Judgment.- This appeal is against the order of remand passed by the District Judge of West Tanjore in A.S. No. 205 of 1959 directing O.S. No. 437 of 1958 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court of Pattukottai to be disposed of on its merits. The defendant is the appellant. One Karuppa Konar owned certain agricultural lands in Vathalaikadu village in the Tanjore District. The village was originally part of an inam estate and was notified and taken over by the Government under the provisions of Act XXVI of 1948. Karuppa Konar died in 1948 leaving behind him his second wife Chellayee and six daughters through his pre-deceased first wife. On 7th January, 1955, Chellayee purported to execute a sale of the suit lands in favour of the respondent, who, on the strength thereof, instituted a suit for declaration of his title and for recovery of possession of the same from the appellant. The latter contested the claim stating that Karuppa Konar had even during his lifetime effected a partition of the suit property amongst the six daughters and that two of them had subsequently created an usufructuary mortgage in his favour which entitled him to remain in possession thereof. The appellant also relied on the circumstance that subsequent to the notification his mortgagor was granted a ryotwari patta in respect of the suit lands. The plea of the defendant was really two-fold: first, that by virtue of the grant of the patta and even otherwise his mortgagor had superior title to the properties, superior to that of the respondent, and second that as patta had been granted under the provisions of the Abolition Act in favour of his mortgagor, the Civil Court would have no further jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Amongst the several issues that were framed in the suit, issue 5 was “whether the suit was barred by Act XXVI of 1948 ?” That issue was tried as a preliminary issue by the learned District Munsif and he held that, on the notification of the estate the title of Chellayee, if any, had become extinguished and the appellant’s predecessor-in-title having received a patta in respect of the suit lands would have superior title. On that findings the suit was dismissed. The respondent took the matter on appeal. On that findings the suit was dismissed. The respondent took the matter on appeal. The learned District Judge held that the mere fact that the daughters obtained a ryotwari patta under the provisions of section 11 of the Abolition Act could not conclusively show that they had title to the property, that that question could be determined only after a proper adjudication of the antecedent title of the rival claimants and that in the circumstances the dismissal of the suit on the preliminary point could not be sustained. In that view, the appellate Court set aside the dismissal of the suit and directed its disposal on its merits. The present appeal contests the correctness of the conclusions arrived at by the learned District Judge. It is contended for the appellant that, on the abolition of an estate under section 3 of Act XXVI of 1948,the title of all persons interested in the lands situate in the village, namely, the Zamindar or Inamdar and also of the ryots, would be extinguished and the entire property having vested in the Government, it could grant patta to whomsoever it chose and that no other person except the one to whom the patta was given, could have any title to the land covered therein. On that assumption it was urged that the appellant deriving title as he did from the pattadar would have superior right to the property. There is an obvious fallacy underlying the contention. Madras Act XXVI of 1948 was enacted for the acquisition of the rights of the landholders of certain estates in order to introduce the ryotwari tenure in the place of the pre-existing Zamindari or Inam tenure. Section 3 (a) and (b) provide that on notification the entire estate, freed from encumbrances, shall stand transferred to the Government and that rights and interests created in or over the estate shall cease and be determined. Clause (c) states that no person shall be entitled to any rights and privileges except those recognised and conferred by the Act. Sections 24 to 37 provide for the determination of the compensation payable to erstwhile landholder. Clause (c) states that no person shall be entitled to any rights and privileges except those recognised and conferred by the Act. Sections 24 to 37 provide for the determination of the compensation payable to erstwhile landholder. They show clearly that the compensation is calculated only on the basis of the rent collected by the Zamindar or Inamdar from the ryots ; there is no provision made for the payment of compensation in respect of the pannai or private land of the landholder or for the kudiwaram lands for the ryots. The reason is that under the Act the landholder would obtain patta for his pannai or private land and the ryot would obtain patta for the ryoti lands in his occupation. Indeed, the Proviso to section 3 (d) states that the Government shall not even dispossess any person of the land in which prima facie he would be entitled to patta. Sections 11 to 14 provide for the grant of ryotwari patta to the ryot and to the landholder, the former in respect of the ryoti land and the latter in respect of the private land. Section 11 states that every ryot in an estate is entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of all ryoti lands which immediately before the notified date were properly included or ought to have been included in his holding excepting certain category of lands specified in the section.. Section 12 declares the right of the landholder in a Zamindari to obtain ryotwari pattain respect of private lands other than those specified in clause (b) thereof. Section 13 makes similar provisions for a landholder in an inam estate. Section 14 deals with the case of an under tenure estate. These provisions cannot be understood as implying that the kudiwaram interest in the ryoti land is kept intact any more than the private lands could be held to remain with the landlord as such after the abolition. The kudiwaram right and the right to private lands are all incidents of a tenure which had been expressly abolished by the Act. In the place of the old system the ryotwari system has come into being. It will therefore be incorrect to say that the kudiwaram still vested in the ryot and the effect of the grant of patta is only to add to or augment the rights already held. In the place of the old system the ryotwari system has come into being. It will therefore be incorrect to say that the kudiwaram still vested in the ryot and the effect of the grant of patta is only to add to or augment the rights already