JUDGMENT James, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of Habeas Corpus by Naik Ram Pandey, a student of the University of Allahabad and is directed against the District Magistrate of Allahabad and the Superintendent of the Central Jail, Naini. Criminal Miscellaneous Cases No. 53 and 54 or 1960, respectively by Rama Shankar Singh and Raj Kishore Singh, two other, students of the University are similar petitions and are based on the same facts. The present judgment shall govern them all. 2. In appears that the peace of the town of Allahabad had been seriously disturbed by acts of hooliganism allegedly committed by some students of the University and accordingly the authorities decided to close the University sine die with effect from the night between the 12th and 13th December 1959. Affidavits filed and papers produced before us disclose the following. On the 12th December: shortly before the actual closure of the University the Station Officer of police circle Colonelganj, within whose territorial jurisdiction lies the campus of the University, submitted a report against eleven students for action u/s 107 Code of Criminal Procedure. In this report, after reciting the alleged unlawful activities of these students, the Station Officer stated that the authorities were being obliged to close the University on account of which there was grave apprehension of breach of public Pease in the town and danger to the life and property of the University authorities; he requested for action u/s 107 Code of Criminal Procedure and also recommended that the students in question be arrested at once and bound aver u/s 117 Code of Criminal Procedure. On receipt of this report the City Magistrate the same day passed three orders under the provisions of the Code: first, an order u/s 112 read with Section 107 calling upon each of the eleven students to show cause why he should not be made to execute a personal bond of Rs. On receipt of this report the City Magistrate the same day passed three orders under the provisions of the Code: first, an order u/s 112 read with Section 107 calling upon each of the eleven students to show cause why he should not be made to execute a personal bond of Rs. 1,000/- and two 'reliable sureties each in like amount for keeping the peace' for a period of two months; second, an order u/s 117(3) stating that he (the City Magistrate) was satisfied that t was necessary to take immediate measures for the prevention of breach of peace and directing each of the eleven students to give similar security for maintaining peace and public tranquility for the pendency of the enquiry before him, adding that in default of furnishing the required security the person concerned would be taken in custody and detained until such time as the security was furnished or the enquiry completed (whichever was earlier); third, an order u/s 114 stating that there was reason to fear that the eleven students concerned were likely to commit breach of peace forthwith and that such breach could not be prevented otherwise than by their immediate arrest and consequently directing the issue of warrants for their immediate arrest, together with copies of the Station Officer's report and the notices u/s 107/112 and 117(3). 3. The necessary warrants were immediately issued and nine of the eleven students were arrested from their places of residence during the night between the 12th and 13th December. In the early hours of the 13th December they, along with the City Magistrate's warrants and his first two orders, were produced at the Allahabad Kotwali before Mr. J.P. Singhal, a first class Magistrate, who was one of the officers posted at various points of the town for dealing with the apprehended disturbances occasioned by the closure of the University. The warrants were in the form prescribed by the High Court u/s 344 of the Code and mentioned the "offence" as "Section 107/117 Code of Criminal Procedure". On their back the period of remand was given as "13-12-1959 to 27-12-1959", but Mr. Singhal crossed out "27" and substituted it by "14"; that is to say, instead of granting a remand for fourteen days he allowed it for only one day. On their back the period of remand was given as "13-12-1959 to 27-12-1959", but Mr. Singhal crossed out "27" and substituted it by "14"; that is to say, instead of granting a remand for fourteen days he allowed it for only one day. The nine arrested students were sent to the Central Jail, Naini and on the authority of the warrants aforesaid admitted there. Next day, the 14th Dec, the City Magistrate personally went to the jail and read and explained his two orders made u/s 107/112 and Section 117(3) to the arrested students, gave them copies of both these orders as well as a copy of the report of the Station Officer and granted them a remand up to the 28th December. Each student signed the order-sheet of that day. Fourteen-day remands have been granted subsequently. 