DAVE, J.—These are 3 writ applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of temporary permits granted by the Regional Transport Authority Jaipur by its resolutions Nos. 222 and 223 dated the 25th June, 1960. Although the temporary permits have been granted on different routes to different persons, common questions of law are involved in these applications and therefore they are disposed of together. 2. In order to appreciate the points canvassed before us, it would be proper to state briefly the facts which have given rise to these applications : — Writ applications Nos. 216 and 217 are in respect of the permits granted for Jaipur Kishangarh route. The petitioners in writ application No. 216 are bus operators holding non-temporary permits and they are plying their buses on Jaipur-Kishangarh-Ajmer route. The Jaipur Kishangarh route overlaps Jaipur Ajmer route upto Kishangarh. These petitioners were granted permits by the Regional Transport Authority Jaipur by resolution No. 380 of 1958 on 16-12-1958. There were several appeals against that resolution and so the Appellate Authority set-aside the said resolution on 7-12-1959. The petitioners filed writ applications Nos. 27 and 59 of 1960 and it was urged by them that the Appellate authority had decided the matter against them without giving them any notice of appeal and a chance of hearing. Learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellate authority gave an undertaking that the appellate authority would give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and therefore they withdrew their writ applications. The appeals filed against them were therefore still pending when the present application was filed. The petitioners were allowed to ply their buses during the pendency of the appeals against them and therefore their buses are running on the Jaipur Ajmer route. 3. Non-petitioners Nos. 3 to 22 had non-temporary permits to ply buses from Jaipur to Kishangarh and the period of their permits expired on 30.9.59. Before that date, they had applied for renewal of their permits. Tho:e renewal applications could not be decided early and therefore they were given temporary permits for 4 months from 30.9.1959 to 30.1.1960. On 1.2.1960, the Regional Transport Authority gave them Certificates for plying their buses. Before that date, they had applied for renewal of their permits. Tho:e renewal applications could not be decided early and therefore they were given temporary permits for 4 months from 30.9.1959 to 30.1.1960. On 1.2.1960, the Regional Transport Authority gave them Certificates for plying their buses. On 26th,27th Feb., 1960, their applications for renewal of permits were rejected by resolution No. 49 by the Regional Transport Authority on the ground that the State Transport Undertaking was likely to run its buses in the near future. But since the Regional Transport Authority was not certain about the date from which the State Roadways buses were to run on that route, the non-petitioners were granted temporary permits for 4 months subject to the condition that they would become ineffective from the date the Rajasthan State Roadways buses would begin to operate on that route. Aggrieved by the said resolution, the non-petitioners filed a writ application No. 134 of 1960 which was decided on 26.5.1960. It was heard by a learned Judge and he has found that the Rajasthan Transport Authority had not given an opportunity of hearing to the non-petitioners before rejecting their applications for renewal of permits. The resolution No. 49 therefore was set-aside and the Regional Transport Authority was directed to reconsider their applications after giving them an opportunity of hearing in connection with the scheme relating to the nationalisation of the Transport services by the State. Thereafter the non-petitioners presented fresh applications for temporary permits. Before considering these applications, the non-petitioners were permitted to ply their buses on what was called "temporary authorisation". These applications were allowed on 25.6.60 by resolution No. 223 for a period of 3 months or till the disposal of their applications for renewal which ever was earlier. It is the validity of this resolution which is challenged by the petitioners. 4. It is urged by them that the Regional Transport Authority which granted the temporary permits was constituted by Notification dated 21st June, 1960, that it consisted of only 4 officials, namely, the Divisional Commissioner, the D.I.G. Police, the Superintending Engineer,Buildings and Roads and the Regional Transport Officer, that no non-official was included, that this constitution of the Regional Transport Authority was against the express provisions of sec. 44(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and therefore its resolution was without jurisdiction and hence illegal. 44(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and therefore its resolution was without jurisdiction and hence illegal. It is next contended that the grant of the temporary permits to the non-petitioners who had filed applications for renewal of permits beyond a period of 4 months, was illegal. It is pointed out that in the second proviso of sec. 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the maximum period for which temporary permits could be granted to the non-petitioners was 4 months and therefore only the temporary permits from 1.10.1959 to 31.1.1960 were valid. It is contended that the Certificates, the temporary authorisation and the temporary permits given thereafter were all against the provisions of law. Lastly, it is contended that Shri Prabhu Narain Mahesh Chand had filed an application for grant of a permanent permit on Jaipur Kishangarh route, that his application was published by the Regional Transport Authority in the Rajasthan Gazette on 14th August, 1959 along with the applications for renewals made by the non-petitioners and that temporary permits could not be granted during the pendency of that application according to proviso (1) of sec. 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is also contended by the petitioners that 49 vehicles were running on Jaipur Ajmer route which completely covered Jaipur Kishangarh route, that only 18 out of 49 buses were allowed to ply daily, that there was thus no temporary need and the grant of temporary permits was not justified. 5. The petitioner in writ application No.217 is one Atmaram. It is stated by him that he had filed an application for grant of a permanent permit for stage carriage on Jaipur Kishangarh route on 6.5.60. Other persons had also filed similar applications for permanent permits on the same rute. He has filed their copies which are marked as Ex/2, Ex/3 and Ex/4. He has also challenged the validity of resolution No. 223 on the same grounds as are stated in writ application No. 216. 