Judgment :- 1. This Civil Revision Petition is by the defendant in a suit for redemption of a mortgage and recovery of possession of property with arrears of purapad. Defendants 3 to 5 had a contention that the transaction on the basis of which recovery of possession was sought was a kanam as defined in the Malabar Tenancy Act, 14 of 1930, and additional issue No. 10 was in these terms. "Is the plaint transaction a mortgage or a tenancy." The trial court repelled the defence contention and held that it was a mortgage. The correctness of this finding is canvassed in this revision petition. 2. The transaction in question is evidenced by a Kaivasampanaya deed (RRWvwkepLiLgU) executed on 22-1-1898 by the plaintiff's ancestor in favour of Cheeramma, mother of defendants 1 and 2, for a sum of Rs. 300/- and a panaya kychit (Ext. A-1) executed by the latter on the same date. Cheeramma was to appropriate Rs. 18/- towards interest on Rs. 300/-, adjust Rs. 4-7-7 towards revenue and Rs. 20-8-5 for putting up fences and thatching the building etc. and out of the surplus of profits she was to pay Rs. 32/-as purapad and Re. 1/- as the cost of two bunches of plantains. Interest on arrears of purapad or tax was also provided for and it was also stipulated that Cheeramma's rights could be sold for realisation of such arrears. The term was fixed as one year. The question is whether this transaction is a kanam as defined in the Malabar Tenancy Act. 3. Both sides referred to decisions of this court in support of the respective position contended for but it may be observed that these are not of much help as the decision in each case is based on the nature of the document sued on and the points raised in the case. 3. Both sides referred to decisions of this court in support of the respective position contended for but it may be observed that these are not of much help as the decision in each case is based on the nature of the document sued on and the points raised in the case. I may in this connection refer to the oft-quoted words of Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem (1901) A. C. 495:11 there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a rase is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." Thus, in Janardhanan v. Kuppandy & Another (1959 KLT. 118), the maim question argued before the Full Bench was whether the expressions, "called the "kanamdar' " and "called 'kanarthom' " in S.3 (14) which defines 'kanam' meant that the Act applied only to transactions where the words 'kanam' and 'kanarthom were used. It was held that the use of these expressions in the document was not essential if the transaction satisfied the requirements of kanam as defined in the Act. In Emmuni Panicker v. Krishna Panicker (1958 KLT. 756), Varadaraja Iyengar, J., held that the absence of a term of 12 years and a provision for payment of renewal fees as well as the inclusion of a specific provision for sale given to the transferee were not material and that the transaction in question was a kanam. The latest decision on the point is Krishnankutty v. Padmanabha Menon and another (1960 KLT. 294). The latest decision on the point is Krishnankutty v. Padmanabha Menon and another (1960 KLT. 294). Vaidialingam,J., construed the document in that case as a usufructuary mortgage and pointed out that the real test was to see whether the relationship was that of a debtor and creditor or of a landlord and lessee. This view is in consonance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramdhan Puri v. Bankey Behari (AIR 1958 SC. 941). As observed earlier the decisions in these cases finally rest on the terms of the deed. 4. So far as the plaint transaction is concerned I have no hesitation in holding that it is a usufructuary mortgage and not a 'kanam' as defined in the Malabar Tenancy Act. S.22 of the Malabar Tenancy Act which enables the court to decide the real nature of the transaction "notwithstanding anything in the Indian Evidence Act 1872, or in any other law for the time being in force" is not applicable to the plaint transaction which came into existence before Ist January, 1916. The decision of this case must therefore rest on the terms of the deed. S.3(14) of the Act defines 'kanam' as follows: "'Kanam' means the transfer for consideration in money or in kind or in both by a landlord of an interest in specific immovable property to another (called the 'kanamdar') for the latter's enjoyment, the incidents of which transfer include - (a) a right in the transferee to hold the said property liable for the consideration paid by him or due to him which consideration is called 'kanartham', (b) the liability of the transferor to pay to the transferee interest on the kanartham, and (c) the payment of'michavaram' by the transferee." As the section originally stood before it was amended by Act 33 of 1951, a term of 12 years and a provision for payment of renewal fee at the end of such term if the transferee was to enjoy it for a further period were also included as incidents of kanam. The absence of such provisions is immaterial now. Sri Krishna Warrier, learned counsel for the petitioner, conceded that it was difficult to point out any distinction between a usufructuary mortgage and a kanam as defined in the Act. The absence of such provisions is immaterial now. Sri Krishna Warrier, learned counsel for the petitioner, conceded that it was difficult to point out any distinction between a usufructuary mortgage and a kanam as defined in the Act. The preamble of the Act shows that the Act was passed to define, declare, alter and amend