JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal arises out of a suit for damages, suffered by the plaintiff-respondent, on account of non-delivery of goods, booked by him for carriage by the Eastern Railways. The claim was valued at Rs. 11,160/-. The suit was decreed for Rs. 9,765/- with proportionate costs, amounting to Rs. 1,838/-. 2. FACTS, in so far as they are material for decision of this appeal, are herein below stated. On September 9, 1949, the plaintiff booked 186 half-bales of jute for carriage, by the Eastern Railway, from Lalgola Station to Cossipore Road Station. He paid Railway freight at Lalgola and obtained Railway Receipt No. 670047. Although in the usual course the goods ought to have been delivered to the plaintiff on September 15, 1949, the Railway Administration failed to deliver the goods. The plaintiff, thereafter, made repeated attempts to obtain delivery, when at last on December 1, 1949, he was told that the Railway Administration was not in a position to deliver the aforesaid goods. After service of usual notices under Section 77 of the Indian Railways Act and under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff respondent filed a suit in the Original Side of this Court, being suit No. 1009 of 1950 for recovery of damages. The aforesaid suit was filed on February 28, 1950 and a certified copy of the plaint in the aforesaid suit is Exhibit B (l), in this case. The said suit came up for hearing before A. K. Sarkar, J. on May 26, 1952 and his Lordship was pleased to dismiss the suit on the ground that the High Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. A certified copy of the decree passed in the aforesaid suit has been filed in this case, marked as Ext. 8'. Thereafter, on June 11, 1952, the plaintiff sent a fresh notice under Sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Railway Administration and after the expiry of the statutory period, filed the suit, out of which this appeal arises, on August 20, 1952, in the 1st Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore. 8'. Thereafter, on June 11, 1952, the plaintiff sent a fresh notice under Sec. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the Railway Administration and after the expiry of the statutory period, filed the suit, out of which this appeal arises, on August 20, 1952, in the 1st Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore. In paragraphs 11 and 13 of the plaint, the plaintiff invoked the provisions of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act for the purpose of excluding the period of about 2 years and 3 months, which was consumed in uselessly prosecuting suit No. 1009 of 1950, in the Original Side of the High Court. Paragraphs 11 and 13 are set out below:- "11. That the plaintiff states that hither to before he filed a suit in the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta in its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction being Suit No. 1009 of 1950 on the 28th February, 1950 for recovery of damages and/or compensation for non-delivery of the said consignment. But the said suit was dismissed on the 28th May, 1952 on the technical ground of want of jurisdiction. 13. That the plaintiff states that the previous suit in the Hon'ble High Court was dismissed as the Court was unable to entertain the same for want of jurisdiction. The time taken in the proceeding of the said suit till its dismissal was 2 years and 3 months. The plaintiff is entitled to deduct the said period of 2 years and 3 months in computing the period of limitation for filing the present suit and hence the plaintiff is within time. " 3. IT is not disputed that if the aforesaid period be excluded for the purpose of computation of limitation, the suit, out of which this appeal arises, was filed in time. There was an issue framed on the point of limitation being issue No. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge decided the issue in plaintiff's favour and being satisfied about the merits of the plaintiff's claim, passed a decree in his favour, as hereinbefore stated. The propriety of the aforesaid decree was contested before us only on the point of limitation. 4. MR. The learned Subordinate Judge decided the issue in plaintiff's favour and being satisfied about the merits of the plaintiff's claim, passed a decree in his favour, as hereinbefore stated. The propriety of the aforesaid decree was contested before us only on the point of limitation. 