ORDER R.S. Shukla, Member Non-applicant's application under section 38(2) of the Zamindari Abolition Act was rejected by the Tahsildar, but allowed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in first appeal. In second appeal, the Additional Commissioner, rejected it on the ground that in view of the insertion of section 38-A by the Second Amendment Act, 1959, no second appeal was permissible. The Additional Commissioner has further observed that the decision of the High Court (Gwalior Bench) in Sujansingh v. Dwarka Pd. 1959 MPLJ 738 is "no longer to be regarded as a good law in view of the provisions of the right of appeal against the order of the Tahsildar under section 38-A(1) of the Act". The learned counsel for the non-applicant justified the view taken by the Additional Commissioner and urged that after the insertion of section 38-A, the order of the Collector in first appeal had become final and conclusive. I am unable to subscribe to this view. In the above mentioned decision of the High Court it has been held that an action taken by the Tahsildar under section 38(2) is purely an administrative act and any order passed thereunder is not an appealable order, but, at the same time, it did hold that in case an application under section 39 contains a prayer for the mutation of applicant's name, it would be an application of a composite nature and the proper course for the revenue Court, in such cases, would be to treat such a prayer as one under section 86. The High Court further observed that when a Tahsildar passes an order in regard to the mutation, it is really (but not expressly) an order under section 86 and "is certainly appealable under section 35 of that Act". In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the non-applicant's application under section 38(2) was a composite application, and it cannot, therefore, be denied that, in keeping with the High Court's above decision, the forum of appeal shall be governed by sections 35 and 36 of the M.B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. In this view a second appeal would be tenable and the impugned order of the Additional Commissioner cannot be sustained. In this view a second appeal would be tenable and the impugned order of the Additional Commissioner cannot be sustained. In my opinion, it would not be correct to say that the aforesaid decision of the High Court has ceased to be good law after the enactment of section 38-A. The High Court's decision is affected only to the extent that an order passed by the Tahsildar, purely under section 38(2), has now been made appealable. To this extent alone, one might say that the view of the High Court can no longer hold the field; but there is nothing in section 38-A to supersede the view of the High Court in other respect, namely, that, in case an application under section 38(2) is accompanied by a prayer for mutation, the same shall be treated as one under section 86 of the M.B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, and the forum of appeal shall accordingly be determined in accordance with sections 35 and 36 of the M.B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. Once an application is taken out of the ambit of section 38 of the M.B. Abolition of Zamindari Act the provisions of section 38-A prescribing only one appeal cease to have any relevancy. I, therefore, disagree with the view taken by the Additional Commissioner and set aside his order accordingly. The case is remanded to him for disposal in second appeal in accordance with law. Parties to bear their own costs.