JUDGMENT K.L. Pandey, J. The questions referred to this Bench are: (i) Whether the appellant can sue for a declaration of his title on the strength of the registered lease deed dated 4 January 1947? (ii) Whether he can claim such a declaration even if he has not been in possession of the suit land? (iii) Whether the word 'possession' in the expression "who immediately before the date of vesting was in possession of any holding as an absolute occupancy tenant or an occupancy tenant" occurring in section 45(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, means actual physical possession or merely a right to possession? The facts of this case, so far as they are necessary, may be briefly stated. One Krishna Chandra Sharma was the proprietor and landlord of village Kishangarh Bhatnora. He executed in favour of his brother-in-law, Beharilal (appellant), a registered patta dated 4 January 1947 without any premium and thereby granted to him occupancy right in respect of 91 acres of land of the village in return for Rs. 40 payable annually as rent. When the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Bights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (hereinafter called the Act), came into force, the Revenue Authorities refused to recognise the appellant as occupancy tenant of the land and treated it as vested in the State. Thereupon he instituted the suit, out of which this appeal arises, for a declaration that he was the occupancy tenant of the land. While the Court of first instance held that the patta dated 4 January 1947 was a fictitious and sham transaction, the lower appeal Court took the view that, since it was executed before 16 March 1950, its genuineness was not open to challenge. However, both the Courts below hold that the appellant was not in possession of the land and the lower appeal Court dismissed the suit on the ground that because the appellant was not in possession of the land immediately before the date of vesting, that is, 31 March 1951, he could not be regarded as an occupancy tenant within the meaning of section 45(1) of the Act. On the first question, our opinion is that the appellant can sue for a declaration of his title on the basis of the lease deed dated 4 January 1947 if it was a real as opposed to a fictitious document. On the other hand, if it was only a sham transaction by which the land was put in a false name and there was no intention to transfer any interest in the land to the appellant, he could not get under the deed any title to the land. In that event, although he may bring a suit for a declaration of his title, he would be disentitled to the relief claimed. Whether, in the instant case, the transaction is the one or the other is a question of fact requiring decision with due regard to all the circumstances of the case: Nainsukhdas Sheonarayan Shop v. Goverdhandas AIR 1948 Nag 110 : ILR 1947 Nag 510. On the second question, we are of the view that if title had passed and was subsisting on the date of the suit, the fact that the plaintiff had not been in possession of the land would not be material. The last question referred to us relates to the meaning and effect of the expression "who immediately before the date of vesting was in possession of any holding" in sub-section (1) of section 45 of the Act which reads as follows: Subject to the provisions of section 41, any person who immediately before the date of vesting was in possession of any holding as an absolute occupancy tenant or an occupancy tenant shall, on and from the date of vesting, be deemed to be a tenant of the State and shall hold the land in the same rights and subject to the same restrictions and liabilities as be was entitled or subject to immediately before the date of vesting. As the learned single Judge has stated in his reference, the question is whether the word 'possession' in the expression mentioned in the last paragraph means actual physical possession or is wide enough to include a right to possession. If the first meaning is attributed to it, absolute occupancy and occupancy tenants, who happened to be temporarily out of possession on the date of vesting would not be within the purview of section 45(2) of the Act. If the first meaning is attributed to it, absolute occupancy and occupancy tenants, who happened to be temporarily out of possession on the date of vesting would not be within the purview of section 45(2) of the Act. That the word 'possession' has a larger meaning is clear from the observations of the Supreme Court in Kotturuswami v. Veerayya AIR 1959 SC 677, where their Lordships were considering the meaning of the expression "possessed by a female Hindu" in section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. According to their Lordships, in the context of that Act, the word possession had to be interpreted in its widest connotation. In our opinion, the language employed here is ambiguous in that it is fairly and equally open to either of the two meanings. When any doubt arises from the words used by the Legislature, it is safe to call in aid the ground and the cause of making the statute and to have recourse to the preamble. Maxwell, in his Interpretation of Statutes, observed: The preamble of a statute, even after repeal, has been said to be a good means of finding out its meaning, and, as it were, a key to the understanding of it; and, as it usually states, or professes to state, the general object and intention of the Legislature in passing the enactment, it may legitimately be consulted to solve any ambiguity, or to fix the meaning of words which may have more than one, or to keep the effect of the Act within its real scope, whenever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt. As the preamble of the Act shows, it was placed on the Statute Book for the acquisition of the