4. MR. Bhabes Narayan Bose, learned Advocate for the appellant, contended before us that in order to take the advantage of Section 14 (1) of the Indian Limitation Act, the plaintiff must affirmatively show that the previously instituted case was being prosecuted by him with due diligence and in good faith. In other words, he must show that he had acted with due care and attention and that he had been prosecuting the previously instituted suit with due diligence. The relevant consideration, in such cases, Mr. Bose contended, was not whether the plaintiff had acted dishonestly or his acts or omissions were malafide, but whether, given due care and attention, he would have detected his omissions earlier. The burden of bringing his case within the section, Mr. Bose further contended, lay on the plaintiff and if the plaintiff failed to satisfy the initial burden which lay upon him to bring his case within Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, the burden would not shift, if it ever shifted, to the defendant to show the contrary. In support of the aforesaid proposition of law, Mr. Bose strongly relied on a decision of the Supreme Court of India, reported in 1959 (1) S. C. A. 145 (1) (Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardh and The State of Bombay v. Ram Krishna Govind Bhanu and others.) Mr. Bose contended that the reason why the plaintiff instituted his earlier suit in the Original Side of the High Court was that the Union of India as owner and Administrator of the East Indian Railway, was supposed to have its principal office and place of business at No. 105, Netaji Subhas Road, Calcutta within the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court. This was what the plaintiff expressly stated in paragraph 1 of the copy of the plaint in suit No, 1009 of 1950 [ext. B (l)]. Mr. This was what the plaintiff expressly stated in paragraph 1 of the copy of the plaint in suit No, 1009 of 1950 [ext. B (l)]. Mr. Bose argued with great emphasis that to think that the Union of India had its principal place of business at No. 105, Netaji Subhas Road, in the town of Calcutta, was erroneous, so erroneous that it evidenced a total lack of diligence and good faith. In other words, he contended that the plaintiff filed his earlier suit in the Original Side of this Court rashly and in total disregard of very well established principles of law and if at any time after the filing of the suit, the plaintiff or his solicitor had given care and attention to the suit, he or his solicitor could have easily detected the error committed and might have tried to rectify the same earlier. 5. MR. Bose invited our attention to the decision reported in (2) I.L.R (1887) 14 Cal. 256 (Doya Narain Tewary v. The Secretary of State for India in Council), (3) I.L.R. (1913) 40 Cal. 308 (Rodricks v. The Secretary of State for India) and (4) A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 207 (Dominion of India v, M/s. R C. K. C Nath and Co., Khulna) 6. IN the first of the three cases cited by Mr. Bose, namely, the case reported in (2) I.L.R. 14 Cal. 256, the plaintiff, a purchasing agent, sued the Secretary of State for India in Council to recover certain sums of money alleged to be due to him for purchase of stores, etc., for the second Kabul campaign. The suit was filed in the Original Side of this Court, without previous leave being obtained under the provisions of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. One of the issues raised in the suit was whether or not the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The judgment of the Division Bench was delivered by Mitter, J (Trevelyan, J concurring) and it was observed in the said judgment as follows:- "in this case it is admitted in the plaint that the cause of action did not arise wholly within the said local limits. Notwithstanding this admission it was contended in the course of the argument that the cause of action did arise wholly within the said limits, because the money claimed in the suit was payable in Calcutta. Notwithstanding this admission it was contended in the course of the argument that the cause of action did arise wholly within the said limits, because the money claimed in the suit was payable in Calcutta. Supposing that it was payable in Calcutta, still the cause of action would not arise wholly there. But it was urged on behalf of the plaintiff that a cause of action arises wholly in a place where the breach of contract, upon which a particular suit is brought, takes place. " It has been uniformly held here that the words 'the whole cause of action' in s, 12 of the Letters Patent mean all things necessary to give a right of action, and that in a suit for breach of contract it must be established that the contract, as well as the breach thereof, have taken place within the local jurisdiction of the Court. When the law has thus been settled in this Court by a current of decision, we would not be justified in disturbing it. Therefore, under the first head of jurisdiction laid down in s. 12 of the Letters Patent, the present suit is not cognizable by this Court. Neither is it cognizable under the second head of jurisdiction. It is enacted in s. 65 of the Act for the better government of India, 21 and 22 Vic, c. 106, that 'the Secretary of State in Council shall and may sue and be sued as well in India as in England by the name of the Secretary of State in Council as a body corporate, and all persons and bodies politic shall and may have and take the same suits, remedies and proceedings, legal and equitable against the Secretary of State in Council for India as they could have done against the said Company, and the property and effects hereby vested in Her Majesty for the purposes of Government of India, or acquired for the said purposes, shall be subject and liable to the same judgments and executions as they would, while vested in the said