V. B. RAJU, J. ( 1 ) THE applicant was convicted under sec. 3 (1) and sec. 4 (1) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act 1956 which will be hereinafter referred to as the Act. The judgment of the Judicial Magistrate. First Class Junagadh was confirmed by the Sessions Judge Junagadh in appeal. Hence this revision application. ( 2 ) THE prosecution case was that the Assistant Superintendent of Police sent a bogus punter Lalji by name to the house of the applicant with a five rupee currency note that Lalji gave this currency note to the applicant who thereupon asked Lalji to select a girl for the purpose of prostitution. Lalji selected the wife of the applicant Jaya alias Indumati by name and both were allowed to go into a room. The Police and Panchas then made a raid and found the punter in the company of Jaya in a compromising attitude on a cot. The Five rupee currency note was found in the pocket of the applicant. The applicant was prosecuted. He denied that he was guilty but admitted that he had received Rs. 5/from Lalji but according to him he was given that amount in connection with the sale of a horse. The Trying Magistrate rejected the defence accepted the prosecution evidence and convicted the applicant as stated above and the conviction was confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge in appeal. ( 3 ) IN revision the following points were raised by the learned counsel for the applicant:-- (1) The Assistant Superintendent of Police was not specially empowered by the Government; (2) under the Act a Police Officer must be specially empowered. He relies on Emperor vs. Udho s/o. Chandumal and others A. I. R. 1943 Sind 107 It is next contended that the Asst. Superintendent of Police did not record the grounds for his belief as required under sec. 15 of the Act and therefore the raid is vitiated; and the third point argued is that the Panchas selected did not belong to the locality namely Bukar Falia where the house was situated but they belonged to others localities in the same town. It is next contended that there is no proof that the house was used as a brothel. Another contention urged is that there is no corroboration of the evidence of Lalji the bogus punter. It is next contended that there is no proof that the house was used as a brothel. Another contention urged is that there is no corroboration of the evidence of Lalji the bogus punter. It is lastly contended that at any rate the offence would fall under sec. 3 (2) and not under sec. 3 (1) of the Act. ( 4 ) UNDER sec. 15 of the Act a Special Police Officer is authorised to enter and search a premises without a warrant if he has reasonable grounds for believing that an offence punishable under the Act is or is being committed in respect of a woman or girl living in any premises and that search of the premises with warrant cannot be made without undue delay. Special Police Officer is defined in sec. 2 (i) of the Act as follows:-"special Police Officer means a Police Officer appointed by or on behalf of the State Government to be in charge of police duties within a specified area for the purpose of the Act. " ( 5 ) THE Government of Bombay issued a notification in exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 13 of the Act appointing the Deputy Assistant Superentendent of Police in charge of sub-division of District or any Police Officer not below the rank of the Dy. S. P. temporarily holding the additional charge of the Deputy or A. S. P. of a Sub-division of a District for the Sub-Division of a District constituted for the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 It is therefore clear from this Notification that for every Division of District constituted for the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Deputy or Assistant Superintendent of Police in charge of that Division is appointed as a Special Officer. The learned counsel for the applicant contends that the special appointment must be by name and he relies on Emperor v. Udho s/o. Chandulal and others A. I. R. 1943 Sind 107 That was a case under sec. 6 (ii) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act which provided that entry by Police Officers in gaming houses can be made amongst other persons by Taluka Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government or by an Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police specially empowered by the State Government. 6 (ii) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act which provided that entry by Police Officers in gaming houses can be made amongst other persons by Taluka Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government or by an Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police specially empowered by the State Government. Having regard to these expressions it has been held in the Sind case that when a Deputy Superintendent of Police is especially empowered by Government under sec. 6 (ii) of the Gambling Act he should be specially empowered by name and not merely by virtue of his office because the words or by an Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police specially empowered by the Government in this behalf clearly implied the exercise by Government of a certain selection or discrimination as regards an individual on which this special power is to be conferred. The scheme of sec. 6 (ii) of the Gambling Act is that although there may be several Assistant and Deputy Superintendents for the purpose of search under sec. 6 (ii) it is only that Assistant Superintendent or Deputy Superintendent of Police specially empowered by Government who can issue a warrant for the search. The wards specially empowered are not found in the definition of Special