ORDER A.H. Khan, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India and is directed against an order of the Revenue Board, re fusing to set aside an order of Tehsildar which was challenged on the ground of not being only against law, but also on the ground of being against natural justice. 2. The facts giving rise to this application are that the petitioner was a Zamindar, that some tenants executed a surrender-deed in his favour and after an inquiry, the land in question was entered as the Khudkasht of the Zamindar by an order of the Tehsildar. After the abolition of the Zamindari, the Zamindar (petitioner) was also duly entered as a Pucca tenant of the land in Revenue papers, and, he also paid rent which was accepted by the Tehsildar. Non-petitioner No. 2, Janki by an application dated 16-6-52 under section 51 of the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act, disputed these entries, but since he did not pursue his application it was dismissed for default on 8-11, 52, five months after Janki had instituted these proceedings, and, the order of the Tehsildar acquired a finality. On 12, 12, 53, the Girdawar Qanoongo of the Circle, submitted a report to the Tehsildar, to the effect that entries of Samvat 2007 should be kept in tact in Samvat 2010. The Tehsildar purporting to act under section 50 of the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act, accepted the suggestion and in utter disregard of the former orders passed by him, and, without giving notice to the petitioner, in whose name the entries stood, passed an order, the effect of which was the cancellation of the name of the petitioner in the Revenue papas and the substitution of the name of Janki con petitioner No. 2. It is significant that the Girdawar Qanoongo submitted his report on 22-1-53 and the Tehsildar forthwith passed an order on the same day, saying ditto to what the Qanoongo suggested without any conviction of his own. Against this order an appeal was filed before the Collector and the matter eventually reached the Revenue Board in revision. The Revenue Board refused to interfere and the present petition is filed against that order of the Revenue Board. 3. Against this order an appeal was filed before the Collector and the matter eventually reached the Revenue Board in revision. The Revenue Board refused to interfere and the present petition is filed against that order of the Revenue Board. 3. The petitioner challer ges the order of the Tehsildar on the ground that without recording a finding and without hearing the petitioner the Tehsildar passed an order, adversely affecting the rights of the petitioner. It is contended that the order is not only not in breach of the provision of section 50 of the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act, but it also contravenes the principles of natural justice. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that according to Section 50 of the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') no Revenue Officer is competent to correct a wrong or incorrect entry without recording a finding about the entry that is sought to be corrected It is argued that in the first place the word find' occurring in the Section 51 of the Act connotes that an enquiry must be made and a finding arrived at as a result of the enquiry. Secondly, it is urged that in consonance with the well recognised principles of natural justice if any adverse order is to be made against any person, then such a person should be first heard before an order is made 5. It is argued that in the instant case after ordering an enquiry in respect of the surrender deeds by the tenants and after being satisfied that the surrender of the field was made, the Tehsildar ordered petitioner's name to be entered on the fields in question. 6. On the other hand Mr. A.B. Mishra, counsel for the petitioner contends that there is no direction in Section 50 requiring the Revenue Officer to institute any enquiry before making a correction. It is also con-tended that in cases where the Tehsildar has acted in a manner like the present one, it is open to the aggrieved party to dispute the entry under Section 51 of the Act and that as a matter of fact in the course of present proceedings, when the appeal was pending before the Commissioner the petitioner has moved the Tehsildar under Section 51 of the Act. 7. 7. In considering these arguments, let us first refer to Section 50 of the Act, which runs thus:- If any Revenue Officer finds that a wrong or incorrect entry has been made in the Annual Village Papers by his subordinate officer, he shall direct necessary changes to be made in the Annual Village papers concerned and shall inform the persons concerned of his having done so. From its perusal, it is obvious that a Revenue Officer acquires jurisdiction to correct an entry provided he 'finds' that a wrong or incorrect entry has been made in the Annual Village Papers by his subordinate officer. The use of the word 'find' is significant. In Webster's Dictionary the word 'find' when used in regard to legal proceedings means "to determine and declare an issue of fact by decision" According to the New Standard Dictionary 'find' means "to decide after Judicial investigation." According to Chamber's Twentieth Dictionary the word 'find' means "to determine after judicial enquiry." Apart from the dictionary meaning of the word 'find', there is no doubt that when a court is to find a thing, it means an objective test, which of necessity depends upon an enquiry into the matter. In passing the impugned order, the Tehsildar did nothing to find out whether the entry was wrong or incorrect. In the words of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1958 S. C. 667 (Mahadyzl Premchandra vs. The Commercial Tax Officer and another), the Tehsildar has merely voiced the opinion of the Qanoogo without any conviction of his own. "Their Lordships in the case (supra) also observed (in a context, where behind the back of the appellant an order was passed and the appellant had no opportunity of meeting the point of view that had been adopted) that the whole procedure was contrary to the principles of natural justice. 