and of other laws shall cease to apply: Provided that all cases pending before any revenue Court at the time of commencement of this Act shall be decided according to the provisions of Acts and laws heretofore in force. Section 50 provides for presumption about entries in the record-of-rights. Section 50 deals with the effect of provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder which are inconsistent with enactments. It lays down its overriding character. It provides:- The provisions of this Act and any rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent herewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act. It is clear from these provisions that after 2-10-1951 the Zamindars are deprived of all their proprietary rights in their Zamindari estates and the said rights stand vested in the State subject to such rights as are specifically saved. We are in this case concerned with the land which under the pre-existing proceedings before the revenue Courts under Qanoon Mal had become Khudkasht land of the Zamindar. By sub-section (2) of section 4 notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 4 the proprietor is allowed to continue in possession of his Khudhasht land so recorded in the annual village papers. By sub-section (2) of section 4 notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 4 the proprietor is allowed to continue in possession of his Khudhasht land so recorded in the annual village papers. Under section 37 the proprietor becomes a Pacca tenant of the Government in respect of the Khudkasht land in his possession. While according to section 38(1) a tenant of a proprietor is recognised as a sub-tenant. In the case of sub-tenants or tenants of sub-tenants of a proprietor they would be entitled to acquire the rights of Pacca tenants only on making deposits of certain sums indicated in the Act within statutory periods. In the case of sub-tenants in respect of Khudkasht land it is further provided that in case they do not make deposits as provided the proprietor, that is the ex-Zamindar, becomes its Pacca tenant automatically without having to do anything. Explanation (1) at the foot of section 38 clearly indicates that the Pacca tenancy rights under the section are to accrue or could be acquired of such land as may be in actual possession of a tenant, sub-tenant or tenant of a subtenant as the case may be. Section 41 further makes it clear that a person claiming to have Gair Maurusi rights in respect of land is deemed to be tenant of the Government from the date of vesting only if he was in actual possession of the land and that a proprietor is to become entitled to be a tenant of the Government from the date of vesting in respect of his Khudkasht land which is in his actual possession, subject to saving in respect of pending litigation. Moreover section 56 clearly provides for the overriding effect of the Act over any other statutory provisions to the contrary. Now in the present case the suit of the petitioner was not pending on the date of vesting. He was not in actual possession of the land in question. It was Isharsingh who was in possession. The petitioner therefore had not the necessary qualification to acquire the right of a Pacca tenant under the Act in respect of the land in question, the proprietary interest whereof had passed to the Government. He was not in actual possession of the land in question. It was Isharsingh who was in possession. The petitioner therefore had not the necessary qualification to acquire the right of a Pacca tenant under the Act in respect of the land in question, the proprietary interest whereof had passed to the Government. The Act having overriding effect except perhaps in the case of pending litigation, the plea that the petitioner had certain vested rights under Qanoon Mal as against the proprietor cannot have any effect as against the State in whom all the rights had passed subject only to such of them as are specifically saved, granted or could be acquired. If Isharsingh has made deposit as required by the Act then in spite of anything in any enactment he would be entitled to claim rights of a Pacca tenant as he was a sub-tenant of land recorded as a Khudkasht land on the date of vesting. If he on the other hand has not made any such deposit the landlord becomes entitled to it as a Pacca tenant by the statute itself. The petitioner, in the scheme and provisions of the Act has no place and the mere fact that he had a right under Qanoon Mal as against the proprietor will not avail where by the Act it is only the right recognised under the Act which can be enforced. In this sense the Act clearly intends to affect vested rights of the petitioner in the present context and the contention with respect general presumption against retrospectivity with reference to vested right cannot help him. It might he suggested that the possession contemplated under section 41 of a tenant including a Gair Maurusi tenant is equivalent to 'right to possess' and that if he has such a right then he will be deemed to be tenant. The line of reasoning which might be adopted in this connection is that the section will apply as well to a person entitled to the status of a Gair