JUDGMENT K.L. Pandey, J. 1 This is a Plaintiff's first appeal against the lower Court's decree by which his claim for declaration (a) that he continued to be in the Defendant's service from 10 March 1941 to 30 April 1953 and (b) that he was entitled to his salary, including increments; and pension on that basis and for two sums, together with future interest, namely, (i) Rs. 5,363/- accrued due as arrears of salary and (ii) Rs. 2,000/- on account of compensation was dismissed. The Plaintiff has filed Second Appeal No. 276 of 1957 against the reversing decree of the lower appeal Court whereby the order of the Board of Revenue dated 12 September 1950 was declared to be without jurisdiction and the Plaintiff was required to refund to the Defendant a sum of Rs. 1,826/5/-. This judgment will govern the two appeals, which involve common questions of fact and law. 2. The undisputed facts are these. The Plaintiff entered Government service in 1918 as a clerk in the Education Department. In the year 1921, his services were transferred to the District Council, Hoshangabad. In due course, he was promoted as Head Clerk. He was working on that post in 1948 when the Local Government Act, 1948 (XXXVIII of 1948) came into force, the District Council, Hoshangabad, ceased to exist and Janapada Sabhas were constituted under the new Act. The services of the Plaintiff were transferred to the Janapada Sabha, Sohagpur (Defendant), under which as before, he continued to work as Head Clerk. He was suspended on 10 March 1949 and a departmental enquiry was held against him. He appealed against the order of suspension to the Deputy Commissioner, who stayed that order but, later on, cancelled it thinking that he had no power so to do. The matter was, however, referred to Government, who, by an order dated 24 September 1949, set aside the order of suspension with retrospective effect. Then upon the Plaintiff was allowed to resume his duties on 8 October 1949. Even so, as a result of the departmental enquiry, the Plaintiff was found to be inefficient and grossly negligent and was therefore, dismissed with effect from 19 October 1949. The Plaintiff's appeal against his dismissal was dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner on 12 December 1949. Then upon the Plaintiff was allowed to resume his duties on 8 October 1949. Even so, as a result of the departmental enquiry, the Plaintiff was found to be inefficient and grossly negligent and was therefore, dismissed with effect from 19 October 1949. The Plaintiff's appeal against his dismissal was dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner on 12 December 1949. Subsequently, by an order dated 12 September 1950 passed in revision, the Board of Revenue set aside the order of dismissal and directed that the Plaintiff be treated as on duty between 10 March 1949 to 19 October 1949 and should be retired on pension from 12 September. 1950. The Defendant applied for a review of the Board's order but failed to get it set aside. Thereupon, for the period 10 March 1949 to 11 September 1950. the Plaintiff was paid a sum of Rs.2,651/2/-on account of his salary and increments. In pursuance of the order of the Board dated 12 September 1950, he was also retired from service. 3. The Plaintiff averred that, inspite of his repeated requests, the Defendant did not allow him to resume his duties inspite of the order of reinstatement passed by the Board of Revenue on 12 September 1950. Also, although he made no application for retirement he was compelled to sign the pension papers and he did so only after attaining the age of superannuation on 1 May 1954. Since he was wrongfully kept out of office, he should be deemed to have been in service from 12 September 1950, to 30 April 1953. Accordingly, he claimed a declaration to that effect and further claimed Rs. 11/13/- paid less on account of salary for the period prior to 12 September 1950, Rs. 5351/3/- on account of salary for the period 12 September 1950 to April 1953 and Rs. 2,000/- as damages for harassment by wrongfully keeping him out of office and delaying payment of his dues. He also claimed future interest on the total amount of Rs. 7,363/-. 4. The Defendant denied that the Board of Revenue ordered reinstatement of the Plaintiff and pleaded that he was directed to be retired with effect from 1 September 1950. 2,000/- as damages for harassment by wrongfully keeping him out of office and delaying payment of his dues. He also claimed future interest on the total amount of Rs. 7,363/-. 4. The Defendant denied that the Board of Revenue ordered reinstatement of the Plaintiff and pleaded that he was directed to be retired with effect from 1 September 1950. It was in pursuance of that order that arrears of his salary up to 11 September 1950 were paid to him and thereupon he was retired and his pension papers were prepared and sent to the State Government. These steps were, however, taken under a mistake. On the material date, the Plaintiff was a Head Cleric drawing a salary of Rs. 115/-per mensem. Since no revision against the dismissal of the Plaintiff's appeal by the Deputy Commissioner lay to the State Government, the order of the Board of Revenue dated 12 September 1950 was without jurisdiction, illegal and of no effect. Consequently, the dismissal of the Plaintiff on 19 October 1949 continued to be legally effective. That being so, there could be no question of his reinstatement or of his being in service after that date. It was for this reason that the pension papers sent to the State Government were being withdrawn and a suit was filed for