JUDGMENT V.R. Newaskar, J. This second appeal arises out of a suit for redemption of a house situated in the town of Manasa. Plaintiff's case is that his father Khemkaran had effected usufructuary mortgage of the disputed house for a consideration of Rs. 1,670 under a registered deed of mortgage dated 3-9-1931; that subsequent to mortgage his father died and that he alone is entitled to succeed to his rights as mortgagor. A notice, according to him, had been given to the defendants-mortgagees on 1-4-1949 asking them to permit redemption of the house on receipt of the mortgage amount but they failed to comply. The plaintiff' therefore prays for a decree for redemption on payment of the appropriate mortgage amount to which the defendants are legally entitled. The defendants stated in answer to the plaintiff's claim that they have not found any document with them incorporating a usufructuary mortgage as alleged by the plaintiff. In case the plaintiff' succeeds in providing any such document the same is not legal and valid. The tender of mortgage money is denied and it is further asserted that the defendants have been in possession of the suit house as owners of over 12 years and had spent large amount of money for its reconstruction and repairs and had mortgaged the same with third parties. They also stated that they had been told by their father, who was the actual mortgagee, that the house had been purchased by him. In their special pleadings they asserted that if the plaintiff succeeds in establishing the existence of mortgage then under a subsequent transaction dated Chaitra of Samvat Year 1994 mortgagor Khemkaranji had got his right of redemption extinguished after receiving Rs. 11-4-0 as Municipal Tax in respect of the earlier period and that thereafter the defendants have been in possession as full owners of the property. With these pleadings the parties went to trial. The trial Court overruled the defence and held the existence of the usufructuary mortgage, as alleged by the plaintiff, established. 11-4-0 as Municipal Tax in respect of the earlier period and that thereafter the defendants have been in possession as full owners of the property. With these pleadings the parties went to trial. The trial Court overruled the defence and held the existence of the usufructuary mortgage, as alleged by the plaintiff, established. It found that the plaintiff's right to redeem had not been lost by any lawful transaction subsequent to the date of the mortgage and the term in the mortgage deed, that on the expiry of 3 1/2 years the mortgagor's right to redemption would be extinguished and the transaction would be treated as sale in case the mortgagor does not redeem the property within that period, was a clog on mortgagor's right of redemption and was therefore invalid. The defence as to adverse possession was negatived by it and ultimately it granted a preliminary decree with costs for redemption in favour of the plaintiff on condition of his repaying Rs. 1,670 as the initial mortgage amount and Rs. 138-12-9 as the amount lawfully spent in keeping the property in order. On appeal the learned District Judge confirmed the decree and dismissed the appeal. This is a mortgagees' second appeal. In order to appreciate the exact contentions that are raised before me it would be material to state certain facts. It is not disputed before me that the parties had entered into a transaction of mortgage as alleged by the plaintiff. A copy of the registered mortgage deed is on record and it discloses that plaintiff's father Khemkaran had effected a usufructuary mortgage of the house in suit for a consideration of Rs. 1,670 which included a decretal debt of Rs. 1,601. The terms of the mortgage as mentioned in the deed indicated that mortgagee had been given possession of the mortgaged property in lieu of interest and the mortgagor had agreed to redeem the property within a period of 3 1/2 years. In case the mortgagor failed to redeem the property within the aforesaid period it was provided that it would be deemed to have been sold to the mortgagee. There were also terms with regard to the amounts which the mortgagee in possession could spend for maintaining the property in proper state of repairs and a stipulation on the part of the mortgagor to repay the amount spent by the mortgagee over and above Rs. There were also terms with regard to the amounts which the mortgagee in possession could spend for maintaining the property in proper state of repairs and a stipulation on the part of the mortgagor to repay the amount spent by the mortgagee over and above Rs. 3 per year. The document is dated 3-9-1931, and the possession was delivered to the mortgagee on that date. It is clear from the terms of the mortgage deed that the term with regard to the transaction getting it converted into a sale of the mortgaged property at the end of 3 1/2 years in default of mortgagor's redeeming the property is a clog on redemption and both the learned counsel who appeared for the respective parties do not controvert this petition. It is however contended on behalf of the appellant that about 5 1/2 years abusequent to the date of the mortgage there was a separate transaction