6. In writ application No.2o8,the petitioner is Janta Transport Cooperative Society Ltd., which is running motor bus on non-temporary permits on Jaipur Bharatpur route. This petitioners permit is still valid but there were 13 other bus operators whose permanent permits expired on 21.10.1959. They had applied for renewal of their permits and during the pendency of their applications, they were given temporary permits which were valid upto 31.1.1960. This petitioners permit is still valid but there were 13 other bus operators whose permanent permits expired on 21.10.1959. They had applied for renewal of their permits and during the pendency of their applications, they were given temporary permits which were valid upto 31.1.1960. From 1.2.1960 to 28.2.1960, they were again allowed to play their vehicles on the basis of Certificates. On 26th and 27th Feb., 1960, the Regional Transport Authority dismissed their applications for renewal but granted them temporary permits for 4 months which were to become ineffective from the date of the nationalisation of that route. They had also approached this Court by way of writ which was decided by a learned Judge of this Court on 26th May, 1960 by the same Judgment which is referred to above. The Regional Transport Authority was directed to reconsider their applications after giving them a hearing. Thereafter, the Regional Transport Authority allowed them to ply buses from 1.6.60 to 22.6.60 on "temporary authorisation". Meanwhile, on 13.5.60, the Regional Manager of Rajasthan Roadways Jaipur also presented applications for grant of temporary permit on the same route. His applications as also the renewal applications were considered by the Regional Transport Authority on 25th June, 1960 and by resolution No 222 it granted 13 temporary permits to the 13 bus operators who had filed applications for renewal of their permits and 13 temporary permits to the Rajasthan State Roadways for a period of 3 months. It would appear that the facts giving rise to this writ application are very similar to those mentioned in writ applications Nos. 216 and 217. The main feature distinguishing this writ application with others is that 13 temporary permits were granted to the Rajasthan State Roadways for the first time. The validity of this resolution No. 222 is also challenged on the same grounds as have been set out about resolution No. 223 and therefore need not be repeated. 7. It would appear from the above narration of facts that the following 3 questions arise for our determination:— (1) Whether the constitution of the Regional Transport Authority which passed resolutions Nos. 222 and 223 was not in accordance with law? (2) Whether the grant of temporary permits to those who had applied for renewal of their permanent permits, was illegal beyond the period of 4 months? 222 and 223 was not in accordance with law? (2) Whether the grant of temporary permits to those who had applied for renewal of their permanent permits, was illegal beyond the period of 4 months? (3) Whether the grant of temporary permits for any period whatsoever, was illegal during the pendency of applications for a permanent permit on the same routs? 8. It would be proper to take up the points set out above in seriatim? 9. To begin with the first point, it is common ground between the parties that the Regional Transport Authority which passed resolutions Nos. 222 and 223 on 26th June, 60 was reconstituted by the Rajasthan Government Home Department Notification No. i/F.i(3)/ 1/HB/59 dated the 21st June, 1960. It consisted of the Divisional Commissioner, the D. I.G. Police Ajmer Range, the Superintending Engineer, Buildings and Roads, Jaipur, and the Regional Transport Officer. The Divisional Commissioner was to function as Chairman and the Regional Transport Officer as member-cum-secretary. Thus all the members of that body including the Chairman were officers in the employ of the State Government. The petitioners contention is, that according to sec. 44 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 as amended by Act No. 100 of 1956, the Regional Transport Authority ought to have consisted of atleast two officials and two non-officials besides the Chairman and since no non-official was appointed, the constitution of that body was not at all according to law. It is also urged that the body ought to have consisted of atleast 5 persons including the Chairman and since only 4 were appointed its constitution was invalid for that reason as well. The non-petitioners have contested the correctness of this argument. Since the decision of the question depends upon the interpretation of sec.44 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act which will hereinafter be referred as the Act, it will be proper to reproduce here the relevant part thereof. 44(2) "A State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority shall consist of a Chairman who has had judicial experience and such other officials and non-officials, not being less than two, as the State Government may think fit to appoint;" 10. 44(2) "A State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority shall consist of a Chairman who has had judicial experience and such other officials and non-officials, not being less than two, as the State Government may think fit to appoint;" 10. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that a perusal of the said section shows that there should be one Chairman with judicial experience and there should be atleast two officials and two non-officials to constitute a proper Regional Transport Authority. He has also referred to R. 77 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1951 which will hereinafter be referred as the Rules. It is pointed out that according to Rule 77(c), the number of members whose presence would constitute a quorum must be four and that this rule also indirectly supports that the total number of members should not be less than 5 because a quorum is generally less than the total strength of the body. If the total number of members is 4, then, in order to constitute the quorum, all of them would have to attend every meeting. In reply, it is urged on behalf of the non-pet Loners that the words officials and non officials should be read conjunctively so as to form one unit and not disjunctively. According to the learned Government Advocate and other counsel appearing for the non-petitioners, the legislature only meant to stress that besides the Chairman, the number of other members should not be less than two. It was left open to the State Government to choose the other members either from amongst the officials or from the non-officials and it was not necessary to choose them from both the groups separately. Thus, according to their interpretation, the minimum number of members including the Chairman ought to be three and not five, and out of them, all may be officials or all may be non officials or some of them may be officials and others non officials. In support of their argument they have referred to Amara-vathi Motor Transport Co., Amaravathi, by its President N. Hanumantharao Vs. State of Andhra represented by its Chief Secretary at Kurnool(1). In that case, it was observed as follows: — "If the entire section along with the proviso is read together, any ambiguity that might otherwise appear in the section is dispelled. State of Andhra represented by its Chief Secretary at Kurnool(1). In that case, it was observed as follows: — "If the entire section along with the proviso is read together, any ambiguity that might otherwise appear in the section is dispelled. Briefly, the construction may be stated thus: The field of selection for appointment to the Provincial Transport Authority is officials and non officials treated as one unit. The Government may appoint from both the groups or exclusively from either of the two groups. It may, if it chooses, appoint only a single official. So construed, in the present case, the Regional Transport Authority consisting of three officials was validly constituted." 11. This observation no doubt supports the contention of the non-petitioners but it may be pointed out that under sec. 44(2) as it was reproduced in the above case there was a proviso which ran as follows: — "Provided that if the Provincial Government thinks fit a provincial transport authority or a regional transport authority may consist of a single official." 