JUDGMENT P.R. Sharma, J. 1. This is a plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated the 30th of July, 1959 passed by the District Judge Gwalior in Civil First Appeal No. 31 of 1959 whereby he set aside the decree dated the 23rd of February, 1959 of the Court of the Civil Judge Second Class Gwalior in Civil Original Suit No. 497 of 1957. 2. The facts material for the purpose of the present appeal may be stated as follows : The plaintiff and his brother Dhaniram on 6-11-1950 jointly purchased a house, the ground-floor of which was occupied by the defendant Ramdayal as a tenant of the previous owner. By an agreement dated 31-12-1950 the defendant attorned in favour of the plaintiff and his brother Dhaniram agreeing to vacate the rented premises before the end of August 1951. The defendant having failed to vacate the premises according to his promise, a suit (Civil Original suit No. 337 of 1952) was filed against him by the present appellant and his brother Dhaniram for ejectment and arrears of rent. This suit was on Second appeal finally dismissed by the High Court on 28-8-1957. The defendant on the other hand applied to the Rent Controller for the rent being standardised, and the same was fixed by the latter at Rs. 93/- per annum. 3. Thereafter on 3-9-1957 a partition of the joint family property was effected between the plaintiff and his brother under a registered deed, in consequence of which the premises occupied by the defendant fell to the share of the present appellant. The partition deed, it may be mentioned here, also contained a provision to the effect that arrears of rent which might be due from the defendant prior to the date of the partition shall be recoverable by the present appellant. 4. The plaintiff on 5-9-1957 served the tenant with a notice demanding arrears of rent on pain of ejectment and vacant possession of the shop on the ground that it was needed by the plaintiff for starting his own business therein. The defendant having failed to vacate the shop, as also to pay the demanded rent, the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, was filed on 16-10-1957 for ejectment, arrears of rent for a period of 3 years prior to the 1st of Oct., 1957 and damages at the rate of Rs. The defendant having failed to vacate the shop, as also to pay the demanded rent, the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, was filed on 16-10-1957 for ejectment, arrears of rent for a period of 3 years prior to the 1st of Oct., 1957 and damages at the rate of Rs. 2/- per diem from 1-10-1957 till the date of the suit. 5. The defendant in his written statement pleaded inter-alia that the partition was a bogus and sham transaction, inasmuch as the plaintiff and his brother never constituted a joint Hindu family; that the shop was not needed for the genuine business requirements of the plaintiff; that no rent was due from the defendant, since he had already deposited, for payment to the plaintiff, a sum of Rs. 211-12-0 in Court in Civil suit No. 337 of 1952, and a sum of Rs. 31/- in Civil appeal No. 160 of 1955 and that the defendant was entitled to deduct from the arrears of rent the sum of Rs. 47-12-0 which had been awarded to him as costs in Civil suit No. 337 of 1952. 6. The trial Judge held that a partition had in fact been effected between the plaintiff and his brother Dhaniram; that the notice to quit served on the defendant was valid and in accordance with law and that the claim for pre-partition arrears of rent was not proved. He, therefore, passed a decree for ejectment and rent from the date of partition and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 93/- per annum. 7. The defendant went up in appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and the plaintiff filed a cross-objection in respect of the portion of his claim which was dis-allowed by the court of first instance. The appellate court held that the partition was a bogus and fraudulent transaction which was entered into between the plaintiff and his brother with the object of securing ejectment of the defendant and that the house was still the joint property of the plaintiff and his brother. It was, therefore, held by the learned District Judge that the plaintiff alone was not entitled to issue a notice for ejectment or to sue the defendant for ejectment. It was, therefore, held by the learned District Judge that the plaintiff alone was not entitled to issue a notice for ejectment or to sue the defendant for ejectment. It was further held by him that the notice was vague and not in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Lastly it was held by the learned District Judge that there was nothing on record to show that the plaintiff knew of the cash deposits made in court by the defendant and that it was very doubtful if he could at that stage receive payment of those amounts from the courts concerned. He held that the plaintiff was entitled under the terms of the partition deed to recover the arrears of rent prior to 3-9-1957. He upheld the lower Court's finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 2/- per day. However in the result the appellate court dismissed the plaintiff's suit as well as his cross-objection. 