incorporated in a document called receipt which had the effect of putting an end to plaintiff's right of redemption. The document purported to be under the signature of mortgagor Khemkaran and is dated 28-3-1937. The Courts below have held the document to be inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. The document is as follows:- RECEIPT Salutations to Bhai Ramlalji Durag from Khemkaranji Ramchandraji Agarwal of Manasa and Indore. Besides (this) we had mortgaged our house with Dhanji Gangaram Barthoonwala. The period of 3 1/2 years stipulated by us with respect to it having expired the house stood sold (to you). However House Tax continued to be levied in our name in the Municipality and is being recovered from us. Consequently we have intimated the Municipal authorities that they should levy the House-Tax in the name of Dhanji Gangaram hereafter and the House-Tax amounting to Rs. 11-4-0 upto the end of the present year for a period of six years at the rate of Rs. 1-14-0 per year has been received by us from you. Now on receipt of this amount no right is left in us in respect of the house which had been mortgaged and sold. From today Bhai Dhanji Gangaramji is the proprietor thereof. This receipt of Rs. 11-4-0 has been executed by us after receiving the aforesaid amount. Dated 28-3-1937. Sd/- Khemkaran Witness:- Sd/- Nathulal Halwai Dhani Raju. Mr. Now on receipt of this amount no right is left in us in respect of the house which had been mortgaged and sold. From today Bhai Dhanji Gangaramji is the proprietor thereof. This receipt of Rs. 11-4-0 has been executed by us after receiving the aforesaid amount. Dated 28-3-1937. Sd/- Khemkaran Witness:- Sd/- Nathulal Halwai Dhani Raju. Mr. Vijayvargiya, who appears for the appellant relies upon this document and raises two-fold contentions on its basis. It is firstly contended that the document does not require registration and is admissible even in the absence of its registration. The Courts below are therefore not right in rejecting the document on the ground of its non-registration. In the alternative he contended that in case it is considered to incorporate sale of equity of redemption, the exact value of that right not being determined at the trial, it will have to be done now either by remanding the case or by calling for a finding. Second contention raised by him with respect to this document is that whatever might have been the position under the initial mortgage deed the possession of the defendant should be taken to have become adverse at least from the date of this document and the document would be admissible for the purpose of determining the nature of the defendant's possession. Since, it is urged, more than 12 years have elapsed from the date of this document upto the date of the present suit the plaintiff's right of possession should be taken to have been lost by adverse possession. Mr. Sanghi, who appears for the respondent, sought to meet both these contentions. With respect to the first he agreed that on true construction of the document it did not require registration. He however urged that the document does no more than state the factual position under the initial transaction and did not incorporate any transaction DEHORS that document. The document does not purport to effect the sale of equity of redemption. Nor does it purport to bring about any fresh change in the nature of possession of the defendant with reference to the property. He therefore contended that inasmuch as the document of mortgage incorporated a term which amounted to a clog on equity of redemption that term would be invalid and any reference to that invalid term would not amount to fresh transaction DEHORS the original transaction of mortgage. He therefore contended that inasmuch as the document of mortgage incorporated a term which amounted to a clog on equity of redemption that term would be invalid and any reference to that invalid term would not amount to fresh transaction DEHORS the original transaction of mortgage. He also contended that the receipt of 28-3-1937 relied upon on behalf of the defendants will not have the effect of making their possession adverse so as to disentitle the plaintiff to claim redemption although 60 years have not elapsed from the date of the mortgage. It is clear from the terms of the document that all that it incorporates is a transaction of receipt. The reference to the sale of the house by reason of expiry of 3 1/2 years as initially stipulated under the mortgage deed is nothing more than the statement as to the factual position as the mortgagor understood by reference to the terms of the document. No fresh transaction was either entered into or thought of. Primarily the document came into being in order to incorporate a fact that the mortgagor had received Rs. 11-4-0 in respect of the house-tax which he was not liable to pay as the house stood sold to the mortgagee by reason of the expiry of the term within which it was open for him to redeem. The statement may involve misconception on his part as regards the legal rights but no fresh transaction with reference to that property had been thought of when the document was executed. The document