recovering back the arrears of salary paid to him under a mistake. In any event, even apart from the order of the Board of Revenue, the Plaintiff, who had completed more than 25 years of qualifying service, could be retired at any time without assigning any reason and on this ground also the claim as laid was unsustainable. Nay, it was barred by time under Section 173 of the Local Government Act since it was instituted more than six months after the accrual of the cause of action 5. As indicated earlier, the lower Court accepted the defence and dismissed the Plaintiff's suit. 6. The present Defendant's suit, out of which Second Appeal No. 276 of 1957 arises, was laid for refund of Rs. 1,826/6/- out of Rs. 2,651/2/- paid to the Plaintiff on the ground that the order of the Board of Revenue dated 12 September 1950 was passed without jurisdiction and was inconsequence illegal and did not, therefore, affect the validity of the order of Plaintiff's dismissal with effect from 19 October 1949. 1,826/6/- out of Rs. 2,651/2/- paid to the Plaintiff on the ground that the order of the Board of Revenue dated 12 September 1950 was passed without jurisdiction and was inconsequence illegal and did not, therefore, affect the validity of the order of Plaintiff's dismissal with effect from 19 October 1949. The Plaintiff resisted the claim inter alia on the ground that the Board's order was valid and binding on the Defendant. 7. The Court of first instance held that the Board of Revenue had jurisdiction to pass the order dated 12 September 1950 and dismissed the suit. The lower appeal Court took a contrary view and decreed the claim. 8. The main question for consideration in the two cases is whether the dismissal of the Plaintiff's appeal by the Deputy Commissioner was final or whether the Board of Revenue could entertain a revision and set aside the Plaintiff's dismissal. It is conceded before us that when the departmental enquiry was started against the Plaintiff and he was dismissed the Local Government Act, 1948 was in force. It is also clear that new rules providing for appeal and revision by the aggrieved officers or servants of Janapada Sabhas came into force on 3 December 1949 (Notification No. 4692 1598 J-XIII dated 3-12-1949). That being so, the right of the Plaintiff to take action against his dismissal was governed by the new Act and the old rules framed under the Central Provinces and Berar Local Self Government Act, 1920, which were expressly kept alive by Clause (b) of the proviso to section 192 of the new Act. 9. The relevant rules under the Central Provinces and Berar Local Self Government Act, 1920, were these: 1(i) The following classes of employees shall have no right of appeal- (a) Employees referred to in proviso (iii) to Sub-section (a) of Section 45, (b) All other employees drawing less than Rs. 10/- per mensem, (c) All employees who are temporaly or on probation. (ii) Employees drawing Rs. 10/- per mensem and above shall have a right of appeal to the Deputy Commissioner The Deputy Commissioner's order shall be final in the case of employees drawing less than Rs. 30/- per mensem and shall not be subject to revision. (iii) A second appeal shall be to the Commissioner in cases of employees drawing Rs. 30/- per mensem or over. 30/- per mensem and shall not be subject to revision. (iii) A second appeal shall be to the Commissioner in cases of employees drawing Rs. 30/- per mensem or over. Except as provided in Rule 2, the Commissioner's order shall be final. 2. Revision of the Commissioner's order shall lie to the Local Government in the case of employees drawing Rs. 200/- per mensem and above. Under these rules, the Plaintiff, whose salary at the relevant time was Rs. 115/- per mensem, was entitled to file a second appeal to the Commissioner. 10. At the material time, the posts of Commissioners had ceased to exist and the powers which they exercised had vested in the Provincial (State) Government under section 4 of the Central Provinces and Berar Commissioners (Constructions of References) Act, 1948. By virtue of Section 7 of that Act, the State Government was authorised to delegate, by notification the power exercisable by it to entertain appeals or applications for revision or review against decisions in revenue cases. The Central Provinces and Berar Board of Revenue Act, 1949, was also then in force. Under Sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Act, the power to entertain appeal against an order under Sections 119, 120, 123 or 124 of the Local Government Act, 1948. and to revise an order or proceedings of a subordinate officer under Section 159 of that Act was expressly entrusted to the Board of Revenue. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 6, the State Government was also authorised to delegate to the Board additional powers or functions assigned to the State Government by or under any enactment for the time being in force. The Plaintiff did not file a second appeal. He has also not brought to our notice any notification by which the power of the State Government to entertain a second appeal in a case like the one before us was delegated to the Board of Revenue. That being so, we have to consider whether the Board of Revenue had power to revise the appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 12 December 1949. 11. It is urged that, under Rule 1 (ii) and (iii) of the old rules reproduced in paragraph 9, the order of the Deputy Commissioner passed in this case must be regarded as final because the Plaintiff did not file a second appeal to the State Government. 