Judgment N.L.Untwalia, J. 1. This is a miscellaneous second appeal by the decree-holder whose execution case filed on 15-3-1958, has been held to be barred by limitation. The decree was obtained on 23-2-1953, for a sum of Rs. 2,500 and odd and an instalment decree was passed. It was also provided in the decree -- "In case of default of any instalment the plaintiff is entitled to execute the decree for the unpaid balance ....." The first instalment was to be paid on 28-3-53; and the second on 23-2-54; the third on 23-8-54; the fourth on 23-2-55; the fifth en 23-8-55; the sixth on 23-2-56; the seventh on 23-8-56 and the last and the eighth instalment was to Be paid on 23-2-57. On the findings, it is clear that only the first instalment was paid but the subsequent instalments were not paid. It also appears that the decree-holder filed execution Case No. 63 of 1958 on 26-2-1958, claiming the entire balance of the decretal dues, i. e., the amount which was to be paid by the seven remaining unpaid instalments. Two days later, he filed an application stating that the judgment-debtor had deposited the first Instalment-money which the decree-holder had already withdrawn and that he had paid the second, third and the fourth instalments due on 23-2-54, 23-8-54, 23-2-55, for which the decree-holder had already granted receipts to the judgment-debtor but by mistake the decree had been put into execution for the whole of the decretal dues. The decree-holder, therefore, by an application asked the executing Court to note these payments of three instalments and to dismiss execution case No. 63 of 1958. It appears from exhibit 1, order dated 28-2-1958, passed in that execution case (63 of 1958) that referring to the statement made by the decree-holder in his petition dated 28-2-1958, the following order was passed : "If the case of the decree-holder is believed that judgment-debtor made payment of the instalments as stated by him the limitation may be saved but these payments cannot be accepted unless the judgment-debtor has been given a chance to accept or deny these payments. The decree-holder does not want any notice to be issued against the judgment-debtor. He wants on the ground made out in his petition that execution petition be dismissed. On the face of it the petition is barred. The decree-holder does not want any notice to be issued against the judgment-debtor. He wants on the ground made out in his petition that execution petition be dismissed. On the face of it the petition is barred. Therefore the petition has to be dismissed as prayed by him." Later on, on 15-3-1958, the present execution case was filed for realisation of the amounts of the last four instalments payable on and between 23-2-55 to 23-2-57. The judgment-debtor filed an objection under Sec. 47, Code of Civil Procedure, stating that the present execution case is barred by limitation. The Courts below have accepted his objection and have held accordingly that the execution case is barred by limitation. The decree-holder has, therefore, come up in second appeal to this Court. 2. The first point which was argued in the Courts below on behalf of the judgment-debtor was that in view of the default clause in the decree (which I have quoted above), the only remedy of the decree-holder was to execute the decree within time in default of the second instalment which was to be paid on 23-2-1954. That is to say, the decree-holders remedy to execute the decree for the balance of the seven instalments was barred by limitation on 23-2-1957. This point was sought to be replied on behalf of the decree-holder by referring to certain decisions of this Court as well as of other Courts taking the view that if the default clause is not mandatory in nature the decree-holder has a right to realise the amount of the instalment-decree as and when the instalments fall due; and it was further contended that the default clause in question was not mandatory in nature. The Courts below have not specifically answered this question but have defeated the decree-holder on the ground that, even assuming his contention to be correct, the position of law is that the decree-holder has got an option in the matter, either to rely upon the default clause and exercise his right there-under or to execute the decree relying upon Clause (7) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act for realisation of the amount of the various instalments as and when they fall due. And in the instant case the Courts below have come to the conclusion that by filing the execution case on 26-2-1958, the decree-holder exercised his option of executing the decree for the whole of the amount in exercise of his right based upon the default clause and, that being so, he cannot be now allowed to file another execution case and take recourse of Clause (7) of Article 182. 3. Since I am differing with the decisions of the Courts below in regard to the second question, it is necessary for me to express my opinion in regard to the first point which has been canvassed before me by Mr. K. K. Sinha appearing for the judgment-debtor-respondent. In the case of Monindra Nath V/s. Kanhai Ram, 4 Pat LJ 365: (AIR 1918 Pat 95) the decree provided that in the event of default being made in the payment of any one of the instalments the balance remaining unpaid should immediately fall due and be forthwith recoverable. Even in face of this clause, it was held by the Bench -- "Therefore unless the decree clearly leaves the decree-holder no option on the happening of a default but to execute the decree once and for all For the whole amount due under it; the decree-holder may execute it on the happening of the first, second, or any subsequent default; and limitation will run only against him in respect of each instalment separately from the time when each such instalment may become due and payable." This view following 4 Pat LJ case (4 Pat LJ 365 : (AIR 1918 Pat 