ORDER Both these appeals by the judgment-debtor arise out of the Execution Case No. 4 of 1947-48 which itself seems to be a new number given to an old case pending at the time of integration. After some controversy, the execution case was transferred from the Munsiff, Dhar to the District Judge who passed an order to the effect that the case was governed by the Dhar Usurious Loans Act and accordingly ordered that accounts should be taken-in other words-applied section 3(1)(i & ii) of the Dhar Usurious Loans Act. He refused to accept the judgment-debtor's contention that the execution was time-barred. Upon that, both the parties went up in appeal, the judgment-debtor repeating that the execution was time-barred and the decree-holder urging against the application of the Usurious Loans Act. After an order by a single Judge, the matter went up again in a special appeal to a Divisional Bench which rejected the plea of limitation. It also rejected a new ground set up by the decree-holder during the appeal that the District Judge had no jurisdiction having become functus by the operation of an Ordinance of the Madhya Bharat. As for the application of the Usurious Loans Act, the Divisional Bench directed that the District Judge should consider whether the Usurious Loans Act applied at all. When the case went back to the District Judge, he held that the Usurious Loans Act did apply but this was not a case in which the judgment-debtor could get any benefit on the merits of his case. Thereupon the judgment-debtor has come up again alleging that the District Judge was wrong, both on the merits of his decision and because he differed from his predecessor. Further it is contended that in the special appeal, one of the Judges of the High Court had been of the view that the objection regarding the District Judge's jurisdiction should be left open so that he should have been permitted to re-agitate it in the executing Court. While this was going on, apropos the objections originally raised in the Court of the District Judge, the judgment-debtor raised yet another objection on 22-8-1955. This was numbered as a miscellaneous case. Here the objection was that when the first execution case was filed soon after the passing of the decree in 1938, the Munsiff who entertained it, did not have jurisdiction to do so. This was numbered as a miscellaneous case. Here the objection was that when the first execution case was filed soon after the passing of the decree in 1938, the Munsiff who entertained it, did not have jurisdiction to do so. The subsequent transfer of the case to the District Judge did not cure this irregularity and all proceedings taken after 1938 were void for want of jurisdiction. This objection being dismissed, the judgment-debtor has filed Misc. Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1957. The questions for our decision are, in Civil First Appeal No. 28 of 1955-(i) whether any question other than the one regarding Usurious Loans Act of Dhar was left open by the High Court; (2) to what extent this Act is applicable in principle; (3) whether in the event of its being applicable, the judgment-debtor is entitled to any benefit; In Misc. Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1957, the question is, whether the judgment-debtor should have been allowed to raise new objection in 1955. The decree itself had been passed in 1938 so that this case is yet another of the multitude where the decree-holder, having got the decree, is unable to reap the fruit of a success for many years. Even now when he is pursuing the judgment-debtors for what they have inherited from him, he does not seem near the end of his troubles. In Misc. Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1957, the real question is not as to the jurisdiction of the Munsif in 1938 to entertain an application in execution. It is, whether having failed to raise this point in the particular form as an objection at any earlier state, the judgment-debtor should at all have been allowed to raise it. When he did raise it after so many years, it was the duty of the lower Court to have pointed out his omission to do so at the earlier stages and to reject it summarily. The applicability of the principles of res judicata, both express and constructive, to execution cases is so well established that it is unnecessary to cite any case-law. Thus Misc. Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1957 stands dismissed. Coming to the Civil First Appeal No. 38 of 1955 no question can now be raised about jurisdiction of the District Judge. This was raised for what it was worth in the appeal before the High Court and has been rejected. Thus Misc. Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1957 stands dismissed. Coming to the Civil First Appeal No. 38 of 1955 no question can now be raised about jurisdiction of the District Judge. This was raised for what it was worth in the appeal before the High Court and has been rejected. There is really no point in taking a sentence or two out of the context in the body of the judgment. The operative portion is clear enough and that is the decision of both the Judges constituting the Bench in the special appeal was to reject this objection. The plea of limitation had already been rejected. All that was left was the issue regarding the effect and the extent of the applicability to this case of the Dhar Usurious Loans Act. I fail to see how the earlier decision of his predecessor to the effect that it was applicable, fetters the discretion of the present District Judge. As far as this issue is concerned, the decision of the High Court has thrown open the entire problem which had to be reconsidered by the District Judge. Coming to the merits of the decision, he holds that the Act is applicable but, in the present instance, the judgment-debtor can be at no benefit. This is far too general and it is only proper that the matter should be discussed in some detail. The operative section in this regard is section 3 of the Act, which empowers the Court hearing any suit to which the Act applies, to do one of the four things-(i) reopen transaction; (ii) reopen accounts already taken; (iii) set aside wholly or in part or review or alter any security; and (iv) grant suitable time or fix instalments. There is a proviso- (2) Except to the extent specified in (iv) the Court cannot do anything which affects any decree of a Court. Thus we have it that the section in its entirety applies only to suits of the class to which the Act applies; in other words, suits for realisation of loans. No doubt, the decree in the present case was on a suit based on a loan, but the suit was decided long ago and the Court at this time is not hearing the suit but is dealing with an execution application. No doubt, the decree in the present case was on a suit based on a loan, but the suit was decided long ago and the Court at this time is not hearing the suit but is dealing with an execution application. Thus section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act does not in its entirety apply to the present case. However, it does apply to a very limited extent, namely, the Court shall, if certain conditions are fulfilled, fix instalments for payment of loan or grant suitable time for repayment in execution proceeding in such manner as it deems reasonable. In the present instance, the Court is not in a position to find either that the interest is excessive or that the transaction between the parties was substantially unfair. In fact the original suit, in which the decree was passed, is a matter of ancient history coming on from the time before the commencement of this Act in June 1942. Thus it is doubtful if at all, even to the extent of sub-clause (iv), this section can be invoked. But assuming that it could be invoked in principle, it would not at all have been reasonable either to grant suitable time for payment or fix instalments. The judgment-debtor, and after him his heirs, have been through long years putting off repayments and filing objections after objections. Suitable time and instalments are really meant for judgment-debtors who are honestly willing to pay but are unable to do so on account of their poverty or circumstances beyond their control. If the law is that instalments shall be fixed without any consideration of reasonableness or convenience, then the executing Court is bound to fix them. But the law leaves it to the Court to apply the test of reasonableness. Therefore, the Court has to see whether in a particular case even if the conditions in sub-clause (i) are fulfilled, whether it would be still reasonable to fix instalments. The very history of this case will show that it would not be reasonable. Thus the decision of the District Judge was proper and the Civil First Appeal No. 28 of 1955 is dismissed. In both the appeals, the judgment-debtor shall pay costs and pleaders' fees, according to rules, to the decree-holder. Appeal dismissed