8. There is one more defect which I find in the impugned order. Section 50 of the Act empowers a Revenue Officer to correct a wrong entry made by his subordinate officer. The entry in dispute was made under the orders of the. Tehsildar himself. And, as such an officer higher than the Tehsildar may have corrected it, but not the Tehsildar him-self. In fact the order of the Tehsildar amounts to a review of his former order. The entry in dispute was made under the orders of the. Tehsildar himself. And, as such an officer higher than the Tehsildar may have corrected it, but not the Tehsildar him-self. In fact the order of the Tehsildar amounts to a review of his former order. It being so according to Clause (c) of Section 40 of the Act, the Tehsildar is not competent to vary or reverse his own order unless notice has been served on the parties interested in the matter to appear. It being so, I find that the impugned order of the Tehsildar is neither legal, nor, it is according to the principles of natural justice. It suffers from both the defects, which cut at the root of the matter, and in consequence it must be set aside. 9. It will be Interesting to review the position of law on the point under consideration, both before the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act came into force and also after its repeal by Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code of 1959. 10. The law in force in the Gwalior territory before the creation of Madhya Bharat was Qanoon Mal Gwalior of Samvat 1983. Section 456 of the Qanoon Mai empowered a Revenue Officer to correct a mistake whether it was made by him or his predecessor, But the condition precedent to such correction was that before making a correction, an opportunity was to be given to a party whose rights were affected by such an order. It also enjoined that the objections of the affected persons should be heard before making a correction. This was the position of law before the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act. 11. On the repeal of the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act by Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, Section 115 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code contained the following provision : - If any Revenue Officer finds that a wrong or incorrect entry has been made in the land records prepared under section 114 by an officer subordinate to him, he shall direct necessary changes to be made therein after making such enquiry from the persons concerned as ha may deem fit after due written notice. Here the word 'find' also occurs and reading section 115 as a whole, it means that a correction will be made after making an enquiry from the person concerned, and, after due notice to him. 12. Here the word 'find' also occurs and reading section 115 as a whole, it means that a correction will be made after making an enquiry from the person concerned, and, after due notice to him. 12. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (9th Edition) page 35, under the heading "Exposition of one Act by the language of Another" has staled:- Probably the rule as to the exposition of one Act by the language of another is satisfactorily and most comprehensively laid down in broad statement of Lord Mansfield that where there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times or even expired, and, not referring to each other, they shall be taken and constructed together, as one Sys-tem and as explanatory to each other. 13. In this view of the matter, there is no doubt that what the Legislature intended was that a Revenue Officer must first find that an entry is wrong and then correct it. And as I have already stated above, the word 'find' means arrive at a conclusion or finding after an enquiry. And it goes without saying that an enquiry will be held after giving notice to parties whose rights are likely to be affected In the instant case the Tehsildar made no enquiry, nor came to a finding, but merely played a second fiddle to the Qanoongo. It is not conceivable that the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act allowed revenue officers to act arbitrarily and without rhyme and reason. 14. With regard to suggestion that an entry now made by the Tehsildar can be challenged under Sec. 51 of the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act, I have my own doubts. In the instant case in fact there was no dispute about any entry in the beginning. The dispute was the result of an order by the Tehsildar, because it is only after his order that a different entry gives rise to a dispute. It cannot be considered to be a reasonable and sound policy of law that at first it would allow its officers to act arbitrarily without a finding, and then it would, as a consequence of that, allow the decision to be challenged in a subsequent proceeding. It cannot be considered to be a reasonable and sound policy of law that at first it would allow its officers to act arbitrarily without a finding, and then it would, as a consequence of that, allow the decision to be challenged in a subsequent proceeding. The petitioner may have resorted to proceedings under Sec 51 of the Act by way of abundant caution, but that does not prevent him from challenging an order which is both against law and cannons of natural justice. The petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorary. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 36 (State of U.P., vs, Mohammad Nooh) in para 10 of their judgment have observed that it must be borne in mind that there is no rule with regard to Certiorari as there is with Mandamus, that it will be issued only where there is no other equally effective remedy It was also said in the case (supra) that "it cannot then be laid as an inflexible rule of law that the Superior Court must deny the writ when an inferior court or tribunal by discarding all principles of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure arrives at a conclusion which shocks the sense of justice and fair play, merely because such decision has been upheld by another inferior court or tribunal on appeal or revision." 15. For reasons stated above, I would quash the order of the Tehsildar dated 22-12-1953, so far as concerns the petitioner. Shivdayal J.--16. This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution praying that an order passed by the Tehsildar of Gwalior on December 22, 1953, under section 50 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, directing changes to be made in the annual village papers (hereinafter called the impugned order), be quashed. 17. The Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act came into effect on October 2, 1951 (Samvat year 2008). Under that Act tenants who were in actual occupation on October 1, 1951, were recognised as tenants of the Government. A Zamindar also became a tenant of the Government in respect of the holding of his Khudkasht. 18. Shiv Narain Sharma petitioner was a Zamindar and he had let out the disputed holdings in village Manpur-Arroli (Tehsil Gwalior) to Janki, Badaria and others. A Zamindar also became a tenant of the Government in respect of the holding of his Khudkasht. 18. Shiv Narain Sharma petitioner was a Zamindar and he had let out the disputed holdings in village Manpur-Arroli (Tehsil Gwalior) to Janki, Badaria and others. It is the petitioner's case that in April 1951 his tenants surrendered their holdings in the manner pro vided in the law and in July 1951 his name was entered in revenue papers as Khudkasht holder. It is undisputed that he was entered as a pucca tenant in the Revenue papers for Samvat years 2008 and 2009. In 2010 his name was removed from the disputed holding in pursuance of the impugned order which was passed in the following circumstances. 19. On December 22, 1953, the Girdawar Qanoongo made a report to the Tehsildar in these words: - On the same day the Tahsildar ordered thus:- 20. It is an admitted fact that before the above order was made, no notice had been given to the petitioner. One fine morning he came to know that in the village papers of Samvat 2010, his name had been struck off in pursuance of an order passed by the Tehsildar behind his back and without any opportunity of being heard. He made an application to the Madhya Bharat Government in the Revenue Department under section 39 of the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act. The Government refused to take any action "as the case was of a judicial nature", In the Government order dated April 23, 1954, the petitioner was advised to approach the Collector or the Board of Revenue. 21. On April 30, 1954, the petitioner took an appeal to the Collector against the impugned order of the Tehsildar. The Collector refused to interfere and advised the petitioner to take proceedings under section 51 of the Tenancy Act. (It appears to me that this advice also was subsequently availed of by the petitioner.) 22. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Revenue Commissioner from the Collector's order. The Commissioner (Shri Bhajan lal Chaturvedi) held that the Tehsildar's order under section 50 of the Qanoon Mal was not appealable, but he treated the appeal as a revision petition. (It appears to me that this advice also was subsequently availed of by the petitioner.) 22. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Revenue Commissioner from the Collector's order. The Commissioner (Shri Bhajan lal Chaturvedi) held that the Tehsildar's order under section 50 of the Qanoon Mal was not appealable, but he treated the appeal as a revision petition. Since he formed the opinion that it was not proper for the Tehsildar to have corrected the entries in the Revenue papers which had excised for three years, without first giving a notice to Shiv Narain, he referred the case to the Board of Revenue. 23. The Board of Revenue, (Shri P S. Apte) held that the impugned order of the Tehsildar was of a judicial nature and an appeal, therefore, lay. He remanded the case to the Commissioner for deciding it as an appeal. 24. When the matter came back to the Commissioner, Janki (one of the former tenants and respondent No. 2 before us) made an application for being made a party alleging that he was a necessary party. He was made a party. Then, the Commissioner (Sari S. P. Mehta) dismissed the appeal as time barred, holding that Janki was a necessary party and he was made a respondent after the expiry of the period of limitation. 