12. A perusal of the entire judgment shows that the learned Judges were led to express the opinion noted above because of the language of the proviso. It is clear that according to the proviso, it was left to the Provincial Government to constitute a provincial transport authority or a regional transport authority of one single official. The observation of the learned Judges shows that they had construed the remaining provision of sec 44(2) along with the proviso and it was on that account, that they thought that the legislature had contemplated "officials and non-officials" as one unit. It may be pointed out that under sec. 44(2) as it stands at present, there is no such proviso. The question of reading sub-sec. (2) along with the proviso therefore does not arise. The section read in its present form, means that a State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority should consist atleast of three persons of whom one should be a Chairman with judicial experience, and out of the other two —one should be an official and the other one should be a non-official. We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners to the effect that there should be atleast two officials and two non-officials because the words used by the legislature are "not being less than two". We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners to the effect that there should be atleast two officials and two non-officials because the words used by the legislature are "not being less than two". If the legislature thought that there should be atleast two officials and two non-officials, then, the word each would have been used after two. The section however does not say "not being less than two each." We must interpret the section as it stands and we cannot import the word each when it has not been used by the legislature. We, therefore, do not see any force in the argument that there should be atleast two officials and two non-officials. At the same time, we find it difficult to accept the view that the legislature meant to use the words "officials and non-officials" as one unit. If that were so, it would not have wasted the two words i.e. (1) officials and (2) non-officials. It would have been sufficient to use one word persons instead of "official and non-official". The use of these two words clearly indicate the intention of the legislature to the effect that it wanted to enjoin upon the State Government to appoint members both from the official and from the non-official groups. It was not considered proper to lay down the exact number of officials and of the non-officials of a ratio between the two; but it certainly appears to be the intention of the legislature that whatever may be the number of the members of the body which the Government may think fit to appoint, the said number must no: be less than two besides the Chairman and that out of them, atleast one must be an official and one must be a non-official. It is left to the discretion of the State Government to vary the number of the non officials and the officials but it is not left to it to drop out one of the two groups altogether. In short, the legislature has in its wisdom, laid down that the Regional Transport Authority must be representative both of the official group and the non-official group of persons and if one of them is left out, the constitution of the body would not be according to law. 13. As regards rule 77 of the Rules, it would suffice to say that the rules were framed in 1951. 13. As regards rule 77 of the Rules, it would suffice to say that the rules were framed in 1951. Moreover, it need hardly be stressed that the rules cannot govern the Act and the Act cannot be interpreted wrongly in order to adjust it with the rules. If any rule is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, it has to give way to the latter. In our opinion, the Regional Transport Authority is it existed on 25.6.60 was not properly constituted as it did not consist of even a single non-official. Since the constitution of the Regional Transport Authority was defective, both the resolutions passed by it were illegal. 14. Now coming to the second point, it is not controverted by the non petitioners in writ applications Nos. 216 and 217 that the period of their permanent permits expired on 30.9.59 and that they had filed applications for renewal of their permits prior to that date. They were given temporary permits for 4 months from 1.10.1959 to 31.1.60, Thereafter they were given certificates to ply their buses from 1.2.60 onwards. Then they were given temporary permits with retrospective effect from 1.2.60 to 31.5.60. From 1.6.60 to 22.6.60 allowed to ply their buses on temporary authorisation. From 25.6.60 they were again given temporary permits for .3 months. The same was true of 13 bus operators referred in resolution No. 222. It is urged by the petitioners that the Regional Transport Authority had committed a fragrant breach of the second proviso appearing in sec. 62 of the Act and that it had no authority to grant temporary permits after 31.1.60. Before examining this argument, it would be proper to produce here sec. 62 of the Act because the contention procceds on its interpretation. It runs as follows:— Sec. 62. "A Regional Transport Authority may without following the procedure laid down in sec. 57, giant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily— (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit; and may attach to any such permit any condition it thinks fit. Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of a new permit under sec. 46 or sec. 84 during the pendency of the application: Provided further that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted more than once in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the renewal of a permit during the pendency of such appli cation for renewal. 15. It may be pointed out that clause (d) which now allows the Regional Transport Authority to grant temporary permits pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit was introduced by Act No. 100 of 1956 along with the next two provisos. Before that the section ended with clause (c). A plain reading of the second proviso clearly shows that although it was left to the discretion of a Regional Transport Authority to grant a temporary permit pending its decision on an application for the renewal of a permit, its authority was restricted at the same time and it was expressly laid down that a temporary permit in such a case should, under no circumstances, be granted more than once in respect of the route or area specified in the application for the renewal of the permit. The opening part of sec. 62 says that a temporary permit may be granted for a limited period not in any case to exceed 4 months. It is thus clear that the maximum period for which a temporary permit may be granted is 4 months and if it can be granted only once and no more, then the Regional Transport Authority has absolutely no discretion left, to grant a temporary permit for a period exceeding 4 months pending decision on an application for the renewal of a non temporary permit. The correctness of this position was contested on behalf of the non petitioners during the earlier part of their arguments but later on, the challenge was given up. Learned counsel for the non-petitioners could not point out any authority in law to justify the grant of Certificates from 1.2.60 or the grant of further temporary permits from 1.2.60 to 31.5.60. The correctness of this position was contested on behalf of the non petitioners during the earlier part of their arguments but later on, the challenge was given up. Learned counsel for the non-petitioners could not point out any authority in law to justify the grant of Certificates from 1.2.60 or the grant of further temporary permits from 1.2.60 to 31.5.60. They could rot also point out any authority to justify the issue of what was