JUDGMENT S. Velu Pillai, J. 1. This is a petition by the Karnavan and manager of the Thekumuri Jumayat Mosque, to quash Ext. P. 2, an order passed by the second respondent, the Collector of Kozhikode, cancelling resolutions dated June 5, 1957, August 30, 1958, and October 17, 1958, passed by the Trikkandiyur Panchayat, granting permission to the petitioner to bury the dead in the compound attached to the mosque bearing Resurvey No. 119/8. The chief ground on which the petition is founded is, that the Collector did not give notice to the petitioner or afford an opportunity to him to be heard in support of the resolutions, and that therefore the order was passed in violation of the rules of natural justice. The relevant provisions of the concerned statute which is, the Madras Village Panchayats Act, 1950 and which may be referred to as the 'Act', may be quoted:-- Sec. 43(1). "The Inspector may, by order in writing,--" (i): "suspend or cancel any resolution passed, order issued, or licence or permission granted, or" (v) "prohibit the doing of any act which is about to be done or is being done, in pursuance or under colour of this Act, if in his opinion,--" (a): "such resolution, order, licence, permission or act has not been legally passed, issued, granted or authorised, or (b): "such resolution, order, licence, permission or act is in excess of the powers conferred by this Act or any other law or an abuse of such powers or is considered by the Inspector to be otherwise undesirable, or (c): "the execution of such resolution or order, or the continuance in force of such licence or permission or the doing of such act is likely to cause danger to human life, health, or safety, or is likely to lead to a riot or an affray :" "Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall enable the Inspector to set aside any election which has been held:" (2): "The Inspector shall, before taking action on any of the grounds referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-s.(1), give the authority or person concerned an opportunity for explanation". (3) : "The power conferred on the Inspector under clause (c) of sub-s.(1) may be exercised by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of that clause". 2. (3) : "The power conferred on the Inspector under clause (c) of sub-s.(1) may be exercised by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of that clause". 2. It will be observed, that clause (a) and (b) of sub-s.(1) relate to resolutions, orders, licences, permissions, etc, which have not been legally passed, or issued or granted, or which are in excess of the powers conferred by the Act or any other law, and that Section 43(2) prescribes, that before taking action with respect to them, an opportunity for explanation shall be given to the authority or person concerned. Clause (c) of sub-s.(1) relates to resolutions, orders, licences, permissions, the execution or continance of which is dangerous to life or health, or is likely to lead to a riot or an affray, obviously, matters in respect of which, prompt and preventive or remedial action is indicated, and are therefore distinguishable from cases under clauses (a) and (b). Therefore, Section 43(3) which relates exclusively to cases under clause (c), does not prescribe an opportunity for explanation being given to the authority or person, who is affected. "Where an obligation to give notice and a hearing would obstruct the taking of prompt preventive or remedial action", as stated by S. A. de Smith in his book on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, page 120, an exception to the audi alter am partem rule may be inferred. Comparing with Section 43(2), there is no doubt in my mind, that the Legislature intended by section 43(3), to apply the above exception to the rule, in cases coming within clause (c). S. A. de Smith has further explained the position at. page 121 as follows:-- "The necessity for taking immediate action may similarly justify summary interference with freedom of property, as where an order is issued, in the interests of public safety, prohibiting smoking in a theatre, or where the Minister of Agriculture orders the destruction of infected crops, or where, in the exercise of common law powers, a dangerous nuisance is abated without notice. Various powers to take summary action for reasons of urgency are vested by statute in public health authorities" Judged from a different point of view, it may also be held, that Section 43(3), following as it does Section 43(2), and being in close juxtaposition with it, provides impliedly, if not expressly, that no notice need issue to the party effected in a case governed by it, on the principle, that "Where legislation expressly provides for notice and hearing for certain purposes, but imposes no procedural requirements for other purposes" notice may be deemed to be dispensed with for the latter. (S. A. de Smith on Judicial Review of Administrative Action, page 118). 3. In the present case, however, before passing the order impugned, the Collector had addressed the Panchayat to give effect to the report of the local authority on public health, by withdrawing the permission to bury the dead ; but the Panchayat did not give effect to it. The Collector then addressed the President of the Panchayat, requesting him to convene a special meeting of the Panchayat to "place before it the above facts and explain, why the resolutions referred to above should not be cancelled by him for reasons stated, in the exercise of the power under Section 43(1) (c) read with Section 43(3)". The Panchayat however passed a resolution affirming the earlier resolutions, and communicated it to the Collector, and it was after considering it, that Ext. P. 2 came to be passed. If the procedure prescribed by Section 43(2) may be pressed into service, also with respect to a. matter governed by Section 43(3), even then, there was substantial compliance with such procedure, an opportunity for explanation having been afforded to the Panchayat, though not to the petitioner; but as I take it, it was unnecessary for the Collector to have followed it, to give validity to his action. 4. The learned counsel invited my attention to decided cases which have laid down the general rule, that a quasi judicial function can be performed only after hearing the party who may be affected by it. 4. The learned counsel invited my attention to decided cases which have laid down the general rule, that a quasi judicial function can be performed only after hearing the party who may be affected by it. It was assumed by counsel for both parties at the hearing, that the Collector was exercising a quasi judicial function under Section 43(3); even then, in the words of the Supreme Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v Commissioner of Hills Division ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ): "the rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitution of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function, and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice had been contravened should be decided not under any preconceived notions, but in the light of the statutory rules and provisions." Mukhtar Singh v State of U. P. (AIR 1957 Allahabad 297) one of the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, has held that, "there is no general limitation on the power of legislature that it will not enact a law contrary to the principles of natural justice. If a certain procedure is prescribed by law then unless it contravenes the provisions of Article 14, it cannot be challenged as invalid, upon any supposed principles of natural justice." The petitioner had no case before me, that Section 43(3) violated the provisions of Article 14. D. C. Mills Ltd. v Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal ( AIR 1955 SC 65 ) also relied on, related to an assessment to income tax according to the best of judgment under Section 23(3), in which the Tribunal, had violated fundamental rules of justice and denied the right of fair hearing to the assessee. Chennappa v Mysore State (AIR 1956 Mysore 33) has decided, that parties affected must be appraised of the material appearing against them, although it is not necessary to observe all the formalities of judicial procedure in exercising quasi judicial functions. Shivji Nathubhai v Union of India ( AIR 1960 SC 606 ) the last case on which reliance was placed, has held, that the power of the Central Government under Rule 54 of Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, is quasi judicial in character, and that it is therefore incumbent upon it, to give a reasonable opportunity to the party concerned. Shivji Nathubhai v Union of India ( AIR 1960 SC 606 ) the last case on which reliance was placed, has held, that the power of the Central Government under Rule 54 of Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, is quasi judicial in character, and that it is therefore incumbent upon it, to give a reasonable opportunity to the party concerned. It is to be noted, that Rule 54 itself contained provision for opportunity being given for explanation, and in any event, the Court was not faced with a situation as in the present case, of two different procedures for different classes of cases. The cases relied on are not applicable. I hold, that no notice need have issued to the petitioner under Section 43(3) and that Ext. P. 2 order, is not vitiated for want of such notice. 5. It was faintly argued by the learned counsel that Rule 5 of the Rules framed, which provides, that "no person shall bury, burn or otherwise dispose of, or cause or suffer to be buried, burnt or otherwise disposed of, any corpse in any place within a hundred yards of a dwelling place or source of drinking water-supply other than a place provided, registered, or licensed as aforesaid must be read subject to Rule 1, which provides, that "a Panchayat may, and shall if no sufficient provision exists, provide at its cost, places to be used as burial or burning-grounds, or crematoria and may charge rents and fees for the use thereof." In other words, the argument was, that the restriction under Rule 5 can arise, only if under Rule 1, a place is provided by the Panchayat. There is no substance in this argument, for Rule 1 imposes only a duty on the Panchayat, to make provision for suitable burial grounds, and Rule 5 deals with three categories of burial grounds, viz., a place provided by the Panchayat, an existing burial ground which under the provisions of the Rules has to be registered, and a new burial place which is licensed by the Panchayat. I do not think, that, Rule 5 can be ignored. The petition fails and is dismissed ; no costs.