Maurusi Kashtakar who was entitled to obtain possession from the landlord and his transferee. A moment's reflection will show that this cannot be the meaning. For if that be the meaning any suit under section 319-A will be unnecessary. A moment's reflection will show that this cannot be the meaning. For if that be the meaning any suit under section 319-A will be unnecessary. It is unnecessary for the purpose of the present case what would be the effect upon the right of a person who has been deprived of his possession by force or fraud. We are not to deal with that case here. We are dealing with a case where a sub-tenant of a Khudkasht land is in possession of the holding on the date of vesting. He has a status which is recognised by the Act and in the absence of anything in the Act he cannot be deprived of that status. Merely because under the pre-existing law, by reason of a statutory right conferred upon a Gair Maurusi Kashtakar to obtain back possession from the sub-tenant of a proprietor in respect of his Khudkasht land (which he had acquired under sections 318 and 319 of the Qanoon Mal), his right to possess was likely to be defeated, it does not follow that the possession of the sub-tenant would become unlawful. It is a possession obtained under a contract with a proprietor of the land and is not one which even under Qanoon Mal is unlawful. There is a clear distinction between a possession which is illegal in the sense of its being contrary to the specific prohibition of law and possession which is likely to be lost by reason of a superior right recognised by law. Where the latter is the case the possession as long as it is not taken away in pursuance of the order of a lawful authority by means of the procedure prescribed by law, is lawful. Such was the case in this case. It cannot be said by any stretch of the language of section 319-A of the Qanoon Mal that on 1-10-1951 the possession of Isharsingh became illegal. The petitioner who was an ex-Gair Mourusi Kashtakar had not filed any suit. To acquire the status of a Gair Mourasi tenant was a right coupled with a liability. He had the option till then either to exercise such onerous right or not to do so. Till he actually decides to enforce the right there was nothing unlawful in the possession of Isharsingh. To acquire the status of a Gair Mourasi tenant was a right coupled with a liability. He had the option till then either to exercise such onerous right or not to do so. Till he actually decides to enforce the right there was nothing unlawful in the possession of Isharsingh. If then his possession was that of a sub-tenant of a Khudkasht land on the date of vesting his case specifically fell under section 38(c) and the right thus conferred upon him is not subject to any limitation except perhaps what is indicated in proviso to section 41 regarding pending cases. It is also clear from explanation to section 38 that it is the actual possession that is contemplated for the purpose of acquisition Pacca tenancy rights under section 38. It is therefore not correct to introduce any other notion of possession under an indefeasible right. Sections 3 and 4 of the Act clearly indicate that the consequences indicated in those sections are to accrue notwithstanding any contract, grant, document or any law to the contrary except such as are not to ensue by the subsequent provisions of the Act itself. The plaintiff cannot claim to be a Pacca tenant as he was not in actual possession on the date of vesting nor was his case, for possession against the person, who had lawful right to acquire that status under the law, was pending then. It need not be emphasised that the relation between the State and the tiller which was intended to exist after the 2nd of October 1951 except for a temporary period for determination of disputed rights, is that of a Pacca tenant and this relation could only be brought about, where it did not exist before by the provisions of the Act and nothing else. The Act had to make a line of demarcation for settling land and had to adopt a rough and ready test for making such a line of demarcation for the conferral of such Pacca tenancy rights. The actual possession was considered on the whole to be a just basis. This might have involved the affecting of some rights recognised by the pre-existing statutes but in a revolutionary legislation such as this some cases of apparent hardship may be unavoidable and recognition of complicated rights might have been sacrificed for attaining easy and simple working of the new law. This might have involved the affecting of some rights recognised by the pre-existing statutes but in a revolutionary legislation such as this some cases of apparent hardship may be unavoidable and recognition of complicated rights might have been sacrificed for attaining easy and simple working of the new law. In any case what is not recognised is not recognised and any amount of argument cannot have the effect of bringing about the position not contemplated by the Act. The Board of Revenue were therefore right in dismissing the suit. The petition therefore does not deserve to succeed. Under the circumstances parties to bear their costs. Petition dismissed