held. What the Act intended to do was to effect a conversion of the erstwhile Zamindari and inam estates into ryotwari system of tenure. The features of ryotwari system are too well known to require recapitulation. Recently I had occasion to consider the features of that system in two cases, viz., Gopalan v. State of Madras1, and Rajagopalachariar v. State of Madras2 . Shortly stated, the ryotwari system was conceived as a system of land revenue administration without the aid of middleman. A ryotwari pattadar is treated as the proprietor he being made to pay the assessment directly to the Government. The assessments are fixed periodically. There has been some controversy as to whether such assessments should be held to partake the character of a rent or were really in the nature of a tax. The preponderance of authority is now in favour of the view that the assessments are in the nature of taxes. The effect of sections 11 to 14 is to declare that the ryots in the quondam estate as well as the Zamindar or inamdar as the case may be, would be respectively entitled to patta in respect of the kudiwaram or pannai lands. Section 11 read with section 3 (d), Proviso 1 would show that the ryotwari patta in respect of ryoti lands would be granted to the ryot by the Settlement Officer. There is no provision in section 11 for the ascertainment of even the character of the land. Nor is there any machinery to decide whenever a dispute arises between the rival claimants for the patta. Section 15 however provides for the examination of the nature and history of the private or pannai land in respect of which the landholder would be entitled to a ryotwari patta under the provisions of sections 12 to 14. There is also a provision for appeal and for the finality of the decision in the appeal in respect of that matter. There is also a provision for appeal and for the finality of the decision in the appeal in respect of that matter. It may be noticed that under section 15 it is only the nature and character of the and that has got to be decided by the special machinery created by the Act. Patta would be given to the landholder if the land is of the category mentioned in sections 12 to 14. But if there are rival claims to the title of the landholder himself there would be no power in the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal to adjudicate as to who among them would have a preferential right. This is more so in a case under section 11 where no question of any decision at all can arise. There is no provision for any adjudication amongst the rival claimants to patta in respect of a particular land. It would therefore follow that the statute having declared that the erstwhile ryot (that is the ryot lawfully entitled to be in possession of the holding) would be entitled to patta and not having designated a Tribunal or machinery to decide as to who amongst the several claimants would be entitled to patta, the dispute if and when it arises will have necessarily to be decided by the civil Court. Now is there anything in the nature of the patta itself to show that it conferred title. Under the Estates Land Act the patta granted by a landholder to a ryot contains the names of parties, the description and extent of land held by the ryot, the amount and nature of rent, tax, cesses, fees, etc., payable with the rent and certain other terms. The counter-part executed by the ryot is known as the muchilika. They in substance specify the engagement between the landholder and the ryot. A ryotwari patta is however different. It is nothing more than a mere bill for the assessment made by the Government. There is no question of any counterpart for it. It is not a grant or conveyance. The counter-part executed by the ryot is known as the muchilika. They in substance specify the engagement between the landholder and the ryot. A ryotwari patta is however different. It is nothing more than a mere bill for the assessment made by the Government. There is no question of any counterpart for it. It is not a grant or conveyance. In The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Kasturi Reddi1, Bhashyam Ayyangar, J, observed at page 272: “A reference to the form and wording of a patta will show that as correctly characterised by the District Judge, it is in the nature of a mere bill and is not nor does it purport to be in the nature of a grant or conveyance.” This view was accepted in Muthu Veera Vandayan v. The Secretary of State for India in Council2, and Secretary for State v. Raghavachariar3. In The Official Assignee of Madras v. Badri Narayan Doss2, it was held that a ryotwari patta was a document of title, but not a title deed. Srinivasa Ayyangar, J., observed at page 457: “I use the words ‘documents of title' and not ‘title-deed' because it may be mat there is some plausible distinction between the two expressions.” It will follow that the mere fact that a ryotwari patta stands in the name of a particular individual cannot show that he was the grantee of the land. As the object of the Abolition Act is only to introduce the ryotwari system by granting patta to the ryots in respect of the erstwhile ryoti lands and to landholders in respect of their private lands, the patta granted under sections 11 to 14 cannot be anything more than a ryotwari patta of the kind mentioned by Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. in The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Kasturi Reddi1. Not being thus a grant it cannot by itself confer any title. The Abolition Act as originally enacted contained section 56 which conferred in terms a power to decide any dispute as to who the lawful ryot of a holding is. Sub-section (2) provided for an appeal from such a decision. Not being thus a grant it cannot by itself confer any title. The Abolition Act as originally enacted contained section 56 which conferred in terms a power to decide any dispute as to who the lawful ryot of a holding is. Sub-section (2) provided for an appeal from such a decision. If that provision were still to exist, it can be said that as the question whether the person was the lawful ryot or not was one to be decided by the Settlement Officer, the issue of ryotwari patta by him presumably after such decision could not be challenged in a civil Court ; to that extent there would be an ouster of the jurisdiction of the civil Court. But section 56 (1) has been repealed by Act XXXIV of 1958. There is now no machinery to decide the case of a disputed claim to patta. Thus, if a ryot is entitled to the ryoti land before the notification, he would by virtue of that right be entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta. There is nothing in the procedure to be adopted for the grant of patta under section 11, to justify an