25. Shiv Narain then filed a revision before the Board of Revenue. The Board (Shri R. S. Shukla), refused to go into the merits of the order passed by the Tehsildar because it was admitted before him that the petitioner had already initiated proceedings under section 51 of the Tenancy Act against Janki and others, on June 18, 1956. He thought it inadvisable to interfere in revision at that stage and observed:- As the dispute between the parties has not so far been dealt, with on merits and as the matter is already seized by the Tehsildar, it would create complication if this court were to interfere in revision. He, however, agreed with the Commissioner that Janki was a necessary party. It is apparent from his order that he did not apply his mind to the question whether the impugned order of the Tehsildar was a judicial order or by an administrative one, although this point seems to have arisen before him. He, however, agreed with the Commissioner that Janki was a necessary party. It is apparent from his order that he did not apply his mind to the question whether the impugned order of the Tehsildar was a judicial order or by an administrative one, although this point seems to have arisen before him. As to that, his observations are:- I do not think I need go into the controversy now sought to be raised partly because the present revision can be disposed or without touching the issue and partly because the earlier order of the Board in 1956, referred to above, cannot be got over except by a division bench in review for which no move has been made by the parties ever since 1956. 26. My purpose in giving a resume of all the stages of the proceedings in the revenue courts his been to point out that they treated the impugned order of the Tehsildar as a judicial order. Now, it is incombustible that the first requirement of a judicial proceeding is to notice all the parties who are going to be affected by the order. No one has any stage denied that the impugned order was passed without notice to Shiv Narain. It is also undeniable that the impugned order adversely affected him. That being so, it was imperative for the Board of, Revenue to have set aside the impugred order and to have given necessary directions to the Tehsildar for proceeding further in the matter. 27. It is a fundamental principle which is firmly rooted in English jurisprudence that no one shall be condemned or punished or deprived of property in any judicial proceeding unless he has bad an opportunity of being heard. The maxim audi alteram (sic)tem (hear the other side) is one of those principles of natural justice which has always been followed in our country, and superior courts are jealous to enforce this basic requirement of procedure and feel themselves duty-bound to intervene in case of its infraction. Every breach of this sacred rule is looked upon with marked disfavour. 28. When on the first occasion the Board of Revenue (Shri Apte) held that the impugned order was of a judicial, nature a remand to the Commissioner was unnecessary. Every breach of this sacred rule is looked upon with marked disfavour. 28. When on the first occasion the Board of Revenue (Shri Apte) held that the impugned order was of a judicial, nature a remand to the Commissioner was unnecessary. The Board was hearing the matter in revision and as the superior judicial authority on the revenue side, not only there was no impediment to its setting aside the impugned order, but, in my opinion, it was the only proper order which should have been passed in the interests of justice If that was done, these four and and a half years would have been saved. Likewise, when the matter reached the Board of Revence the second time, there were only two courses open to it: (1) If Shri Shukla agreed with the view of his predecessor in office that section 50 of the Tenancy Act contemplated a judicial proceeding, he could not but set aside the impugned order for want of a previous notice to the petitioner who was affected by it; (2) If he was of the opinion that proceedings under S. 50 were ministerial, the matter was bound to be referred to a division bench for a review of Shri Apte's decision because until that was done there was no alternative for him but to adopt the first course; and it was immaterial whether a party moved the Board for review or not (Section 40 of the M. B Tenancy Act). 29. It is no body's case before us that the proceedings before the Tehsildar were not of a judicial nature. Neither the learned Member of the Board of Revenue (Respondent No. 3) nor the Tehsildar (respondent No. 1) has filed any return to this petition. This attitude of theirs is reconcilable only with their acceptance of the proceedings being of a judicial nature, otherwise the would have filed a Return and were bound to place before us the entire record, as ordained by their Lordships in Ghaio Mall and Sons vs. The State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 65 "The Tehsildar's failure to file a Return and to submit the entire record only means that he dealt with the proceedings us judicial." 