PADMANABHA MENON v. RDO, MALAPURAM — 1960 DIGILAW 259 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. This petition is to quash certain orders passed by respondents 1 to 3, who are respectively the Revenue Divisional Officer, Malapuram, the District Collector, Kozhikode and the Board of Revenue, Trivandrum, by which the fourth respondent was appointed as the Adhikari of Karuvarakundu Amsom rejecting the claims of the petitioner, who was his rival applicant. Earlier, the Revenue Divisional Officer had appointed the petitioner as the permanent Adhikari of that Amsom, first by Ext. P.1, order, dated May 23, 1956, and later, after Ext. P1 was set aside by the District Collector, by Ext. P3, order, dated December 25, 1956. An appeal preferred by the fourth respondent against Ext. P3 was dismissed by the District Collector by Ext. P5, order, dated May 31, 1957. In revision by the Board of Revenue at the instance of the fourth respondent, the appointment of the petitioner was cancelled and the matter was remanded for "passing fresh orders on the subject, after considering the intrinsic claims of the two applicants" by Ext. P7, order, dated March 11, 1958, the Board observing, that the reasons adduced by the Revenue Divisional Officer for appointing the petitioner were not sufficient, for superseding the claim of the fourth respondent who, in the words of the Board, "has got experience as Adhikari of the same village and selecting another (the petitioner) whose experience is confined to a neighbouring village". The fact, however, was, that the fourth respondent had worked as assistant Menon in the same village for 91/2 years, and not as Adhikari as stated in Ext. P7; but this did not make any difference, for the Revenue Divisional Officer took his qualification as Menon also into consideration, and after weighing the respective claims of the petitioner and the fourth respondent, appointed the latter temporarily as Adhikari of Karuvarakundu Amsom by Ext. P8, order, dated June 26,1958. This was confirmed on appeal by Ext. P9, order passed by the District Collector, and in revision by Ext. P11, order passed by the Board of Revenue. The orders sought to be quashed in this petition are Exts. P7, P8, P9 and P11. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner pressed several grounds before me, in support of the petition, but I do not think, that I can accept any of them as valid or sustainable. It was complained, that Ext. The orders sought to be quashed in this petition are Exts. P7, P8, P9 and P11. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner pressed several grounds before me, in support of the petition, but I do not think, that I can accept any of them as valid or sustainable. It was complained, that Ext. P11 was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, first, because the petitioner was not given an opportunity to be heard 'on his revision petition before it was dismissed, secondly, that no reasons have been set out in Ext. P11, and thirdly, that there has been discrimination by the Board of Revenue against the petitioner, for, on the former occasion the fourth respondent was heard on the revision petition preferred by him for passing Ext. P7. 3. Standing 0.156-A of the Board of Revenue, which deals with the powers of revision of the Government and the Board of Revenue, has a proviso which reads: "no order prejudicial to any party shall be passed unless he has had a reasonable opportunity of making his representations." The petitioner did make a representation of his case by Ext. P10 the revision petition, which has set out the several grounds on which he impeached the orders passed against him, and on which, he sought to establish his claim for appointment. The Board, apparently on perusing the same, did not deem it necessary to issue notice upon it, but dismissed it, in limine, holding, that there is "no reason to question the findings of the Revenue Divisional Officer, supported also by the District Collector". According to the learned Government Pleader, this was sufficient opportunity for the petitioner to make his representation and he had no right of personal hearing. The learned counsel for the petitioner did not invite my attention to any provision in any statute or rule, which made it incumbent upon the Board of Revenue, to hear the petitioner in support of his petition. The observations of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in State of T C. v. Joseph Chacko, AIR. 1951 T. C. 241 =1951 KLT. 268, made with reference to the disposal of appeals preferred to Government are, in my view, particularly applicable to a proceeding of this kind, before the Board of Revenue. The observations of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in State of T C. v. Joseph Chacko, AIR. 1951 T. C. 241 =1951 KLT. 268, made with reference to the disposal of appeals preferred to Government are, in my view, particularly applicable to a proceeding of this kind, before the Board of Revenue. The Court observed that: "Government when it is dealing with an appeal presented to it could not be deemed to be a court of law. It is only a court that is bound to administer justice in public, posting appeals presented to it to particular dates for hearing and giving an opportunity to the parties or their advocates to appear and argue their cases. In the case of the Government, normally when an appeal is presented, whether it is by virtue of a right conferred by a Statute or by a rule of law, it may be disposed of by the Government on going through the grounds mentioned therein. There is no obligation imposed upon the Government by any Statute or rule to make a Minister or an Officer of State to sit in public and hear arguments before disposing of an appeal presented to the Government." Relying on Local Government Board v. Alridge,1915 A. C. 120, the Madras High Court in In re F. S. Shanmugha Mudaliar, AIR. 1951 Madras 276, has stated the principle to be, that: "All that quasi-judicial Tribunals like the Board of Revenue have to do, is to give sufficient opportunity to the persons who approach them for the exercise of their jurisdiction to state their case" and has ruled, that because the petitioner in that case had set forth all grounds of objection in the revision petition preferred by him, he was not entitled to be heard, and that, in not hearing him, the Board did not violate any principle of natural justice. The principle stated above, was applied by the Travancore-Cochin High Court in P. K. Krishnan Kutty v. State of Travancore-Cochin, AIR. 1952 T. C. 287. In K. Balagangadharan v. The Central Road Traffic Board, 1956 K. L. T. 792, it was decided, that the essence of the rules of natural justice, is, that a person should be given a fair opportunity to state his case. In F. N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, AIR. 1952 T. C. 287. In K. Balagangadharan v. The Central Road Traffic Board, 1956 K. L. T. 792, it was decided, that the essence of the rules of natural justice, is, that a person should be given a fair opportunity to state his case. In F. N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, AIR. 1957 S. C. 648, on a complaint, that the petitioner before the Court was not heard on the appeal that he had preferred to the Central Board of Revenue and on the application for revision that he had preferred to Government, the Supreme Court laid down that "there is no rule of natural justice that at every stage a person is entitled to a personal hearing." On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the observations of Fazl Ali, J., in A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR. 1950 S. C. 27 at page 59, which, to my mind, do not bear on the present question. G. Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, AIR. 1959 S. C. 308 also relied on, was decided on the special provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, which was construed as imposing a duty on the State Government to give a personal hearing; but the violation of the rules of natural justice was founded upon the circumstance, that one person heard the case, and another decided it. These two decisions have no relevance whatever to the present case. I hold, that the petitioner had a reasonable opportunity of making his representation within the meaning of the proviso to Board's Standing 0.156-A. 4. The complaint, that the rules of natural justice had been violated by the failure of the Board of Revenue to state reasons in its order, is equally untenable. Standing 0.156-A enjoined on the Revising Authority, the duty to state its reasons in writing to "annul, modify, reverse or remit for reconsideration" any order passed by a subordinate authority. But, Ext. P11 was in affirmance of the orders passed by the subordinate authorities and in my judgment, there is no good ground to evolve, as a principle of natural justice, that a revisional authority is bound, even where it affirms, to restate in its own order, the reasons set out in the order sought to be revised. But, Ext. P11 was in affirmance of the orders passed by the subordinate authorities and in my judgment, there is no good ground to evolve, as a principle of natural justice, that a revisional authority is bound, even where it affirms, to restate in its own order, the reasons set out in the order sought to be revised. The passages in the Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers presented to the British Parliament in April, 1932, and the report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries presented to the British Parliament in July, 1957, that reasons must be set out in the orders, however pertinent in the case of original orders passed by administrative tribunals, have very little application to the case of an order like Ext. P11, dismissing a revision petition in limine as devoid of any ground. The objection of discrimination is baseless, for on the former occasion in passing Ext. P7, the Board of Revenue chose to interfere with the order of the District Collector and therefore heard both parties. What transpired then under different circumstances, can hardly be relied on now, to found an argument of discrimination in a later proceeding and under different circumstances. The above disposes of the objections to the appointment of the fourth respondent, on the ground of a violation of the principles of natural justice. 5. The second ground urged by the petitioner, that the Board of Revenue had circumscribed the scope of the remand to a consideration of the alleged superior claim of the fourth respondent, by reason of his experience as the Adhikari of the same village, and that therefore a de novo consideration of the rival claims of the applicants, as had been undertaken by the subordinate authorities, was not permissible, has no foundation. Far from limiting the scope of the enquiry, the Board of Revenue, after adverting to the claim advanced before it by the fourth respondent, left it to the subordinate authorities to "consider the intrinsic claims of the two applicants". This was what the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Collector did. I am not therefore prepared to accept the contention, that the authorities transgressed the limits of the enquiry or committed any error, much less an error of law apparent on the face of the record. This ground is accordingly overruled. 6. This was what the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Collector did. I am not therefore prepared to accept the contention, that the authorities transgressed the limits of the enquiry or committed any error, much less an error of law apparent on the face of the record. This ground is accordingly overruled. 6. The third ground was stated to be the violation of Standing 0.155 of the Board of Revenue, the material part of which, is as follows: "No village Officer should be transferred from the village where he holds office permanently to any other by way of promotion or punishment" ...................................... The basic fact on which the argument depended was, that the petitioner had been the Menon of Thuvvur Amsom till his appointment as the Adhikari of Karuvarakundu Amsom, which must therefore be deemed to be by way of promotion. This objection had never been raised by the petitioner before any of the authorities by whom the orders impugned were passed, and I am unable to hold, that Para.6 of Ext. P10, revision petition which reads "the direction of the learned R. D. O. that the respondent resigns his Amsom Menon's post after he takes charge as Adhikari, is against the usual procedure laid down by the Board of Revenue" is sufficient to cover it. The objection was not set up specifically in the petitioner's affidavit or in this petition itself and grounds 2 and 6 therein rolled on, are not specific; the first time it was raised, was in the reply affidavit, but at a stage, at which the respondents were not called upon to meet it by way of a further counter to it. Had the point been taken in the earlier proceedings or at least in the affidavit of the petitioner or this petition, some elucidation as to how the department understood the above Standing Order might be forthcoming. I do not think, that the petitioner can be allowed to take the point now. On the terms of the Standing Order itself, I also feel, that it can only apply to a transfer by way of promotion, but not to a direct appointment in open competition, such as it was here. I do not think, that the petitioner can be allowed to take the point now. On the terms of the Standing Order itself, I also feel, that it can only apply to a transfer by way of promotion, but not to a direct appointment in open competition, such as it was here. Though the fourth respondent has been the Menon of the Thuvvur Amsom, he offered himself as a candidate in competition with the petitioner for appointment as Adhikari, and was appointed as such; consequently, no notion of promotion was involved in the appointment. He was also directed to resign his post as Menon, which need not be, if the appointment was by way of promotion to a higher post. 7. The next contention was advanced on the strength of Ext. P12, a circular of the Board of Revenue, that in making such appointments "when in the result two men are 'equal', the man with military record should be given the preference." On the finding of the Revenue Divisional Officer, affirmed by the District Collector, the fourth respondent had a superior and not an'equal' claim on account of his financial position and his past experience as a Village Officer, to that of the petitioner. There was thus no scope for applying the provisions of the circular in favour of the petitioner. 8. The last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was, that there has been an infringement of the guarantee of reasonable opportunity under Art.311 of the Constitution. The argument was, that under Ext. P1, the first order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, the petitioner had been appointed as the permanent Adhikari and that by reason of the later orders he had been reduced in rank. The contention has only to be stated, in order to be rejected, for Ext. P1 was not final, but was subject to the result of appeal and revision under the Standing Orders. Ext. P1 was set aside by the Collector, and on Ext. P3 being made, it was also set aside by the Board of Revenue, in revision. 9. The petition is therefore groundless, and is dismissed, and in view of the nature of the contentions advanced, I think it proper to direct the petitioner to pay the costs of this petition to the fourth respondent, including advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.