8. The fact that a partition has taken place between the plaintiff and his brother is supported by the evidence of the two brothers themselves and the registered deed under which the partition was effected. The house in question was admittedly purchased in the name of both brothers and the fact that Dhaniram has come forward to state on oath that the portion of the house occupied by the defendant has fallen to the plaintiff's share is, in my opinion, sufficient to establish the plaintiff's exclusive ownership thereof. It is open to the members of joint Hindu family to bring about a severance of status by mere expression of their intention to separate and the law does not require any reasons to be stated, much less to be proved, for such intention being given effect to. I have no hesitation in holding that the facts that no reasons for bringing about a disruption of the joint family were stated in the partition deed or that the partition was effected with a view to secure the ejectment of the defendant are wholly immaterial for determining whether a partition has in fact taken place between the two brothers. I have no hesitation in holding that the facts that no reasons for bringing about a disruption of the joint family were stated in the partition deed or that the partition was effected with a view to secure the ejectment of the defendant are wholly immaterial for determining whether a partition has in fact taken place between the two brothers. It is not open to Courts by a process of speculative reasoning to avoid to give effect to a registered deed of partition, especially when it is not challenged by the parties directly affected by its terms. Much stronger reasons than those referred to by the learned Judge in his judgment would, in the circumstances, be required for arriving at a conclusion that the partition was a bogus and sham transaction. Considerations of public justice require that the courts ought not to draw such inferences except on proof of circumstances which, when taken as whole, are incapable of being explained on any other hypothesis. 9. For the reasons stated above, I would set aside the finding of the lower appellate court on this point and hold that it is not possible on the basis of the materials on record to hold that the partition deed is a bogus and sham transaction. 10. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the notice dated 5-9-1957 is not in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned appellate Judge has, I am afraid, misinterpreted the following portion of the notice- "" These words were interpreted by the learned appellate Judge to mean that the defendant was called upon to vacate on the 16th day of the month in which he received the plaintiff's notice. This is evidently an incorrect translation. What is meant by the words quoted above is that the defendant was called upon to vacate at the end of the month of tenancy which was current on the 16th day of receipt of the notice. Woodfall in paragraph 2240 at page 1047 of his book 'Landlord and Tenant' has summed up the law on the point as under- "The notice need not mention the particular day on which the tenant is required to quit. Woodfall in paragraph 2240 at page 1047 of his book 'Landlord and Tenant' has summed up the law on the point as under- "The notice need not mention the particular day on which the tenant is required to quit. Thus a notice to quit ''at the expiration of the current year of the tenancy which shall expire next after the end of one half-year from the date hereof" is sufficient." 11. The view expressed by the learned author was followed in the case of Addis Vs. Burrows (1948) 1 K. B. 444 (Ex. 453). It was not disputed in the present case that the tenancy commenced from the 1st day of every month. The tenant could, therefore, have no difficulty in understanding the import of the terms of the notice. He had only to see on what date the 16th day after the receipt of the notice fell. The notice required him to vacate at the end of the month of tenancy which was running on that day. 12. The date of commencement of the tenancy need not be mentioned in the notice. It was held by Sinha C. J. and Hidayatullah J. in the case of Rochaldas Vs. Ratanchand (A.I.R. 1954 Nag. 292) that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not require that the exact date of the termination of the tenancy should be specified in the notice. The same rule would apply to the date of the commencement of tenancy. 13. I would, therefore, set aside the finding of the lower appellate court on this point also and hold that the notice to quit is a valid and effective notice under the law. 14. The lower appellate Court rightly held that there was nothing to she that the plaintiff knew of the deposits made by the defendant and that it was doubtful if the plaintiff could now get these amounts. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover the sum of Rs. 279/- as arrears of rent for a period of three years prior to 1-10-1957. Since no evidence was led by the plaintiff in order to show that the fair rent did not represent the real value of the premises, the rule in Bhagwandas Lakhsmi Vs. Mst. Kokabai (1952 N.L.J. 393) will not apply to this case. The mesne profits were, therefore, rightly assessed by the courts below at the rate of Rs. Since no evidence was led by the plaintiff in order to show that the fair rent did not represent the real value of the premises, the rule in Bhagwandas Lakhsmi Vs. Mst. Kokabai (1952 N.L.J. 393) will not apply to this case. The mesne profits were, therefore, rightly assessed by the courts below at the rate of Rs. 93/- per annum, from the 1st of Oct., 1957 till delivery of possession. Their findings on this point are hereby affirmed. 15. In the result this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate court are set aside. The plaintiff's suit for ejectment, rent in the sum of Rs. 279/- till the 1st of Oct. 1957 and thereafter at the rate of Rs. 93/- per annum till delivery of possession is hereby decreed with costs throughout. Pleader's fee Rs. 30- only. Appeal allowed