JUDGMENT S.N. Dwivedi, J. - The Petitioner made an attempt to the RC and EO, the Respondent No. 2, for the allotment of the shop in dispute in his favour on or about 14-11-58. There was also a rival Applicant, the Respondent No. 3. The RC and EO, by his order dated 17-12-58; allotted the shop in dispute to the Petitioner. The Respondent No. 3 then moved the State Government u/s 7-F of the UP (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) to set aside the order of the RC and EO The State Government, by its order dated 26-10-59, has set aside the order of the RC and EO. Feeling aggrieved by this order the Petitioner has come to this Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The Slate Government has set aside the order of the RC and EO on the ground that the Petitioner was a minor and that a contract with a minor was not enforceable at law. Sri Kacker, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, questioned both the premises of the State Government order. He has submitted that the Petitioner was not a minor. It appears that the record of the allotment case contains two documents. One of them is the affidavit of the Respondent No. 3 to the effect that according to the scholar's register of the institution where the Petitioner had been reading, the Petitioner's birth date was 3-2-43. The other document is the written statement of the Petitioner submitted to the (sic) Government and in paragraph 9 of that document the Petitioner has assrerted that he was 19 years of age. It is further stated in that paragraph that as usual the Petitioner's parents gave a declaration of a lesser age to the institution, where he was admitted. This admission indirectly accepts the allegation of the Respondent No. 3 that according to the age mentioned in the Scholar's register the Petitioner was born on 3-2-43. It is further stated in that paragraph that as usual the Petitioner's parents gave a declaration of a lesser age to the institution, where he was admitted. This admission indirectly accepts the allegation of the Respondent No. 3 that according to the age mentioned in the Scholar's register the Petitioner was born on 3-2-43. The State Government accepted the version of the Respondent No. 3 aS to the minority of the Petitioner; and I do not think it can be said here that the State Government, while accepting the version of the Respondent No. 3, acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or with cut good faith, I cannot accordingly reverse the finding of the State Government that the Petitioner was a minor on the date of the passing of the allotment order in his favour. 3. The next question then is whether an order directing a landlord to let an accommodation to a minor is not envisaged by the provisions of the Act. Sri Kacker has strenuously maintained that the Act did not either expressly or by necessary implication, enact a bar against the allotment of an accommodation to a minor. I am, however, unable to accede to his submission. 4. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act authorises the District Magistrate to require a landlord to let or not to let to any "person" any accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant. Sri Kacker says that a minor is undoubtedly a person and that is all that the State Government should have looked at. The decisive question, therefore, is what is the true meaning of the word "person" in Sub-section (2) of Section 7. For determining the true meaning of that word it will be necessary to examine the scheme of the Act and the context of the word 'person'. The preamble of the Act indicates its object, which is to provide for the continuance of powers to control the letting and the rent of accommodations, an to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom. The avowed object of the Act therefore is to regulate the creation of tenancies, fixation of rent a ad the ejectment of tenants. For toe accomplishment of the avowed object of the Act the District Magistrate is authorised by Sub-section (2) of Section 7 to direct a landlord to let an accommodation to a person. The avowed object of the Act therefore is to regulate the creation of tenancies, fixation of rent a ad the ejectment of tenants. For toe accomplishment of the avowed object of the Act the District Magistrate is authorised by Sub-section (2) of Section 7 to direct a landlord to let an accommodation to a person. Sub-section (4) of Section 7 empowers the District Magistrate to require, on an application made to him by the landlord, a prospective tenant of any accommodation in respect of which an order has been made Under Sub-section (2) to pay to the landlord an advance of rent equal to one month's rent wnether the accommdation is to be let on monthly basis and to one-half of the yearly rent where the accommodation is to be let on a yearly basis. The next important Section is Section 5. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that except as otherwise provided in Section 5 the rent payable for any accommodation, to which this Act applies, shall be such as may to agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant. Sub-section (3) thereof provides that if any accommodation to which the Act applies is let out after the commencement of this Act without the rent being agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant, the rent fixed Under Sub-section (2) shall be payable from the date of the commencement of the tenancy. Sub-section (4) thereof provides that if the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, claims that the annual reasonable rent of any accommodation to which the Act applies, is inadequate or excessive or if the tenant claims that the agreed rent is higher than the annual reasonable rent he may institute a suit for fixation of rent in the Court of the Mansif having territorial jurisdiction if the annual rent claimed or payable is Rs. 500/- or less and in the court of the Civil Judge having territorial jurisdiction if it exceeds Rs. 500/-. Sub-section (1) of Section 7-B provides that when any tenant, who is in occupation of an accommodation in pursuance of an order made under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 7, is in arrears of rent or any instalment thereof for more than three months, the landlord may make an application to the Munsif having territorial jurisdiction for an order of ejectment of the tenant from that accommodation. 5. 5. It will appear from a perusal of the preamble of the Act, which indicates its object and the sections which have been cited above, that the direction of the District Magistrate Under Sub-section (2) of Section 7 to the landlord to let an accommodation to a person eventually culminates in the creation of the relationship of the landlord and the tenant between the owner of the accommodation and the person in whose favour the order has been made. A person, who has obtained the order under Sub-section (2) of Section 7 becomes the tenant. It seems to me, therefore, that the word "person" in Sub-section (2) of Section 7 by necessary implication means a person who is capable of becoming a tenant. In other words, must be a pet son who is competent to contract for the creation of tenancy in his favour. Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act describes persons who are competent to contract. It is indicated therein that every person is competent to contract who is of the age of magority according to law to which he is subject and who is of sound mind and is not, disqualified by any law to which be is subject. The first condition prescribed by the Section is that the person must be of the age of majority according the law to which he is subject. If a person is not a major according to that law, then he would be incompetent to contract for creating a tenancy in his favour. The Petitioner would be governed by the Indian Majority Act, 1875. Section 3 of that Act provides that every person shall be deemed to have attained his majority when he shall have completed the age of eighteen years and not before. According to the sender's register the Petitioner's birth date is 3-2-1913 and he was accordingly below 13 years of age when the RC and EO passed an allotment order in his favour. On that date the Petitioner was not competent to make a contract creating a tenancy in his favour. I would therefore hold that the State Government has correctly held that the order of the RC and EO was not an order envisaged by Sub-section (2) of Section 7. 6. On that date the Petitioner was not competent to make a contract creating a tenancy in his favour. I would therefore hold that the State Government has correctly held that the order of the RC and EO was not an order envisaged by Sub-section (2) of Section 7. 6. It has been urged that in spite of the allotment order in favour of the Petitioner it is open to the landlord to enter into a contract of tenancy with the Petitioner's guardian for the benefit of the Petitioner. I do not think that that is possible. The District Magistrate's direction to the landlord is that the accommodation should be let to the Petitioner. The landlord is bound by that direction and he could not let out the accommodation in the name of any person other than the Petitioner. It may be noted that the contravention of the order of the District Magistrate is made punishable under the Act. 7. Sri Kacker referred me to certain decisions, where in it has been held that a person could enforce a contract notwithstanding that he was a minor when he entered into that contract and he has relied upon those decisions for his submission that a direction to the landlord to lei an accommodation to a minor need not be necessarily against the intendment of the Act. Decisions relating to the enforcement of a minor's right flowing from a contract cannot, to my mind be extended to a case where a minor is sought to be made liable on his contract. Here the liability to pay rent is an obligation flowing from the order of allotment and the minor would be liable to pay the rent. It seems to me that the landlord cannot sue the minor for arrears of rent in a court of law on the strength of a contract entered into by the minor with him. That being so, I do not think that the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 7 envisage the passing of an order of allotment in favour of a person who is a minor. 8. As a result of the foregoing discussion the petition is liable to be dismissed. I accordingly dismiss the petition. I think that in the circumstances of this case the parties should bear their own costs.