rights of the proprietors in estates, mahals, alienated villages and alienated lands and to make provision for certain matters connected therewith. Having due regard to this key to the minds of the makers of the Act and the mischief which they sought to redress, the effect of the Act should be kept within its real scope which was to abolish the rights of intermediaries. The preamble does not indicate that the rights of tenants were intended to be affected or taken away. The preamble does not indicate that the rights of tenants were intended to be affected or taken away. Sub-section (1) of section 45 of the Act itself shows that, as a consequence of abolition of the proprietary rights, the State was substituted in place of the proprietor and the tenants continued to hold the land in the same rights and subject to the same restrictions and liabilities as they were entitled or subject to immediately before the date of vesting. If all that was intended was continuance of tenure of absolute occupancy and occupancy tenants, there could be no reason for not including within the ambit of the section all those who were such tenants. Indeed, the two earlier sections, namely 41 and 43, make no distinction between such tenants in possession of their holdings and those who were temporarily not in possession. Other provisions of the Act also throw light on the question, Section 3 which provides for vesting of proprietary rights and sections 4, 5 and 6 which set out the consequences of vesting, leave the rights of absolute occupancy and occupancy tenants unaffected. Further, section 7, which authorises the Deputy Commissioner to take charge of all vested lands, expressly excludes occupied lands meaning inter alia lands held immediately before the date of vesting in absolute occupancy or occupancy tenure. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion that a larger meaning should be assigned to the word 'possession' in section 45(1) of the Act so as to include within the ambit of that section every person who on the date of vesting held or was entitled to hold any land as an absolute occupancy or occupancy tenant even though, on that date, be was not in actual physical possession of such land. We may add that this was also the view taken by Shrivastava J. in Mahendra Kumar v. The State of Madhya Pradesh Second Appeal No. 298 of 1957 dated 14 October 1959 (1960 MPLJ 66). Our answers to the questions referred to us are: (i) The appellant can sue for a declaration of his title on the strength of the registered lease deed dated 4 January 1947 if it was a real as opposed to a fictitious transaction. Our answers to the questions referred to us are: (i) The appellant can sue for a declaration of his title on the strength of the registered lease deed dated 4 January 1947 if it was a real as opposed to a fictitious transaction. (ii) If title to the land had passed to the appellant and was subsisting on the date of suit, the fact that the land had not been in his possession would be immaterial. (iii) The word 'possession' in section 45(1) of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act includes within its ambit every person who, on the date of vesting, held or was entitled to hold any land as an absolute occupancy or occupancy tenant even though, on that date, he was not in actual physical possession of such land. Since the whole case has been referred to us for decision, we have to consider whether the patta dated 4 January 1947 was a fictitious transaction. It is true that under section 6 of the Act transfers made after 16 March 1950 are void. This does not mean that all transfers made before that date must be conclusively presumed to be real or that it is not open to the State Government to show the patta to be a fictitious or sham transaction. That being the position, we do not accept the lower appeal Court's view that the genuineness of the patta dated 4 January 1947 could not be challenged by the State Government. The facts relied upon for the contention that the patta dated 4 January 1947 evidenced a fictitious transaction are these. The appellant is a brother-in-law of the lessor Krishna Chandra Sharma. No premium was taken for the lease. The appellant did not get the name recorded in the annual papers. He was also not in possession of the land after the lease. The first three facts are equivocal and do not necessarily support the conclusion that there was no intention to transfer the leasehold interest in the land to the appellant. On the question of possession, the appellant examined Himma P.W. 2 who said that, at the instance of one Ramcharanlal, he used to recover sub-rent for the appellant and make it over to the said Ramcharanlal. This evidence was disbelieved. On the question of possession, the appellant examined Himma P.W. 2 who said that, at the instance of one Ramcharanlal, he used to recover sub-rent for the appellant and make it over to the said Ramcharanlal. This evidence was disbelieved. Even so, there is no affirmative evidence to show that, after 4 January 1947, the lessor continued to remain in possession of the land. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the patta dated 4 January 1947 has not been proved to be a fictitious transaction. Having regard to our opinion on the questions referred to us and the fact that the patta dated 4 January 1947 was not a fictitious transaction, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The decrees of the lower Courts are set aside and instead it is declared that the land shown in schedule A to the plaint is the appellant's occupancy land and that the land has not vested in the State under the provisions of the Act. The respondent shall bear its own costs and pay those of the appellant throughout. Counsel's fee here Rs. 75. A decree shall thus follow. Appeal allowed