JUDGMENT Shiv Dayal, J. The respondents instituted a suit against the appellant for ejectment and arrears of rent. It was alleged in the plaint that Maksudandas was a tenant of the plaintiffs from before 1944; that there was no lease deed but the tenant had been paying Rs. 15 per month. On December 31, 1950, the defendant paid Rs. 485 but did not pay anything thereafter, not even on plaintiffs' notice dated September 20, 1953. The suit was instituted on November 15, 1954, claiming arrears of rent for 36 months, presumably because for the period prior to that the same had become time-barred. The defendant denied the plaintiffs' title, denied that he was a tenant, denied that he was liable to pay Rs. 15 per month as rent and asserted that no cause of action had accrued to the plaintiffs. The trial Judge held that the plaintiffs were owners of the suit house and that the defendant was their tenant. But he held that the plaintiffs failed to prove any rate of rent which the defendant was bound to pay to them and dismissed the suit in respect of rent. However, he passed a decree for eviction on the ground that the defendant did not pay any rent to the plaintiffs in spite of notice. Aggrieved by that decree both the parties filed cross-appeals. The learned Additional District Judge has dismissed both the appeals and has maintained the decree passed by the trial Judge. Aggrieved by the same the defendant has come to this Court in second appeal and the plaintiffs have filed cross-objections, claiming the same reliefs respectively as they did in the first appellate Court. It is contended on behalf of the defendant that the finding of the lower appellate Court holding him to be a tenant of the plaintiff is erroneous as it is based merely on the counterfoil (Ex. P. 2) of a receipt which purports to evidence a payment of Rs. 485 to the plaintiffs. The learned counsel invites my attention to several facts: Even on plaintiffs' own showing, the defendant himself did not make any payment of rent. It is the plaintiffs' case that the amount was paid by the defendant's son on behalf of the defendant. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the defendant had authorised his son to make any payment on his behalf. It is the plaintiffs' case that the amount was paid by the defendant's son on behalf of the defendant. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the defendant had authorised his son to make any payment on his behalf. The payment made by the defendant's son cannot under any law be deemed to be a payment made by the defendant himself, so as to create a relationship of landlord and tenant. It appears from Ex. P. 2 that the name of the payer was first written as "MITTHOOLAL URF BRIJBHUSHAN DAS DAULATGANJ WALA" and then "BRIJBHUSHANDAS" was scored off and "MAKSUDANDAS" was written above it. The payment is described to be on account of rent of Daulatganj house "upto 31-12-50". It cannot be known from Ex. P. 2 for what period this rent was. The figure of Rs. 485 is not divisible in a whole number by 15. On these arguments Shri Swami Saran assails the finding of the first appellate Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in Sheodhari Rai v. Suraj Prasad Singh AIR 1954 SC 758 , that payment of rent by itself does not necessarily establish the relationship of landlord and tenant. Shri Gupta urges that there is positive evidence on the record of the creation of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and, if the lower appellate Court did not consider the rest of the evidence but was content in relying on the receipt Ex. P. 2 alone, the plaintiffs must not suffer. He tells me that the defendant was let into possession of the house after it had been purchased by the plaintiffs under sale deed Ex. P. 1 and that the statements of Gulabchand P.W. 4 and Phoolchand P.W. 2 are evincive on this point. The learned counsel relying on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Ramkuwar Das v. Jagdish Chand Deo AIR 1952 SC 23 : 1952 SCR 269 , urges that payment of rent is prima facie evidence of tenancy. On a careful consideration of the arguments placed before me by both sides I must hold that the judgment of the first appellate Court is not according to law. As a first appellate Court, it could not possibly afford to ignore any material fact on the record. On a careful consideration of the arguments placed before me by both sides I must hold that the judgment of the first appellate Court is not according to law. As a first appellate Court, it could not possibly afford to ignore any material fact on the record. Here, the defendant denied the plaintiffs' title in the written statement, he did not assert his own title, nor title in any one else, nor did he assert the nature of his own possession, nor did he plead adverse possession. His son admitted the plaintiffs' title. The plaintiffs produced the sale deed Ex. P. 1. The defendant's son did not produce that counterfoil of the receipt Ex. P. 2 which he obtained at the time of making the payment of Rs. 485. The receipt does not denote any payment by the defendant himself, but the payment was made by his son. The receipt does not state the period for which nor the rate at which the rent was paid. The plaintiffs produced Gulabchand P.W. 4 and Phoolchand P.W. 2 to prove that Maksudandas was let into the house as a tenant by the plaintiffs themselves. All these facts ought to have been taken into consideration by the first appellate Court, but it does not appear from its judgment that this was done. In these circumstances the finding recorded by it must be set aside. Similarly on the second question whether the defendant agreed to pay Rs. 15 per month, it is urged by Shri Gupta that the statements of Gulabchand P.W. 4 and Phoolchand P.W. 2 have been ignored by the first appellate Court. His argument is that at the time of putting the defendant into possession no particular rent was settled between the parties but these witnesses