by its own force does not purport to affect any right in an immovable property of Rs. 100 or more. Besides being a receipt it only incorporates a factual position according to the understanding of the mortgagor. The document evidently therefore does not require registration and would be admissible in evidence even in the absence of such registration. Had I considered necessary in this view of the matter to permit the document to be proved I would have sent the case back to the Court below for a finding but the counsel for the parties were allowed to argue the case on the assumption that the document in fact had been executed by the mortgagor because, in my opinion, even on that assumption the appellant is not entitled to succeed. Mr. Vijayvargiya's contention is that since on 28-3-1937 the mortgagor received Rs. Mr. Vijayvargiya's contention is that since on 28-3-1937 the mortgagor received Rs. 11-4-0 in respect of the house-tax and accepted the position that from that the defendants namely Dhanji Gangaramji became the proprietors of the house that should be treated as a subsequent transaction putting an end to the equity of redemption. The learned counsel relied in this connection upon the decision in Ramalinga Mudliar v. Arunachala Mudali AIR 1926 Mad 386 . On the second question with regard to adverse character of possession the learned counsel relied upon the decision in Venugopala Rao v. Hanumantha Rao AIR 1958 AP 541. According to him whatever might have been the position prior to the execution of the receipt in question on and from the date of that receipt the possession of the mortgagor became definitely adverse. In my opinion the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted either on the point that the receipt dated 28-3-1937 incorporated a fresh transaction DEHORS the document or that from the date of the document the nature of appellants' possession had altered and had become adverse. It is well settled that there is nothing in law to prevent the parties to a mortgage from coming to a subsequent arrangement qualifying the right of redemption. A separate transaction DEHORS the mortgage is not a clog and may operate to extinguish the equity of redemption vide Shankar Din v. Gokal Prasad ILR 34 All 620. The only question which we have to consider is whether the receipt dated 28-3-1937, relied upon on behalf of the appellant, constitutes such a fresh transaction. In my opinion the reasons which have led me to hold that the document does not require registration are the very reasons which indicate that the document does not incorporate any fresh transaction DEHORS the original mortgage transaction. Had the document intended to affect the original transaction by reason of what was incorporated in that document it would have been difficult to escape the conclusion that the document required registration. I have already dealt with the exact purport of the document in question. It would be useful in this connection to refer to some of the decisions having a bearing on this question. In Kanhayalal v. Narhar ILR 27 Bom 298, Chandavarkar and Aston JJ., had to deal with a case of a mortgage known as GAHAN LAHAN. I have already dealt with the exact purport of the document in question. It would be useful in this connection to refer to some of the decisions having a bearing on this question. In Kanhayalal v. Narhar ILR 27 Bom 298, Chandavarkar and Aston JJ., had to deal with a case of a mortgage known as GAHAN LAHAN. The facts of that case as found by the District Judge were shortly these:- The mortgagor mortgaged the property with possession and the deed contained the usual GAHAN LAHAN clause. The mortgagor failed to pay within the stipulated period and about a year after his failure the parties made up accounts of the mortgage and it was agreed that the mortgagor should sell the property to the mortgagee. The mortgagor paid Rs. 10 or 12 to the mortgagee for costs of repairs and the mortgagee continued to be in possession as owner. They acted upon that understanding for several years. On these facts it was contended before the High Court that the subsequent transaction as indicated above constituted a fresh transaction so as to extinguish the mortgage and effect a sale of the property to the mortgagee. It was held by the High Court that it had been found very distinctly that the mortgagor had entered into so called fresh transaction under the belief that he could become absolute owner under it. The necessary reference, according to the High Court, from that finding was that the agreement for sale of the property to the mortgagee was not a bargain independent of the mortgage but was based on GAHAN LAHAN clause of the mortgage deed. It was virtually a transaction enforcing that clause. Chandavarkar J. who delivered the judgment in the aforesaid case relied upon an earlier decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Vishnu v. Kashinath ILR 11 Bom 174 in that connection. The facts of the present case are practically on all fours with that case. In this case also when the receipt was executed it was clearly executed on the assumption made by both the mortgagor and the mortgagee that they were bound by the term