Judgment :- 1. This revision is directed against the order of the Executive First Class Magistrate of Trichur in M.C. 14/60 purporting to have been passed under S.144, Crl. P.C. On 20-3-1960, the Executive First Class Magistrate passed the following order: "Whereas, I, Zacharia Mathew, Executive First Class Magistrate, Trichur, feel that a situation likely to create breach of peace exists in the Arthat Simhasana Church, I hereby order that village officer, Kunnamkulam is appointed as Receiver of the five boxes kept in the church till the matter is disposed of by a competent court. I also order that the box near the tomb, which has been removed by the trustee, is placed back. The keys of the five boxes should immediately be handed over to the Receiver. No additional box is allowed to be placed inside the church and its premises." 2. On receipt of this notice, the parties appeared in court and on 28-3-1960 the First Class Magistrate purporting to act under S.144 (4) passed another order which is now sought to be revised.. That order directed the receiver to hand over the five boxes to Mar Sevarios Metropolitan of the Cochin Diocese of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church and directed the key to be handed over to the revision petitioner from whom the receiver had taken it. 3. The first point that is raised before me is that the two orders passed by the First Class Magistrate are illegal, without jurisdiction and not warranted by the provisions of S.144, Crl. P.C. The portions of the order that is challenged are the directions in the order appointing the Receiver and asking him to take charge of the boxes and the direction in the final order to hand over the boxes to Mar Sevarios Metropolitan. On a perusal of S.144, Crl. P.C., there is not the slightest doubt that the direction appointing a Receiver and taking charge of the boxes was without jurisdiction. The power of the Magistrate under S.144 extends to the issue of a direction in the proper circumstances to any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management. The Magistrate has not been invested with the power either to attach the property as in the case of proceedings under S.145, Crl. P.C., or to appoint a Receiver. 4. The Magistrate has not been invested with the power either to attach the property as in the case of proceedings under S.145, Crl. P.C., or to appoint a Receiver. 4. If authority for the position is needed, we have the decision in an early case in Leong Mow v. Tchun Chun (12 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1044). In that case there was some dispute among the members of a church and the Magistrate purporting to pass an order under S.144, Crl. P.C., had the safe and accounts removed to the custody of the court. It was held that taking custody of the boxes by the court was wholly., without jurisdiction. This was followed by the Madras High Court in the case in Bhaganathi Servai v. Valayee (33 Indian Cases 830). There the court acting under S.144, Crl. P.C. ordered the Village Munsiff to be in possession of the property. It was held that the section only enabled the Magistrate to direct a party to the proceedings to do or abstain from doing a certain act regarding the subject-matter of the dispute and that the courts had no right to direct the Village Munsiff to take possession of the property, and the Village Munsiff was directed to restore the properties back to the parties from whom the properties were taken into custody. 5. In Indrasan Rai v. Enayat Khan (A.I.R.1952 Patna 316) the question arose whether the Sub-Divisional Officer acting under S.144, Crl. P.C., had the right to order the seizure of a truck and the handing it over to the opposite party. It Was held that: "the Magistrate acting under S.144, Crl. P. C., had no authority to seize the truck in question and take away the truck from the custody of the petitioner to the police station... or to anywhere else. No person can be deprived of the possession of his property except in accordance with law and there was no provision contained in S.144, Crl. P. C., had no authority to seize the truck in question and take away the truck from the custody of the petitioner to the police station... or to anywhere else. No person can be deprived of the possession of his property except in accordance with law and there was no provision contained in S.144, Crl. P. C. or in any other law authorising the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate to act in the manner he did on the facts before him.' It was also held that: "removing the truck from the custody of the petitioner was bad enough, but what was still worse was to have decided the question of title by holding in express terms that the truck belonged to the opposite party and then delivering the vehicle to the opposite party. This amounts to an usurpation of jurisdiction which did not exist and the learned Magistrate should have known before long that under S.144, Crl. P.C., a merely summary power is given to prevent breach of the peace and it is never meant to give jurisdiction to a criminal court to decide finally even the question of possession and much less to decide questions of title and ownership of a property," 6. In Hafizuddia v. Laborde (A.I.R.1928 All. 14), Iqbal Ahamad, J., observed as follows: "These provisions show that the scope of the section is very limited, and the powers vested in the Magistrate by that section ought to be sparingly exercised. The section was never intended to vest a Magistrate with powers to decide disputes of a civil nature between private individuals and to usurp the functions of a civil court. Civil courts and civil courts alone have been vested by the Legislature with jurisdiction to decide disputes of a civil nature between private individuals and it is not permissible for a Magistrate under cover of an order under S.144, to dispossess a particular individual from certain property and to direct delivery of possession of that property by an order under S.144, when the object of the order is not to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury, etc., to "any person lawfully employed." 7. It is significant to note that S.144, Crl. P. C. provides that the order is to remain in force only for a period of two months. It is significant to note that S.144, Crl. P. C. provides that the order is to remain in force only for a period of two months. This means, that the order must not be in its nature irrevocable, and must be such that can be recalled on the expiry of two months. In the present case the order passed by the learned Magistrate directing the delivery of the boxes to Mar Sevarios Metropolitan was unlimited in matter of time and in my opinion the learned Magistrate was not competent to pass such an order. The order is also defective, because the order under S.144, Crl. P.C., should be addressed to a definite person and it should be addressed to a party to the proceedings and not to a third party. 8. Another objection that has been taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the jurisdiction conferred by sub-section 4 to S.144, Crl. P.C. is only to rescind or alter the original order and not to substitute an entirely new order. Here in this case what the Magistrate has done is not only to cancel the previous order of appointing a Receiver, but he has passed a fresh order directing the handing over of the boxes so taken to a third party. The order of the Executive First Class Magistrate is vitiated on this ground also. It will always be open to the Executive First Class Magistrate when occasion arises and when conditions requisite for taking action under the Section are satisfied to pass appropriate orders directing any person to abstain from certain acts or to take orders with respect to the property. 9. I should not be understood to have expressed any opinion regarding the merits of the claims of the different parties to the possession of the boxes. I am told a civil suit is pending in respect of the properties of the church including these boxes. It would be for that court to pass appropriate orders in respect of these boxes, if so desired by the parties to the suit. 10. Ordinarily when the order of the Magistrate has spent itself or in other words the two months' period has elapsed at the time of the revision, the High Court will not interfere in revision. It would be for that court to pass appropriate orders in respect of these boxes, if so desired by the parties to the suit. 10. Ordinarily when the order of the Magistrate has spent itself or in other words the two months' period has elapsed at the time of the revision, the High Court will not interfere in revision. But in exceptional cases like this, involving questions of jurisdiction, the High Court has certainly the power to interfere and pass appropriate orders even if the period of the order has expired. In the result the revision petition is allowed and the order of the Executive First Class Magistrate is set aside. Allowed.