JUDGMENT This appeal involves a point of some interest, relating to the interpretation of the expression ‘due‘ as occurring in the definition of ‘debt’ in Explanation II (b) to section 2 of Madras Act I of 1955. The facts necessary for an appreciation of the question are very simple. The plaintiff in the Court below is a High School represented by its Manager and correspondent, and is also the appellant here. There was a deed of mortgage executed by the two defendants in favour of the plaintiff for a principal of Rs. 10,000 on 14th November, 1945. The defendants contended that they were agriculturists entitled to the benefits of Madras Act IV of 1938 as well as of Madras Act I of 1955. Admittedly, the present action was instituted by the plaintiff-appellant during the period when suits of this kind were barred under section 3 of Madras Act I of 1955, which was an enactment intended to give benefits to indebted agriculturists. Under sub- section (2) of section 3 of the Act, if such a suit is filed, the Court shall in decreeing the suit direct the plaintiff to bear his own costs, and pay the costs of the defendant who is an agriculturist. In accordance with this provision of law, the Court below, in granting the preliminary decree, directed that the plaintiffs should be disallowed their costs and should further pay the costs of the defendants under sub- section (2) of section 3 of Madras Act I of 1955. The short point raised in the appeal is that the debt in this case does not fall within the Explanation already referred to by me, because, though it existed as a debt between the parties, it was not enforceable by the creditor on 1st October, 1953, under the terms of the contract. The short point raised in the appeal is that the debt in this case does not fall within the Explanation already referred to by me, because, though it existed as a debt between the parties, it was not enforceable by the creditor on 1st October, 1953, under the terms of the contract. In order to appreciate this point, it is necessary to refer to the definition itself, which is in the following terms: “ ‘Debt’ means any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from an agriculturist on the 1st October, 1953, whether payable under a contract or decree or order of a Court, Civil or Revenue or otherwise.” In the present case it is not disputed that (1) the mortgage deed was executed on 14th November, 1949; (ii) that, under the terms of the contract, the principal amount was payable only after a period of 5 years from that date and (iii) that, actually, there was no interest due upon the mortgage upon the date, 1st October, 1953, since interest for that year would accrue only on 14th November, 1953. Hence, the argument is that this is not a debt ‘due ‘within the ambit of the definition, and that in consequence, section 3 (2) under which costs were awarded in this case would not be operative, as between the parties. It would at once be obvious that the entire argument depends upon the construction of the word ‘due ‘as occurring in the definition. The argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant is that this means not merely that a debt subsists between the parties, and that there is a jural relationship of creditor and debtor, but also that the debt is enforceable as such by the creditor. In other words, unless the debt was enforceable on 1st October, 1953, by the creditor, or was payable by the debtor on that date, which is the same thing, the definition would not apply. The question is, how far such an argument finds support in the authorities available upon this problem of interpretation. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd edition, the word ‘due ‘is defined under two primary meanings. Firstly, a debt is ‘due ‘when it is payable or immediately payable. Secondly, a debt is due even when it is payable in futuro, and when it is owing and subsisting. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd edition, the word ‘due ‘is defined under two primary meanings. Firstly, a debt is ‘due ‘when it is payable or immediately payable. Secondly, a debt is due even when it is payable in futuro, and when it is owing and subsisting. Before I refer to the cases on the subject, I may also refer to a discussion upon this aspect in The United States v. The State Bank of North Carolina, (1832) 30-33 U.S. Sup. Court Report 28 at 36. Mr. Justice Story said as follows in delivering the opinion of the Court: “The whole difficulty arises from the different senses in which the term ‘due’ is used. It is sometimes used to express the mere state of indebtment, and then is an equivalent to owed, or owing. And it is sometimes used to express the fact that the debt has become payable.” An examination of the cases reveals that both these meanings are normally attached to the expression, and that the wider signification ought not to be excluded, unless the language used expressly warrants such a restriction in the scope of the meaning. Thus, for instance, James, V. C, stated in European Life Assurance Society, In re (1869) L.R. 9 Eq. 122., that a debt was ‘due’ when it was payable. Again, in Stockton Iron Co., In re,L.R. (1875) 2 Ch.D. 101. where certain articles gave a company a lien upon the shareholders’ shares for moneys due from the shareholder, the word was interpreted as meaning ‘presently payable ‘in the context of the particular facts. But as Gibson, J., stated in Irish Land Commission v. Massereene (1904) 2 L. R. 513., ‘due’ means not merely immediately payable, but payable in futuro. In ex parte Gawley, 34 S.J. 29.6 (1960) 1 MLJ. 1 (F.B.)., a debt was held ‘due’ notwithstanding that the Statute of Limitations might have barred the remedy, for that does not extinguish the debt, as distinguished from the remedy. Having these authorities in mind, as well as the entire scheme of this Act, particularly as revealed by the language of Explanations I and II to section 2 (b), I have no doubt that the Act intended to give relief to agriculturists-debtors who were in a state of indebtedness, whether the debts, which they owed, were immediately enforceable by their creditors, or otherwise. The decision cited by learned counsel for the appellant, Ramanathan Chettiar v. P. S. L. Ramanathan Chettiar, relates to the interpretation of the words ‘payable on such commencement’ in section 19 (2) , with reference to a deposit. That has no relevance to the present question of interpretation. Hence, after a careful consideration of the context in which the expression ‘due ‘occurs, the entire scheme and intendment of the relevant provisions, and the authorities available upon the interpretation of the expression ‘due’ as occurring in statutory law, I have no doubt whatever that the lower Court was justified in applying section 3, sub- section (2) to the present facts and in awarding costs accordingly. The appeal is therefore dismissed. The respondents are unrepresented, and hence the parties will bear their own costs. Before parting with the appeal, I desire to acknowledge my indebtedness to Sri V. S. Ramakrishnan, who has acted as amicus curiae for the absent respondents, at the instance of Court. R.M.- Appeal dismissed.