called as "temporary authorisation" by the Regional Transport Authority in order to enable the non petitioners to ply their buses from 1.6.60 to 22.6.60. The grant of temporary permits by the two resolutions dated 25.6.60 was however sought to be justified by an argument which follows immediately. It was pointed out that the applications for the renewal of permits were rejected by the resolution passed on 26th/27th Feb., 1960. Thereafter, the resolution of Regional Transport Authority was set aside by an order of this Court on 26th May, 1960 in writ petitions Nos. 83, 122, 123, 125, 126, 128, 134 and 143 of 1960. According to learned counsel, there was afresh pendency of the applications for renewal from 26th May, 1960 onwards, and therefore the temporary permits could be granted again for a period of 4 months. We have given due consideration to this argument and in our opinion, it is not tenable. It is incorrect to suggest that the applications of the non petitioners should be deemed to have been made afresh after the decision of the above writ applications on 26th May, 1960. The Regional Transport Authority had no doubt rejected the renewal applications of the non petitioners on 27th Feb., 1960 and that order was set aside by this Court on 26th May, 1960; but since the case was remanded, the same old applications became pending before the Regional Transport Authority. It may be pointed out that if a certain case is decided by a judicial tribunal or a quasi-judicial tribunal and if its decision is set-aside by this Court in appeal or by way of a writ and if the case is remanded to the said tribunal, it cannot be urged that a new case is instituted before the tribunal after the order of remand. It is the same old case which goes back to the tribunal and which it is required to decide afresh. It is the same old case which goes back to the tribunal and which it is required to decide afresh. It may be further pointed out that an application for renewal of a stage carriage permit has to be made under sec. 58(2) atleast 60 days before the date of the expiry of the non temporary permit and this period could not be extended even by an order of this Court. Therefore, to say that a fresh application became pending after the date of this Courts order is not correct. Since the non petitioners were already allowed temporary permits for the maximum period of 4 months from 1.10.59 onwards, a further grant of temporary permits by resolutions No. 222 and 223 to those whose applications for renewal were pending, was wrong. The legislature in its wisdom thought that 6 months time was more than sufficient for the Regional Transport Authority 10 decide whether an application for renewal should be allowed or not. This is why it was laid down that application for renewal should be made at least 2 months before the expiry of the period of the permit. It further allowed the Regional Transport Authority to grant temporary permits for 4 months during the pendency of the renewal applications. The Regional Transport Authority having used its authority to its fullest extent, it had no power left thereafter to grant any Certificate or temporary authorisation or temporary permit after 31.1.1960. The contention of the petitioners is therefore fit to be allowed and the resolutions Nos. 222 and 223 should be quashed so far as they grant temporary permits to those whose renewal applications were pending. 16. We now come to the last and the most difficult question which relates to the interpretation of the first proviso under sec. 62 of the Act. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that applications for new permits under sec. 46 of the Act were pending in respect of both the routes and that during their pendency, a temporary permit could not be granted according to the first proviso of sec. 62. It is urged on behalf of the non-petitioners that the proviso only means that a temporary permit should not be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of the new permit under sec. 46 or sec. 62. It is urged on behalf of the non-petitioners that the proviso only means that a temporary permit should not be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of the new permit under sec. 46 or sec. 54 during the pendency of that application, but this applies only to the person who presents an application for the grant of a new permanent permit. This argument is sought to be supported by a decision of this Court in Bhoor Singh Vs. R.T.A., Jaipur (2). In that case, it was held that the first proviso only means that a temporary permit shall not be granted to a person whose application for a permanent permit is pending. It does not mean that if a single person makes an application for a permanent permit, everybody else is barred from obtaining a temporary permit. If this were so, the grant of a temporary permit on the occasion of fairs would be ruled out, if one of the operators or anybody else takes it into his head to make an application for a permanent permit. Learned counsel for the petitioners have doubted the correctness of this view and referred to Bhanwarlal Vs. The Appellate Tribunal of the State Transport Authority (3). In that case, it was observed as follows — "All that the proviso clearly means is that where an application for the grant of a new stage carriage permit or for a public carriers permit has been made before a Regional Transport Authority and is pending before it with respect to a certain route or area specified in such application, then a temporary permit u/s. 62 shall, in no case, be granted in respect of such route or area. The proviso nowhere says that in order to attract this proviso, the applications for temporary permits as well as the applications for new permits under sec. 46 and sec. 54 must be by the same person; and in our opinion, the application of this proviso cannot be resisted even in those cases where a temporary permit has been applied say by A, and there are already applications for regular permits by other persons say B and C pending before the Regional Transport Authority." 17. It is apparent that there is a conflict of views in the cases cited above. It is apparent that there is a conflict of views in the cases cited above. It appears that Bhanwarlals case was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge who decided Bhoor Singhs case. We have given our anxious consideration to this vexed question and we agree with the view expressed in Bhanwarlals case(3) to the extent that the proviso nowhere says that in order to attract it, the applications for temporary permits as well as the applications for new permits under secs. 46 and 54 must be by the same person. If the view expressed in Bhoor Singhs case is upheld, then, the person applying for a temporary permit gets into a position worse than of a person applying for a temporary permit. If the authority is favourably inclined towards the person applying for a temporary permit, it may oblige him by delay ing the decisions of the application for permanent permit. This interpretation would defeat the very purpose on account of which the proviso was added. The proviso seeks to put a check upon the R. T. A. in the exercise of its discretion in granting a temporary permit when an application for a permanent permit is already pending. The interpret on put upon the proviso in Bhoor Singhs case(2), would enable the authority to make a greater misuse of its powers. There is nothing in the wording of the proviso* to warrant the construction that it seeks to prohibit the grant of a temporary permit only to that person who has presented an application for the grant of a permanent permit under sec. 46 or sec. 54. The same view was held in Calcutta Wynad Motor Service (P.) Ltd. Vs. S.T.A.T. Trichnr (4). 