adjudication of title. Nor is there anything in the nature of the patta itself to show that there must have been an adjudication of title in favour of the pattadar. It is a familiar rule that the evidentiary value of a patta is in regard to the possession of the land and not in regard to the title. To hold otherwise will lead to inconvenient results. Take a case where some years before the notification of an estate a trespasser got into possession of a ryoti land and continued to be in such possession on the date of the notification. The lawful ryot who had been dispossessed for six years could not possibly obtain the patta, because the Settlement Officer would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate on his title. The trespasser might get patta as the person in possession. As section 11 declares that the lawful ryot would alone be entitled to the patta, it must be held that it would be open to the aggrieved party to get the matter adjudicated in a civil Court notwithstanding the fact that ryotwari patta has been granted under the provisions of section 11. As section 11 declares that the lawful ryot would alone be entitled to the patta, it must be held that it would be open to the aggrieved party to get the matter adjudicated in a civil Court notwithstanding the fact that ryotwari patta has been granted under the provisions of section 11. If the Civil Court in such a suit gives a declaration as to who is the party that will be entitled to the rights created under section 11, it will be the duty of the Government to cancel the previous patta issued to the trespasser and grant it to the real ryot. Learned counsel for the appellant seeks to derive support for his argument in certain observations of mine in Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan2, in that case a suit was filed for recovery of possession of a ryoti land in an estate on the ground that the defendant had trespassed into the same. The defendants pleaded that as the estate had been notified and taken over by the Government under Act XXVI of 1948, the plaintiff would no longer have title to sustain the suit. The precise question for determination in that case was whether having regard to section 56 (which had not been repealed by then) the suit for possession of a ryoti land in a notified estate could be entertained by a civil Court. That question was answered in the affirmative. The view taken in that case was approved by a Bench in Adakalathammal v. Chinnayan Panipundar3. In the course of the judgment in the former case, I had to deal with the question whether irrespective of any question of title, the plaintiff could base his title on his antecedent possessory title. During the course of the discussion the following observations occur: “It may be that during the course of the suit if the defendant is able to obtain the patta from the authorities he can produce that patta as an answer to the plaintiff’s claim that he has got superior title against whom a decree for possession cannot be granted.” That is but an illustration of the familiar rule of law that mere possessory title would avail against the rest of the world except the true owner. Having regard to the provisions of section 56, the holder of a patta was deemed to be the owner. Having regard to the provisions of section 56, the holder of a patta was deemed to be the owner. Those observations should not be understood as laying down that even after the repeal of section 56 the grant of a patta under section 11 would be conclusive on the question of title in respect of the land referred to therein. This matter is made clear in Adakalathammal v. Chinnayan Panipundar1, where the learned Chief Justice after referring to the repeal of section 56 observed: “Henceforward the question has really become academic because with the disappearance of section 56 there can be no basis for the plea that the jurisdiction of the civil Court has been ousted.” It is unnecessary to refer to the decision in State of Madras v. Karuppiah Ambalam2, which concerned the right of a ryot to contest a survey conducted under the Abolition Act. That decision was also rendered with reference to section 56. The result is that under the Abolition Act a statutory right is created in favour of the ryot in respect of the erstwhile ryoti land in the landlord in respect of the private lands. There is no machinery for adjudicating the question as to who amongst the rival claimants (if there be rival claimants) should be given the patta, although the statute specifically says that the patta should be given to the lawful ryot under section 11 and to the landholder under sections 12 to 14. In Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan3, I referred to the judgment of Willes, J., in Wolverhampton New Water Works Co. v. Hawkesford4, and extracted the follwing passage: “There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. One is where there was a liability existing at Common Law and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at Common Law ; there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude the Common Law remedy, the party suing has his election to pursue either that of the statutory remedy. The second class of case is where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy. There, the party can only proceed by action at Common Law. The second class of case is where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy. There, the party can only proceed by action at Common Law. But there is a third class, viz., where the liability not existing at Common Law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. The remedy provided by the statute must be followed and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class.” If the Abolition Act provided a machinery for the adjudication of such disputes as under section 56 (since repealed) there would be no doubt that the third rule in the above passage would apply and the remedy of the party would only be to pursue the course prescribed by the statute. But if there is no such machinery provided by the statute the case will come under the second category of cases specified in the above passage. In such a case an action in a civil Court will lie. It follows that it will be competent for a civil Court to adjudicate the rival claims to title of the erstwhile ryoti land in a notified estate notwithstanding the fact that the Settlement Officer had granted patta under section 11 to one of the contesting parties or even to a stranger. I am therefore of opinion that the view taken by the learned District Judge is the correct one and that the order of remand passed by him cannot be assailed. The appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Leave refused. R.M. ------------- Appeal dismissed.