Judgment :- 1. The defendant, in a suit for recovery of property with arrears of rent, is the appellant. The property belonged to the 1st plaintiff. It was leased out to the defendant as per Ext. A dated 1-11-1116 for an annual rent of Rs. 61/-. The lease deed was executed by the defendant in favour of the 1st plaintiff's husband and mukthiar holder, Pw.1, on behalf of the 1st plaintiff. It contained a provision that the defendant may put up any building that may be found necessary for his purposes, over and above the shed that existed on the date of the lease, and that if any such building was put up, the defendant would remove the same and surrender the property and the building that were let to him without any objection at the termination of the lease. Ext. A was for a term of one year but it contained a provision for renewal for another two years. According to the plaintiffs, after the expiry of three years from the date of Ext. A the term of the lease was extended by another six months and therefore the lease terminated on 30-4-1120. According to the defendant, on the expiry of three years from the date of Ext. A the term was renewed for another term, of three years. The only documentary evidence in connection with the renewal of the lease after 30-10-1119 is Ext.1 which is a receipt, dated 7-11-1119 executed by the 1st plaintiff's husband, Pw.1, wherein he acknowledged receipt of Rs. 75/- "being the rent due to me for the first instalment from Ani 1st, 1119, up to the end of Vrischikam 1120 for the premises and. buildings....". It is agreed by both parties that the rent was enhanced to Rs. 150/- per annum at the time of the renewal of the lease in 1119. The expression in Ext. I that Rs. 75/- represent the first instalment of rent due from 1-11-1119 would clearly show that the term of the renewal could not be six months only for which the rent of Rs. 75/- was paid under Ext. I; but must certainly be a longer period. There is no reliable proof as to the exact term for which the lease was extended in Ani 1119. 75/- was paid under Ext. I; but must certainly be a longer period. There is no reliable proof as to the exact term for which the lease was extended in Ani 1119. Anyhow, one thing is clear, that is, that the term of such renewal could not be less than an year dating from 1-11-1119. 2. On 8-3-1120, the 1st plaintiff sold the property to the 2nd plaintiff as per Ext. IX in which it was averred that the property was outstanding on lease with the defendant and its term would expire by the end of Vrischikam 1120. On the basis of the sale deed, plaintiffs 1 and 2 instituted the suit on 2-7-1120 for recovery of the property with enhanced rent at Rs. 250/- per mensem from 1-5-1120. The learned Munsiff gave a decree to the plaintiffs for recovery of the property "with arrears of rent by way of damages at Rs. 900/- per annum from 1-5-1120." He negatived the defendant's claim for compensation for improvements on the ground that the provision in Ext. A amounted to a prohibition of any such claim. The learned District Judge, on appeal by the defendant, affirmed the decree of the trial court, holding that the defendant is not entitled to any value of improvements as per the terms of Ext. A, that the defendant's possession from 1-5-1120 was clearly wrongful and that therefore he was liable for mesne profits by way of damages which he assessed at Rs. 75/- per mensem as found by the trial Court. Hence this Second Appeal by the defendant. 3. It is stated at the Bar by both sides that the defendant has surrendered possession of the property and building in about 1125 and this Second Appeal relates only to the mesne profits awarded against the defendant and the compensation for improvements claimed by him. 4. A preliminary objection as to the maintainability of, the appeal was raised by Shri V. Parameswara Menon, the learned counsel for the respondents, on the ground that the 8th respondent, who is one of the heirs of the deceased 2nd plaintiff, died in the course of this appeal and nobody having been impleaded as her legal representatives the appeal abated as a whole. He relied on Pyli v. Verghese 1955 KLT. 739=(AIR. 1956 T.C. 147 (F.B.) in support of this contention. He relied on Pyli v. Verghese 1955 KLT. 739=(AIR. 1956 T.C. 147 (F.B.) in support of this contention. The dictum in that ruling is only to the effect that where one of the heirs who are co-owners, was not impleaded in the case, his interest cannot be said to be represented by the other heirs who are on the array of parties in the case on the theory of substantial representation. Order XXII, R.3, C. P. C. lays down that where within the time limited by law no application is made to implead the legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff "the suit shall abate so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned"; and Order XXII, RA lays down that where within the time limited by law, no application is made to implead the legal representatives of a deceased defendant "the suit shall abate as against a deceased defendant." These rules do not provide that by the omission to implead the legal representatives of a party the suit will abate as a whole. What will be the interest of the deceased plaintiff or the defendant in the case, whether he represents the entire interest in the case or only a specific part thereof is a fact that would depend upon the circumstances of each case. But if the interests of the co-plaintiffs or co-defendants are separate, as in the case of co-owners, the suit will abate only as regards the particular interest of the deceased party. Here the 8th respondent is one of the legal representatives of the deceased 2nd plaintiff who was a Muslim gentleman and as such she had a definite and separate interest in the property which is distinct from the interests of the other plaintiffs in the case. As such, by the omission to implead the legal representatives of the 8th respondent this appeal can abate only as regards her share in the property and therefore the appeal cannot be said to have abated in its entirety. The above view of law appears to be supported by the rulings reported in AIR. 1917 Lahore 371; Mahomedally v. Safiabai (AIR. 1940 P. C. 215) and Sant Singh v. Gulab Singh (AIR. 1928 Lahore 572 (FB.)). 5. The above view of law appears to be supported by the rulings reported in AIR. 1917 Lahore 371; Mahomedally v. Safiabai (AIR. 1940 P. C. 215) and Sant Singh v. Gulab Singh (AIR. 1928 Lahore 572 (FB.)). 5. As regards the question of mesne profits, the learned District Judge took the view that the defendant's possession after 30-4-1120 was wrongful because the renewal of the lease in Ani 1119 as evidenced by Ext. I related, according to the learned judge, only to a period of six months from 1-11-1119. I have already found that the recitals in Ext. I clearly show that the lease was extended for more than six months from 1-11-1119 and that at any rate it could not have expired before 1-11-1120. Therefore the defendant's possession on the date of the suit, viz., 2-7-1120, cannot be held to be wrongful. It is also noteworthy that the plaint does not aver that the defendant's possession was wrongful from 1-5-1120. On the other hand, in the plaint the prayer is that the plaintiff may be awarded enhanced rent at the rate of Rs. 250/- per mensem since he has served the defendant with a notice that unless he surrendered the property within the time allowed in the notice, the defendant would have to pay rent at Rs. 250/- per mensem. If the defendant's possession was not wrongful, it follows that no award of mesne profits as such can be justified. Further, the only basis on which the quantum of 'mesne profits' as the learned judge would call it, or of 'enhanced rent by way of damages' as the learned Munsiff would put it, was assessed, was the statement of Pw.1 in the box that the premises had been let out to Messrs. Harrison & Crossfield in 1102 and 1103 at a rent of Rs. 75/- per mensem. Even if that statement be taken at its face value, it cannot be of any help even to assess the mesne profits of the premises from 1120 onwards. It is admitted that the premises were leased out to the defendant in 1116 as per Ext. A on a rent of Rs. 61/- per annum. That arrangement continued till 1119 when the rent was enhanced to Rs. 150/- per annum. It is admitted that the premises were leased out to the defendant in 1116 as per Ext. A on a rent of Rs. 61/- per annum. That arrangement continued till 1119 when the rent was enhanced to Rs. 150/- per annum. In view of these facts the rate at which the premises might have been let in 1102 and 1103 is of no consequence in this case. Barring the above-said statement of Pw.1 there is no evidence worth the name in this case to assess the mesne profits of the suit premises. Anyhow the question as to the quantum of mesne profits need not be considered in view of my finding that the defendant need not be made liable for any mesne profits in this case. Since the lease was subsisting even on the date of the suit and thereafter, the plaintiffs cannot claim anything except the rent agreed to between the parties which is admitted to be Rs. 150/- per annum only. Therefore I set aside the decree as regards mesne profits and decree that the plaintiffs may recover from the defendant rent at the rate of Rs. 150/- per annum from 1-5-1120. Any amount paid or deposited by the defendant as rent or damages for occupation of the premises for any period after 1-5-1120 will be given credit to. The decree will be modified accordingly. 6. As regards the claim for compensation for improvements urged by the defendant, I find that the law governing the matter shall be taken as on the date of eviction from or surrender of the property. Since it is admitted that the defendant has surrendered the property to the plaintiff by 1125, long before the Tenants' Compensation for Improvements Act, X of 1956 or Act XXIX of 1958 came into being, he cannot claim the benefit of those Acts. As per the law of compensation for Tenants' Improvements as it was in 1125 M.E., or as a matter of fact, before 1956 A.D., the tenant was absolutely bound by the terms of his agreement with the land-Lord. Ext. A clearly implies a prohibition against any claim for improvements by way of buildings by the defendant. There is no case for the defendant that he has effected any improvements other than buildings in the suit property. Ext. A clearly implies a prohibition against any claim for improvements by way of buildings by the defendant. There is no case for the defendant that he has effected any improvements other than buildings in the suit property. Hence I affirm the concurrent findings of the courts below that the defendant is not entitled to any compensation for improvements in this case. 7. In the result, the decree of the courts below as regards mesne profits will stand cancelled and instead there will be a decree for the plaintiffs for recovery of rent from the defendant at the rate of Rs. 150/- per annum from 1-5-1120 to the date of surrender of the property, less any amounts paid or deposited by the defendant in relation to his occupation for the same period. The decree of the courts below will stand affirmed in all other respects. The appellant will have one half of his costs in this appeal from the respondents. Since the appeal has abated as regards the 8th respondent in this case, the above modifications in the decree will not bind the 8th respondent's interests as per the decree of the courts below.