4. Now one of the arrested students, Prabhakar Nath Dwivedi by name, on the 18th December 1959 filed petition No. 2762 of 1959 (1) for Habeas Corpus contending that his detention in the Naini Jail was illegal. The petition was heard by a Bench composed of Roy and Uniyal, JJ. On behalf of Prabhakar two arguments were advanced before their Lordships: first, that there had been an infringement of Article 22(2) of the Constitution inasmuch as when he was produced at the Kotwali before Mr. Singhal the latter was not functioning as a Court, so that the constitutional rule for production before the Court of the nearest Magistrate within twenty-four hours had been violated; second that the City Magistrate's order u/s 117(3) of the Code dated the 12th December 1959 was an invalid one. By their judgment dated the 23rd December 1959 their Lordships repelled the first argument but accepted the second and accordingly directed Prabhakar to be set at liberty. Then oh the 31st December another student, Islam Beg Changezi, moved petition No. 2858 of 1959 for Habeas Corpus urging the same grounds as Prabhakar. His petition was heard by the same Bench and by a judgment dated the 5th January 1960 his release ordered. 5. The present petition by Naik Ram Pandey was instituted on the 7th January 1960, as was also the case with the petitions by Rama Shankar Singh and Raj Kishore Singh. Their learned Counsel Mr. His petition was heard by the same Bench and by a judgment dated the 5th January 1960 his release ordered. 5. The present petition by Naik Ram Pandey was instituted on the 7th January 1960, as was also the case with the petitions by Rama Shankar Singh and Raj Kishore Singh. Their learned Counsel Mr. Asif Ansari has before us raised the same two points as were raised on behalf of Prabhakar Nath and Islam Beg-before the other Bench. 6. In pressing his first point, namely, that the fundamental right under Article 22(2) of the Constitution has been infringed, Mr. Ansari argues that the constitutional provision in question requires production before the Court of a Magistrate but that in the present instance Mr. Singhal was not holding Court but was posted at the Kotwali purely in his executive capacity, so that there was no production within twenty-four house before the Court of a Magistrate. Mr. Ansari concedes that this point was decided against him by Roy and Uniyal JJ. in the two earlier cases, but he submits that their view requires reconsideration. After having heard him at considerable length we find ourselves, if we may say so with respect, in complete agreement with their Lordships. We agree that in Article 22 of the Constitution, as well as in Section 61 of the Code, the terms "Magistrate" and "Court of a Magistrate" are interchangeable ones and mean the same thing We assent to the proposition that under to scheme of the Code a Magistrate discharges types of functions, namely judicial, quasi-judicial and executive. We concur with the view that when Mr. Singhal was posted at the Kotwali his primary duty was to quell any disturbance that might arise, that is to discharge an executive function. Nevertheless, we repudiate the theory that when the Petitioner, along with the City Magistrate's orders and the warrant, was produced before him and he had to consider the question of granting a remand, he did not exercise judicial functions, i.e., act as a Court. 7. Relying of the decision in S.K. Gupta v. Superintendent District Jail 1957 AWR 14 , Mr. Ansari argues that Section 167 of the Code does not apply to proceedings u/s 107 inasmuch as the Defendant in such proceedings is not charged with any criminal offence, hence in considering the question of remand Mr. Singhal did not act as a Court. Relying of the decision in S.K. Gupta v. Superintendent District Jail 1957 AWR 14 , Mr. Ansari argues that Section 167 of the Code does not apply to proceedings u/s 107 inasmuch as the Defendant in such proceedings is not charged with any criminal offence, hence in considering the question of remand Mr. Singhal did not act as a Court. In the first place, with great respect to the Bench which decided SK Gupta's case we doubt the correctness of the view that Section 167 does not apply to proceeds sings u/s 107; our doubt is grounded on the manner in which Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 167 are found worded: Clause (1) refers to any person who is arrested and detained in custody and would therefore include a person who has been arrested in connection with security proceedings under Clause. VIII of the Code, while Clause (2) mentions any accused person, namely, a person charged with a substantive offence. Reading both the Clauses together as in our opinion they must be read it becomes difficult to resist the conclusion that Section 167 is designed to apply both to persons arrested for security proceedings and for a substantive offence. But we wish to make it clear that we should not be understood to be recording any definite declassing on this point, since for purposes of the instant case such a declassing is not necessary. Whatever may be the true interpretation of Section 167, we have the authority of the Division Bench, decision in Vasu Deo Ojha and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, AIR 1958 All 578 , that by