18. Learned counsel for the non petitioner have urged that if this view is upheld, then, the grant of temporary permit on the occasions of fairs or religious gatherings or a seasonal business would be ruled out if any one of the operators or a third person takes it into his head to present an application for a permanent permit. It is contended that interested persons would be able to paralyse the hands of the Regional Transport Authority in granting temporary permits where they are absolutely necessary and that it would cause great inconvenience to the travelling public. It is contended that interested persons would be able to paralyse the hands of the Regional Transport Authority in granting temporary permits where they are absolutely necessary and that it would cause great inconvenience to the travelling public. According to them it could not have been the intention of the legislature to create a greater malady while providing a small remedy in another respect and therefore the proviso should be construed in harmony with the foregoing provisions of the section. Learned counsel for the petitioners have urged on the contrary that the proviso covers the grant of the temporary permits under all the three clauses (a), (b) and (c) and that this Court should interpret the proviso as it is and not as it should be. In support of his argument, he has referred to Jairam Das Vs. R.T.A. Jodhpur (5). In that case it was observed after referring to Salomon Vs. Salomon & Co. ((1867) A.C.22) and Cox Vs. Hakes ((1890) 15A. C. 506) that even though a court may be satisfied that the Legislature had not contemplated a particular consequence while enacting a law, the court is still bound to give effect to its clear language. I was also a party to that judgment and I have no hesitation in endorsing that observation again. It is certainly one of the cardinal principles or the rules of interpretation that if the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature. But the above rule of interpretation cannot be applied to the present case because, as I will show presently, the language of provisos (1) and (2) is not so precise and unambiguous as it is said to be. If the language were very plain and unequivocal, a difference of opinion in its interpretation would have hardly arisen between the learned Judges of this Court constituting two different Division Benches. It may be further observed that although a literal construction is one of the most elementary rules of construction, yet, it is not the only rule which must be applied in every case without any other consideration. In other words, the mere paraphrasing of the language of a particular provision of law is not the only or the universal rule of interpretation. In other words, the mere paraphrasing of the language of a particular provision of law is not the only or the universal rule of interpretation. When the language of a particular statute is not very precise and clear, then certain other rules have also got to be kept in view, because while interpreting a certain provision of law, it is one of the primary duties of a Court to interpret it in such a way as to bring out the real intention of the legislature. According to Crawford, "ascertaining the meaning of the Legislature forms the very heart of the interpretative process." It may be pointed out that the very first sentence, which appears in Maxwells well known treatise on the Interpretation of Statutes (10th Edn) and which view is based on numerous cases, is as follows: — "A Statute is the will of the legislature and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded "according to the intent of them that made it." The learned author goes on to say (at page 4) that "when the language is not only plain but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise." "The underlying principle is that the meaning and intention of the statute must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expressions used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just or expedient" (see page 5). But, adds the author, "judges are not always prepared to concede as plain language that which involves absurdity and inconsistency." Thus another rule of interpretation is, that if the language of the statute is not plain, it should be so interpreted as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency. At page 17, he points out that "where alternative constructions are not equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system." Then at page 19, he has summarized certain criterions suggested by Lord Coke for finding out the intention of the legislature. He writes that "to arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope, and object of the whole Act; to consider, according to Lord Coke : (1) What was the law before the Act was passed; (2) What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (3) What remedy Parliament has appointed; and (4) The reason of the remedy." Another useful way of arriving at the meaning of the legislature as suggested by him at page 29 is that "construction is to be made of all the parts together and not of one part only by itself." Thus harmonious construction of the various parts of a statute is also one of the important rules of interpretation. Further, he has pointed out that it is the duty of the judge to make such construction of a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Regarding the interpretation of provisos in particular, the following may be reproduced here usefully from the "Construction of Statutes" by Crawford: — "Even though the primary purpose of the proviso is to limit or restrain the general language of a statute, the legislature, unfortunately, does not always use it with technical correctness. Consequently, where its use creates an ambiguity, it is the duty of the court to ascertain the legislative intention, through resort to the usual rules of construction applicable to tatutes generally, and give it effect even though the statute is thereby enlarged.or the proviso made to assume the force of an independent enactment, and although a proviso as such has no existence apart from the provision which it is designed to limit or to qualify. It should also be construed in harmony with the rest of the statute." 19. In Abdul Jabar Butt Vs. The State of Jammu & Kashmir (6), it was observed by their lordships of the Supreme Court that— "It is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso"............ and that "the proviso is to be construed harmoniously with the provisions to which it is a proviso." 20. It would now be proper to examine both the provisos and interpret them in the light of the above noted rules of construction. and that "the proviso is to be construed harmoniously with the provisions to which it is a proviso." 20. It would now be proper to examine both the provisos and interpret them in the light of the above noted rules of construction. Let us first of all see whether the language of one or both the provisos is precise and whether it can stand a literal interpretation. It would appear that the following clause is common to both the provisos — "Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall in no case be granted." The question at once arises what was meant by "in no case" and "under this section" used therein. It was suggested that the words "in no case" refer to clauses (a), (b), (c), & (d), but this interpretation should not be accepted, in my opinion, because it is not borne out by the language of the second proviso. The second proviso governs only clause (d) because a temporary permit pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit can be granted only under clause (d). The plain meaning of the second proviso therefore is, that temporary permit under clause (d) of the section shall not be granted in any circumstances more than once, in respect of an area which is specified in the application for the renewal of a permit, so long as such an application for the renewal of permit remains pending. The word "case" used in "in no case" cannot thus possibly mean a case referred in clauses (a), (b) and (c). To my mind, the words "in no case" only mean "in no circumstances". They have been used only to emphasise the negative duty and it would not be proper to stretch their meaning in any other sense. 