Kaushalendra Prasad Narain Singh v. Nand Kishore Prasad Singh
1960-10-13
J.C.SHAH, SUDHANSHU KUMAR DAS
body1960
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : J.C. Shah, J. 1. This is an appeal by special leave. The appellant was a candidate at the last General Elections held in 1957 for election to the Bihar Legislative Assembly from the Asthawan Constituency. The first respondent was declared elected by the Returning Officer. The appellant then submitted a petition to the Election Commission for setting aside the election of the first respondent. The petition was accompanied by a chalan evidencing a deposit of Rs. 1000 on behalf of the appellant in the Government treasury. The chalan showed that the amount was tendered as "security deposit for election petition in favour of security, Election Commission". The word "security" used immediately before "Election Commission" was evidently a mistake for "Secretary". The Election Commission referred the petition to the Election Tribunal presided over by the District Judge, Patna, for trial. The first respondent filed his written statement, but did not specifically raise a contention that the petition was liable to be dismissed because the requirements of Section 117 of the Representation of the People Act, 53 of 1951, hereinafter called "the Act", were not complied with. After a large number of witnesses were examined on behalf of the appellant, and some witnesses were examined by the respondent, on February 7, 1958, the first respondent sought to raise by amendment of his written statement a contention that the petition was liable to be dismissed because it did not show on its face that the amount of Rs. 1000 was deposited in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission as security for the costs of the respondent. The Election Tribunal permitted amendment of the written statement, and raised the following additional issue. "Is the deposit of security money in accordance with the provisions of Section 117 of the Act or not, and whether the election petition is liable to be dismissed under Section 90(3) for non-compliance of Section 117 of the Representation of the People Act. " The first respondent then applied that the additional issue be tried as a preliminary issue and that the petition be disposed of without entering upon a decision on the merits. 2. The Election Tribunal declined to accede to that request.
" The first respondent then applied that the additional issue be tried as a preliminary issue and that the petition be disposed of without entering upon a decision on the merits. 2. The Election Tribunal declined to accede to that request. Against the order passed by the Election Tribunal the first respondent presented a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the High Court of Judicature at Patna, praying that the election petition be ordered to be dismissed as it was not in conformity with the provisions of Section 117 of the Act. The High Court upheld the contention of the first respondent observing that the case before them was governed by their earlier judgments in Sardar Harihar Singh v. Ganga Prasad Singh, (1958) Patna Law Reports, II and Sunder Singh v. Member, Election Tribunal, Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 686 of 1957, in which it was held that failure on the part of the petitioner to comply with the provisions of Section 117 of the Act amounted to a defect fatal to the maintainability to the petition. The High Court accordingly set aside the order of the Election Tribunal and ordered that the election petition be dismissed for non-compliance with the requirements of Section 117 of the Act. 3. Against the order passed by the High Court, this appeal is filed with special leave. The question whether failure to comply with the requirements of Section 117 of the Act amounts to a defect which is fatal to the maintainability of an election petition was considered by this Court in K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, (1959) SCR 583. In that case, it was held that the words "in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission" used in Section 117 of the Act, were directory and not mandatory in their character and no literal compliance with the terms of Section 117 was required. What was of the essence of the provisions of Section 117 of the Act was that the receipt should show, or it should be proved by evidence led before the Tribunal that the deposit was at the disposal of the Election Commission to be utilised in the manner authorised by law and was under the control of the Commission and payable to the Election Commission or to any other person duly authorised to receive the same. 4.
4. In our view, the principle of that case governs the present case. The error in the chalan was venial and it could not affect the maintainability of the petition, nor is it likely to give rise to any difficulty, if the petition is ultimately dismissed, in the recovery of the costs, out of the amount deposited by the appellant. Section 117 of the Act is intended to provide that security for costs shall be furnished by a party moving the Election Commission and for that purpose he is required to furnish a receipt showing that an amount of Rs. 1000 is deposited in Reserve Bank or in the Government treasury. It is true that the amount should be shown to have been deposited in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission; but the matter of primary importance is the deposit of the amount which may be at the disposal of the Election Commission, and if the security is deposited, a venial error in describing the name of the person in whose favour the amount is deposited will not affect the validity of the deposit. In our view, the High Court was in error in holding that the petition filed by the appellant was liable to be dismissed. 5. Since the date on which the petition was filed, more than three years have elapsed and we do think that it would be in the interest of all the parties that no further time be spent in the hearing of preliminary objections of the nature sought to be raised by the first respondent. We accordingly direct that the additional issue, which has been raised, at the instance of the first respondent as to the maintainability of the petition in view of the alleged defect, be struck off. We trust that this petition will be taken up for hearing by the Election Tribunal with the least practicable delay and disposed of according to law. 6. We allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court. The appellant will be entitled to his costs in this Court as well as in the High Court.