virtue of the Proviso to Clause (IA) to Section 344 a remand order under the latter section can be passed in Section 107 proceedings also and in this connection it will be recalled that the warrants before Mr. Singhal were on the form prescribed u/s 344. In these Circumstances it is hardly open to dispute that in considering the question of remand the Magistrate acts judicially all that is necessary on his part is, as held in S.S.H. Saraswati v. Jailor 1954 ALJ 355 and Bir Bhadra Pratap Singh Vs. D.M. Azamgarh and Others, AIR 1959 All 384 , that he must apply his mind to the facts of the case. That in the case before is Mr. D.M. Azamgarh and Others, AIR 1959 All 384 , that he must apply his mind to the facts of the case. That in the case before is Mr. Singhal did apply his judicial mind is established by the facts that he considered the orders passed by the City Magistrate and what is more, that instead of granting a remand up to the 27th December (as desired by the police) granted it only up to the 14th. Consequently he must be held to have acted properly as a Court. 8. Mr. Ansari says that no one can be expected to have been acting as a Court in the early hours of the morning and he has brought to our notice a Government order by which 10-30 a.m. to 4-30 p.m. has been fixed as the period for Magistrates to hold their Court. Surely, Mr. Ansari treads on dangerous ground if he means that by virtue of Article 22(2) of the Constitution the arrested person can be produced before a Magistrate only between the hours of 10-30 a.m. and 4-30 pm and that too on a Court working-day, for he ignores that this would imply that no production would be valid before 10-30 a.m. or after 4-30 p.m. on a working-day or at any t me on a Court holiday whenever a Court holiday-supervenes production within twenty four hours would be a physical impossibility and consequently a, total violation of Article 22(2). In The State of Punjab Vs. Ajaib Singh and Another, AIR 1953 SC 10 , the Supreme Court have emphasised that no construction of the Constitution should be adopted which would lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or make well-established provisions of existing law nugatory. Mr. Ansari does not appear to have realised that he is asking us to do what the Supreme Court forbids. The fact of the matter is that the function which a Magistrate discharges at any point of time is governed entirely by the nature of that function and the passing of a remand order by its very nature renders the Magistrate's function a judicial one and thereby converts him into a Court. For all these reasons we are firmly of opinion that when the Petitioner was produced ' before Mr. Singhal in the early hours of the 13th December and was granted a remand, Mr. For all these reasons we are firmly of opinion that when the Petitioner was produced ' before Mr. Singhal in the early hours of the 13th December and was granted a remand, Mr. Singhal acted as a Court from which it follows that the production was in full conformity with the requirements of Article 22(2). 9. In the foregoing we have endeavored to examine Mr. Ansari's arguments at some length. Nevertheless, there is a far simpler approach to the point urged by him. Article 22(2) has no application when an arrest is made under a warrant issued by a Court. This is what has been unambiguously laid down by the Supreme Court in The State of Punjab Vs. Ajaib Singh and Another, AIR 1953 SC 10 . This Court too in the Division Bench case of it Jit Bahadur Singh Vs. The State, AIR 1953 All 753 , has held that Article 22 does not apply to an order made under Ch. VIII of the Code (which comprises Sections 106 to 126A). In The State of Punjab Vs. Ajaib Singh and Another, AIR 1953 SC 10 , case, after classifying arrests into two categories, viz., arrests under warrants issued by a Court and arrests otherwise than under such warrants, their Lordships turned to Clause (1) and (2) of Article 22 in order to ascertain-whether their protection extended to both categories of arrests and if not, then which one of them came within the protection. They ruled: The language of Article 22(1) and (2) indicates that the fundamental right conferred by it gives protection against such arrests as are effected otherwise than under a warrant issued by a Court of the allegation or accusation that the arrested person has, or is suspected to have, committed, or is about or likely to commit an it of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature or same activity prejudicial to the public or the State interest. In other words, there is indication in the language of Article 22(1) and (2) that it was designed to give protection against the act of the executive or other non-judicial authority. 10. Mr. Ansari suggests that these observations are mere obiter. We entirely disagree. The point raised was a specific issue before their Lordships and they specific it in unequivocal language. 