Company, have been liable to in respect of debts and liabilities law rally contracted and incurred by the said Company'. This section does not constitute the 'secretary of State in Council' a body corporate, but it simply lays down that that officer and department are to be sued as a body corporate, the object of the suit being to obtain satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim if it should be decreed, out of the Indian Exchequer A suit of this kind is not really against any per son or any real body corporate But it is allowed to be brought against the Secretary of State in Council as a body corporate In other words as a suit cannot be brought without a defendant, a nominal defendant is allowed to be put upon the record to enable the plaintiff to obtain the remedy secured to him by this section. This being the nature of the suit contemplated by s. 65 of the Act for the better government of India, and the defendant on the record being a mere name used for the purpose of prosecuting the suit, the words by which the second head of jurisdiction has been defined in s. 12 of the Letters Patent are in my opinion inapplicable to it. The same view was taken by Wells, J., in Rundle v The Secretary of State in Council (1 Hyde, 37) He says : The words 'carry on business and personally work for gain' do not refer to an institution like the Government of India He further held that the carrying on of the business of the Government cannot be considered to be carrying on of business within the meaning of the 12th section of the Letters Patent It is somewhat difficult, nor is it necessary in this case, to define exactly what may be deemed as business' within the meaning of s. 2 of the Letters Patent, but it is dear to me mat the business of governing the country is not business within the meaning of s. 12 of the Letters Patent. 7. 7. IT has been said that supposing the business of governing the country is not business within the meaning of s 12 of the Letters Patent, still the Government in this country carries on various trades, such as the trades in opium and salt, and the principal places of business of these trades are located in Calcutta But these trades are not carried on by the defendant in this case as already observed the words carrying on of a business or trade are inapplicable in this case. These trades, if they can be properly ailed trader are carried on in one sense by the Government officers in charge of them, but they are so carried on for the benefit of the Indian Exchequer." 8. IN the case reported in (3) I.L.R. 40 Cal. 308, the appeal arose out of a suit brought against the Secretary of State for India in Council, and the alleged cause of action was malicious prosecution. It was alleged by the plaintiff that while employed as a permanent way Inspector on Eastern Bengal State Railway, he was falsely and maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause prosecuted for criminal breach of trust and that the prosecution terminated in an acquittal. The plaintiff alleged to have suffered damage thereby. The suit was filed in the original side of this Court with leave under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, on the allegation that part of the plaintiff's cause of action arose within the Original Jurisdiction of this Court. The defendant, Secretary of State, contended that the cause of action arose wholly outside the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this Court and therefore, the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The suit was heard by Chaudhuri, J. His Lordship dissented from the view expressed in Doya Naraian Tewary's case in (2) I.L.R. 14 Cal. 256 and expressed his view in the following language:- "if, however, the Secretary of State for India in Council is a 'mere name' it is quite clear that a name can never be said to 'dwell' anywhere or 'carry on business'. It is also clear that a 'mere name' can do nothing. 256 and expressed his view in the following language:- "if, however, the Secretary of State for India in Council is a 'mere name' it is quite clear that a name can never be said to 'dwell' anywhere or 'carry on business'. It is also clear that a 'mere name' can do nothing. The name cannot sue or be sued, nor can, there ever be a cause of action against a 'mere name' but as I hold it is not, I shall consider whether the Secretary of State for India in Council who is a 'legal person' in such suits, can be said to dwell in Calcutta or carry on business there. It seems to me difficult to say that the Government does not dwell in its own capital and that a Government engaged in trades, though it may be for purposes of the State, does not 'carry on business. ' If Sir George Jessel is right that where the 'brain power' is, there a trade or business is carried on, the assumption that the Brain Power of the Government of India is at its seat of Government, is not an unjustifiable assumption. I would have had, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the Secretary of State for India in Council, namely the Government dwells at its capital and carries on business there, and is thus amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court, in