Order.- Two grounds were raised before the Rent Controller. One was that the agent of the landlord who filed the petition for eviction of the tenant (Petitioner), was not authorised to file that petition. The second was that there was no wilful default in the payment of rent. The learned Rent Controller found both the points against the tenant. On appeal, the Appellate Authority went into the first question in some detail and came to the conclusion that, notwithstanding that the agent was armed with a general power, which power specifically included the right to take steps in eviction in civil, criminal, revenue or rent control Courts, that was not sufficient compliance with section 7 (7) of the Act. He thought that there should be a specific authorisation in respect of the proceedings launched by the agent. This matter was taken in revision before the learned District Judge who disagreed with the Appellate Authority and concluded that the general power-of-attorney conferred the necessary power upon the agent and was not against the tenor of section 7 (7) of the Act. Accordingly, the learned District Judge remanded the appeal to the Appellate Authority for disposal of the second question which had been left undecided by it, namely, whether there was wilful default. It was found by the Appellate Authority that the default was wilful. Accordingly, we have the concurrent findings of all the Courts below that the default in this case was wilful, and that concludes that question. In this revision before me, the first ground has been pressed, learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant arguing that the interpretation placed on section 7 (7) of the Act by the Appellate Authority is incorrect. Accordingly, we have the concurrent findings of all the Courts below that the default in this case was wilful, and that concludes that question. In this revision before me, the first ground has been pressed, learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant arguing that the interpretation placed on section 7 (7) of the Act by the Appellate Authority is incorrect. Section 7 (7) states: “Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, no person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building merely as an agent of the landlord shall, except with the previous written consent of the landlord, be entitled to apply for the eviction of a tenant.” The plain purport of this section appears to be nothing more than that no person who is collecting the rent or is entitled to collect the rent of the premises on behalf of the landlord and whose power in that connection is limited only to such collection of rent shall be entitled to take any steps for the eviction of the tenant except with the previous consent of the landlord. The expression “merely as an agent of the landlord” has necessarily to be read along with the earlier clause “who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent.” “Merely” therefore, qualifies the extent of the power of the agent, and where such power is limited only to receiving the rent or to be entitled to receive the rent, such an agent cannot apply for the eviction of the tenant unless he is armed with the further power in the shape of previous written consent of the landlord. This, to my mind, is the proper interpretation to be placed on this section. It does not mean, as argued on behalf of the petitioner, that notwithstanding that the agent holds a general power which specifically includes the power to take steps in eviction proceedings on behalf of the landlord, even then, there should be a separate written consent for that purpose. The learned District Judge, in dealing with the revision petition, has referred to the rules framed under the Act, and pointed out that a recognised agent as defined in the rule would include a person holding the power-of-attorney authorising him to act on behalf of the principal. The learned District Judge, in dealing with the revision petition, has referred to the rules framed under the Act, and pointed out that a recognised agent as defined in the rule would include a person holding the power-of-attorney authorising him to act on behalf of the principal. The power-of-attorney produced in the case established that the agent was rendered competent to appear, continue, prosecute and defend all legal proceedings in civil, criminal, revenue and rent control Courts. The power accordingly, included the right to take eviction proceedings against the defaulting tenants. I agree with the learned District Judge that this complies With the requirements of section 7 (7) of the Act, and accordingly, the competency of the agent of the landlord cannot be questioned. It was somewhat vaguely pointed out that the tenant had been in occupation of the premises for the last 14 years and that the power-of-attorney itself was executed some time in 1945. I do not see how this has any relevancy whatsoever. It is quite clear that, even at the time of the execution of the power-of-attorney, Rent Control Courts had come into existence and the landlord was competent to arm his agent with the necessary powers to take all proceedings under the Act. The petition is without substance and is dismissed with costs. Time to vacate: three months, provided the tenant pays all the arrears upto the end of October, 1960 before the end of the month and continues to pay rents for the succeeding months in time, failing which he will be evicted immediately. V.S. ------------- Petition dismissed.