JUDGMENT K. Sankaran, C.J. 1. The additional 2nd plaintiff in O.S. 92/1116 on the file of the Kottayam District Court is the appellant. The final decree in that suit was passed by the High Court. Plaint items 2 to 5 & 9 to 11 were in the possession of defendants 17 to 24 on the strength of two sale deeds, Exts. B & E. By the final decree passed in the suit, both these sale deeds were set aside and the 2nd plaintiff was allowed to recover possession of these items from defendants 17 to 24 with mesne profits from 7-11-1118 onwards and on payment to the defendants the value of improvements, if any, effected by them subsequent to the date of the sale deeds. The value of such improvements as also the quantum of mesne profits were directed to be determined in execution. The Meenachil Sub-Court where the decree is being executed, issued a commission to report about the mesne profits payable to the 2nd plaintiff and the value of improvements effected by the defendants. The amounts payable under these two items were fixed by that court after considering the commission report and other material items of evidence. In the present appeal preferred by the 2nd plaintiff against that order, he has challenged the correctness of that order. 2. Even though detailed objections have been raised to the method adopted by the Commissioner in assessing the value of improvements under the various items and in fixing the quantum of mesne profits, the main point urged by the counsel for the appellant is that a fresh assessment of the value of improvements has become necessary in view of the coming into force of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958 (Act XXIX of 1958). This Act came into force during the pendency of the present appeal and before the value of improvements payable to defendants 17 to 24 has been finally determined. Such final determination is to be made in accordance with the new law which has in the meanwhile come into force. The decision in Kunjukrishnan v. Krishna Pillai (1958K.L.T. 645) is in support of this view. If defendants 17 to 24 are entitled to the benefits of the new Act (Act XXIX of 1958), the value of improvements due to them has to be assessed afresh in accordance with the provisions of that Act. 3. The decision in Kunjukrishnan v. Krishna Pillai (1958K.L.T. 645) is in support of this view. If defendants 17 to 24 are entitled to the benefits of the new Act (Act XXIX of 1958), the value of improvements due to them has to be assessed afresh in accordance with the provisions of that Act. 3. The preamble to Act XXIX of 1958 states that payment of compensation for improvements made by tenants in the State of Kerala has to be in accordance with the provisions of the Act. For the purpose of the Act, the expression 'tenant' has been defined in a very comprehensive manner. This definition as contained in clause (d) of S.2 is as follows: "Tenant" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions includes [i] a person who as lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee or in good faith believing himself to be lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee of land is in possession thereof; [ii] a person who with the bona fide intention of attorning and paying a reasonable rent to the person entitled to cultivate or let waste land, but without the permission of such person, brings such land under cultivation and is in occupation thereof as cultivator; and [iii] a person who comes into possession of land belonging to another person and makes improvements thereon in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements." Sub-clauses (i) & ('ii) taken together are by themselves wide enough to include all persons who have come into possession of land and are in occupation of the same with the bona fide intention of attorning to the real owner of the land. Persons falling under sub-clauses (i) & (ii) were included in the definition of the expression 'tenant' as contained in clause (d) of S.2 of the earlier Act also, i. e., the Travancore-Cochin Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1956 (Act X of 1956). The legislature obviously wanted to amplify and enlarge the scope of this definition when that Act was repealed by enacting the new Act, Act XXIX of 1958. This object was achieved by adding sub-clause (iii) to the definition of the expression 'tenant' as given in clause (d) of S.2 of the new Act. It is significant to note that the person coming under sub-clause (iii) need not be one in the position of a lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee. This object was achieved by adding sub-clause (iii) to the definition of the expression 'tenant' as given in clause (d) of S.2 of the new Act. It is significant to note that the person coming under sub-clause (iii) need not be one in the position of a lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee. He need not also be entertaining a bona fide intention of attorning and paying reasonable rent to the person entitled to enjoy the land. In fact, sub-clause (iii) stands by itself unconnected with and independent of sub-clauses (i) & (ii). In Chempaka Pillai v. Nadaraja Pillai (1959K.L.T. 956) a learned Single Judge of this Court