11. It is urged that, under Rule 1 (ii) and (iii) of the old rules reproduced in paragraph 9, the order of the Deputy Commissioner passed in this case must be regarded as final because the Plaintiff did not file a second appeal to the State Government. As we have indicated earlier, the old rules continued to be in force and in so far as they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the new Act had to be deemed to have been made under that Act. Even apart from this express provision, it is well-established that rules made in pursuance of on authority delegated for that purpose must be consistent with the statute under which they are made or deemed to be made. The authority is given to the end that the provisions of the Statute may be better carried into effect and not with a view to neutralising or contradicting those provisions. In the instant case, if the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 12 December 1949, which could be, but was not challenged in second appeal, be regarded as final, it would abridge the unfettered power of the State Government to interfere in any case. In our view, the rule providing for finality of the order of dismissal cannot be regarded as superseding the power of revision conferred by Section 159 of the Local Government Act, 1948. The reason is this. When the words of an enactment are clear, the rules made thereunder must, if possible be reconciled with it and, where that cannot be done, must give way to the enactment. Lord Horschell L.C. observed in Institute of Patent Agents Vs, Lockwood (1894) App Cas 347. No doubt there might be some conflict between a rule and a provision of the Act. Well, there is a conflict sometimes between two sections to be found in the same Act. You have to try and reconcile them as best you may. If you cannot, you have to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other. That would be so with regard to the enactment and with regard to rules which are to be treated as if within the enactment. In that case, probably the enactment itself would be treated as the governing consideration and the rule as subordinate to it. That would be so with regard to the enactment and with regard to rules which are to be treated as if within the enactment. In that case, probably the enactment itself would be treated as the governing consideration and the rule as subordinate to it. In our opinion, the power of revision under Section 159 Ibid remained unimpaired by the rules under the old Act even in regard to matters covered by those rules. 12. It is next argued that the scope of the power of revision conferred by Section 159 of the Local Government Act, 1948, is restricted so that the power could nut be exercised relation to the dismissal of the Plaintiff. To appreciate this argument, it is necessary to examine closely the words of the section which reads as follows: The State Government may at any time, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by, or as to the regularity of the proceedings of, any officer subordinate to it and acting in the exercise of any power conferred on it by or under this Act, call for and examine the record of any case Pending before, or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit: Provided that no order shall be varied or reversed unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order. It is contended that the words "acting in the exercise of any power conferred on it by or under this Act" have reference to "the State Government" and not to the word "officer". To reinforce this argument, it has been brought to our notice that, before this section was amended by Act XXXII of 1949 in order to make changes necessitated by the abolition of the office of Commissioner, it read as under: The Provincial Government or the Commissioner may..........and acting is the exercise of any power conferred on it or him by or under this Act..........It is also suggested that Section 159 is merely a declaratory enactment, the power exercisable thereunder being limited to cases where "any power" is given to the State Government by or under any other provision of the Act. For reasons we would presently give, we are unable to accept this construction which is sought to be placed on the section. For reasons we would presently give, we are unable to accept this construction which is sought to be placed on the section. 13. In the first place, if power has been given to any authority to interfere by entertaining an appeal or application for review or otherwise, it is unusual to give to that authority an overlapping power of revision. Secondly, if the State Government acting under Section 159 of the Local Government Act, 1948, can do so only when acting in the exercise of powers given to it by other provisions of that Act, it can take action under those powers and there would be no need to invoke the power under Section 159. Such a construction would render the section meaningless and otiose. Thirdly, according to rules of grammar, if the clause "acting in the exercise of any power conferred on it by or under this Act" was intended to be restrictive of the occasions when the State Government could exercise the power of revision, it would not have occurred at the place where it is found in the texture of the sentence. Indeed, the clause, which preceded and followed by commas, reads like this: any officer subordinate to it and acting in the exercise of any power conferred on it by or under this Act. To dismember this clause and to construe the second part of it, which occurs after the word "and" as referring to the State Government