in the mortgage deed regarding the transaction becoming sale on failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property within 3 1/2 years. No fresh transaction DEHORS the mortgage was thought of and no new consideration passed. The payment of Rs. No fresh transaction DEHORS the mortgage was thought of and no new consideration passed. The payment of Rs. 11-4-0 in respect of the house-tax was also on the basis of the same assumption though legally erroneous. It is therefore clear that the receipt did not incorporate any fresh transaction. The decision in Kanhayalal v. Narhar ILR 27 Bom 298, referred to above, was followed in the case reported in Ram Singh v. Baij Nath AIR 1919 All 136. It was held in that case that a mere admission by a mortgagor or an understanding between him and the mortgagee that the mortgagee had become owner cannot have the effect of extinguishing the mortgage or to destroy the right of redemption of the mortgagor. The same view is taken in a Division Bench case of Madras High Court in the case reported in Ramalinga Mudaliar v. Arunachala Mudali AIR 1926 Mad 336. It was observed there that there must be some transaction proved DEHORS the mortgage but before the Court can be satisfied that the equity of redemption has been relinquished or disposed of by the mortgagor. It must be stated that had I entertained an opinion that the receipt incorporated any such fresh transaction PEHORS the original mortgage deed I would necessarily have held that it required registration because if a document purports to affect the already existing interest in an immovable property of a value of more than Rs. 100 it would require registration under section 17 of the Registration Act. As regards the contention regarding adverse possession that too has no force. The mortgagee entered into possession under the mortgage deed, there was no fresh transaction subsequent to it and the nature of the initial possession continued. Any admission contained in the subsequent document under a misconception as regards the legal right cannot have the effect of altering the nature of that possession so as to make it adverse and that too from the date of the receipt. The decision in Venugopala Rao v. Hanumantha Rao AIR 1958 AP 541 upon which the learned counsel sought to rely has no application. That was a case of simple mortgage and subsequent to the date of the mortgage an arrangement was arrived at whereby the mortgaged lands were made over to the mortgagee in satisfaction of the mortgage debt. The decision in Venugopala Rao v. Hanumantha Rao AIR 1958 AP 541 upon which the learned counsel sought to rely has no application. That was a case of simple mortgage and subsequent to the date of the mortgage an arrangement was arrived at whereby the mortgaged lands were made over to the mortgagee in satisfaction of the mortgage debt. The initial mortgage transaction was of the year 1909 while the arrangement took place in the year about 1927. In view of this finding it was perfectly open for the High Court in that case to hold that the possession of the mortgage not a separate transaction was adverse from the date of the subsequent transaction. Here in this case the appellants were already in possession as mortgagees and the only question is whether there was any fresh transaction by which the nature of that possession changed and whether the receipt incorporated that transaction. The answers to both these questions ought to be in the negative. The Supreme Court, in Mst. Kirpal Kuar v. Bachan Singh AIR 1958 SC 199 , had to consider the question whether the possession of one Harnam Kuar which was adverse initially had become permissive by reason of an agreement dated 6-2-1932. The agreement was unregistered. The High Court had held that the document was admissible to prove the nature of Harnam Kuar's possession on the basis of the decision of the Privy Council, in Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathammal 46 IA 285. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court distinguished the aforesaid case from the facts of the case which they had to consider and held as follows:- In the present case Harnam Kaur had been in possession before the date of the document and to admit it in evidence to show the nature of her possession subsequent to it would be to treat it as operating to destroy the nature of the previous possession and to convert what had started as adverse possession into a permissive possession and, therefore, to give effect to the agreement contained in it which admittedly cannot be done for want of registration. To admit in evidence for the purpose sought would really amount to getting round the statutory bar imposed by section 49 of the Registration Act. These observations would, in my opinion, apply in the present case. For these reasons the appeal is without force and is dismissed with costs. To admit in evidence for the purpose sought would really amount to getting round the statutory bar imposed by section 49 of the Registration Act. These observations would, in my opinion, apply in the present case. For these reasons the appeal is without force and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed