ORDER V.R. NEWASKAR, J. 1. The only substantial question involved in this petition for revision is as regards the competency of a review petition against an order pronouncing judgment by the improper exercise of powers under Order 10, Rule 4 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code. 2. The opponent-plaintiff filed the present suit, out of which this revision petition arises, for a declaration regarding her title to certain land as the sister heir of one Somli. The suit was filed against the four defendants who claimed title to the said land and whose names were directed to be mutated in place of deceased Somli. 3. The defendants contested the suit claiming that they were the sons of Jomlya who was the brother of the plaintiff and deceased Somli. They put forward their preferential right. 4. The written statement incorporating the aforesaid pleas was submitted on 28-9-1957. The court thereupon asked the plaintiff to file a rejoinder and at the same time required the parties to remain present on the next date to which the suit was adjourned namely 21-10-1957. On the adjourned date the plaintiff's counsel informed that the plaintiff did not want to file any rejoinder. The court thereupon required the parties to remain present on the next date of hearing which was fixed on 8-11-1957. On that day the defendants did not remain present. An application for adjournment was however submitted on behalf of the defendants that the defendant was ill and could not attend the court that day. The court allowed the application and fixed 26-11-1957 as the next date. On that day the plaintiff's counsel was present but neither the defendant's counsel nor their counsel were present. The court thereupon at once proceeded to pronounce judgment against them by recourse to Order 10, Rule 4 (2), C.P.C. 5. No appeal was preferred against this order although the same is appealable under Order 43, Rule 1 (e), C.P.C. 6. However, a petition for review of the aforesaid order was submitted to the trial court on the ground that having regard to the pleadings of the parties presence of parties was not required, that no clarification was sought from the defendants' counsel regarding any imperfection in the written statement of the defendants' and that necessary conditions for the applicability of Order 10, Rule 4 (2) were consequently not present in the case. The exercise of powers under the said provision therefore involved an error apparent on the face of the record justifying its review. 7. The petition for review was opposed on behalf of the plaintiff. During the pendency of this petition plaintiff Fundhbai died. Her legal representatives were therefore brought on record. 8. The trial court after hearing arguments of the counsel on either side rejected the review petition chiefly on the ground that neither erroneous view of law, nor erroneous exposition or application of any provision of law can amount to an error apparent on the face of the record. Reliance was sought to be placed by the learned Judge upon the decisions reported in A.I.R 1957 Nag 97 Mohd. Hussain Khan Vs. Ahmad Hafiz and 1959 M.P.L.J. 476 Mohd. Hasan Khan Vs. Ahmad Hafiz Khan. 9. The present revision petition is directed against that decision. 10. Mr. Pandey appearing for the petitioners strongly urged that this is a clear case where there is an error apparent on the face of the record as the order dated 26-11-1957 pronouncing judgment against the petitioners when read along with the provisions of Order 10, Rule 4, C. P. C. would clearly show that the said order was passed by the trial court without applying its mind to the requirements of law for the exercise of that power. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1933 All 517 Parmarth Vs. Krishna Dayal and A.I.R. 1949 FC 106 (110) Hari Shankar Vs. Anath Nath, in support of his contention that the review petition was competent under the circumstances of the present case and rejection of that revision petition justifies the exercise of the powers of revision by this Court. 11. Mr. Sanghi who appears for the other side mainly contended in reply that even asuming that the exercise of powers under Order 10, Rule 4 (2), C. P. C. was improper under the circumstances of the present case, the review petition being rejected on merits no revision is competent. Reliance in this connection was sought to be placed by the learned counsel upon the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1953 All 554 Madan Mohanji Vs. Sunder Lal; A.I.R. 1957 All 400 Arya Insnrance Co. Vs. Lala Channoolal and 1955 MPLJ 205 Shankarlal Vs. Ganpat. 12. Reliance in this connection was sought to be placed by the learned counsel upon the decisions reported in A.I.R. 1953 All 554 Madan Mohanji Vs. Sunder Lal; A.I.R. 1957 All 400 Arya Insnrance Co. Vs. Lala Channoolal and 1955 MPLJ 205 Shankarlal Vs. Ganpat. 12. Questions which fail to be considered on above submissions of the learned counsel on either side are- (1) Whether the necessary conditions as required by law for the exercise of powers under Order 10, Rule 4 (2), C. P C. were present in this case so as to clothe the trial court with a power to pronounce judgment in accordance therewith ? (2) Assuming that no such conditions were present and the exercise of the power was bad could the error be remedied by invoking the powers of review ? (3) Assuming that a revision petition was an appropriate remedy since it was rejected is a petition for revision competent ? 13. Now as regards (1) it may be said that Order 10, C. P. C. relates to 'examination of parties by the Court' Rule 1 of Order 10 empowers the court at the first hearing to secure clarification from each party or his pleader with respect to any part of his pleading when there is vagueness, evasion or imperfection. Such clarification is to be recorded in the form of admission and denials. Rule 2 of Order 10 enables the court to examine orally any party appearing in person so as to elicit from him information on any material question relating to the suit. The same rule enables the court to examine orally any other person conversant with facts relating to any material question. When such oral examination takes place the court can reduce to writing the substance of such examination. This is provided by Rule 3. The same rule enables the court to examine orally any other person conversant with facts relating to any material question. When such oral examination takes place the court can reduce to writing the substance of such examination. This is provided by Rule 3. Then comes Rule 4 which is as follows:- (1) Where the pleader of any party who appears by a pleader or any such person accompanying a pleader as is referred to in Rule 2, refuses or is unable to answer any material question relating to the suit which the Court is of opinion that the party whom he represents ought to answer, and is likely to be able to answer if interrogated in person, the Court may postpone the hearing of the suit to a future day and direct that such party shall appear in person on such day. (2) If such party fails without lawful excuse to appear is person on the day so appointed, the Court may pronounce judgment against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. 14. It is clear by reference to Clause (1) of this Rule that before the Court can require a party to remain present in person on any appointed day under this provision it may first try to find out whether the pleader of a party or any other person accompanying a pleader as is referred to in Rule 2 is able or willing to answer any material question required of him by it. It is only of expression of his unwillingness or his inability to answer the same that it can require the personal presence of a party provided that it be of opinion that such a party is likely to be able to answer any such question. 15. Where the court requires the attendance of a party under these circumstances and the party fails to appear then alone power under sub-rule (2) of Rule 4, C. P. C. can be exercised and a judgment can be pronounced against such a party. 16. Now in the present case a routine order without reference to the state of pleadings or the willingness or ability of the pleader of the defendants to answer any material question relating to the suit, was passed and both the parties were asked to be present on 21-10-1957. 16. Now in the present case a routine order without reference to the state of pleadings or the willingness or ability of the pleader of the defendants to answer any material question relating to the suit, was passed and both the parties were asked to be present on 21-10-1957. It does not appear to be probable that the court had then applied its mind to the question whether there is any vagueness or imperfection in the pleadings or whether any information on any material question was needed by it. Even after the plaintiff had declared that she did not want to file any rejoinder the order previously passed was repeated. After adjourning the case once the court proceeded to pronounce judgment without asking any question to the counsel with reference to pleadings. Thus there is no doubt whatever that the conditions for the exercise of powers under Order 10, Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 were absent and the court acted illegally in pronouncing judgment against the defendants though their pleader was present. 17. The next question is whether in this state of facts the court can review its order. The order in question is no doubt appealable under Order 43, Rule 1 (e) and had the appellate court's jurisdiction been invoked to review the decision the defendants might have easily succeeded in securing the setting aside of the order. But failing to appeal can the defendants invoke the trial Court's powers of review ? 