10. Mr. Ansari suggests that these observations are mere obiter. We entirely disagree. The point raised was a specific issue before their Lordships and they specific it in unequivocal language. It is therefore the law laid down by the Supreme Court and under Article 141 binds 311 Courts in the country. Since the Petitioner's arrest was under a valid warrant issued by the City Magistrate, Article 22(2) has no application, thereby rendering it unnecessary for him to be produced within twenty-four hours before the Court of any Magistrate. His production before Mr. Singhal may be construed as necessitated by the fact that he would not have secured admittance into the jail without a warrant duly signed be a Magistrate or other Court. Mr. Ansari's argument based on Article 22(2) fails. 11. But his second argument, namely, that the City Magistrate's order u/s 117(3) passed on the 12th December 1959 was invalid and therefore the detention there under unlawful is sound and must prevail, as indeed it did in the earlier cases of Prabhakar Nath and Islam Beg. It is incontestable that u/s 117(3) it is only after the Defendants have appeared and the Magistrate has proceeded to enquire into the matter that he can direct the execution of interim bonds. In the instant case the Defendant-students appeared before the City Magistrate for the first time on the 14th December and it was then that by reading out and explaining his orders he started the enquiry. His order for interim bonds passed two days earlier on the 12th December was clearly without jurisdiction and cannot therefore justify detention. But we should like to emphasise that the infirmity in the order lies in it being passed without jurisdiction and not in any fault with regard to the Magistrate's satisfaction that it was necessary to take immediate measures for avoiding breach of the peace. 12. But that does not end the matter. It will be recalled that Prabhakar's Habeas Corpus petition was allowed on the 23rd December 1959 and Islam Beg's on the 5th January 1960 and the judgment of the Bench in those cases had made it clear that the City Magistrate's order u/s 117(3) dated the 12th December 1959 was an invalid one. But that does not end the matter. It will be recalled that Prabhakar's Habeas Corpus petition was allowed on the 23rd December 1959 and Islam Beg's on the 5th January 1960 and the judgment of the Bench in those cases had made it clear that the City Magistrate's order u/s 117(3) dated the 12th December 1959 was an invalid one. But on the 5th January the Station Officer of Colonelganj made a fresh report requesting that the arrested students be directed to furnish interim security for the maintenance of peace during the enquiry. Thereupon, on the 6th January the City Magistrate called up the persons who were still in custody and passed a fresh order u/s 117(3) of the Code demanding interim security for maintaining peace; on their failure to do so he remanded them to jail custody. 13. Against the fresh order dated the 6th January 1960 Mr. Ansari's contention is that having once passed a wrong order the City Magistrate had no authority to rectify the mistake by passing a subsequent order. The simple answer to this contention is furnished by Naranjan Singh Nathawan Vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 106 , wherein the Supreme Court have held that in Habeas Corpus proceedings the Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the date of the institution of the proceedings and that the detaining authority can supersede an earlier order challenged as illegal and make a fresh order which is free from defects and which complies with the requirements of the law. In actual fact the impugned order of the 6th January stands on a much higher footing for it had been in existence prior to the institution of these Habeas Corpus proceedings by the Petitioner and was not passed after these proceedings had commenced. Besides, Section 117(3) in terms authorises, the Magistrate to demand interim security at any time during the pendency of the enquiry. 14. Mr. Ansari has challenged the validity of the order of the 6th January on the ground that it was passed at a time when the enquiry was not pending before the City Magistrate and he bases his argument on the fact that the learned Magistrate had recorded no evidence in the case. 14. Mr. Ansari has challenged the validity of the order of the 6th January on the ground that it was passed at a time when the enquiry was not pending before the City Magistrate and he bases his argument on the fact that the learned Magistrate had recorded no evidence in the case. The argument disregards Clause (2) of Section 117, which enacts that the enquiry shall be made as nearly as may be practicable in the manner prescribed for conducting trials in summons cases, while the procedure prescribed for such cases in Section 242 is that when the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate, the particulars of the offence of which he is accused are stated to him and he is asked if he has any cause to show why he should not be convicted. Thus, the trial of a summons case starts with the particulars of the offence being stated to the accused. It follows that the enquiry u/s 117 commences when the order u/s 112 is read or explained to the Defendant. Since in the case before us this had admittedly been done as early as the 14th December the enquiry was pending before the City Magistrate when he made his order of the 6th January Consequently that order must be held to have been passed in accordance with law. 15. Since the order of the 6th January was passed after the enquiry had commenced and since this Court is not entitled to enter into the question of the City Magistrate's satisfaction that immediate measure were necessary for preventing a breach of the public peace, the order becomes unchallengeable and the detention by virtue of it lawful. 