30. Shri Misra does not contend before us that the impugned order of the Tehsildar was administrative in nature. Shri Misra does not contend before us that the impugned order of the Tehsildar was administrative in nature. His only contention is that in proceedings under Section 50, a notice is not necessary before an order is passed by the Tehsildar, although the parties effected by the order have to be informed of it after it is passed. J find myself quite unable to see any force in this contention. Section 50 reads thus: If any Revenue Officer finds that a wrong or incorrect entry has been made in the annual village papers by his subordinate officer, he shall direct necessary changes to be made in the annual village papers concerned and shall inform the persons concerned of his having done so. The expression "and shall inform the persons concerned of his having done so" no doubt makes it obligatory for the revenue officer directing a change in the annual village papers to inform the persons concerned, of the order that he passed. That phrase, however, cannot be read as to dispense with the requirement of natural justice, that is, issuance of a notice of the proceedings to every such person giving him an opportunity of being heard before an order is passed. It is one thing to say that a judgment or an order of a court shall be pronounced in open court, or shall be intimated to the parties when it is passed, and it is a different thing to say that no notice is to be given until the order is passed, 31. The word "find" in section 50 is significant. This word is well-known in legal parlance as meaning "to ascertain by judicial inquiry; to determine and declare any issue of fact by its verdict or decision as a court or Jury" See 25 CJ 1132 and Webster's New International Dictionary). In section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is provided: "If the Magistrate upon taking evidence finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal. If he finds the accused guilty, pass a sentence upon him according to law. Needless to multiply illustrations to show that the word find has acquired a particular legal connotation. The impost of the word 'find' in section 50 of the Tenancy Act, therefore, makes it necessary that the Tehsildar should institute a judicial inquiry, without which he can not 'find' any thing. Needless to multiply illustrations to show that the word find has acquired a particular legal connotation. The impost of the word 'find' in section 50 of the Tenancy Act, therefore, makes it necessary that the Tehsildar should institute a judicial inquiry, without which he can not 'find' any thing. I do not propose to take any word from the previous or the subsequent enactments. It is unnecessary to enter into the questions what kind of evidence was necessary and what was the scope of the inquiry that was required because in the present case, as I am going to point out presently, the Tehsildar did nothing except to pass the impugned order. 32. Adverting to the impugned order, it is noteworthy that it was passed on the same day on which the Girdawar Qanoongo placed his submission before him. One thing which leaps to the eye is that the order was passed without any application of the mind. The order can appropriately be called a mechanical order. His opinion is expressed in a single sentence, "uprokt Guzarish uchit hone se manya ki jati hai." He prejudiced himself by the fact that the Girdawar Qanoongo of another circle also made to him a similar report. An examination of the Girdawer's report becomes necessary. It has been reproduced above in verbatim. (1) It opens by a statement that names of some tenants which had been entered in Samvat 2007 were altered in Sam-vat 2008. There is no mention whatever of any particular names of tenants whom the Girdawar had in his mind; (2) Then it is stated that the Girdawer went to the villages and on an inquiry, found that no body had surrendered his holding under section 315 of the Qanoon Mal and, as such, all of them had become pucca tenants under section 38 (1) of the Zamindari Abolition Act and section 54 (7) of the Revenue Tenancy Act. The report is studiously silent as to what inquiry was made, from whom it was made, whether the persons concerned were noticed or not, and whether the Girdawar made an endeavor to find out if the changes had been made under the orders of the Tehsildar or other competent Revenue Officer or not; (3) He then jumps to the conclusion that without an order of a competent officer entries in revenue papers had been changed in Samvat 2008, and that the Patwaris were responsible for unauthorisedly and illegally making entires of new tenants; (4) This is followed by a sweeping recommendation that all those names which had been entered in Samvat 2007 should be restored, and the persons concerned be informed of the order. In making this submission, the Girdawar endeavors to obtain an immediate order from the Tehsildar- He does not suggest any inquiry to be made and a finding to be reached by the Tehsildar. What is more, he states in conclusion that unless an early order was passed as proposed by him, it was not possible to compile the village papers for that year and recovery of Government revenue would also be obstructed; (5) Apprehending that the Tehsildar will issue show cause notices to persons concerned and may also enter into an inquiry in the interests of justice, he shrewdly diverts his attention by pointing out a remedy available to those against whom the order will work in justice. No one tells us that the Tehsildar had passed any order or made any direction before the impugned order was passed by him. 33. The Girdawar's report had a magic effect on the Tehsildar and the desired result was achieved. The hypnotising part was where the Girdawar said