JUDGMENT M.A. Ansari, C.J. 1. The appellant has failed in obtaining a writ of certiorari to vacate orders by the revenue authorities, whereby the lease of Puramboke lands been granted to his rival, the 3rd respondent. The appellant's case is that he was the owner of and in occupation of Sy. No. 336/12 in Mararikulam South Village, Ambalapuzha taluk, and, at the time of the survey, its western boundry was the Arabian Sea. His case further is that the sea has since receded, some new land has been formed, which he had begun to occupy as part and parcel of his adjacent property. It is common ground that the person who has been given the lease, had been allowed in the property to reside and run a tea shop, sometime prior to 1953, when the village authorities found the newly formed land to be Government property. The appellant claims to have, on May 25, 1953, applied for a Kuthagapattdm lease of the newly formed land. The Tahsildar, however, started, on the report of the village officer, encroachment proceedings against both the appellant and the 3rd respondent, who, on April 22, 1955, applied for the grant of the lease, on the ground that he had been residing therein for 11 years. The appellant alleges that the Tahsildar, without recording evidence or affording the parties opportunity to adduce evidence, passed orders, on April 27, 1955, directing arrears of prohibitory assessment to be realised from both the applicants and fine of one rupee from each. The Tahsildar further came to the conclusion that the later applicant, who had later applied for the lease, was in sole possession of the property and should be given the lease under Rule 24(4) of the Kuthagapattom Rules. The appellant preferred an appeal against that order to the Collector, who called for the report from the Tahsildar; and the latter sent in a report that both parties were enjoying the land for the past 15 years, and that the person, who had later applied, was indigent and in physical possession. It is averred that the Collector, on the basis of the report, directed lease to be granted to the 3rd respondent and held him to be entitled to it under Rules 24(2) and 24(4). The appellant's revision petition before the Board of Revenue was dismissed, and the effort to have the order reviewed, was also unsuccessful. It is averred that the Collector, on the basis of the report, directed lease to be granted to the 3rd respondent and held him to be entitled to it under Rules 24(2) and 24(4). The appellant's revision petition before the Board of Revenue was dismissed, and the effort to have the order reviewed, was also unsuccessful. Thereafter, the writ petition, from which this appeal arises, was filed; and it also has been dismissed. 2. The learned Judge, declining to issue the writ, has held that the proceedings before the revenue authorities were administrative, no auction was necessary, and the failure to auction would not amount to irregularity. He also reached the conclusion that the foundation of the orders by the revenue authorities, was his rival's being in possession, the proceedings were administrative, quasi judicial approach was not required, and, therefore, no question of observing principles of natural justice arose. 3. The appellant's learned advocate has urged that the enactment under which the Rule had been framed, has vested the authorities with jurisdiction, which is quasi judicial, and the learned Judge has erred in treating the proceedings to be merely administrative. The next part of the same argument is that in making the order, the Collector has given the appellant no adequate opportunity of proving his case or meeting the contents of the Tahsildar's report, which has been used in arriving at the conclusion of the respondent's being in possession for 11 years, and that the order is, therefore, bad, as it has violated principles of natural justice. It is clear that the exercise of the power is governed by the Travancore-Cochin Government Land Assignment Act, No. 33 of 1950, whose Section 3 provides that Government lands may be assigned by the Government or by any prescribed authority, either absolutely, or subject to such restrictions, limitations and conditions, as may be prescribed. Section 4 enacts that there shall be notification that the land will be, by public auction or otherwise, assigned; which notification would call upon those, who have any claim to such land, to prefer to the officer their objections, if any, in writing within the time to be fixed by such notification. Section 4 enacts that there shall be notification that the land will be, by public auction or otherwise, assigned; which notification would call upon those, who have any claim to such land, to prefer to the officer their objections, if any, in writing within the time to be fixed by such notification. Section 4(2) directs that any objection preferred within the time fixed in the notification, would be inquired into by the Tahsildar, who would pass orders in writing, either accepting or rejecting the claim and intimating in writing the fact of such disposal to the claimant. An appeal is provided for by Section 6 ; and Section 7 authorises rules being framed, which, are required to be published in the Gazette and thereafter to have the force of law. 4. It is common ground that though no Rules have been framed under Section 7, those given in G. O. R. O. C. No. 4848/42/Rev. of November 28, 1944, still govern proceedings, as they had been framed under the repealed Act. Rules 7 and 24 are important and are extracted below : "7. (a) Kuthagapattom for definite periods relates and includes :-- (i) Leases of Government lands occupied bona fide between the years 1932 and 1945, (ii) Leases of Government lands occupied after 1945, (iii) Leases of unoccupied Government lands or trees thereon or both. (b) The lease under (i) above shall invariably be granted to the occupant thereof for a period of 12 years, renewable thereafter, and the leases under (ii) and (iii) above shall only be by public auction. (c) All lands bid in favour of Sirkar or the management assumed under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, for default in the repayment of Agricultural loans, Special Punja Loans or Industrial Loans or the lands acquired for public purposes, or the lands applied for certain seasonal cultivation, will be governed by the provisions of these Rules." "24. Land of the following description, shall be leased to the applicant or occupants without auction, subject to the recovery of adequate pattom not below the minimum fixed in the Schedules. (i) Land not exceeding 1/2 an acre in extent adjoining registered holding indispens­ably required for the beneficial enjoyment of such holdings. (ii) Land, subject to a maximum of 3 acres to a single family, to members of the Backward communities and indigent families. (i) Land not exceeding 1/2 an acre in extent adjoining registered holding indispens­ably required for the beneficial enjoyment of such holdings. (ii) Land, subject to a maximum of 3 acres to a single family, to members of the Backward communities and indigent families. Explanation : "Family" for purposes of these Rules means and includes a person, his wife or her husband and their children living with them. (iii) Land not exceeding 2 acres required by the holder of a registered wet land in the neighbourhood for growing green manure trees or fodder crops. (iv) Government land occupied bona fide between the years 1932 and 1945 inclusive." It is clear that the intention to assign Government lands excepting those mentioned in Rule 24, requires advertisement; and this is with a view to decide the claims of the parties, who have any objection to such assignment. It is also clear that any decision on the objection raised, has to be after sifting of material, should such evidence be brought in support of the objection, and the conclusion is subject to appeal as well as revision. It is, therefore, obvious that the Act requires quasi judicial approach, and the disposal is not merely administrative. In State of Andhra v Gangappa (1957-11 Andhra Weekly Reporter 123) one of us, while deciding the nature of the duty cast under the Dharkhast Rules, has observed that the form, in which the applications were to be made, the requirement of observing principles of equity in making the decisions, the heirarchy of several officers, who were to hear the appeals, and, finally, the exercise of the revising powers, clearly indicated that the Officers were to perform their duties "conscien­tiously with a proper feeling of responsibility", and, in these circumstances, their functions were quasi judicial. We find similar requirements in the provisions, under which the lease been granted in the case before us. These are the require­ments of the inquiry into the objection, of the inquiring authority having power to summon evidence, of the order concluding the inquiry being in writing, and the objector being entitled to the notice of the order. There is further the heirarchy of officials for diciding appeals and revisions against the orders. We feel that because of these requirements, the proceeding becomes one for deciding the issues of rights, rather than one for determining questions of policy. There is further the heirarchy of officials for diciding appeals and revisions against the orders. We feel that because of these requirements, the proceeding becomes one for deciding the issues of rights, rather than one for determining questions of policy. They are, there­fore, quasi judicial, and the authority dealing with the objection is bound to observe the rudimentary principles of natural justice. One of such principles is to afford the party, against whom some evidence is being used, a fair opportunity of meeting the material. In this connection, it would be useful to recall what Lord Lorsburn had, in Board of Education v Rice ((1911) AC 179 at p. 182) which still continues to be treated as a general definition of the nature and limits on the requirements of natural justice. The observation is that the Board of Education was under a duty to act in good faith, and to listen fairly to both sides, inasmuch as that was a duty which lay on everyone, who decided anything. It follows that should the proceedings disclose failure to observe the principle, the decision reached would be vacated by issuance of certiorari. It further follows that the complaint of not having been given a fair opportunity would not be justified when the party had not availed of, nor claimed the opportunity to contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to his case. This is amply supported by University of Ceylon v Furnando ((1960) 1 AIR 631, where a declaratory suit had been brought against the disciplinary action by the University against the plaintiff, who had succeeded in the lower court. The action by the University had rested on a statement by a fellow student, and the complaint was that the plaintiff had no opportunity to cross examine her. The Privy Council held the complaint not to be justified, because the plaintiff had not asked to cross examine the student, and allowed the appeal. Therefore, if the appellant before us had never asked to be allowed to contradict the report, the complaint of his case having been not fairly disposed of, would not be justified. 5. It is not disputed that the appellate authority had given the lease to the respondent, as he was found in possession for 11 years and that the authority alone has the jurisdiction to grant the lease under Rule 24(4). 5. It is not disputed that the appellate authority had given the lease to the respondent, as he was found in possession for 11 years and that the authority alone has the jurisdiction to grant the lease under Rule 24(4). The Collector's jurisdiction being not disputed, the objections to its exercise is two-fold : (1) The conviction of the appellant is not consistent with his being held not to be in possession; and (2) The conclusion of the respondent's being in possession, is without affording the appellant any opportunity to meet the Tahsildar's report, on which it rests. 6. Before adjudicating on the first objection, two things must not be overlooked. The first is that the exercise of power under Article 226, must not be such as to convert this Court into an appellate authority over the Tribunal, whose orders are challenged. It follows that every error of fact in the decision, cannot be redressed. The other observation, that should be made, is that the decision of the Collector about the appellant's not being in possession, has become merged in that of the Board of Revenue, and the latter decision alone covers the issue. Now the Board of Revenue, after hearing the appellant's objection, has reached the conclusion that the appellant had no preferrable possessory title to justify his being granted the lease, and that conclusion is neither in excess of the jurisdiction, nor tainted with error of law apparent on the face of the record. It follows that it cannot be corrected by issuance of certiorari. We, therefore, feel the first ground for allowing the appeal not to be sufficient. 7. Coming to the complaint of the decision being in violation of the principles of natural justice, that is divided into two sub-clauses. The first is that the appellant had not been given an opportunity to adduce evidence, and the other is that the Tahsildars's report was called by the Collector at the hearing stage, and the appellant had no opportunity of challenging its correctness. It is, however, clear that the appellant had not asked the Collector about his being given opportunity to controvert the report, which had been called for before the final hearing, and there is no allegation about the appellant's not having seen the report before such a date. It is, however, clear that the appellant had not asked the Collector about his being given opportunity to controvert the report, which had been called for before the final hearing, and there is no allegation about the appellant's not having seen the report before such a date. It is also clear that the Collector was never requested by the appellant for permission to adduce material, which could be usefully placed on the record in order to support the appellant's case. There was a vague statement before the Board of Revenue about the appellant not being afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence; but the Board has not been impressed with it. We feel the case before us is fully covered by Fernando's case, and, in these circumstances, the complaint of the principles of natural justice having been violated, is not justified. It follows that this appeal fails, and is accordingly dismissed. But we think that the appellant should not be saddled with the costs of this appeal.