18. This question will be answered in favour of the defendants in case we hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in this case. 19. In A.I.R. 1956 SC 233 Hari Vishnu Vs. Ahmad Ishaque, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that ordinarily where an error is self-evident and did not require any examination or argument to convince the court about such an error it would be an error apparent on the face of the record but that even this test may break down in certain cases. According to them what is an error apparent on the face of the record is not capable of precise or exhaustive definition and has to be left for judicial determination. According to them what is an error apparent on the face of the record is not capable of precise or exhaustive definition and has to be left for judicial determination. But it appears to me that where special powers are conferred upon a Court to dispose of an action in a particular way under certain conditions, if the non-existence of such conditions is patent, the disposal of the action pursuant to such powers would amount to an error apparent on the face of the record. Such being the position in this case it comes under the first part of the observations of the Supreme Court referred to above. 20. In A.I.R. 1933 All 517 Parmarth Vs. Krishna Dayal, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had to deal with some what similar situation. For some reason which was not apparent on the record, the trial court in that case considered that it would be more convenient if the parties appeared in person to admit or deny each others documents. The pleaders of the parties were not asked to admit or deny the documents. No occasion therefore arose in that case for their (the pleader's) refusal or expression of inability to make such admission or denial of document. 21. The court appeared to have assumed in that case that it had power to require the attendance of a party without assigning any reason. This was an erroneous assumption according to the view of the High Court. They observed as follows :- "It will be observed that the power of the Court under this Rule is not an ultimated one. It is only where the party's pleader or recognised agent refused or is unable to answer a material question that the Court can direct the personal attendance of the party himself. Assuming that admission and denial of documents amounts to a 'material question relating to the suit', the Court should have called upon the pleaders of the parties to admit and deny each other's documents and if they refused or expressed their inability to do so, then only the court could direct the personal attendance of the parties for that purpose. As already stated, the pleaders of the parties never refused or expressed their inability to admit and deny each other's documents. As already stated, the pleaders of the parties never refused or expressed their inability to admit and deny each other's documents. No case therefore existed for the exercise by the Court of its power under Order 10, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code." Their Lordships further observed :- "Apart from the inherent power, of the Court, we are satisfied that the plaintiff's application for restoration fulfilled all the requirements of Order 47, Rule 1. Civil Procedure Code, and the Court had ample power to review its order of 22nd December 1932, and it did so." The aforesaid observations fully support the line of reasoning adopted by me in the present case. 22. The Federal Court in A.I.R. 1949 FC 106 (110) Hari Shankar Vs. Anath Nath, observed in similar strain:- ''that a decision is erroneous in law is certainly no ground for ordering review. If the Court has decided a point and decided it erroneously, the error could not be one apparent on the face of the record or even analogous to it. When, however, the Court disposes of a case without adverting, to or applying its mind to a provision of law which gives it jurisdiction to act in a particular way, that may amount to an error, analogous to one apparent on the face of the record sufficient to bring the case with in the purview of Order 47, Rule 1, Civil Procedure Code." 23. Having regard to the aforesaid views regarding the applicability of Order 47, Rule 1, I am inclined to hold that the Court had sufficient jurisdiction to review its own order. It refused to do so under an erroneous impression that the order pronouncing judgment under Order 10, Rule 4 (2), C. P. C. could at the most be considered to be "an erroneous view of law or a wrong exposition, or application of law." 24. This view of the trial, Court, regarding the limitations upon its powers of review, is erroneous. I therefore think that, the trial Court had jurisdiction to review its order in pursuance of the power conferred upon it under Order 47, Rule 1. But it either erroneously refused or failed to exercise its jurisdiction. The case therefore can property fall under (b) of Section 115, C. P. C. 25. I therefore think that, the trial Court had jurisdiction to review its order in pursuance of the power conferred upon it under Order 47, Rule 1. But it either erroneously refused or failed to exercise its jurisdiction. The case therefore can property fall under (b) of Section 115, C. P. C. 25. I would therefore allow the revision petition and direct that the review petition be granted and the order pronouncing judgment against the defendants be set aside. On doing so the case will be taken up for hearing from the stage at which it was when the impugned order was passed and thereafter disposed of in accordance with law in light of the observations made above. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs of the review petition as well as those of the present petition for revision from the plaintiff-opponent. Petition allowed