that unless and until an order as proposed by him was passed by the Tehsildar, the annual village papers could not be prepared and the recovery of Government revenue could be hindered. I call the influence a magical one because on a little reflection it should have occurred to the Tehsildar (who was also a revenue court) that a general order of a sweeping nature was neither just nor proper and, moreover, there could not be any apprehension of any loss or delay in respect of revenue because those persons whose names were actually entered were liable to pay rent. Moreover, it did not occur to him that existence of a remedy no justification for doing a wrong. He did not care to see what entries were suspected and why. He did not examine even a single case. He forgot that the remedy under section 51 of the Tenancy Act was equally available to those who were aggrieved by the existing entries and no emergent situation arose so as to disregard the rule of natural justice. The Girdawar thus obtained a blank cheque from him. Even while passing the impugned order the Tehsildar did not make any direction to inform the persons concerned which was imperatively required under section 50. The petitioner was, however, given a notice in 1954 when his appeal was pending before the Commissioner and, presumably, his objections woke up the Tehsildar. It is admitted by the petitioner that he has since made an application under section 51 of the Act. 34. From whatever angle it is looked at, the impugned order is undoubtedly an arbitrary and a high handed one and was passed in utter disregard to natural justice. And all this is apparent on the face of the order. It is, therefore, bound to be quashed. Substantial justice will be done only on inquiry by the Tehsildar into the petitioner's averments regarding surrender in April 1951 by his tenants under section 315 of the Qanoon Mal, and, unless and until he finds that the previous tenants did not surrender their holdings under section 315 of the Quanoon Mal, the entries in respect of the petitions made in Samvat years 2008 and 2009 must be restored and must be carried over in village papers of subsequent years. 35. 35. It is stated by Shiv Narain in the petition before us that Janki and others who were his tenants, executed a deed of surrender of their holding in favour of the petitioner and submitted it to the Tehsildar on April 27, 1951; that this surrender was under section 315 of the Qanoon Mal and was accepted by the Tehsildar, who directed that consequential entries be made in revenue papers, and it was the Girdawar Qanoongo who in compliance with the Tehsildar's order, "after verification on the spot", ordered the Patwari of the village to make the necessary entries; and that thereupon an entry of the petitioner's Khudkasht was made in respect of the surrendered holding "in possession of the petitioner" on July 1, 1951. The petitioner has annexed to the petition copies from the proceedings under section 315 of the Qanoon Mal, including the alleged surrender petition, reports of the Patwari and Girdawar and order of the Tehsildar. I express no opinion and say nothing about these documents, for we are not examining the merits of the case. It is not for us in these proceedings to arrive at any finding of fact on appreciation of evidence. It was Janki alone who applied to the Commissioner to be made a party. There is nothing on record before us to show that any other tenant of Shiv Narain joined hands with him Consequently, Janki is the only previous tenant who has been made a respondent in the petition before us. 36. On the impugned order being quashed, the proceedings will be restored to the position in which they stood on December 22, 1953, that is to say, from the stage that the Girdawar Qanoongo submitted his report to the Tehsildar and there will now be a judicial inquiry on the issue whether Janki and others, the previous tenants of Shiv Narain Sharma bad reality surrendered their holdings under section 315 of the Qanoon Mal. Shiv Narain Sharma's petition under section 51 of the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act may also be consolidated wish it. I have no doubt that the Tehsildar will first ascertain whether the petitioner's Khudkasht was entered under an order passed by him as alleged by the petitioner or by any of his subordinate officers and thereafter will proceed according to law. Shiv Narain Sharma's petition under section 51 of the Madhya Bharat Tenancy Act may also be consolidated wish it. I have no doubt that the Tehsildar will first ascertain whether the petitioner's Khudkasht was entered under an order passed by him as alleged by the petitioner or by any of his subordinate officers and thereafter will proceed according to law. Until an adverse finding against the petitioner is reached, his name shall be restored in the revenue paper of Samvat 2008 and of all the subsequent years. 37. In the result I agree with my learned brother. The judgments and orders of the Collector, the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue are set aside. The order of the Tehsildar dated December 22, 1953, is quashed so far as it affects the petitioner We restrict our order to the case of the petitioner because we do not know whether any other person was adversely affected by the Tehsildar's order and, if so, whether he has not acquiesced in it. We do not saddle Janki with the petitioner's costs because the Girdawar and the Tehsildar were solely responsible for the impugned order.