21. As regards the words "under this section", they are, to my mind, of great importance in this case, since the applications of the provisos depend upon their interpretation. Ordinarily the words "under this section" should mean "under the whole of the section" and yet they cannot possibly be given that meaning in the context of the subject matter of the second proviso. As pointed out above, the second proviso only relates to the grant of a temporary permit during the pendency of an application for renewal of non-temporary permit. As pointed out above, the second proviso only relates to the grant of a temporary permit during the pendency of an application for renewal of non-temporary permit. So, these words refer to clause (d) alone and mean "under the relevant part of this section" and not the whole section. If the language of the second proviso were precise, the words" clause (d) of" should have been added after "under" and before "this section". In other words, the precise language should have been "under clause (d) of this section" instead of "under this section". It is thus clear that the language of the second proviso is not very precise and the argument of the petitioners learned counsel for applying the rule of literal interpretation cannot stand. 22. Now, it would be proper to take up the first proviso and see whether the words "under this section" have been used there in the same sense as in the second "proviso, that is meaning "under the relevant part of the section" or the whole section." It is one of the rules of interpretation that if there is any difficulty in finding out the real meaning of any word or term and the intention of those who have used it, then it should be seen whether the same word or term has been used elsewhere in the same document, and, if so, in what sense. Unless the subject or context necessarily requires that the same words must be given different meaning, they should be taken to have been used in same sense. Still, it would be proper to see first if the said words can stand the literal interpretation without any difficulty. 23. Now, if the first proviso is literally interpreted, and the words "under this section" are held to apply to the entire foregoing section, then it would be as much applicable to clauses (a), (b) and (c) as to clause (d). But, if it is applied to clause (d), then it would create a very anomalous and difficult situation and the very purpose for which clause (d) has been introduced will be defeated. It need hardly be pointed out that an application for renewal of a stage-carriage or a public carriers permit under sec. 58(2) of the Act has to be made not less than sixty days before the date of its expiry. It need hardly be pointed out that an application for renewal of a stage-carriage or a public carriers permit under sec. 58(2) of the Act has to be made not less than sixty days before the date of its expiry. This application has to be disposed of according to the same sub-section as if it were an application for new permit. As held in M/s. Vijay Singh Kalyan Singh Vs. R.T.A. Jaipur(y), applications for renewal have to be advertised in the same way as applications for new permits under sec. 57 of the Act. Ordinarily, it is expected that applications for the renewal of permits should be disposed of before the expiry of their period. It was, however, found that because of the above procedure, the R.T.A. could not, in certain cases, dispose of such applications within the prescribed period. In order to avoid the break-down of the bus services immediately after and also to provide interim relief to the Bus operators plying their Buses on non temporary permits, the expiry of the period of non temporary permits, the Legislature thought it proper to empower the R.T.A. to grant temporary permits without following the procedure under sec. 57 of the Act, pending the decision of the applications renewals of permits. Now, if any application for a permanent permit is pending before the date of the expiry of the permits for which Applications for renewals have been filed and if it is held that temporary permits cannot be granted on account of the pendency of that application, then this view would cause a stalemate on that route and the provision of cl. (d) would become nugatory. It is very common for people to file applications for new permits prior to the date on which the term of the existing permits expires. Such applications are considered along with the applications for a new permit. To my mind, it could not have been the intention of the Legislature that applications for new permits should be considered and disposed of, even before the applications for the renewal of existing permits are decided. To illustrate the difficulty,we need not go to a hypothetical case but let us see the facts of writ application No. 216 of 1960 itself. As pointed out above, the period of permanent permit of the non-petitioners was to expire on 30th Sept., 1959. To illustrate the difficulty,we need not go to a hypothetical case but let us see the facts of writ application No. 216 of 1960 itself. As pointed out above, the period of permanent permit of the non-petitioners was to expire on 30th Sept., 1959. Their applications for renewal could not be decided before that date and therefore under cl. (d) they were given temporary permits from Ist Oct., 1959 to 31st Jan., 1960. If proviso (1) is held to govern cl. (d) also, then the grant of temporary permits from 1.10.59 to 31.1.60 would also be illegal because one bus-operator Prabhunarain Maheshchandra had already presented an application for a new permanent permit. His application was published in the notification of 14th August, 1959 (Ex. 3) along with 20 applications for renewal of permits and it was also lying undecided on 1st Oct., 1959. If 20 buses were to stop plying on 1st Oct., 1959 atonce, it would have caused very serious inconvenience to the travelling public. It is to provide for such contingencies that cl. (d) has been provided and if the first proviso is held applicable to it, then the power given under cl. (d) would be almost nugatory. It could not have been the intention of the Legislative to give to the R. T. A. power to grant temporary permit under cl. (d) with one hand and take it away with another hand. The check on the powers under cl.(d) was laid down in proviso (2) alone and, in my opinion, proviso(1) was not provided to cover cl. (d). Thus the words "under this sec." appearing in the first proviso do not apply to cl. (d) and so, here also the use of these words lacks in precision. 