Police Officer in section 2 (i) or in sec. 15 of the Act. In view of the definition of expression Special Police Officer in sec. 2 (i) of the Act what is required is that the State Government should appoint a particular Police Officer to be in charge of police duties within a specified area for the purpose of this Act. But in the Gambling Act for the purpose of issuing a warrant when an Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police is specially empowered by Government under sec. 6 (ii) of that Act he should be specially empowered by name as there may be many such Police Officer. In the instant case the Government has appointed only one Police Officer for the sub-division of a district as constituted for the purpose of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the area of the sub-division it is the Deputy or Assistant Superintendent of Police in charge of the sub-division who is appointed as a Police Officer. Ordinarily there would be only one Police Officer in charge of the sub division of that District. In the area of the sub-division it is the Deputy or Assistant Superintendent of Police in charge of the sub-division who is appointed as a Police Officer. Ordinarily there would be only one Police Officer in charge of the sub division of that District. There is therefore no question of selection between Police Officers in charge of the Sub-division of a District. In my opinion therefore the Notification issued by the Government appointing Special Police Officers for the purpose of the Act for every sub-division of a District is a perfectly valid notification and a Deputy or Assistant Superintendent of Police in change of the sub-division of a District would be a Police Officer for the purpose of sec. 15 of the Act in regard to the area of the sub-division of that District of which he is in charge There is therefore no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the appointment of the Special Police Officer is not by name and that therefore the Assistant Superintendent of Police had not been specially empowered. ( 6 ) AS regards the contention that the Assistant Superintendent of Police had not recorded grounds for his belief while acting under sec. 15 of the Act no question has been put to the Assistant Superintendent of Police in his examination. In such cases it is not necessary for the Assistant Superintendent of Police to depose that he had recorded the grounds for his belief when acting under sec. 15 of the Act. When an official act is done under sec. 114 of the Evidence Act it is presumed to have been properly done. In the absence of an admission by the Assistant Superintendent of Police and in the absence of any other evidence it cannot be held that it has been proved that the Assistant Superintendent of Police did not record the grounds for his belief when acting under sec. 15 of the Act. This contention of the learned counsel must also be rejected. ( 7 ) SIMILARLY the contention that the Panchas do not belong to the same locality as the house searched with is in Bukar Falia in Junagadh while the Panchas come from other parts of the same town has no substance. Locality does not necessarily mean the street in which the house is situated. ( 7 ) SIMILARLY the contention that the Panchas do not belong to the same locality as the house searched with is in Bukar Falia in Junagadh while the Panchas come from other parts of the same town has no substance. Locality does not necessarily mean the street in which the house is situated. Whether the Panchas belong to the same locality or not has to be decided on the facts of each case. Of course if the Panchas belong to a different and distant town they cannot be said to belong to the same locality; but it is not necessary that they should be residents of the same street or the same Falia. As the Panchas belong to different parts of the same town it cannot be said Oat they do not belong to the same locality. ( 8 ) REGARDING the contention that the evidence of the bogus punter Lalji is not corroborated there is evidence that the five rupee currency note which had been given to Lalji the bogus punter was found in the pocket of the applicant. This fact corroborates the evidence of the punter. Of course it is open to the accused person to rebut the inference to be drawn from the evidence of the punter and from the fact that the evidence of the punter has been corroborated. The explanation of the defence that Rs. 5/had been accepted by the accused as earnest money in regard to the sale of a horse has not been accepted by the courts below and in revision it would not be proper for me to accepted the explanation of the defence when it bad not been accepted by the two courts below. The evidence of the punter is also corroborated by the fact that the bogus punter was found in the company of Jaya the wife of the applicant in a compromising attitude. ( 9 ) AS regards the argument that there is no evidence to prove that the house of the accused was a brothel it is true that there is no direct evidence. A brothel is defined in sec. 2 (a) of the Act as follows:-"brothel includes any house room or place or any portion of any house room or place which is used for purposes of prostitution for the gain of another person or for the mutual gain of two or more prostitutes. A brothel is defined in sec. 2 (a) of the Act as follows:-"brothel includes any house room or place or any portion of any house room or place which is used for purposes of prostitution for the gain of another person or for the mutual gain of two or more prostitutes. "" (2) Where any person is proved - sub-section (2) of sec 4 of the Act provides:- (a) to be living with or to be habitually in the company of a prostitute; or (b) to have exercised control direction or influence over the movements of a prostitute in such a manner as to show that such person is aiding abetting or compelling her prostitution; or (c) to be acting as a tout or pimp on behalf of a prostitute it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that such person is knowingly living on the earnings of prostitution of another person within the meaning of subsection (1):- provided that no such presumption shall be drawn in the case of a son or daughter of a prostitute if the son or daughter is below the age of eighteen years. " ( 10 ) IN the instant case on the evidence it is clear that Indumati the wife of the applicant was a prostitute and that the applicant her husband was living with her. The presumption mentioned in sec. 4 (2) of the Act may therefore be drawn. But it is contended that the presumption should be drawn only in the case of strangers living with or habitually in the company of a prostitute and that such a presumption should not be drawn in the case of the husband of the prostitute who is living with her. There is no reason to restrict the scope of the presumption provided in sec. 4 (2) of the Act. If a stranger lives with a prostitute a rebuttable presumption may be drawn that such person is knowingly living on the earnings of a prostitute. If the husband lives with his wife and allows his wife to be a prostitute there is no reason for not believing that the husband was doing so for the purpose of living on the earnings of prostitution of his wife. If the husband lives with his wife and allows his wife to be a prostitute there is no reason for not believing that the husband was doing so for the purpose of living on the earnings of prostitution of his wife. If the husband allows his own wife to be a prostitute the presumption would be stronger that he was doing so for the purpose of living on her earnings of prostitution. There is therefore no reason not to apply the presumption mentioned in sec. 4 (2) of the Act to the case of the husband living with his prostitute wife. In this case therefore such a presumption can be drawn and when such a presumption is drawn until the contrary is proved it can be presumed that the applicant was knowingly living on the earning of the prostitution of Indumati his wife. When such a presumption is drawn that would be sufficient to constitute the house of the applicant a brothel because brothel includes any house room or place with is used for purposes of prostitution for the gain of another person. That the house in question was a brothel is therefore proved by the evidence on record and the presumption to be drawn from sec. 4 (2) of the Act. ( 11 ) IT is lastly contended that the conviction of the applicant under sec. 3 (1) of the Act is erroneous and that the conviction should have been under sec. 3 (2) of the Act. Two sub-sections of sec. 3 are as follows:-" (I) Any person who keeps or manages or acts or assists in the keeping or management of a brothel shall be punishable on first conviction with rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years and also with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction with rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less than two years and not more than five years and also with fine which may extent to two thousand rupees. (2) Any person who- (a) being the tenant lessee occupier or person in charge of any premises uses or knowingly allows any other person to use such premises or any part thereof as A brothel or (b) being the tenant lessor or landlord of any premises of the agent of such owner lessor or landlord lets the same or any part thereof with the knowledge that the same or any part thereof is intended to be used as a brothel or is wilfully a party to the use of such premises or any part thereof as a brothel; shall be punishable on first conviction with imprisoment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and also with fine. " ( 12 ) IT is proved by the evidence that the bogus punter Lalji approached the applicant himself for the services of a woman for the purpose of prostitution and that it was the applicant himself who had offered two girls to Lalji one of whom was Indumati the wife of the applicant. In view of this evidence it must be held that the applicant himself was keeping or managing the brothel. His conviction under sec. 3 (1) would be quite proper provided there has been a charge under sec. 3 (1) of the Actbut it is contended that the charge does not relate to keeping or managing or acting or assisting in the keeping or managing his house as a brothel and that the charge merely relates to using a house as brothel; and that the charge does not fall under sec. 2 (1) of the Act. The charge is clearly under sec. 3 (2) of the Act. I therefore alter the conviction from sec. 3 (1) to one under sec. 3 (2) of the Act. ( 13 ) IT is next urged that as the convictions of the applicant are under sec. 3 and sec. 4 (1) of the Act under sec. 10 of the Act the applicant should be released on probation of good conduct and detention in protective home. But I do not think that this is a case to which provisions of sec. 10 of the Act should be applied. 3 and sec. 4 (1) of the Act under sec. 10 of the Act the applicant should be released on probation of good conduct and detention in protective home. But I do not think that this is a case to which provisions of sec. 10 of the Act should be applied. ( 14 ) I, therefore, reject the revision application except to the extent that the conviction of the applicant under sec. 3 (1) of the Act is altered to one under sec. 3 (2) of the Act. The sentence passed is no interfered with in revision. Revision Rejected. .