JUDGMENT M.A. Ansari, C.J. 1. The appellant is the writ petitioner, whose prayer for vacating the refusal by the Land Acquisition Officer to refer under S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act, has been disallowed by a learned Judge of this Court. The appellant and her sister owned T. S. No. 92/6, Block 4, Ward 10, within the Calicut Municipality which had been acquired and the sister is alleged to have relinquished her share of the compensation in appellant's favour. The award had assessed the compensation at Rs. 77-1-6 on November 10, 1956, the notice under S.12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, hereafter referred to as the Act, appears to have been served on the appellant on November 23, 1956, and the application to refer under S.18 of the Act, is stated to have been received on January 5, 1957. The learned Judge has held these dates to be correct, the appellant not entitled to deduct the period spent for getting the certified copy of the award, and the application to refer to be barred by limitation. The appellant has also taken the position that the notice was not served on her personally on November 23, 1956, and she got it from another on November 24, 1956. 2. The argument that the appellant is entitled to deduct from the period of limitation the time spent for getting the certified copy of the award, has not been accepted by the learned Judge; and we agree with his conclusion about the appellant not being entitled to any such benefit. It is not disputed that the application for the reference to the Court should be within six weeks of the receipt of the notice, or within six months of the award, whichever expires earlier; and because of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, certain Sections of the Limitation Act would be applicable including S.3. It follows that because of S.3 of the Limitation Act, the authority asked to refer is bound to dismiss the application, should it be beyond the Limitation mentioned in the Schedule; and, under S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, the special periods under special Acts have been made part of the Schedule. It follows that because of S.3 of the Limitation Act, the authority asked to refer is bound to dismiss the application, should it be beyond the Limitation mentioned in the Schedule; and, under S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, the special periods under special Acts have been made part of the Schedule. The appellant claims that in computing the period of six weeks, the time spent for getting the certified copy of the award should be excluded, for S.12 of the Limitation Act has also been applied to period fixed for limitation under special Acts. But we find that the appellant cannot be given the benefit of any of the several sub-sections. S.12(4) is the only provision that may be urged to be relevant, and in Burjorjee v. Special Collector, Rangoon (AIR 1926 Rangoon 135), it has been held to cover an application for reference under the Act. That view has not been, followed by other High Courts, and it is now settled that the words "to set aside an award" cannot be interpreted so as to cover applications to refer awards to the court under the Act. The learned judge was, therefore, right, and we respectfully agree with him that the argument for excluding the time spent for obtaining certified copy of the award from the period allowed under the Act, cannot be allowed. 3. The appellant has also claimed that the notice reached her not on November 23, 1956, but on November 24, 1956, and the application would be within time, should this part of her case be true. Now it is not disputed that the decision to order the reference or to reject the application on the ground of limitation, must be of the Officer who has made the award; bat in this case that is not proved. We have scrutinised the counter as well as the personal Register on which the averments In the counter are based; for, the officer, who made the award, was not occupying the office when the counter to the writ was filed in this court. We have scrutinised the counter as well as the personal Register on which the averments In the counter are based; for, the officer, who made the award, was not occupying the office when the counter to the writ was filed in this court. The relevant part of the counter reads thus:-- "The Personal Register for the year 1957 of the respondent shows that on 5-1-1957 an application by way of objection to the award and reference to the court under S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act regarding T. S. 92/6 was received; and that the same was submitted by the clerk on 10-1-1957, that the same came back to him with the orders of the Tahsildar on 11-1-1957, that it was re-submitted with the endorsement to the Tahsildar on 12-1-1957 to the effect that the application is returned to the applicant through the Advocate Shri T. P. Aravindakshan and that the Tahsildar directed the return of the application as per the terms of the endorsement, his further shown from the local delivery book which will be produced at the time of the hearing of this O. P., that once over N. Dis. 11/57 was delivered to Shri. T. P. Aravindakshan, Advocate, Kozhikode, on 17-1-1957 and that the receipt of the cover was acknowledged by him on that date". In order to clarify the position, we requested the Government Pleader to produce the Personal Register, and he has stated today that the aforesaid Register does not show the application being rejected on the ground of limitation. We are not satisfied that the order directing the return of the application, was a conscious judical direction by the Land Acquisition Officer on the ground of limitation, and not a bare endorsement by him of what was put up by his office. It is also not clear why the order of returning the application should be made, when the application could have been rejected on the ground of limitation. The Advocate has also filed an affidavit before us denying his having received the application. We arc satisfied that the records in the case do not disclose exercise by the Officer himself of the statutory power vested in him, and must, therefore, be treated as not amounting to exercise of such power. The Advocate has also filed an affidavit before us denying his having received the application. We arc satisfied that the records in the case do not disclose exercise by the Officer himself of the statutory power vested in him, and must, therefore, be treated as not amounting to exercise of such power. Therefore, he is directed to do so, and it is but fair that the appellant must have a fair opportunity of showing that the notice to her was not received on the day the notice is shown to have been served. As the decision of the Land Acquisition Officer is final, he should fairly decide the issue, and should reconstruct the record by asking for copy of the application. The appeal is allowed with the direction to the respondent to decide afresh the request for reference of the award to the court, after giving the appellant a fair opportunity of showing that the notice was not served on her. It must be taken as established in the case that the application was received on January 5, 1957, as shown by the Register. The appeal is accordingly allowed and so is the writ petition. Parties will bear their costs.