24. The next question, which then arises is, whether all the three cls. (a), (b) and (c) or only one or more of them is governed by the proviso. I have given my earnest consideration to this difficult question and, to my mind, the Legislature meant to introduce the first proviso only for governing cl. (c). This would be clear if we apply Lord Cokes formula in Heydons case and see what was the law before the amendment was made and what was the mischief or defect for which the proviso was introduced. (c). This would be clear if we apply Lord Cokes formula in Heydons case and see what was the law before the amendment was made and what was the mischief or defect for which the proviso was introduced. So far as I have been able to find out from the cases decided in various High Courts, there was no controversy about the meaning and application of cls. (a) and (b). The controversy was only about cl. (c) and the decisions of the various Courts were conflicting about the meaning and scope of the term "particular temporary need." For instance in the case of Sri Ram Vilas Service Ltd. Vs. The Road Traffic Board, Madras (8). Gentle C.J. expressed his views on the applicability of cl. (c) in the following terms: — "The sole authority for grant of such permits is sec. 62 and only when a circumstance, therein specified, exists and for no longer than four months. No attempt was made to justify the grant by virtue of cls. (a) and (b) of the Section but it was argued that cl. (c) has applicable. That clause enables a temporary permit to be granted "to meet a particular temporary need." It was suggested that the "particular temporary need" was the non-availability of the Government buses at the date when the appellants three year permit expired on 1.5.1947 and that need was met by granting a temporary permit for the appellants buses to ply for hire during the period preceding the date when the Government hoped to obtain its vehicles and put them into use. Incidentally it was stated, during the course of argument, that the Governments buses had not materialised within four months of the grant of the temporary permits which have been renewed once and may they will again be renewed. If some private enterprise, instead of the Government, had been making preparations to place buses on the road but the necessary vehicles were not expected to be ready when the appellants three years permit expired, it is beyond doubt that the same course would not have been taken by the Board, nor, indeed, by the Government, as occurred in the present instance. There was not a particular temporary need within the meaning of the Act which empowered the grant of temporary permits. There was not a particular temporary need within the meaning of the Act which empowered the grant of temporary permits. The grant of temporary permits was misusing the provisions of the Act solely for the benefit of the Government and to prevent criticism and objection by the travelling public. The whole circumstance of the grant was improper in the extreme." This view was, however, not followed in Chandi Prosad Vs. The R. T. A. Gauhati (9) in which it was observed by Thadani C. J. that the inability of the Government to provide immediate transport for the conveyance of the public will create a particular temporary need within the meaning of clause(c) of sec. 62 and in order to meet that particular need the Regional Transport Authority is competent to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily. A different view was held by the learned Judges of the same Court in Madhab Chandradas Vs. Regional Transport Authority, Gauhati Region (10) wherein Ram Labhaya J., with whom the other Judge agreed, followed the view expressed in Sriram Vilas Service Ltd. Vs. The Road Traffic Board, Madras (8), referred to above. 25. In Khandari Babu vs. The Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur (11), the R. T. A. had granted a temporary permit under sec. 62(c) on the ground that the bus of the temporary permit holder was not sufficient to meet the traffic demand of the public on that route and grant of a permit was required till the necessary formalities for increasing the non-temporary permits were gone through. It was held that there was no case for interference with the order. It was also observed that a permanent need may also, under certain given circumstances, give rise to the existence of a particular temporary need. In Kotah Transport Ltd. Vs. The Regional Transport Authority, Udaipur(12), the R. T. A. had granted temporary permits on certain routes for a temporary period on the ground that there was persistent demand on the part of the general public for plying more stage carriages. It was held that the persistent demand of the people did not justify grant of temporary permits and that the R. T. A. had virtually tried to circumvent the provisions of law for grant of non-temporary permits. It was thought that there was a conflict of views in the said two decisions, but it was ex plained in Jairamdas Vs. It was held that the persistent demand of the people did not justify grant of temporary permits and that the R. T. A. had virtually tried to circumvent the provisions of law for grant of non-temporary permits. It was thought that there was a conflict of views in the said two decisions, but it was ex plained in Jairamdas Vs. The Regional Transport Authority, Jodhpur(13). I need not multiply the cases. It would suffice to say that there were numerous cases in which the R. T. A. granted temporary permits under cl.(c) in the name of a particular temporary need even when applications for permanent permits were pending. It was in order to put a check on the grant of temporary permits in cases where there was really need for temporary permits and where the R. T. A. had some-how tried to circumvent the grant of permanent permits that the first proviso seems to have been added by Amendment Act No. 100 of 1956. The main purpose of this proviso, to my mind, is to direct those who are responsible for granting a permit and say "please dont grant a temporary permit in the name of or under the guise of a particular temporary need when an application for a non-temporary permit for the same route is already pending before you". There seems no apparent reason and no reason has been suggested to show why the Legislature might have thought of governing clauses (a) and (b) also by the first proviso. Clauses (a) and (b) clearly refer to special temporary needs, i. e. to permit the R. T. A. to grant temporary permits for conveyance of passengers on special occasions, such as (a) to and from fairs and religious gatherings or (b) for the purpose of a seasonal business. Now it is common knowledge that fairs and religious gatherings are held only for a few days and seasonal business is also carried out during a particular season which cannot in any case last for a period longer than four months. No reasonable explanation has been given on behalf of the petitioners as to why the Legislature might have thought it proper that the R. T. A, should refuse the grant of temporary permits under these clauses simply because some application for one or more permits on these routes is pending. No reasonable explanation has been given on behalf of the petitioners as to why the Legislature might have thought it proper that the R. T. A, should refuse the grant of temporary permits under these clauses simply because some application for one or more permits on these routes is pending. The temporary needs in such cases would terminate with the end of the fairs, religious gatherings or seasonal business and if such temporary needs are met by the grant of too many permanent permits, there would be a glut of buses on the route. 