the law relating to landlord and tenant in the District of Malabar and certain neighbouring areas in the State of Madras. The object was not to alter the law relating to mortgages which is governed by the Transfer of Property Act. As pointed out by my learned brother Vaidialingam, J., what the court has to decide in such a case is whether the transaction is one between a debtor and creditor where immovable property is given as security for the loan or whether it is one between a landlord and lessee where the latter obtains an interest in land and is put in possession for enjoyment of the same. Judged in the light of this principle it is clear that the transaction in question is not a kanam as defined in the Act. 5. Though nomenclature is not conclusive, due weight must be given to the fact that Ext. B-3 was described as a "kaivasam panayadharam" and not as a kanam. Kanam was a well-known tenure in Malabar and the parties deliberately chose not to use that term but to describe it as "Kaivasam panayam." The transferee is described as "panayakkari" (mortgagee) and the consideration as "panayasanghya" (mortgage amount). Kanam is a tenure which owes its origin to the ingenuity of people in this part of the country who placed the person who paid money in a somewhat inferior position to the person who received the same by camouflaging the nature of the relationship in order to make it appear that the person who received money was thereby conferring a boon on the person who advanced the same. This was generally resorted to when people of higher social status had to borrow money from persons of a lower status. The respective status of the parties can be seen from the fact that the transferor in this case is referred to as "Thampuran" in the panayam kychit (Ext. A-1). Notwithstanding this, the document is described as a Kaivasampanayam and this must have been deliberately done. The respective status of the parties can be seen from the fact that the transferor in this case is referred to as "Thampuran" in the panayam kychit (Ext. A-1). Notwithstanding this, the document is described as a Kaivasampanayam and this must have been deliberately done. The following passage in the decision of the Supreme Court referred to earlier is useful for supporting the position that some weight must be given to the use of these terms in Ext. B-3: "Though the document is described as a cowle, the parties, who have had earlier transactions, must be deemed to have known the nature of the transaction they were entering into. In clear and express terms, the nature of the transaction has been stated in more than one place. The executant requested the other party in respect of the advance amount and interest to get executed by him a usufructuary mortgage deed bearing a lower rate of interest in respect of the 8 annas share. After mentioning the various terms, the executant restated the intention of the parties in the following terms: "In security of the payment of the peshgi money with or without interest mentioned in this ijara deed, I, the executant, have mortgaged, hypothecated, encumbered and made liable the ijara property." Therefore, whatever ambiguity there might be in the recitals, that was dispelled by the unambiguous declaration made by the parties that the property was given as security for the loan and the document was executed as a mortgage. The gist of the document was not a letting of the premises, with a rent reserved, but a mortgage of the premises with a small portion of the income of it made payable to the plaintiff. There is, therefore, no scope for the argument in this case that the document is a lease and not a mortgage." 6. Though the absence of a term of 12 years and the provision for payment of renewal fee at the end of the term may not be material in view of the definition of the term "kanam" this can be taken along with the other facts and circumstances. The very short term of only one year supports the plaintiff's case that the relationship was one of debtor and creditor. The property was acquired by the transferor for Rs. 700/-and consideration paid under the plaint transaction is Rs. The very short term of only one year supports the plaintiff's case that the relationship was one of debtor and creditor. The property was acquired by the transferor for Rs. 700/-and consideration paid under the plaint transaction is Rs. 300/- comparatively a high sum in the circumstances. 7. The subsequent conduct of the parties also lends support to the plaintiff's case. Ext. A-2 is a reply notice sent on 9-11-1944 by Cheeramma and she states therein that she is prepared to surrender possession on receipt of the sum due to her. This is long after the Malabar Tenancy Act came into force, and it is significant that Cheeramma did not claim permanent right of occupation. The defendants had a case that Cheeramma agreed to surrender possession in order to spite her children, but this allegation has not been substantiated. The defendants relied on a notice (Ext B-1) sent by the plaintiff's karnavan to Cheeramma on 2-11-1931 to show that there was an offer to grant a further term under the new "Kudiyan Bill". Ext. B-1 starts by demanding surrender of possession on payment of the mortgage money less arrears due, and in view of Ext A-2, Ext B-1 is not of much importance. 8. Taking all the circumstances into consideration I am of the opinion that the trial court's finding is correct and does not call for any modification. The civil revision petition therefore fails, and is dismissed but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs. Dismissed.