16. But there is yet another ground on which the Petitioner's detention must be held to be perfectly Kalid. This is the City Magistrate's third order of the 12th December 1959, namely, the order u/s 114 of the Code. 16. But there is yet another ground on which the Petitioner's detention must be held to be perfectly Kalid. This is the City Magistrate's third order of the 12th December 1959, namely, the order u/s 114 of the Code. The Proviso to Section 114 reads: ...whenever it appears to such Magistrate, upon the report of a police officer or upon other information (the substance of which report or information shall be recorded by the Magistrate), that there is reason to fear the commission of a breach of the peace and that such breach of the peace cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such a person, the Magistrate may at any time issue a warrant for his arrest. 17. It is under this provision of the law that the City Magistrate had on the 12th December passed his third order against the eleven students, simultaneously with the first two orders u/s 107/112 and Section 117(3) against them. His competence to pass such an order cannot be called into question. The only reply Mr. Ansari has been able to give is that his client has no knowledge of the Section 114 order and on the ground that if any such order existed it was bound to have been brought to the notice of the Bench in the case of Prabhakar Nath and Islam Beg, he has suggested, though feebly, that it must have been prepared subsequently. There is no doubt that Roy and Uniyal, JJ. were kept completely in the dark as to the order u/s 114 and we can attribute this purely to the inaptitude with which counsel for the Respondents presented their case before their Lordships. We have examined the original Section 107 Code of Criminal Procedure Court file for ourselves and as a result are fully satisfied that the Section 114 order had in fact been passed on the 12th December at the same time as the orders u/s 107/112 and Section 117(3). We have examined the original Section 107 Code of Criminal Procedure Court file for ourselves and as a result are fully satisfied that the Section 114 order had in fact been passed on the 12th December at the same time as the orders u/s 107/112 and Section 117(3). By way of proof it is necessary merely to mention that the order-sheet of the 12th December inter alia clearly mentions the passing of the order u/s 114 against all the eleven students and that just below on the same sheet is the order sheet of the 14th December which on the margin is found signed by each of the nine students (including the present Petitioner) who had been arrested by then their signatures are positive proof of the fact that the whole order-sheet is a genuine one. Had only the original file been produced before the Bench or had the City Magistrate been called upon to swear an affidavit before it, mentioning his Section 114 order, the result of the petitions of Prabhakar Nath and Islam Beg would conceivably have been different. So far as the Petitioner before us is concerned, there is a valid order u/s 114 Code of Criminal Procedure for his arrest. Since the time of his arrest 14-day remands have been allowed from time to time, the last of these being in force at the present time. His detention in the jail is therefore in conformity with-law. 18. Yet another reason for keeping him in jail has been brought to our notice. This is that he has been arrested for substantive offences under Sections 147, 307, 436 and 332 IPC and we find these offences noted on another warrant pertaining to him. But this is a subject to which no reference has been made by the parties in their respective affidavits before us, hence we decline to pass any opinion on it. 19. In the result we hold that although the Petitioner Naik Ram Pandey could not be lawfully detained on the strength of the City Magistrate's order u/s 117(3) dated the 12th December 1959, he is in valid detention by virtue of the City Magistrate's order under the Proviso to Section 114 dated the 12th December 1959 and subsequent remand orders and his order u/s 117(3) Code of Criminal Procedure dated the 6th January 1960. His petition therefore fails and must be dismissed. 20. His petition therefore fails and must be dismissed. 20. The petitions of Rama Shankar Singh and Raj Kishore Singh are based on the same facts and raise identical points. Their petitions too are dismissed. 21. We make no order as to the costs of these Petitions.