cases where a suit can be maintained against the Government. " Chaudhuri, J. however, dismissed the appeal being of the opinion that he was bound by the decision in Doya Naraian Tewary's case (2) (I.L.R. 14 Cal. 256). There was an appeal taken against the decision of Chaudhuri, J. and a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of Jenkins, C. J. and Harrington, J., dismissed the appeal with the following observations :- "it is contended that the Secretary of State for India in Council is a person who dwells or carries on business or personally works for gain within the local limits of Calcutta; and it is on that ground and on that ground alone that we are asked to hold that there is jurisdiction. No doubt, this argument met with some favour in the Court of first instance, and the appellant suggests before us that he was encouraged by the view of the learned Judge to prefer this appeal. No doubt, this argument met with some favour in the Court of first instance, and the appellant suggests before us that he was encouraged by the view of the learned Judge to prefer this appeal. But in fact, this is a point which was decided adversely to him as far back as 1886, and it has not been suggested that from that date to this, the decision to which I refer has ever been questioned or doubted: Doya Narayan Tewary v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (I.L.R. 14 Cal. 256). It was the decision not of a single Judge, but of a Bench of two Judges, and I think it would be wrong for us not to follow that decision. I regard it as important that matters of this kind should have all the certainty possible and that the Court should not lightly disregard a decision definitely settling a question of jurisdiction such as that which arises in this case. If the decision is wrong then it must be for a higher tribunal to correct it." 9. IN the case reported in (4) A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 207 (Dominion of India v. M/s. R. C. K. C. Math and Co.), the plaintiff sued the Dominion of India for damages for short delivery of goods entrusted to the Railway Administration for carriage. The suit was instituted at Sealdah. The Munsif held that the Court had jurisdiction to try the suit, relying upon a notification of the East Indian Railway Administration, according to which the plaintiff was to submit his claim to the Accounts Office at Sealdah. Against the decision of the learned Munsif, on the question of jurisdiction, the Dominion of India moved an application to this Court, under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Banerjee, J. (Harries, C. J. concurring with him) allowed the application and held that the Munsifs Court at Sealdah had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In course of the judgment following observation was made:- "defendants 2 and 3 do not reside or carry on business or personally work for gain within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Sealdah Court. So far as defendant No. 1, the Dominion of India is concerned, I think, the same principle applies, which was applicable in suits against the Secretary of State for India in Council. So far as defendant No. 1, the Dominion of India is concerned, I think, the same principle applies, which was applicable in suits against the Secretary of State for India in Council. That principle, as stated in Rodricks v. Secretary of State, (3) 40 Cal. 308, is this: 'the court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought against the Secretary of State for India in Council, where the cause of action has arisen wholly outside the Ordinary Original Jurisdiction of that Court, on the sole ground that the Secretary of State for India in Council dwelt or carried on business or personally worked for gain within the local limits of that court'. " 10. ON the authorities aforesaid Mr. Base may be right in contending that there is a preponderance of judicial opinion in his favour to the effect that the Union of India did not carry on its business at any principal place of business and therefore not in Calcutta as alleged. But it must be noticed that inspite of the preponderance of opinion in favour of the contention of Mr. Bose, an opinion contrary to the view expressed in (2) I.L.R. 14 Cal. 256 was expressed by Chaudhuri, J., in (3) I.L.R. 40 Cal. 308 and the view Expressed by Chaudhuri, J., was brushed aside by the Court of appeal, consisting of Jenkins, C. J., and Harrington J., not on the basis of any infirmity in the view but on the principle of stare decisis. We may add here that the view expressed in Doya Narain Tewary's case (2) (I.L.R 14 Cal. 256) was restated by C. C. Ghose J. in the case of Baijnath Kamani v. The Secretary of State for India in Council (5) [ (1926) 43 C. L. J. 574]. His Lordship also did not enter into any discussion of principle, but disposed of the contention as to whether the Secretary of State carried on business, that is to say, conducted the management of Eastern Bengal Railway in the Head Office thereof at Koilaghat Street with in the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court in Calcutta, with the solitary observation that the matter was concluded by the authority of the two decisions in (2) I.L.R. 14 Cal 256 and (3) I.L.R 10 Cal 308. This well established view, however, was given a rude shock by Lort-Williams, J in the case of Golab Rai Paliram. This well established view, however, was given a rude shock by Lort-Williams, J in the case of Golab Rai Paliram. v Secretary of State for India in Council, decided on May 23, 1930 and reported 11 years later in (6) I.L.R. (1941) 2 Cal. 160, After referring to the trio logy of decisions in (2) I.L.R. 14 Cal, 256 (Doya Narayan Tewary's case ). (3) I.L.R. 40 Cal 308 (Rodrick's case) and (5) 43 C. L. J 574 (Baijnath's case ). His Lordship observed as follows :- "the general effect of these decisions at first sight might appear to be that under no circumstances can the Secretary of State be sued in Calcutta on the sole ground that he carries on business there. This, in my opinion, cannot have been the intention of the learned Judges who gave those decisions It is useful in this connection to recall the memorable words of Lord Halsbury in Quinn v Leatham (1901) A. C 495. 506):-Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. A case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it Such a mode of reasoning assume that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. " 11. WHETHER the Secretary of State carries on business in Calcutta or not is a question of fact, or of mixed fact and law. The fact that a business of carriage by Railway is being carried on in India by someone is notorious. The fact that such a business called the Eastern Bengal Railway is being carried on in Bengal and that its Head Office is situated at 3, Koilaghat Street in Calcutta is admitted. That such a business is a 'business' within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent cannot be denied. It is the same kind of business as that carried on by Railway Companies in India, which clearly come within the provision. That such a business is a 'business' within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent cannot be denied. It is the same kind of business as that carried on by Railway Companies in India, which clearly come within the provision. It must be equally obvious that the proprietors of such a business 'carry on' their business, amongst other places, at their Head Office, where the general business of the undertaking is transacted and where the manager is to be found 12. IN India certain Railway carriage businesses are carried on, either as owners or lessees by Railway Companies, whilst others, of which the Eastern Bengal Railway is one, belong to Government and are administered by them in the Eastern Bengal Railway there is no officer called the 'manager', but the Chief Managing officer is called the 'agent', and it is to this officer that notice under Section 77 must be given (Kalachand Shaha v. The Secretary of State for India (21 C. W. N. 757) at the Head Office in Calcutta. It follows that it is the Government who carries on the business of Railway carriage under the name of Eastern Bengal Railway amongst other places, at the Head Office in Calcutta. If this business had been owned and carried on by a Railway Company, or other corporate body, or by a body of individuals unincorporated, or by an individual, I do not think that it could be argued reasonably that they were not 'carrying on business' within the meaning of clause 12. 13. SIMILARLY, if the East India Company had not been superseded by the Government of India, trade carried on by the Company was transferred to the Government and carried on subsequently by them. Sec. 32 of the Government of India Act, 1915 (5 and 6 Geo V C. 6) provides:- (1) The Secretary of State in Council may sue and be sued by the name of the Secretary of State in Council as a body corporate (2) Every person shall have the same remedies against the Secretary of State in Council as he might have had against the East India Company if the Government of India Act, 1858 and this Act had not been passed. It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing that one remedy, which a person might have had against the East India Company on the hypothesis stated and in the circumstances of the present case, would have been a suit against the company in the High Court at Calcutta. " 14. AGAINST the judgment passed by Lort-Williams, J. there was an appeal. The Court of appeal, consisting of Castillo and Mcnair, JJ., reversed the decision of Lort-Williams, J. on a point of limitation. The decision of the Court of appeal is reported in (7) I.L.R. (1937) 2 Cal 614. The Indian Law Reports (Calcutta series) did not do a good piece of legal journalism in reporting the judgment of Lort-Williams J., 11 years after the same had been delivered and 4 years after the judgment reversing the same was published. The expression of opinion, as hereinbefore quoted, by a Judge of the eminence of Lort-Williams, J., made after the consideration of the earlier decisions on the point, was entitled of its own force to some respect. It, was not unusual for people, not very vigilant, to believe that the judgment of Lort-Williams, J. in (6) (1941) 2 Calcutta 160 represented a departure from the previously accepted opinion of this Court and was the latest restatement of the law on the point. The judgment of Castillo and Mcnair, JJ. (7) (1937) 2 Calcutta 614 contained nothing in disagreement with the view expressed by Lort-Williams J., on the question of jurisdiction. The appeal Court merely reversed the decision of Lort-Williams J. on the point of limitation. The plaintiff filed a suit in the Original Side of this Court, on February 28, 1950. The case reported in (4) A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 207 was decided on December 5, 1949 and must have been published in the All India Reporter much later than February, 1950, as its position, almost in the second half of the volume of the report indicates. Moreover, the case in (4) A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 207 contained no reference to the decision of Lort-Williams, J., (6) (1941) 2 Cal. 160. 207 was decided on December 5, 1949 and must have been published in the All India Reporter much later than February, 1950, as its position, almost in the second half of the volume of the report indicates. Moreover, the case in (4) A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 207 contained no reference to the decision of Lort-Williams, J., (6) (1941) 2 Cal. 160. If in the face of this contradictory type of judicial, precedents, published in the various; law reports, the plaintiff or his solicitor believed that the suit could be filed in the original side of this Court, it is difficult to hold that the plaintiff acted without due care or attention or without diligence and good faith at the time of the filing of the suit. 15. MR. Bose next argued that even though there may have been reasons for the plaintiff or his solicitor being misled at the time of the filing of the suit in February, 1950, there was no reason to continue the suit in the Original Side of the High Court after the decision in (4) A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 207 was published. He contended that ignorance of law was no excuse for anybody and ignorance of a restatement of the law was worse for him. That is no doubt ordinarily so, but in the instant case, we have already observed, there was a conflict of judicial opinions on the point of jurisdiction of the Original Side of this Court. Law may have been correctly stated in the decision reported in (4) A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 207. But unfortunately, the restatement of the law was made without reference to the conflicting opinions. Judiciary law or judge-made law is treated as a. source of law in the legal system that is followed in this country. Judges are not surely the makers of law, but as Grey observed in his book, "the Sources of law", its discoverers. What they say is law, because they correctly say what the law is; it is not law because the Judges say so. This belief is much too well-established in this country to be disputed. A judicial precedent survives until it is overruled by a higher tribunal. we have already observed that the decision by Lort-Williams J. in (6) (1941) 2 Cal. This belief is much too well-established in this country to be disputed. A judicial precedent survives until it is overruled by a higher tribunal. we have already observed that the decision by Lort-Williams J. in (6) (1941) 2 Cal. 160 was not expressly overruled or dissented from at any material time, although a view completely at variance with the view expressed by Lort-Williams, J. was pronounced by this Court, both before and after that judgment. It would' have been better for the plaintiff or his solicitor to notice the restatement of the law in the later judicial decision (4) (A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 207), but failure to do so cannot be characterised as so bad as to disentitle the plaintiff from the protection of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. The plaintiff's error may have been caused by the opinion expressed by Lort-Williams, J. Had the Indian Law Reports (Calcutta series) not reported the decision of Lort-Williams, J., after its reversal by the Court of Appeal and 11 years after the pronouncement of the judgment by His Lordship, this confusion would not have been arisen. The law would have remained settled by a long line of decisions. Ignorance of that law by the plaintiff' would have been inexcusable and would have disentitled Mm to protection given under section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. But the publication of the judgment of Lort-Williams, J. (6) in I.L.R. (1941) 2 Calcutta 160 created a confusion which was both unfortunate and regrettable. 16. WE, therefore, hold that the learned Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. In our opinion there is nothing contained in the Supreme Court Judgment reported in (1) 1959 (1) S. C. A. 145, which disentitles the plaintiff from the benefit of section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, in the circumstances of the present case. Limitation was the only point argued by Mr. Bose in this appeal. That contention in our opinion fails. The appeal is therefore, dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.