ORDER :- This revision petition is filed against the order of the Munsiff, Imphal, dismissing an application for restoration of another application which had been dismissed for default. 2. The petitioner filed Title Suit No. 26 of 1957 in the Munsiff Court, for recovery of certain land with mesne profits. He had closed his evidence in the case and the defence was to begin on 15-11-1957. On that day, the petitioner was absent and the suit was dismissed for default. Then he filed an application on 28-11-1957 for restoration of the suit. It was Miscellaneous Case No. 58 of 1957. That underwent many adjournments. Ultimately, it was also dismissed for default of plaintiffs appearance. Then, the petitioner filed another application, Miscellaneous Case No. 59 of 1958 for reviving the earlier application. That also was dismissed for default of appearance. Then, he filed Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 1959 on the very same day on which Miscellaneous Case No. 59 of 1958 was dismissed for default stating that he was present in the Court Compound when the case was called and that it was by a mistake that the case happened to be struck off. The Munsiff could have easily restored Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 59 of 1958 on this explanation of the petitioner. But he held that O. 9 R. 9 C.P.C. would apply only to suits and not to applications and that he could treat the application filed by the petitioner as only an application to restore the suit, but that such an application has to be made within 30 days of the dismissal of the suit and that it was therefore barred by limitation. 3. I am unable to agree with the learned Munsiff, Section 141 C.P.C. makes the procedure in regard to suits also applicable to other proceedings in a Court, as far as it can be made applicable. The learned Munsiff has completely lost sight of this provision in holding that O. 9 R. 9 will not apply to the present proceedings. He ought to have treated the application, Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 1959 as an application to restore Miscellaneous Case No. 59 of 1958, which was dismissed for default. It was a mistake on his part to have stated that he must treat the application Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 1959 as if it was an application to restore the suit. It was a mistake on his part to have stated that he must treat the application Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 1959 as if it was an application to restore the suit. It was by no means an application to restore the suit as the petitioner has to cross two further hurdles first by getting his application No. 59 of 1958 restored and secondly by getting Miscellaneous Case No. 58 of 1957 allowed before he could get his suit restored. Thus Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 1959 was clearly for the restoration of Miscellaneous Case No. 59 of 1958. It was filed on the very day of the dismissal of that application and no question of limitation was at all involved. 4. The learned Munsiff has referred to AIR Commentaries on the C.P.C. Vol. II at p. 2460 - under O. 9 R. 9. But he has made no attempt to understand the principle involved in the matter. It is no doubt true that some of the High Courts, namely, Allahabad, Calcutta and Patna have held in some decisions that O. 9 R. 9 would nut apply where applications are dismissed for default; but only where suits are dismissed for default. But other High Courts like Madras, Lahore, Bombay and Oudh have considered the said decisions and differed from them. The Calcutta High, Court in its decision Bipin Behari Shaha v. Abdul Barik, ILR 44 Cal 950 : (AIR 1917 Cal 548 (1)) has also taken the view that O. 9 R. 9 C.P.C. would apply to cases where applications for restoration of a suit are dismissed for default. I have perused many of these decisions. I find that the preponderance of view is for the position that O. 9, R. 9 would apply to such applications. I certainly agree with those decisions which lay down that position, because Sec. 141 C.P.C. makes it clear beyond doubt. Even if O. 9 R. 9 would not apply, the Court has always got its inherent power under Sec. 151 C.P.C. to entertain such an application. In this particular case the petitioner happened to be just out of Court at the time when his petition was called and hence it happened to be dismissed. The application was filed on the very same day stating that fact. In this particular case the petitioner happened to be just out of Court at the time when his petition was called and hence it happened to be dismissed. The application was filed on the very same day stating that fact. The learned Munsiff could have allowed the application immediately and restored Miscellaneous Case No. 59 of 1958 instead of keeping the application pending for another six months and ultimately dismissing it as out of time. 5. It was argued for the respondent that, in any case, a Revision Petition under Sec. 115 C.P.C. would not lie as O. 43 R. 1(c) provided for an appeal in such cases. Order 43 Rule 1(c) provided for an appeal from an order under O. 9, R. 9, C.P.C. rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit. It was pointed out for the respondent that Sec. 141 C.P.C. would make O. 43 R. 1(c) applicable in cases of an order rejecting an application for an order to set aside the dismissal of an application. The decision Rameshar Dutt Singh v. Harihar, AIR 1937 Oudh 344 was also brought to my notice in that connection. I have perused that decision. With all respect, I find myself unable to agree with the reasoning therein. It was stated in that decision that if Sec. 141 C.P.C. can be made use of to bring within the scope of O. 9 R. 9, an application to restore a previous application dismissed for default, then the same Section can be invoked to make appealable under O. 43 R. 1(c) an order which is passed upon such an application. The contrary view had been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Chandar Sahai v. Durga Prasad. ILR 46 All 538 : (AIR 1924 All 682 (2)), where it was held that a right of appeal could not be claimed by virtue of Sec. 141 C.P.C. when O. 43 of the Code made no provision for such an appeal. In that case an appeal was preferred to the District Judge against an order dismissing an application for restoration of an application under O. 9 R. 13 to set aside the ex parte decree. 6. In that case an appeal was preferred to the District Judge against an order dismissing an application for restoration of an application under O. 9 R. 13 to set aside the ex parte decree. 6. Order 43 R. 1 C.P.C. provides for appeals from certain orders under the provisions of S. 104 C.P.C. Sec. 104 C.P.C. is to the effect that an appeal shall lie from the orders mentioned in that Section and further that, save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code of Civil Procedure or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders. It follows from Sec. 104 C.P.C. read with O. 43 R. 1 C.P.C. that except in respect of orders expressly provided for in the body of O. 43 R. 1 C.P.C. appeals shall be from no other orders. I am afraid that Sec. 104 C.P.C. has been lost sight of by the Judges in the Oudh decision cited above. The right of appeal is not a mere procedural right, but a substantive right and such right of appeal has to be specifically given by statute. It cannot be extended by making use of Sec. 141. Section 141 provides only for the procedure to be followed. Hence by reading Sec. 141 and O. 43 R. 1 together, it cannot be said that a right of appeal is created where it is not expressly provided for by statute. I am therefore unable to follow the Oudh decision. I prefer to follow the Allahabad decision. I hold that the petitioner had no right of appeal to the District Judge and he was right in having filed this revision petition to this Court. 7. The order of the Munsiff dismissing Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 1959 is set aside. In view of the fact that the application for restoration was filed on the very same day on the ground that the petitioner was present in the Court precincts, but only happened to be just away when the case was called, this is a case where Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 1959 has to be allowed and Miscellaneous Case No. 59 of 1958 restored to file. The learned Munsiff is, therefore, directed to restore Miscellaneous Case No. 59 of 1958 to file and to dispose of it on the merits of the case. The learned Munsiff is, therefore, directed to restore Miscellaneous Case No. 59 of 1958 to file and to dispose of it on the merits of the case. Under the circumstances, I direct the parties to bear their own costs. Order accordingly.