Judgment K.Sahai, J. 1. The petitioner has been convicted under Sec.228 of the Penal Code, and has been sentenced to pay fine of R.s. 200.00 or, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. 2. Mr. Ojha, a Judicial Magistrate at Jamui, was pronouncing judgment in a case just alter he sat in Court. Shri Tarni Prasad Mandal, an Advocate, appeared and started addressing the Magistrate on the subject of letter No. 672/7-3, dated 30-1-1959. sent by the District and Sessions Judge of Monghyr to Munsifs and Judicial Magistrates at Jamui, saying that certain persons were alleged to be touts and asking them to prevent those persons from doing pairvi in the premises of the Courts at Jamui. In the meantime, two lawyers pointed out the petitioner to the Magistrate, saying that he was one of the men named in the District and Sessions Judges letter. What happened thereafter may be put in the words of the Magistrate himself: "This gentleman (referring to the petitioner) was asked to quit the Court but he insisted on staying. He was warned that, if he would not quit the Court, action for its contempt would be taken. Even then he insisted on staying". 3. It is perfectly clear that the learned Magistrate was sitting in court and was doing judicial work at the time when the petitioner is alleged to have committed the offence. This has not been challenged; but the first point which Mr. Awadhesh Nandan Sahay has urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the Magistrate misunderstood the letter of the District and Sessions Judge. According to him, all that was required under that letter was to prevent persons named in it from doing pairvi and not to exclude them from being present in the court rooms altogether. He has submitted that the court room is a place where members of the public are entitled to have free access, and that the learned Magistrate passed an improper order when, he directed the petitioner to leave the Court. In my opinion, however, the learned Magistrates action was perfectly justified. He could not possibly keep his eyes upon the petitioner all the time while he was in the room so as to stop him just when he was doing any pairvi. In my opinion, however, the learned Magistrates action was perfectly justified. He could not possibly keep his eyes upon the petitioner all the time while he was in the room so as to stop him just when he was doing any pairvi. The best method of carrying out the instruction of the District and Sessions Judge was to exclude persons named in his letter from being present, in the Court room. He had power under Sec.352 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to order, if he thought fit that a particular person shall not remain in the room. In view of the statement of two lawyers made before him, he was of opinion that the petitioner was one of those named in the letter. I am satisfied, therefore, that his order to the petitioner to leave the Court was quite proper. 4. The second point which Mr. Sahay has argued is that, in order that an insult or interruption may amount to an offence under Sec.228 of the Penal Code, it must be caused intentionally. In support of this argument, he has relied upon Surendra Nath Banerjee V/s. Emperor, 4 Cal LJ 415 and Parshotam Lal V/s. The Crown, AIR 1925 Lah 210. In the former case, their Lordships have said: "The principal ingredient of an offence under Sec.228, Indian Penal Code, is intentional insult or interruption". In the latter case, a single Judge of the Lahore High Court has observed: "It has been repeatedly held that the chief ingredient of the offence contemplated by Sec.228 of the Indian Penal Code is the intention of the offender, and that the question is not whether a judicial officer felt insulted but whether an insult was actually offered and intended". 5. In my judgment, the principles laid down in the above two cases are well established and perfectly sound. The mere fact that a judicial officer feels insulted is of no consequence. The intention of the alleged offender must be looked into. If the facts and circumstances show that he intended to cause insult or interruption, his act may amount to an offence under Sec.228. If they show that he had no such intention, his act cannot be held to amount to that offence. 6. Mr. The intention of the alleged offender must be looked into. If the facts and circumstances show that he intended to cause insult or interruption, his act may amount to an offence under Sec.228. If they show that he had no such intention, his act cannot be held to amount to that offence. 6. Mr. Sahay has submitted that the likelihood is that the petitioner merely hesitated for a minute or two in obeying the order of the Magistrate and going out of the room. This must be incorrect. The Magistrates record shows that he told the petitioner to go out but he insisted upon staying, and that be gave a warning that action for contempt of Court might be taken; but the petitioner still insisted upon staying^ This must have taken a considerable time much more than a minute or two. It is also manifest that the petitioner did not merely hesitated but showed a clear intention to disobey the Magistrate and stay in the court room. Learned Counsel has urged that, even if this was so, the proper course for the Magistrate to adopt was to get the petitioner forcibly ejected from the Court room by his orderly or a police constable, instead of drawing up a proceeding for contempt of Court. I completely disagree. If the learned Magistrate had adopted the course suggested by learned Counsel there would have been an unseemly and undignified scene and a much longer and greater interruption of the proceedings of the Court. In my opinion the Magistrate rightly adopted the course of drawing up a proceeding for contempt of court. 7. Mr. Sahay has contended that, even if the petitioner disobeyed the Magistrates order, he cannot be held to have insulted or interrupted the Magistrate. He has referred to some decisions in support of this contention. In High Court Proceedings, D/-30-11-1878, No. 2047, (1870) 1 Weir 215, a defendant was ordered not to leave the court; but he went out and was found communicating with, witnesses outside. In In re Papa Naiken, (1882) 1 Weir 217, the Magistrate ordered the accused to go and stay in a place meant for stay of witnesses. The accused went to the place accordingly. Afterwards, he came into the verandah and leaned against the door for the purpose of hearing the evidence. In In re Papa Naiken, (1882) 1 Weir 217, the Magistrate ordered the accused to go and stay in a place meant for stay of witnesses. The accused went to the place accordingly. Afterwards, he came into the verandah and leaned against the door for the purpose of hearing the evidence. It was held in both these cases that an offence under Sec.228 had not been made out. In the first place, the facts of the two cases have not been given in the reports. In the second place, there is no discussion, and no reasons have been given. It is, therefore, difficult to understand the principle upon which the decisions are based. It may be that, in one case, the defendant may have gone out because he was impelled by some necessity to go and without any intention to disobey the order, and, in the other case, the accused was acting surreptitiously without any intention to defy the court. Hence, I am not prepared to apply those decisions to the facts of the present case. 8. The only other decision which Mr. Sahay has referred to is that in the case of Mahant Hakumat Rai V/s. Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 14. The facts of that case are completely different. The accused in that case was a pleader, and he was alleged to have addressed certain words to the court and done some acts. His Lordship, who decided that case, held that they did not amount to an offence under Section 228. As the case is based upon quite different facts, it has no application to this case. 9. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is perfectly manifest, and I am satisfied, that the petitioner intentionally and deliberately disobeyed and defied the learned Magistrate by not leaving the Court room, in spite of warning that action for contempt of court might be taken against him. An intentional disobedience of the order of the presiding officer o£ a court in his presence must, in my judgment, lead to the conclusion that the person responsible intended, at least, to offer insult to that officer. I, therefore, hold, that the petitioner has been rightly convicted of the offence under Sec.228 of the Penal Code. 10. It seems to me, however, that the sentence imposed upon the petitioner is severe. I, therefore, hold, that the petitioner has been rightly convicted of the offence under Sec.228 of the Penal Code. 10. It seems to me, however, that the sentence imposed upon the petitioner is severe. I, therefore, reduce it to a fine of Rs. 25/- or, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for a fortnight. I understand that the entire amount of fine of Rs. 200.00 has already been paid. If so, a sum of Rs. 175/- will be refunded to the petitioner. With these modifications, the application is dismissed.