because of the pronoun "it" would also render the word "and" meaningless. In our view, the obvious intention is that before the power of revision in relation to the order or proceedings of any officer could be exercised by the State Government, the officer must be "any officer subordinate to it and acting in the exercise of any power conferred on it by or under this Act". From the collocation of words, we are led to think that the pronoun "it" has been inadvertently used by the draftsman for the pronoun "him." We are fortified in this view by a reference to the corresponding provision contained in section 58 of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922, which was introduced in that Act shortly before enacting the Local Government Act, 1948, by Act XIV of 1947. That section is indentical with Section 159 with this exception that the word "him" occurs in place of the word "it". That section is indentical with Section 159 with this exception that the word "him" occurs in place of the word "it". The identity of language employed in the two provisions enacted at about the same time in two cognate Acts for the same object is significant as expressive of the same legislative intention. 14. That the Court may rectify the language employed in an enactment to meet the obvious intention of the Legislature when not to do so would render it meaningless admits of no doubt but that is allowed only when the Court is impelled so to do Stone C.J. observed in Hiralal v. Parasramsao ILR 1941 Nag 581 at pages 585-6 as follows:- But all such considerations are entirely beside the mark, and we have to consider this section by looking at it, by seeing its grammatical meaning, by considering whether that leads to an impossible, that is unworkable, construction and, if it does, by considering what variation will do the lease violence to the grammatical meaning and still make the provision work. The mere fact that a grammatical construction will lead to a very unjust conclusion is neither here nor there if there is no doubt about the grammatical meaning and no doubt that the grammar of the words gives a unique meaning. But if the unique meaning is an impossible meaning, that is to say, a meaning that to destructive of some other provision or is unworkable, then one is driven to other constructions. Then one has in some way to reform the words used and derive as best one can, from an examination of the Act as a whole, a workable meaning. We have already indicated sufficiently the compelling necessity of modifying the language of Section 169 in order to save it from being rendered otiose and to make it workable. Being impelled so to do, we modify the language of the clause "and acting in the exercise of any power conferred on it by or under this Act" by reading "him" for "it". 15. Having regard to the construction we have placed on Section 159, we are of opinion that the Board of Revenue had jurisdiction to pass the order dated 12 September 1950 and that the order is binding on the parties 16. 15. Having regard to the construction we have placed on Section 159, we are of opinion that the Board of Revenue had jurisdiction to pass the order dated 12 September 1950 and that the order is binding on the parties 16. In the view that we have taken of the order dated 12 September 1950, the claim of the Defendant (Janapada Sabha, Sohagpur) for refund of a part of the amount paid to the Plaintiff on account of arrears of salary for period prior to 12 September 1950 must fail. 17. It is also clear from the order dated 12 September 1950 that the Plaintiff was directed to be retired on pension from the date of that order. The order of dismissal, which took effect from 19 October 1949, was substituted by an order for retirement on pension from 12 September 1950. The Plaintiff can take advantage of that order as a whole or not at all. That being so, if, in pursuance of that order, he was retired from 12 September 1950, he can have no legitimate grievance. Indeed, in view of the order he regarded himself as a retired servant of the Janapad Sabha [Exs. D-13, D-14 and D-15]. In any event, even a part from the order, he could be so retired without assigning any reason even before the date of his superannuation because he had completed 25 years of qualifying service- That being so, his claim for declaration that he continued to be in service from and after 12 September 1950 or that he was entitled to arrears of salary and pension on that basis is clearly unsustainable- 18. We are also of the view that the Plaintiff's claim is barred by time under Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Local Government Act in that it was not instituted within six months from the date of cause of action. 19. The result is that First Appeal No. 138 of 1956 fails and is dismissed. The Plaintiff [Somadutta Chaubey shall bear his costs and pay those of the Defendant, Janapada Sabha, Sohagpur] throughout. The Second Appeal No. 276 of 1957 succeeds and is allowed. The decree of the lower appeal Court is set aside and that of the Court of first instance is restored. The Plaintiff [Somadutta Chaubey shall bear his costs and pay those of the Defendant, Janapada Sabha, Sohagpur] throughout. The Second Appeal No. 276 of 1957 succeeds and is allowed. The decree of the lower appeal Court is set aside and that of the Court of first instance is restored. The Plaintiff in that suit (Janapada Sabha, Sohagpur) shall bear its own costs and pay those of the Defendant there (Somadutta Chaubey) throughout. Counsel fee here in the two appeals according to schedule. Appeal dismissed