had occasion to consider the scope of this sub-clause. In construing the sub-clause the learned judge appears to have taken the view that by adding this clause as sub-clause (iii) the legislature has merely extended the concept of the term 'tenant' "outside its strict limits so as to take in those who, if not by mutual agreement, unilaterally and subjectively by reason of their bona fide intention or belief hold under others." The view taken is that such an extended notion underlies the latter part of clause (1) and the whole of clause (ii) and that there is no reason to think that this is not true of clause (iii), also. We are unable to agree with such a restricted construction being put upon clause (iii) so as to unnecessarily restrict and limit its scope. The learned judge was considering the question whether a court auction-purchaser could claim the benefit of this sub-clause when he was attempted to be dispossessed after avoiding the court sale in his favour. The learned judge held that the person in possession of the property on the strength of an invalid court sale and who effected improvements on such property, would not come under sub-clause (iii), the reason stated in support of that view being that the court auction-purchaser came into possession of the property as belonging to himself and not to another. No doubt one of the conditions to be satisfied for invoking the aid of sub-clause (iii) is that the person concerned must have come into possession of land belonging to another person. No doubt one of the conditions to be satisfied for invoking the aid of sub-clause (iii) is that the person concerned must have come into possession of land belonging to another person. The other condition, is that he must have made improvements on the land in the bonafide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements person who comes into possession of land covered by a court auction or a private sale, need not necessarily be taking possession of the land belonging to himself. The question whether he is taking possession of the land belonging to himself or to another person, will necessarily depend upon the nature of the sale in question. The sale may be a valid sale, or it may be a void or voidable sale. If it is a valid sale, then it is clear that the vendee will be taking possession of the property belonging to him by virtue of the sale. If the sale is a void sale, the vendee does not become the owner of the property and it cannot be said that he will be taking possession of the property belonging to himself. The property will still belong to the real owner in spite of the void sale. The position is not in any way different in the case of a voidable sale so long as the right to avoid the sale is available to those who are entitled to exercise that right. If that right is exercised by them and the sale is avoided, such avoidance takes effect from the date of the sale and the vendee cannot in such a situation be held to have been in possession of the land belonging to himself. On the other hand, he must be deemed to have been in possession of the land under another person who continued to be the real owner of .the property in spite of the voidable sale which had come into existence. A vendee who has to surrender possession of the property in such circumstances, must certainly be a tenant within the meaning of sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of S.2 of Act XXIX of 1958. A vendee who has to surrender possession of the property in such circumstances, must certainly be a tenant within the meaning of sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of S.2 of Act XXIX of 1958. Any improvements effected by him on the land covered by the sale must be taken to have been effected by him in the bonafide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements because of the existence of the sale in his favour. The contrary view taken in Chempaka Pillai v. Nadaraja Pillai (1959K.L.T. 956) regarding the scope of the aforesaid sub-clause, is erroneous and to that extent the decision in that case is overruled. 4. So far as the present case is concerned, the vendees under the sale deeds Exts. B and E were in possession of items 2 to 5 and 9 to 11 on the strength of those sale deeds. They were effecting improvements on the properties as belonging to them and with the bona fide belief that they were entitled to make such improvements. But ultimately the sale deeds were avoided by the decree passed in the suit with the result that it transpired that they were in possession of properties really belonging to others. The vendees would therefore come under sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of S.2 of Act XXIX of 1958. The value of improvements due to then has to be ascertained and fixed in accordance with the provisions of that Act. The quantum of mesne profits due to the decree-holder will also be ascertained and fixed afresh. 5. In the result this appeal is allowed and the order of the lower court is set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for fresh disposal of the claims on account of mesne profits and value of improvements in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above.