ORDER : This criminal revision is directed against an order of a first class Magistrate of Agra dismissing a complaint under Secs. 323, 504 and 506 I. P. C. on the ground that it was barred by Sec. 403 Cr. P. C. 2. The first complaint which the applicant Mst. Indra Devi had filed regarding the offences in question was dismissed by Sri R. C. Dubey, first Class Magistrate, on 13-10-1958 because the complainant failed to appear in his court on that date. The complaint actually disclosed no offences under Secs. 504 and 506 I.P.C. and the accused had been summoned in respect of the offence under Sec. 323 I.P.C. only, with the result that the case was tried as a summons case. The order of dismissal passed on 13-10-1958, therefore, was under Sec. 247 Cr. P. C., and its effect was that the accused stood acquitted. The complainant had good ground for having this order of dismissal set aside, for the reason why she had failed to appear in the court was that the case had been transferred from one court to another without proper information having been given to her; but unfortunately, instead of taking steps to have the order of 13-10-1958 quashed, she merely ignored it and filed a fresh complaint against the accused on the same facts, with the result that Sri N. L. Kakkar, first class Magistrate, who was trying this second complaint, dismissed it on 29-10-1958 on the ground that it was barred in view of the provisions of Sec. 403 Cr. P. C. 3. The contention of learned counsel for the applicant is that Sec. 403 Cr. P. C. is not applicable in the circumstances of this case and that an order of acquittal passed under Sec. 247 Cr. P. C. without any decision being given on merits does not bar another trial on the same facts. He points out that the words used in Sec. 403 Cr. P. C. are : "A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall.... P. C. without any decision being given on merits does not bar another trial on the same facts. He points out that the words used in Sec. 403 Cr. P. C. are : "A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall.... not be liable to be tried again for the same offence;" and he argues that the use of the word "tried" suggests that there must have been a regular trial, involving a decision on merits, before the first order of acquittal can operate as a bar to a subsequent trial for the same offence. 4. The only decision which learned counsel for the applicant has been able to cite in support of his contention, however, is the case of Kotayya v. Venkayya, AIR 1918 Mad 212 in which the Madras High Court held : "Sec. 403 only bars the retrial of a person who has once been tried and convicted or acquitted and in this case it does not appear that the accused were tried on the first complaint. The trial of a summons case cannot be said to begin until the particulars of the offence are stated to the accused under Sec. 242 Cr. P. C. and there is nothing on the record to indicate that this was done ...No trial having even commenced on the first complaint, Sec. 403 does not bar the court from taking cognisance of the second complaint. In the course of their decision the learned Judges who decided this case remarked :- "In our opinion some meaning should be attached to the word "tried" in the early part of Sec. 403(1). It should not be treated as mere surplusage." Reliance was also placed by the learned Judge on the fact that under English law an acquittal on merits is necessary to entitle a person to plead "autrefois acquit." 5. The consensus of judicial opinion however is clearly against the view expressed in this ruling. In the case of Dulla v. King Emperor, AIR 1923 All 360 a learned Judge of this Court held (unfortunately without any discussion of the problems of interpretation that arise in this connection) that an accused once acquitted under Sec. 247 Cr. The consensus of judicial opinion however is clearly against the view expressed in this ruling. In the case of Dulla v. King Emperor, AIR 1923 All 360 a learned Judge of this Court held (unfortunately without any discussion of the problems of interpretation that arise in this connection) that an accused once acquitted under Sec. 247 Cr. P. C. cannot be tried again for the same offence on the same facts, by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 403 Cr. P. C. In Shankar Dattatraya v. Dattatraya Sadashiv, AIR 1929 Bom 408, the Bombay High Court remarked that "the word 'tried' in Sec. 403 does not necessarily mean tried on merits" and held that an accused who is acquitted under Sec. 247 Cr. P. C. must be deemed to have been 'tried', within the meaning of Sec. 403, the trial having commenced as soon as the Magistrate took cognisance under Sec. 190. Similar views have been expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Suku Ram Koch v. Krishna Deb Sarma, AIR 1929 Cal 189, and again in Kanai Hizra v. Golap Hizra, AIR 1953 Cal 197 . The Patna High Court in Ram Mahto v. Emperor, AIR 1921 Pat 311 (2) and Rasik Tatma v. Bhagwat Tanti, AIR 1958 Pat 239 , and the Nagpur High Court in Mst. Yashoda v. Mst. Banubai, AIR 1927 Nag 388 have also taken the same stand and have held that an acquittal under Sec. 247 Cr. P. C. bars a subsequent trial for the same offence. 6. It is further to be noted that the Madras High Court itself, in its later decisions, has refused to follow the ruling in Bezwada Kotayya's case, AIR 1918 Mad 212 vide In re Dudekula Lal Sahib AIR 1918 Mad 231 and Kutumbayya v. Lakshminarasimha Rao, AIR 1943 Mad 6 . 7. As pointed out in AIR 1918 Mad 231, no inference can properly be drawn from the English requirements for a plea of 'autrefois acquit', as the system of Criminal Procedure in this country is so different from that of England and there appears to be no justification for the view expressed in Bezwada Kottayya's case, AIR 1918 Mad 212 that the trial commences only when the particulars of the charge are stated to the accused. Actually the trial begins as soon as the Magistrate takes cognisance of the offence and issues process; and since, when an accused is acquitted under Sec. 247 Cr. P. C., process has already been issued, he must be deemed to have been duly 'tried', as required by Sec. 403(1). Moreover the explanation appended to Sec. 403, which shows what orders are not to be taken as amounting to acquittal for the purposes of this section, makes no mention of orders passed under section 247, and it may legitimately be inferred therefore that such orders do amount to acquittal as required by Sec. 403. Indeed to hold otherwise would mean that an order passed under Sec. 247 Cr. P. C., which expressly states that the Magistrate 'shall acquit the accused,' would amount to nothing more than a mere discharge; and if that had been intended, the Legislature would surely have used the word 'discharge' instead. 8. My conclusion is that the contention of learned counsel for the applicant is without force and that an acquittal under Sec. 247 is a definite bar to a fresh trial on the same facts for the same offence. 9. In the present instance the order passed on 13-10-1958 dismissing the first complaint under Sec. 247 Cr. P. C. was therefore a valid acquittal, which by virtue of Sec. 403 Cr. P. C. bars a fresh trial for the same offence, so long as it remains in force and is not set aside. The petitioner should have taken steps to have that order quashed, but did not. She cannot hope to gain her object by assailing the subsequent order of 29-10-1958, by which her second complaint was dismissed, for that order was perfectly proper and legal. This revision application accordingly fails and is dismissed. Revision dismissed.