95)) has been reiterated in the case of Braham Kishun Narain Deo V/s. Harihar Munder, AIR 1932 Pat 253. In that case also the decree seems to have provided that the decree-holder was entitled in the event of default to treat the whole debt as immediately payable. The matter has been fully discussed, if I may say so with respect, in the case of Ranglal Agarwala V/s. Shyamlal Tamoli, a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, AIR 1946 Cal 500. The matter has been fully discussed, if I may say so with respect, in the case of Ranglal Agarwala V/s. Shyamlal Tamoli, a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, AIR 1946 Cal 500. There the different phraseologies providing such contingencies in instalment decree have been referred to, e. g., "shall become due", "shall become payable" or "shall become realisable", "shall have the power to execute the decree for the whole amount" or "shall have the liberty" etc., and with leference to such expression the earlier Calcutta view holding otherwise has been dissented from and the view of the Full Bench is "Such a provision in our view, must, whenever possible, be construed in favour of the decree-holder whose right to get immediate payment has once been interfered with by the order for instalments and the correct way to construe it is to hold in favour of an option, unless, the language used in the decree clearly bars it." Relying upon this principle of law, I hold that the expression "In case of default of any instalment the plaintiff is entitled to execute" the decree in question is an optional clause, giving an option to the decree-holder to execute the decree for the unpaid amount relying upon the default or to wait to realise his dues under the various instalments as and when they fall due. 4. Coming to the second question. I find that the only evidence which was put forward on behalf of the judgment-debtor is exhibit 1, the order dated 28-2-1958, passed in Execution Case No. 63 of 1958, and Exhibit 2, the copy of the suit register. Relying on these exhibits the Courts below have drawn the inference that the decree-holder has exercised his option to execute the decree under the default clause. Mr. Harinandan Singh, appearing in support of this appeal tried to contest the proposition of law decided in the three cases relied upon in the judgment of the lower appellate Court, viz., Bir Narain Panda V/s. Darpa Narain Prodhan, ILR 20 Cal 74, Hanmant Bhimrao V/s. Gururao Swamirao, AIR 1943 Bom 36 and Ram Kishen V/s. Gopal Pan-dharinath, AIR 1950 Hyd 14 but having heard him, I am not prepared to differ from the principles of law decided in these cases if I may add with respect. I entirely agree with the observations of Chakravarty, J. as he then was in the Calcutta Full Bench, in this regard also which is to the following effect: "In our opinion, the correct view is not that when there is no evidence of waiver, the option must be deemed to have been exercised, but that when there is no evidence that the option has been exercised, it must be deemed to have been waived. When the decree-holder applies for realisation of instalments rather than for the whole amount, that itself is evidence that he does not wish to exercise his option or to put it in another way wishes to exercise it in favour of abiding by the instalments; and unless there is something to show that he had previously sought to enforce the default clause, it is not easy to see how it can be said that he must nevertheless be deemed to have done so." 5. In the present case, the execution application filed on 26-2-1958, has not been exhibited. There is no other statement of the decree-holder showing that he has exercised the option under the default clause by filing his application for execution on 15-3-1958, and by claiming the entire decretal dues of the seven unpaid instalments. One more significant fact which has weighed with me, and which the lower courts have missed to notice, is that Execution case No. 63 of 1958 was also filed when the last and the eighth instalment had fallen due. The filing of the execution case therefore, for realisation of the seven instalments on the 26-2-1958, can be consistent, and in my opinion is obviously consistent, with both, viz., in exercise of the default clause the decree-holder claimed the entire decretal dues and, obviously, he was out of time in making that claim, or it may be consistent with the exercise of the right of the decree-holder for claiming the money due under the seven instalments relying upon Clause (7) of Article 182 of the Limitation Act, and in that situation it is obvious that his claim even on 26-2-1958, in regard to the amounts payable under the second, third and fourth instalments was barred by limitation even under Clause (7) of Article 182, but his claim for realisation of the amounts payable under the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth instalment was not barred by limitation. That only because the decree-holder had claimed the entire amount in the previous execution case filed on 26-2-1958, is not sufficient to clearly establish, or conclusively shown, that the decree-holder had exercised his first option. The other exhibit (exhibit 2), copy of the suit register, does not improve the matter any further. Exhibit 2 simply shows that an instalment decree in terms of the decree had been passed and a previous execution case had been dismissed on 28-2-1958. 6. I, therefore, hold that the learned Subordinate Judge has committed an error of law in holding that the present execution case is barred by limitation. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the decisions of the Courts below are set aside and it is held that the present execution case for realisation of the amounts of the last four instalments, viz., fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth, is not barred by limitation. There will be no order as to costs in this Court.