JUDGMENT Shiv Dayal, J. This is an appeal under Order 43, rule 1(u) from an order of remand passed by the Additional District Judge, Shajapur. Bapulal, husband of respondent No. 1 and father of respondent No. 2 instituted this suit for redemption against the appellants alleging that the suit property was mortgaged by Harka Chand in favour of Babalram, father of the defendants; repayment of the mortgage money was to be made within 5 years; on the death of Harka Chand his son Motilal sold the equity of redemption on August 30, 1950, to the plaintiffs. The mortgage deed was unregistered. A decree for redemption was claimed on payment of Rs.225. The defendants resisted the suit on several grounds. At first the suit was dismissed on the ground that it did not lie on the basis of an unregistered mortgage deed. The first appellate Court held that the suit was maintainable because a suit for redemption was in substance a suit for possession and the unregistered mortgage deed could be used for the collateral purpose. The case was remanded to the trial Judge. There was no appeal against that remand order. When the case went back, the question of limitation was agitated and the trial Judge now dismissed the suit as barred by time. The first appellate Court has again reversed that finding and has again remanded the case. It is against this second remand order that the present appeal has been filed by the defendants. The only question before me is whether the suit is within limitation, and whether the mortgage money accrued due on September 8, 1920, in other words whether the mortgage of 1915 was for five years. The plaintiff produced a certified copy of the mortgage deed which he obtained from the Court of the District Judge, Shajapur. It appears from this copy that it was a usufructuary mortgage and that five years time was fixed for repayment of the mortgage money. It is urged by Shri Karkare that this copy cannot be read in evidence inasmuch as it is a certified copy of another copy which was included in the municipal record (file No. 58 of Samvat 2003 of the Municipal Committee, Shajapur, which file was summoned in Civil Suit No. 22 of 1949 and in Civil Appeal No. 105 of 1950 between the same parties). The learned counsel argues that after discarding this certified copy, there is no evidence on record to show that the mortgage was for five years. In my opinion, this contention cannot be accepted. The original mortgage deed of 1915 being unregistered, the plaintiffs could not obtain a certified copy from the Registrar of documents. The fact of mortgage is not specifically denied in the written statement although it is specifically averred in the plaint. Objections in the written statement relate to the invalidity of the mortgage and effect of non-registration. The defendants must, therefore, be held to have admitted by implication the fact of mortgage and existence of a mortgage deed. Moreover, it is alleged in the plaint that in an earlier suit the defendants had pleaded this mortgage in this defence. This allegation too has not been denied. In the absence of any averment in their written statements that the defendants were not in possession of the original mortgage deed, the only presumption is that they were in its possession because it is the mortgagee who is presumed to be in possession of the mortgaged deed. The defendants did not step into the witness-box to say either that they never had the mortgage deed or that it was lost or destroyed. This they did not state even by way of any application either in the Court of first instance or in the first appellate Court or in this Court. From this I infer that the mortgagees are in possession of the original mortgage deed of 1915. Since the suit is for redemption, from its very nature the defendants knew that the production of the original mortgage deed was necessary. As such, notice for its production was not necessary as provided in section 66 (proviso 2) of the Evidence Act. The plaintiffs applied to the trial Judge on December 22, 1953, to summon the original record of the municipality. That application was rejected. In the circumstances detailed above, I am clearly of the view that this is a fit case where a presumption under section 114, illustration (g) must be made in favour of the plaintiffs. Under that section the Court may presume that evidence, which could be and has not been produced, would, if produced, be unfavourable to the persons who withhold it. Under that section the Court may presume that evidence, which could be and has not been produced, would, if produced, be unfavourable to the persons who withhold it. The non-production of evidence that would naturally have been produced by an honest and therefore, fearless claimant permits the inference that its tenor is unfavourable to the party's cause (Wigmore, section 285). It is the duty of the party concerned to place before the Court all relevant material with reference to a matter which the Court is called upon to decide and the Court is justified in raising a presumption against such party for non-production of any relevant material asserted to exist. To withhold the best evidence which a party has in his possession and then to rely upon a set of facts is against sound legal principles when that evidence would throw considerable light on the matter in issue. On a number of occasions the Privy Council has condemned the practice of parties withholding from the Court material evidence which may throw light on the points for determination. In T.S. Murugesan Pillai v. M.D. Gnana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi AIR 1917 PC 6 : 44 IA 98 their Lordships observed: A practice has grown up in Indian procedure of those in possession of important documents or information lying by, trusting to the abstract doctrine of the onus of proof, and failing accordingly to furnish to the Courts the best material for its decision. With regard to third parties, this may be right enough; they have no responsibility for the conduct of the suit; but with regard to the parties to the suit it is, an inversion of sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the Court the written evidence in their possession which would throw light upon the proposition. See also Rameshwar Singh v. Bajillal AIR 1929 PC 95. From the facts stated above I am persuaded to make a presumption against the defendants that they did not produce the mortgage deed only because it contains the clause of repayment of the mortgage debt within 5 years. Having remained in possession for 12 years on the basis of the unregistered mortgage deed the mortgagee prescribed to himself for a valid mortgagee's title and a suit could be brought against him as a mortgages within 60 years under Article 148 of the Limitation Act. Having remained in possession for 12 years on the basis of the unregistered mortgage deed the mortgagee prescribed to himself for a valid mortgagee's title and a suit could be brought against him as a mortgages within 60 years under Article 148 of the Limitation Act. (I.L.R. 44 Mad. 945 : A.I.R. 1927 All. 311 : A.I.R. 1932 All. 259 : A.I.R. 1936 Pat 63 : A.I.R. 1950 Ori 213.) In Palania Pillai v. Amjath Ibrahim Rowther AIR 1942 Mad. 622 : ILR 1943 Mad. 15 (FB) it is held: The interest which the mortgagee in such a case acquires by prescription is the interest of a usufructuary mortgagee. He does not acquire a full title to the property. In Sukra Orson v. Jagat Mohan Singh AIR 1947 Pat. 245 it is held: Even where the mortgage is not a valid transaction because of non-compliance with section 59, Transfer of Property Act, still the defendants who are inducted on the property as mortgagees acquire the character of mortgagees of that property because of prescription when it is proved that they were holding the said property in that character during the period of prescription. And in such a case the purchaser of the mortgagor is entitled to a decree for redemption. Under the Gwalior State Limitation Act a period of 30 years was prescribed for suits for redemption. The Indian Limitation Act became applicable to the territories where the suit property is situate in July 1949. However, since 30 years had not expired before that date (computing limitation from 1920), the suit is within time. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed