Judgment :- 1. The question raised in this petition is whether the petitioners were rightly convicted of an offence under S.341 of the Penal Code. 2. The facts, shortly stated, are as follows: On 31-7-59 at about 7-30 p. m., Pws.1 and 3 to 5 were proceeding to Payyannur in a motor van K.L.C. 134 to attend a public meeting. They were shouting slogans to commemorate the successful termination of the Vimochana Samara Movement which had been started against the then Government in power. Petitioners are said to be communists or their sympathisers who were against the Samaram. When the van reached a place called Kandoth, stones were being pelted at the van. Pw.1 the driver then stopped the van. The petitioners then rushed out from the side of the road and came to the front of the van and asked Pw.1 where he was taking the van and told him that they would not allow him to proceed further. The passengers then got down from the vehicle and requested the petitioners to let them go. They would not heed to their request. By that time people gathered and some of them pushed the petitioners away giving room for the van to proceed. Pw.1 then got in and drove away the van. The wind screen of the van was broken by the stone throw. He reported the matter to the owner of the vehicle, Pw. 2 and under his instructions a complaint was laid by him to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Payyannur who after investigation laid a charge-sheet against the petitioners. 3. The petitioners denied the offence and their plea was that a false case was got up because of political rivalry. Accepting the evidence of the prosecution witnesses the learned Magistrate found the petitioners guilty and convicted them for an offence under S.341, I.P.C. and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of Rs. 15/-. The finding of the court below is fully supported by the evidence on record and it was not seriously challenged by the learned counsel for the defence. 4. The argument that is raised by the learned counsel is that there was no wrongful restraint within the meaning of S.339, I.PC., because although the van was stopped the passengers were left free to proceed on their way on foot if they wanted. 4. The argument that is raised by the learned counsel is that there was no wrongful restraint within the meaning of S.339, I.PC., because although the van was stopped the passengers were left free to proceed on their way on foot if they wanted. The restraint, it is argued, was only of the vehicle and not of the "persons" as required by S.339, I.P.C. 5. The learned counsel referred to the decision in Durga Pada Chatterjee v. Nilmani (A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 252). In that case the accused were alleged to have prevented the cart of one Kali Pada who had purchased some paddy from one Nilmony from proceeding along the public road, their object being to compel the payment of some dues to their master. The complaint was laid by Nilmony who had sold the paddy and the question that was raised was whether Nilmony was wrongfully restrained. It would be seen from the judgment that there was no evidence in the case that either Kali Pada or Nilmony or the cartmen were prevented from proceeding along the public road. Patterson, J., referred to the decisions in I. L. R.12 Cal. 55, Juggeshwar Das v. Koyalash Cunder and (1912) 15 Bombay Law Reporter 103, Emperor v. Rama Lala and held that: "The voluntary obstruction of a vehicle cannot be held to amount to wrongful restraint within the meaning of S.339, I. P. C." 6. In In re Peria Ponnuswami Goundan (A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 507) Jackson, J., observed as follows : "It is argued that restraining a horse on which a person is riding is not wrongful restraint as defined in S.339, I. P. C. If the person is prevented from proceeding at the moment of restraint the terms of the section are satisfied. It is no defence that he might have got off the horse and walked in the same direction". 7. This decision was followed in Gopalareddi and another v. N. Lakshmireddi (A.I.R. 1947 Madras 124). Happell, J., has dealt with the entire case law on the matter including the observation in A.I.R. 1942 Mad. 539, Gurucharan Kaur v. Province of Madras and also the Calcutta case referred to above and held that: "The voluntary obstruction of a cart in which persons are travelling would amount to the offence of wrongful restraint of the person in the vehicle. 539, Gurucharan Kaur v. Province of Madras and also the Calcutta case referred to above and held that: "The voluntary obstruction of a cart in which persons are travelling would amount to the offence of wrongful restraint of the person in the vehicle. The fact that the person or persons may get down and then be left at liberty to proceed on their way unmolested is immaterial. If the person is prevented from proceeding at the moment of restraint, the terms of S.339 I. P. C. are satisfied." 8. This decision has been followed in a later case by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., in In re M. Abraham (A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 233). That was a case where the driver of a bus purposely stoopped the bus across the road in such a manner as to prevent another bus which was coming from behind from proceeding further and he was convicted under S.341, I.P.C. The learned judge held that: "Any person travelling in a vehicle is entitled to travel in that vehicle, and should not be compelled to get down from the vehicle and walk or proceed in any other manner the obstructor wants. That is elementary common sense. Where, therefore, a driver of a bus makes his bus stand across a road in such a manner as to prevent another bus coming from behind to proceed further, he is guilty of an offence under S.341, Penal Code, of wrongfully restraining the driver and the passengers of the other bus It is absurd to say that because the driver and the passengers of the other bus could have got down from that bus and walked away in different directions, or even gone in that bus to a different destination, in the reverse direction, there was, therefore, no wrongful restraint. Such a contention will make "wrongful restraint" under the Penal Code infructuous and meaningless. Proceed in any direction must only mean proceed in that direction and not in any other direction, much less in the reverse direction." 9. The same view has been taken by Ramaswamy, J., in Nadalu Peraiah v. Voruganti Chandriah (A.I.R. 19.54 Mad. 247). Such a contention will make "wrongful restraint" under the Penal Code infructuous and meaningless. Proceed in any direction must only mean proceed in that direction and not in any other direction, much less in the reverse direction." 9. The same view has been taken by Ramaswamy, J., in Nadalu Peraiah v. Voruganti Chandriah (A.I.R. 19.54 Mad. 247). The learned judge has relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Lahanu Menaji (A.I.R 1926 Bom.118) and held: "Where the accused obstructed the complainant from proceeding with his bullocks along a pathway over which he had the right to proceed with his bullocks, the offence is committed." 10. The Patna High Court in Mangal Singh v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 384) has taken the same view. In that case the complainant was proceeding on a road in a tumtum and by obstructing the tumtum the accused prevented him from proceeding on his way. Distinguishing the case in A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 252 and I.L.R. 12 Cal. 55, it was held that the facts constituted the offence of wrongful restraint. 11. I respectfully agree with the view expressed in all these decisions and hold that the accused by standing in front of the van and preventing the passengers from proceeding further in the van had wrongfully restrained Pws.1 and 3 to 5 and therefore has committed an offence punishable under S.341, I.P.C. The petitioners were therefore rightly convicted. The sentence is by no means excessive. The revision petition is therefore dismissed.