26. Moreover, if temporary permits are refused for the conveyance of passengers to and from the fairs etc. simply because an application for a permanent permit on that route is pending, the people would be put to great hardship and inconvenience. It was argued that if somebody wants to create a mischief by presenting an application for permanent permit in order to stay the grant of temporary permits for religious fairs etc., that contingency may be met by the dismissal of the application. It was also suggested that under sec. 47(3), a R. T. A. must limit the number of stage carriages on specified routes so that if somebody puts in an application for a permanent permit just to prevent the grant of temporary permits under clauses (a) and (b), the application may be dismissed atonce. It may be pointed out that sec. 47(3) only enables the R. T. A. to limit the number of stage carriages on specified routes within the region, but it cannot be said that it is bound to do so in every case. The sub-section, as framed is only an enabling one. It is true that in certain cases the R. T. A. may be able to dismiss frivolous applications atonce, but in certain cases, it is also possible for the bus operators to make out a strong case for the grant of say, one or two more permanent permits on a particular route. If such on application is honestly made but it is presented a short time before particular fair such that the R. T. A. is unable to decide that application, then the result would be that it would not be able to grant any temporary permit for the purposes of the fair during the pendency of that application. 27. If such on application is honestly made but it is presented a short time before particular fair such that the R. T. A. is unable to decide that application, then the result would be that it would not be able to grant any temporary permit for the purposes of the fair during the pendency of that application. 27. Learned Government Advocate cited at the time of the arguments the instance of Ramdeora fair which was held only a few months back. It was pointed out that there were quite a number of buses (about 28) running on non-temporary permits on the route on which Ramdeora is situated. Yet, there was such a tremendous rush of pilgrims at the time of the fair that about one hundred temporary permits had to be granted to carry the pilgrims to and back from the fair. It was argued that if in such a case somebody presents an application for a non-temporary permit a month before the fair, the R. T. A. would be helpless in granting temporary permits and people would be put to great inconvenience. To my mind, there is great force in this argument. In this State and also in other parts of this Country, there are numerous places where fairs and religious gatherings are held. The need for non-temporary permits for such places may be a small one while at the time of the fairs or gatherings, thousands of persons may flock to that place. It is difficult to understand that by inserting the first proviso, the Legislature meant to direct the R. T. A. that he should not grant permit under clause (a) if an application for even a single non-temporary permit is lying undecided at the time of the fair or the religious gathering. Clause (b) also relates to the grant of temporary permits and more particularly for public-carriers for the purposes of a seasonal business. The arguments given by me with regard to clause (a) equally apply to clause (b) and therefore they need not be repeated. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Harnarain Roy Vs. The R.T.A.(14) and urged that the said case supports him in his argument to the effect that the proviso has been added only with a view to direct the R.T.A. to dispose of the application for permanent permits as expeditiously as possible. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Harnarain Roy Vs. The R.T.A.(14) and urged that the said case supports him in his argument to the effect that the proviso has been added only with a view to direct the R.T.A. to dispose of the application for permanent permits as expeditiously as possible. In that case the R.T.A. had invited applications for grant of a permanent permit and, therefore, some applications were filed before him. During the pendency of those applications, it granted a temporary permit to opposite party No. 2 for a period of four months. Shri Harnarain Roy, petitioner, filed an application to the State Transport Authority to revise this order. The said authority took no action. In the meantime the period of the temporary permit in favour of opposite party No. 2 was extended inspite of the petitioners objection. The petitioner, therefore, filed a writ application and it was allowed. It is obvious that it was a case in which the temporary permit was granted u/cl. (c) and I respectfully agree with the view that it was hit by the first proviso. It appears that in that case it was not specifically urged before the learned Judge whether the first proviso was also applicable to cl. (a) and (b). The only argument raised was that the first proviso had put unreasonable restrictions 0:1 the power of the Regional Transport Authority. This argument was repelled with the observations that "there is undoubted power in the R.T.A. to grant temporary permits to meet special situation or any special circumstance." It is not clear which provision of the law was in view of the learned Judges while making this observation. On the other hand, it shows that in the view of the learned Judge also, the first proviso did not render the R.T.A. so helpless as learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to make him by a narrow interpretation of that proviso. I respectfully agree with the learned Judges that the first proviso was made in order to put a check on nepotism and favouritism and to exhort the R. T. O. to dispose of the applications for permanent permit expeditiously, but there is nothing in this judgment to suggest that the learned Judges held the first proviso applicable to cl. (a) and (b) as well. 29. (a) and (b) as well. 29. To conclude, both the provisos should be construed harmoniously with the foregoing provisions of sec. 62 and if so interpreted, the words "under this section" in both the provisos would not mean "under the whole section" but "under the relevant part of the section". The first proviso relates to cl.(c) only, while the second proviso governs cl.(d) alone. 30. The meaning and purpose of the first proviso is to direct the R.T.O. that if an application for a non-temporary permit under sec. 46 of the Act is presented for any route or area, then it should be decided expeditiously according to law, and so long as it remains pending, no temporary permit should be given under any circumstances to the applicant for non-temporary permit or to any other person in respect of the said route or area, in the name of, or under the guise of, meeting a particular temporary need under cl. (c). 31. Similarly, the second proviso read with cl. (d) to which alone it relates means that the R.T.A. should ordinarily decide the applications for renewals of permits before the expiry of the period of the said permits, and if, for any reason, such applications cannot be decided by that time, then it may grant temporary permits pending the decision of the applications but the temporary permit should under no circumstances be given more than once. In other words, it is left to the discretion of the R.T.A. to grant the permit for the maximum period of four months, but if it grants the permit for a shorter period —say for a month or two-it cannot thereafter grant another temporary permit by saying that it had authority to grant the permit for four months. 32. In the present case the temporary permits to the Rajasthan Roadways and other non-petitioners were not granted under cls. (a) and (b), but they seem to have been granted under cl. (c) and since applications for permanent permits on those routes were pending by the time the permits were granted, they are hit by proviso (1). 33. Resolutions Nos. 222 and 223 are invalid on all the three grounds narrated above and, therefore, in my opinion, all the three writ applications should be allowed and both the resolutions and the permits granted thereunder should be quashed.