definitely proved the course of conduct between them and it is proved that the defendant had been paying a monthly rent of Rs. 15. It is the grievance of Shri Gupta that the first appellate Court recorded a finding of fact against the plaintiffs without perusing the statements of these witnesses. In my opinion, the objection is quite correct. It was open to the learned Judge to disbelieve those witnesses or to hold that by their evidence the rate of rent was not proved but he could not simply ignore them. In my opinion, the objection is quite correct. It was open to the learned Judge to disbelieve those witnesses or to hold that by their evidence the rate of rent was not proved but he could not simply ignore them. There are other circumstances too, which be could have and should have taken into account while deciding the question. He has raised a presumption against the plaintiffs by their abstinence from stepping into the witness-box. This was undoubtedly relevant. He should have also considered whether any documentary evidence was produced by the plaintiffs to prove the rate of rent. The notice which the plaintiffs gave to the defendant threatening the present suit, is conspicuously silent as to the rate of rent and this was a strong circumstance against the plaintiffs. However, it is on the totality of all the circumstances that a Court of fact should arrive at a definite finding. It is clear from the scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure that a Court of first appeal is entrusted with a great responsibility. It is the final Court of fact. It must, therefore, appear from its judgment that it made an honest endeavour to appraise the merits of the cases put forward by the parties and that it applied its mind fully to the material on record before it reached a finding of fact. It should never appear to any party or to a superior Court that the first appellate Judge agreed with the trial Judge simply because he was not inclined to take much trouble over the case. Every litigant, who is given the right of appeal, is entitled to have a decision from two Courts on questions of fact. If a Court of first appeal does not carefully apply its mind to the matters on record, it fails in its duty. This was emphasised by Rowland J. in Bhagwantsingh v. Ujagarsingh AIR 1940 Pat 33, in the following passage which is worth reading time and again: I do not propose to decide the questions of fact arising in this case, or to go into the details of the depositions to see whether the substantial facts I have referred to can he outweighed by points scored in a contest of wits between cross-examiner and witness in the box. The proper place for that is Court of appeal below. The proper place for that is Court of appeal below. The Legislature has thought fit to entrust to the first appellate Court the final decision of all matters of fact on which the disposal of the suit turns. Every officer in this position should realize that the confidence thus reposed in him implies a corresponding duty and trust, that he will to the best of his power weigh and balance the evidence, facts and considerations appearing on both sides. He should endeavour so to decide his case that his judgment may carry a conviction if not of its correctness, at least of a fair endeavour to place a correct valuation on the merits of the cases of both sides. He should never let it appear, either to the public or to a superior Court that he has chosen to accept the evidence of one side or the other without due consideration of the salient facts established and contrary to the conclusion to which the outstanding facts point, arbitrarily or on patently inadequate grounds. In short the judgment ought to show that the Judge has been led to a particular conclusion by the force of the facts and not that he has had fancy to adopt a particular conclusion and then made a onesided presentation of the facts to support that conclusion. The result of this discussion is that the finding recorded by the Additional District Judge on both the above questions of fact must be set aside and the case must be sent back to him for a fresh judgment. As to the question whether the notice demanding arrears of rent fulfilled the requirements of section 4(a) of the M.B. Accommodation Control Act, reliance is placed on behalf of the appellant on a decision of my learned brother Nevaskar J. in Ram Narain v. Benji 1958 JLJ 708 , and it is urged that because the notice did not specify any amount whatever, it did not satisfy the conditions of section 4(a) of the Act. Also observations in AIR 1950 Ajm 17, support the appellant's argument. On the other hand, Shri Gupta relies on a decision of the M.B. High Court in Har Charan v. Ram Kishan 1955 MBLJ 836. Also observations in AIR 1950 Ajm 17, support the appellant's argument. On the other hand, Shri Gupta relies on a decision of the M.B. High Court in Har Charan v. Ram Kishan 1955 MBLJ 836. The argument of Shri Swami Saran is that because there was no agreement as to the rate of rent between the parties, the only course open to the plaintiffs is to get a reasonable rent assessed by the Rent Controller under the provisions of the M.B. Accommodation Control Act. I am of the opinion that the decision on this question must be deferred because the finding of fact to be reached by the lower appellate Court on the second question may possibly have a bearing on this. I guard myself from expressing any view at this stage lest the lower appellate Court may be prejudiced. The appeal and the cross-objections are allowed to this extent that the judgment of the first appellate Court is set aside on all points. The case shall now go back to it for deciding afresh the aforesaid three questions, raised in both the Appeals No. 181 and No. 211 of 1958 filed by the parties. Court-fee paid in this Court shall be refunded to the respective parties. The rest of the costs in this Court shall be borne by the parties themselves. Appeal allowed